

America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988

By

George P. Shultz
Secretary of State

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I welcome this opportunity to share with you my thoughts on America's foreign affairs agenda for the new calendar and fiscal years. This is the sixth time we have met for this purpose, and the budget you will soon be considering will provide the resources and lay the groundwork as the next Administration implants its foreign policy initiatives.

PROGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY

America's broad foreign policy interests and objectives are as old as our nation itself: promoting domestic prosperity; protecting the safety of our nation against aggression or subversion; combating those activities which would undermine the rule of law and domestic stability; furthering our democratic values and the cause of human rights.

As we review these foreign policy interests and objectives and measure the progress the President has made toward their achievement, we can see that this Administration has developed an impressive legacy. These achievements would not have been possible had the President not understood from the outset that America's democratic values, economic vitality, and military strength are the keys to success.

In 1987, we made significant progress on the President's foreign policy agenda. When President Reagan signed the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] agreement with General Secretary Gorbachev in December, he fulfilled a major arms control objective of the NATO alliance and realized the goal he set in 1981 when he first presented the zero option. And we continued our high-level dialogue with the Soviets on our key concerns of human rights, regional, and bilateral matters. The President has laid the groundwork for a more stable and constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship based on strength, realism, and dialogue.

Throughout the world, democracy continued to take root and grow on an impressive scale, and the United States has encouraged the vital process of democratic institution-building. In the Philippines, we have supported the Aquino government in its efforts to consolidate its achievement of democracy by promoting economic recovery and helping to defeat the communist insurgency. In Korea, the elections clearly demonstrated the depth of democratic feeling within Korean society and the determination of the new leadership to establish a solid base for democratic processes in government. An interim civilian government has been restored in Fiji that has committed itself to producing a new constitution and returning the nation to parliamentary democracy. In Argentina, in Brazil, and throughout Latin America, we have worked hand in hand with new democratic forces. In Central America, the Guatemala agreement would not have been possible had the United States not combined diplomatic perseverance and military strength in behalf of democracy.

In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, our determined support for those fighting for their freedom has forced our adversaries to understand that expansionism and aggression are costly and that alien and repressive regimes will be challenged.

With the reinforcing strengths of power and diplomacy, we have managed difficult crisis situations in the Middle East and elsewhere. In the strategic area of the Persian Gulf, our reflagging policy is protecting basic U.S. interests while we are leading the way in the UN Security Council to help end the Iran-Iraq conflict. This approach has been successful in preserving the security and stability of friendly states and averting the spread of Soviet influence in the gulf. At the same time, it has ensured the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Allies have followed our lead (France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium).

We are more determined than ever to continue helping countries eradicate narcotic crops and interdict drug shipments through our international narcotics program, and we are educating our own public and others about the dangers of narcotics. At least 20 countries eradicated narcotic crops in 1987. Worldwide interest and broader support from our allies was generated by the very successful UN conference on drug abuse and trafficking last June. The National Drug Policy Board is completing work on a new national strategy, including a strengthened international program in which we are emphasizing chemical destruction of coca plants.

We are severely challenged by the scourge of international drug trafficking--not only by the sheer volume of narcotics production but by the combined assault of drug traffickers and insurgents on the governments whose cooperation is vital to our success in combating this menace. Only last week, the Government of Colombia once again paid the price of narcotics control when traffickers murdered their attorney general. Make no mistake; this is a long-term effort.

We must remain determined and vigilant as well with respect to the modern-day barbarity of terrorism. I can report today, however, that our counterterrorism policy is bringing results. We have developed a better understanding of terrorist methods. We have improved our counterintelligence and cooperation with other concerned governments. We have strengthened security measures to protect our citizens at home and abroad. And we have gone on the offensive to bring terrorists to justice, disrupt their operations, and destroy their networks. The statistics are good. American casualties and attacks against U.S. interests are dramatically down. Our gains are wide ranging--from improved operational structures at home to closer allied coordination overseas.

THE AGENDA FOR 1988

So 1987 was a year of important advances; 1988 promises to be even busier, with an exceptionally full foreign policy agenda. Much of our agenda will involve building on the initiatives for peace, security, prosperity, and democracy that the President has made over the past 7 years.

U.S.-Soviet Relations and Arms Control

One major priority will be pressing ahead on the START [strategic arms reduction talks] negotiations and the other elements of the President's four-part agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations in anticipation of the Moscow summit. If the Soviets are prepared to match the effort we are making, we may be able to take a giant step in arms reduction this year and reach a verifiable agreement to enhance stability by cutting strategic nuclear weapons by 50%. The Soviets know we will stand firm on DSI [Strategic Defense Initiative].

We hope to consolidate the major success of 1987 by gaining Senate advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty. We will move forward with our allies to modernize our conventional and nuclear forces on the basis of programs established well before the INF Treaty. We will strive for additional progress in arms control according to NATO's agreed priorities--above all, eliminating conventional disparities in Europe and achieving a truly verifiable global ban on chemical weapons.

But important as it is, arms control is not and will not be our only priority with the Soviet Union; we will continue vigorously to pursue questions of human rights, both individual cases and broader concerns of principle which are enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other international human rights instruments. And, from now on, leading up to the next summit in Moscow, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I will meet on a regular basis to discuss the full range of our concerns.

Central American Peace Process

One of the most serious matters the 100th Congress will have to decide is how to continue our support for the democratic resistance forces fighting in Nicaragua. If the Central American democracies are to succeed in inducing the Sandinistas to comply with the Guatemala agreement, our support for democracy must remain a certainty, not an unknown variable in the regional equation.

In Central America today, the imperatives of human rights, free elections, and economic development are receiving the kind of attention that U.S. policymakers once reserved to more traditional concerns of diplomacy and national security. U.S. policy is expressing our national conviction that democracy is the only lasting foundation for peace and prosperity--for our neighbors as well as for ourselves. Aid for the Nicaraguan resistance is one reason this broad regional strategy is working.

Ten years ago, Costa Rica was the region's only civilian-led democracy. Today, the military dictators who ruled the other four countries are all gone. Three of the countries are moving in Costa Rica's direction, with increasingly open societies and with civilian presidents chosen in competitive elections. In the last 2 weeks, the rulers of the fifth country, Nicaragua's Sandinistas, have begun to tell everyone that they, too, are going to open up and respect democratic principles.

A democratic Nicaragua would be good news, indeed, for the United States. But a new RAND Corporation study concludes that today Nicaragua is well on the way to becoming a Soviet client, particularly in military matters. Direct and indirect Soviet military use of Nicaraguan territory, the RAND study makes clear, can be expected in the future. A democratic Nicaragua would not provide basing options to the Soviet Union in our immediate neighborhood.

A democratic Nicaragua would also be good news for Nicaraguans. Another new study, this one by my own department, reveals that popular opposition to the Sandinistas is closely linked to the denial of basic freedoms. Last week, I met the exiled directors of the Nicaraguan resistance. Ten years ago, three of them were jailed by Somoza. Eight years ago, one was a member of the post-Somoza governing junta, one was the junta's secretary, one was a reporter for La Prensa, and three were political leaders preparing their parties for elections. Then the Sandinistas signed a party-to-party agreement with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, packed the Nicaraguan Council of State, and postponed elections for 5 years. A democratic Nicaragua would not drive leading citizens into exile or hold nearly 10,000 political prisoners.

The problem is that the hard-headed people who for 8 years have skillfully combined force and propaganda to monopolize Nicaragua's government will not suddenly open up to allow democratic competition if our own domestic politics make it impossible for us to support freedom in Nicaragua. To continue the democratic processes now fitfully but broadly underway in Central America will require something of everyone. For the United States, a key requirement is that we provide enough support for Nicaraguan democrats to begin to offset the military and security assistance the Soviet bloc has invested in the Sandinistas.

There is a great irony here. Our debate comes at a time when the Nicaraguan resistance is demonstrating both indigenous support and operational skill and the Sandinistas are losing

support. That is why the Sandinistas are working so hard to prevent this Congress from deciding in favor of continued aid. If the Sandinistas get what they want--if Congress fails to approve our request for additional funds carefully tailored to progress in the peace process--we can be certain that no meaningful progress in the direction of moderation and democracy in Nicaragua will occur.

There is a clear parallel between our efforts in Central America and our longstanding efforts to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table on meaningful nuclear arms reductions. We knew that we had to make clear to the Soviets by our actions, not just our words, that it was in their own interests to come to the table to negotiate. What was not possible in the 1970s became possible in 1987 because we are strong and our alliance is solid.

Eight years ago, in response to Soviet deployments of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which began in the late 1970s, NATO agreed upon a two-track strategy: deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and U.S.-Soviet negotiations to establish a balance at the lowest possible level. In 1981, President Reagan proposed the "zero option" to eliminate all long-range INF missiles. We and our allies hung tough with our decision. We began deployments at the end of 1983, despite Soviet efforts at intimidation and their year-long walkout from negotiations. Our resolve brought the Soviets back to the table in early 1985. Building on this successful model, if we display the same resolve and strength in our strategic programs and at the negotiating table, there are real prospects for success in START.

During this long effort, there were those who argued that building up our military strength and deployment of our missiles was the cause of the problem, not its solution. Remember the "freeze movement." And remember how wrong it has turned out to be. I am happy that the American people and their elected representatives refused to listen and gave us the means to carry out our strategy. It worked. We have achieved a first step--the INF agreement--and we stand on the brink of even greater gains in the arms control and disarmament field.

In Central American, as in Europe and Afghanistan, we have put power behind our political and diplomatic objectives. We have made it possible for Central Americans willing to work for freedom to have the resources to do so. And as with INF and Afghanistan, our strategy is working. Support for the Nicaraguan resistance is today the element of power needed to induce the Sandinistas to comply with the terms of the Guatemala accord for peace and democracy.

Ninety percent of the funds in the Administration's request is for non-lethal aid, such as food, clothing, medicine, and the means to deliver it. Ten percent is for ammunition. And this part of the request will be suspended until March 31st to determine if the Sandinistas are truly complying with the promises they made in Guatemala in August and in San Jose last month, to take irreversible steps to democracy in Nicaragua. In reaching this judgement, the President has committed himself to consult personally the presidents of the four Central American democracies.

Last November and again last week, the President indicated that once serious negotiations between the Nicaraguan resistance and the Sandinista government are underway, he would consider having me enter regional talks in Central America with representatives of all five countries, including Nicaragua. I am prepared to do that when the conditions are right.

As Secretary of State, I am committed to diplomacy and to pursuing negotiations even in the face of the most daunting odds. As a practical man, I also know that negotiations are likely to be genuine only when both sides believe they have something to gain. The abandonment of the strategy and the people that have put the communists on the defensive--in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America, for the first time in a decade-- will not induce continued progress. Continued progress toward democracy in Nicaragua and peace in Central America depends critically on continued U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance.

Other Regional Conflicts

Just as it has furthered the arms control and Central American peace processes, so the combination of diplomatic perseverance and political firmness has caused our adversaries in other areas to see that expansionism and aggression are costly.

Perseverance and firmness are the path to peace in Afghanistan as well. We will continue our support for Pakistan and will continue to press Moscow to withdraw its troops expeditiously. We must assure that the provisions of the Geneva accords regarding withdrawal are credible and verifiable and that they do not put the resistance at risk. When we are satisfied that the Soviets have fulfilled these conditions, the United States will be prepared to sign on as a guarantor to the Geneva agreements. The United States remains fully and firmly committed to the goals that the Afghan people, their leaders on the battlefield, in Pakistan, and in exile have stated clearly and repeatedly: rapid departure of Soviet forces; genuine self-determination; neutrality; return of the refugees.

The recent turmoil in the West Bank and Gaza Strip demonstrates that the status quo in the Middle East peace process is not an option. The time has come to reinvigorate the process by showing Arabs and Israelis that negotiations can produce a better life for people in the occupied territories, ensure Israel's security and well-being, and point the way to a negotiated settlement of the conflict. We need to focus less on procedure than on substance, in order to show people that a negotiating process can meet their real concerns. We will be energetic in our consultations with leaders in both Israel and the Arab community as we seek to spur a new drive toward peace.

International efforts to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war and stability to the Persian Gulf remain front-burner issues for us. We seek a comprehensive solution to hostilities on land, at sea, and in the air. UN Security Council Resolution 598 provides a reliable framework for ending the war without victor or vanquished. It is a balanced document, demanding action on the part of both combatants. Iraq has agreed to comply unequivocally with its terms; Iran steadfastly refuses to comply. The Security Council must move quickly to impose sanctions against the Tehran government as the noncompliant party to the resolution. We and several members of the Council are in near-daily consultation in an attempt to generate unanimity in the Council for an arms embargo against Iran. While we want Soviet cooperation in an embargo, we will continue to stand by the security commitments we have made to our friends in the region, and we will seek case-by-case assistance in staunching the flow of arms to Iran.

In East Asia, we will continue actively supporting all our allies. This includes assisting President Aquino in leading her nation in building democracy and accelerating economic growth as the Philippines contends with a virulent communist insurgency. We support ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] and the Cambodian noncommunist resistance in their efforts to bring about a political solution to a Cambodian conflict. The solution must encompass a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia and self-determination for the Cambodian people. The Republic of Korea can count on our full support as it seeks international condemnation of North Korea for its barbaric terrorist bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 last November. We will cooperate fully with the Republic of Korea as it strives to host the 1988 Olympics in a secure atmosphere.

And, in southern Africa, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement involving withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Angola and Namibia and Namibian independence in accordance with UN Resolution 435. There have been several meetings with the Angolan leadership in recent months. At the last such meeting in Luanda just last week, the

Angolans recognized that there would have to be a total withdrawal of Cuban forces from their country, rather than the partial withdrawal they had earlier proposed. Cuban representatives joined the talks briefly as members of the Angolan delegation to confirm this. This is an important development that holds out the promise of a settlement of the Angola/Namibia tangle. We now look to the Angolans to table concrete and realistic schedules for a phased withdrawal of Cuban forces, so that we can take this proposal to the South Africans.

Apartheid is at the heart of many of southern Africa's most serious problems. We seek a peaceful and rapid end to apartheid and to foster negotiations among all parties that will lead to the creation of a democratic society with equal rights for all South Africans. We remain firm in our belief that this can best be accomplished through a mix of diplomatic and political pressures on the one hand and a series of positive initiatives on the other, including strong support for U.S. programs designed to assist victims of apartheid and to empower black South Africans to achieve their own peaceful liberation. The United States will take every opportunity to contribute to national reconciliation among South Africans.

In the South Pacific, ANZUS [Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] continues to contribute to the collective strength and vigor of the Western system of defense alliances. In Australia, we have a key ally with whom this alliance remains intact and effective, despite our suspension of security guarantees to New Zealand.

Beyond our alliance relationships with Asian states, ties with China have reached a new level of maturity, and we will continue to work on issues that remain unresolved between our two countries. I will be meeting with Foreign Minister Wu in March to build upon possibilities for greater cooperation on bilateral matters and for U.S.-Chinese cooperation in resolving pressing problems of international consequence.

Global Issues

In 1988, we must strengthen cooperative international efforts to deal with other issues of global impact.

In the economic field, we face major challenges at home and abroad which we must meet by a firm commitment to market-oriented policies. We must sustain our resistance to protectionism. As we have with the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and our far-reaching GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] proposals, we must choose the path which opens markets and increases the material well-being of all trading nations. We look forward to expeditious ratification of the free trade agreement by the Senate.

The United States will actively pursue human rights issues related to these and other conflicts throughout the world at the appropriate forums of the United Nations. We intend to ensure that greater attention is paid in UN bodies to the fights of individuals, particularly the rights to free speech, freedom of association, religious liberty, and other fundamental freedoms.

Allied Cooperation and Improving Bilateral Relationships

While working toward solution of the world's persistent problems, we must maintain and strengthen our alliance relationships, which are essential to our national security and the bedrock of our foreign policy. Allied solidarity over the past 7 years has strengthened our defense posture and advanced the arms control process. On March 2-3, President Reagan will travel to Brussels for a summit with NATO leaders to discuss the post-INF security agenda and continue at the highest level the pattern of close allied consultation that has served us to well.

Allied cooperation in controlling the export of strategic goods to Warsaw Pact countries has improved significantly in recent months. At a highly successful meeting in Versailles last week, we and our COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls] partners reaffirmed full political support for vigorous enforcement of strategic export controls and demonstrated that multinational cooperation is the most effective way to protect against breaches in our mutual security such as occurred in the Toshiba/Kongsberg case.

And the recent visit of Prime Minister Takeshita underlined the fundamental political and economic strength of our relationship with Japan. The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the foundation on which our relationship rests and is a significant factor contributing to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. With the Takeshita government, we will be working to sustain international economic growth by removing impediments to trade, expanding access to markets, and opposing forces of protectionism.

In addition to our alliance relationships with NATO countries and Japan, the United States enjoys similarly strong relations with other Asian and Pacific nations, most notably Thailand, Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. The continued strength of the alliance between the United States and Thailand is symbolized by the recent establishment of the War Reserve Stockpile, which will permit American military supplies to be kept in Thailand for use in a nation-threatening emergency. Our security relationship with the Republic of Korea, based on the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 and sustained by the continued need to deter aggression on the Korean Peninsula, remains strong and effective.

In the Philippines, we have unique political, economic, and security interests at stake. Our two countries have enjoyed a long history of close relations and share a democratic tradition--one which will require ongoing U.S. support. Furthermore, U.S. facilities at Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base protect bilateral and multilateral security interests.

The global economy is in a period of profound change. New technologies and the Information Revolution promise the opportunity for unprecedented economic progress for developed and developing countries alike. American and other open societies are well positioned to make the most of the changes now underway. But first we must address the contemporary global economic imbalances which could threaten our bright future. We will work to promote policies that help enable markets to balance international trading patterns, stabilize financial flows, and avoid sharp setbacks to stable economic growth and freer trade.

We must also continue to support the economic and social development of friends and allies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The tools at our disposal for this purpose include bilateral financial and technical assistance, training, and active support for the important work of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the regional development banks, the International Monetary Fund, the UN Development Program, UNICEF [UN Children's Fund], and the specialized UN agencies.

Equitable and sustained growth in the developing countries is crucial to achievement of our security, economic, and humanitarian objectives. It requires internal structural changes in the economies of developing countries as well as outside support that encourages flows of trade, capital, and technology. If it occurs, the prospects are good for a continuation of the healthy trend we have witnessed in recent years toward strengthening of democratic and free-market-oriented institutions around the world.

We will continue our unequivocal, strong support for the new democracies in Latin America, South Korea, the Philippines, and elsewhere as they seek greater internal stability. We must recognize that democratic institution-building is a slow and often fragile process. Yet, the trend

toward democracy is growing around the world on an impressive scale, reaffirming American values and the effectiveness of our policies.

We will press ahead in our determined efforts against international drug trafficking and terrorism, and I can assure you that we will continue to give these issues a high foreign policy priority.

These issues of global impact do not lend themselves to simple, unilateral solutions. Rather, they require sustained multilateral cooperation. The United Nations and its specialized agencies are contributing to the solution of many of the world's shared problems--drug abuse, air piracy, AIDS [acquired immune deficiency syndrome] research, to name a few. We must sustain our active support for these institutions, while continuing to seek significant reform of the UN system for allocating funds.

In sum, this will be an exceptionally busy year: for making as much progress as we can on the full range of issues that comprise our foreign policy; for consolidating achievements where we can; for working away at enduring problems as we must; and for taking new initiatives where they seem useful and promising. I will now turn to the practical question of the means we will need to accomplish our goals.

THE 1988 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET

Last year at this time when we met, I spoke at length about the resource issues posed by the foreign affairs budget. Indeed, budgetary issues still loom so large that when I refer to "the 1987 summit" in conversations with my colleagues, I mean the budget summit--not the one with Gorbachev.

Over the past months, the State Department has engaged intensively with Congress in the rough-and-tumble business of executive-legislative cooperation in order to reduce the Federal deficit in a way that does not harm our foreign policy interests. We have made headway. The agreement reached at the budget summit puts a little more flesh on the bones of our foreign affairs budget for FY 1988 than would otherwise have been the case. But our budget is still a painfully thin and rigid creature.

In the next few weeks, we will be submitting to the Congress our foreign affairs request for FY 1989. You will not be surprised by our request. Although I cannot now discuss the detailed numbers with you, since the budget will not be formally released by the White House for another 2 weeks, suffice it to say that it will be very spare, in keeping with the agreement at the budget summit. [Editor's note. The FY 1989 budget was submitted to Congress on February 18, 1988. It proposes a total of \$18.1 billion in new budget authority for the entire International Affairs budget, with \$8,299.189 million for the five funded security assistance programs, as follows (\$ in millions): FMSCR, \$4,460.0; MAP \$467.0; IMET, \$52.5; ESF, \$3,281.0; and PKO, \$31.689. Overall, the FY 1989 security assistance request represents a three percent increase over FY 1988 appropriations.]

When you have had a chance to study our budget presentation and to examine Administration witnesses about our proposals, I know you will agree we have taken a very hard look at the programs we support and the resources we need to manage them. In fact, after taking into account anticipated inflation, the buying power of the budget we will propose will be somewhat less than this year's, which in itself represented a substantial reduction from the levels of recent years. We cannot do with any less. We would have liked more.

I want to be clear that the moderate request we will be proposing in order to meet the budget summit requirements in no way reflects any diminution in the scope of our foreign affairs interests;

in the depth of our commitments to friends, allies, and the international system; or in the amount of resources we consider necessary in order to pursue those interests and meet those commitments. Rather, our very tight requests reflects an uneasy compromise between our minimum foreign policy needs and our recognition that we must play our part to reduce the deficit. But we cannot defend our interests and meet our most basic obligations without adequate resources and the flexibility to apply them to meet the highest priority needs.

On our part, in turn, we need a willingness in Congress to give the executive branch the latitude we need to manage our very limited resources effectively. I do not question Congress' authority to control the purse strings. Yet, as you know, the resources appropriated in the [FY 1988] Continuing Resolution are almost completely earmarked by Congress for particular countries or programs--97% in the case of the Economic Support Fund and 99% for the Foreign Military Sales program. That leaves us no flexibility to provide adequate resources to countries which afford us vital bases and other defense facilities, such as Kenya, Somalia, Portugal, and Turkey. And it leaves virtually no security assistance funding for such important countries as Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Indonesia.

If we are to reduce the Federal budget deficit--which we must--and advance our foreign policy interests--which are vital--we need greater flexibility within the budget framework to allocate the funds you have appropriated. The excessive earmarking which characterizes this Continuing Resolution and the multitude of amendments accompanying it regarding foreign policy and State Department operations are not minor hindrances. If continued, they threaten the executive branch's ability to conduct the nation's foreign policy.

We know that the executive branch must do its part to obtain the needed flexibility. We must increase Congressional confidence that we will manage our financial resources efficiently and effectively to achieve commonly agreed goals. And the Department of State would welcome consultations with Congress to that end.

BIPARTISANSHIP

Throughout my tenure as Secretary of State, I have been a strong and vocal advocate of three things in foreign policy, and I trust that the record will show that I have practiced what I preach. As I see them, the three essentials of any successful foreign policy initiative are:

- Clarity of purpose;
- Staying power; and
- Bipartisan support.

That is why I have been and remain a strong and vocal advocate of meaningful consultation between the Hill and the Administration. Late last year, some Members of Congress pointed out the need for greater bipartisanship in foreign policy. Their's is an approach which I have endorsed. And I remain willing to do all I can this year to lay the foundation for truly bipartisan cooperation.