

# SECURITY ASSISTANCE PERSPECTIVES

## Commission Report on Security Assistance Requirements


Editor's note. On January 11, 1988, The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy issued its report, "Discriminate Deterrence." The Commission was mandated by the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and was co-chaired by Fred C. Ikle, then Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and Albert Wohlstetter, a leading theorist of military strategy. The commission report provides a series of recommendations for adjustments to U.S. military strategy which will be required in the "changing security environment in the decades ahead." Within the text (pp. 17-20) of this comprehensive strategic study are the following security assistance related observations and illustrative charts which are reprinted herein for our readers.

### Security Assistance Requires New Legislation and More Resources.

U.S. economic and security assistance--the foreign aid programs to assist U.S. friends and allies in reducing the underlying causes of instability--have proven inadequate and inflexible. Congress has repeatedly underfunded Administration requests, and has earmarked as much as 86 percent of military assistance for five countries. For example, out of the 1987 budget of five billion dollars for worldwide security assistance, Congress reserved 62 percent for Egypt and Israel, 17 percent for Greece and Turkey, and 6 percent for Pakistan. With an obvious need to provide funds for El Salvador, Honduras, and the Philippines, the Administration had less than 10 percent for the rest of the world. And even here, Congress circumscribed the President's flexibility to deal with conflicts that threaten U.S. interests.

CHART 1

### Where the Military Aid Goes Military Assistance Programs and Foreign Military Sales Credits




*More than half of security assistance funding has been earmarked by Congress for Israel and Egypt, and much of the remainder for Europe.*

Ordinarily the most effective kind of military assistance we can offer is training. Our training missions are critically dependent on the quality of people we station abroad. We know from experience that a few well chosen, well educated military professionals can transform the security establishment of a friendly country. But current laws reflect a desire by Congress to limit the duties of these professionals to the task of auditing U.S. aid, and to index their numbers to the dollar volume of aid. These provisions represent a self-inflicted strategic wound. They discourage competent men and women from seeking such assignments and severely handicap our Ambassadors and regional Commanders-in Chief.

CHART 2

**Security Assistance Funds Not Earmarked by Congress**



*Non-earmarked funds are the true measure of flexibility to use security assistance to promote U.S. interests in the Third World. They have been dropping and fluctuate sharply from year to year, undercutting efficient use of these funds by recipients.*


The number of U.S. military officers in friendly Third World countries has declined severely. Today the Soviet Union has far more military advisors in the Third World than we do. Even in Latin America, the number of Soviet military advisers exceeds ours by far. We also fall short in another important form of security assistance: training of foreign military in U.S. service schools. The Soviet Union has a much larger program than the United States, and as a result we are losing valuable links to the new generation of military officers in many Third World countries.

Moreover, Congress prohibits the training of officers from countries that have not brought their nuclear technology programs under international control. The law thus works to isolate military officers in those countries, leaving them less accessible to our arguments and perhaps more inclined to pursue a nuclear weapons program. In short, the legislation achieves the opposite of what Congress intended. [Editor's note. With the passage of a legislative provision in the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 100-202) authorizing IMET programs for Argentina and Brazil, this problem has now been considerably ameliorated.]

Legislation from the post-Vietnam era unwisely continues to bar U.S. training for police forces. The legislation forced U.S. combat forces to remain in Grenada long after their role was completed. We had to plead with Canadian, British, and other governments to help in training a small police force for Grenada.

**CHART 3**  
**The Growing Soviet Role**  
**in the Third World**

*The U.S.S.R now has over thirty times as many military advisors in the Third World as the United States. We now train about one-third as many Third World people per year as in 1970. The Soviets passed us in 1980 and now train almost twice as many people as we do.*



<sup>1</sup> Soviet/East European figures do not include 118,000 troops currently in Afghanistan, the 2,800 members of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba, the 2,100 signals intelligence personnel in Cuba, and Soviet personnel at Cam Ranh Bay, Aden, and Dehalak doing purely Soviet tasks. U.S. figures do not include troops that were stationed in Vietnam.

Most U.S. aid money buys materiel. While some U.S. high technology equipment is entirely appropriate for low-intensity conflicts, a great deal of our standard materiel is altogether too complex and expensive for our Third World friends and allies. To fill their requirements, the United States may have to revive obsolete systems, to support or enhance foreign-manufactured systems, or to develop equipment designed expressly for such purposes.

Security assistance for the Third World is not yet well understood by the American public, and therefore has no constituency in Congress. Yet, improvement requires Congressional action. Our security assistance laws should underwrite sensible personnel policies, permit us to train and equip friends and allies to provide for their own security, and also to provide incentives for others to come to their aid.