

SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION AND POLICY

Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1989

[The following has been extracted from the *Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for FY 1989* (pages 1-7, 9-18, 20-21, 23, 27, 31, 37-38, and 40-43). The CPD is jointly prepared annually by the Department of State and the Department of Defense for presentation to the Congress. It provides a detailed description and budget justification for the various security assistance programs and activities which require Congressional authorizations and funding appropriations.]

Security Assistance Budget Request for FY 1989 An Overview

Since the end of the Second World War, successive Administrations, backed by bipartisan support in Congress, have recognized that security assistance is an indispensable element in the efforts of the United States to help build a more secure and peaceful world.

Over the past three years, however, there have been progressive and deep reductions in aggregate security assistance program levels. These reductions have reflected budget stringencies rather than any slackening of U.S. commitment to the security of friends and allies and the promotion of stability and world order--or any decrease in the challenges to our national interests. The aggregate amounts appropriated in FY 88 and those amounts submitted in the FY 1989 Administration request are derived from the agreements reached between the Administration and the Congress in the November 1987 "Budget Summit" on the measures necessary to reach deficit reduction targets.

The difficult fact remains, nonetheless, that these successive cutbacks in total security assistance funding available, combined with the increasingly pervasive earmarking that insulates some individual programs and forces disproportionate cuts or elimination of others, now jeopardize our ability to maintain the degree of presence and influence that we need in various countries and areas. These trends are leading us to a *de facto* retreat from our global responsibilities, an erosion of confidence on the part of many friends and allies who have relied on our commitments and support, and an open invitation to our adversaries to make trouble.

The Administration's FY 89 security assistance budget proposals are the product of a detailed and difficult process of rigorous analysis and hard choices. They are designed to distribute available resources in a manner that best meets the variety of challenges and requirements that we face worldwide. We have multiple, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing goals to pursue, and these are not restricted to one or two geographic areas or to a handful of countries.

We must remain actively engaged around the globe:

- to maintain the cohesion and strength of our alliances and the cooperative arrangements essential to the power projection capabilities of U.S. forces;

- to enhance the ability of our security partners
 - to deter and defend against aggression that would threaten the strategic balance,
 - to deal effectively with low intensity conflict,
 - to implement reforms and build institutions essential to internal stability;
- to promote regional stability, including
 - the spread and consolidation of democracy and social justice in Central America,
 - and the vital process towards peace in the Middle East.

The individual programs we propose toward these ends are tailored to the particular circumstances and requirements of the countries and regions involved.

In some instances the program mix is varied and the overall resource commitment relatively large. In others, we propose to maintain presence and forge lasting ties with very modest, carefully targeted, investments of resources. In still others, we pursue our goals through "security assistance" in its broadest formulation--fostering mutually beneficial relations by being a reliable supplier of legitimate defense requirements that are procured entirely with a country's own resources.

The Congressional Presentation Document offers the Administration's rationale and justification for the overall program and, within that program, the particular efforts projected for each country and area.

The Congress is urged to support these proposals and, within the agreed parameters of the "Budget Summit," to provide both the resources needed and the flexibility needed for the effective pursuit of U.S. foreign policy and security goals worldwide.

**FY 1989 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
BUDGET AUTHORITY
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)**

| | ECONOMIC SUPPORT | FMS FORGIVEN | MAP (GRANTS) | IMET (GRANTS) | PKO | TOTAL |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|---------|
| <u>AFRICA:</u> | | | | | | |
| AFRICA CIVIC ACTION | 0 | 0 | 5,000 | 0 | 0 | 5,000 |
| BENIN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 75 |
| BOTSWANA | 0 | 0 | 4,000 | 350 | 0 | 4,350 |
| BURKINA FASO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| BURUNDI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 140 | 0 | 140 |
| CAMEROON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 | 0 | 250 |
| CAPE VERDE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC | 0 | 0 | 500 | 180 | 0 | 680 |
| CHAD | 10,000 | 0 | 10,000 | 250 | 0 | 20,250 |
| COMOROS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 40 |
| CONGO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 40 |
| DJIBOUTI | 3,200 | 0 | 2,000 | 135 | 0 | 5,335 |
| EQUATORIAL GUINEA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 75 |
| GABON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 200 | 0 | 200 |
| GAMBIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| GHANA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 225 | 0 | 225 |
| GUINEA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 150 |
| GUINEA-BISSAU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| IVORY COAST | 0 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 150 |
| KENYA | 10,000 | 0 | 13,000 | 1,200 | 0 | 24,200 |
| LESOTHO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| LIBERIA | 7,000 | 0 | 1,000 | 800 | 0 | 8,800 |
| MADAGASCAR | 0 | 0 | 1,000 | 75 | 0 | 1,075 |
| MALAWI | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 250 | 0 | 1,450 |
| MALI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 150 |
| MAURITANIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| MAURITIUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| NIGER | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 250 | 0 | 2,250 |
| NIGERIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| RWANDA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 75 |
| SAO TOME & PRINCIPE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| SENEGAL | 10,000 | 0 | 2,000 | 475 | 0 | 12,475 |
| SEYCHELLES | 3,000 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 3,040 |
| SIERRA LEONE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 0 | 70 |
| SOMALIA | 23,000 | 0 | 17,000 | 1,100 | 0 | 41,100 |
| SOUTH AFRICA REPUBLIC | 3,300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,300 |
| SUDAN | 12,000 | 0 | 5,000 | 1,000 | 0 | 18,000 |
| SWAZILAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| TANZANIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 35 |
| TOGO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 75 |
| UGANDA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 150 |
| ZAIRE | 0 | 0 | 10,000 | 1,200 | 0 | 11,200 |
| ZIMBABWE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 200 | 0 | 200 |
| REGIONAL TOTAL | 81,500 | 0 | 73,700 | 10,105 | 0 | 165,305 |
| <u>AMERICAN REPUBLICS:</u> | | | | | | |
| ARGENTINA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 0 | 125 |
| BAHAMAS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 60 |
| BELIZE | 2,000 | 0 | 500 | 100 | 0 | 2,600 |
| BOLIVIA | 25,000 | 0 | 5,000 | 400 | 0 | 30,400 |
| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 0 | 125 |
| CENTRAL AMERICA REGIONAL | 10,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10,000 |
| CHILE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| COLOMBIA | 0 | 0 | 5,000 | 950 | 0 | 5,950 |
| COSTA RICA | 70,000 | 0 | 1,500 | 230 | 0 | 71,730 |
| DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | 25,000 | 0 | 2,000 | 700 | 0 | 27,700 |
| EASTERN CARIBBEAN | 15,000 | 0 | 5,000 | 400 | 0 | 20,400 |
| ECUADOR | 9,000 | 0 | 3,000 | 650 | 0 | 12,650 |
| EL SALVADOR | 185,000 | 0 | 95,000 | 1,500 | 0 | 281,500 |
| GUATEMALA | 80,000 | 0 | 5,000 | 400 | 0 | 85,400 |
| GUYANA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| HAITI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 550 | 0 | 550 |
| HONDURAS | 87,000 | 0 | 60,000 | 1,200 | 0 | 148,200 |
| JAMAICA | 25,000 | 0 | 3,500 | 300 | 0 | 28,800 |
| LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN REGL | 12,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12,500 |

FY 1989 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (CONTINUED)
BUDGET AUTHORITY
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

| | ECONOMIC SUPPORT | FMS FORGIVEN | MAP (GRANTS) | IMET (GRANTS) | PKO | TOTAL |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|-----------|
| <u>AMERICAN REPUBLICS (CONT):</u> | | | | | | |
| MEXICO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 225 | 0 | 225 |
| PACAMS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,100 | 0 | 2,100 |
| PANAMA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 445 | 0 | 445 |
| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 0 | 125 |
| PERU | 2,000 | 0 | 0 | 560 | 0 | 2,560 |
| SURINAME | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| TRINIDAD & TOBAGO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 75 |
| URUGUAY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 0 | 125 |
| VENEZUELA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 0 | 125 |
| REGIONAL TOTAL | 547,500 | 0 | 185,500 | 11,620 | 0 | 744,620 |
| <u>EAST ASIA & PACIFIC:</u> | | | | | | |
| ASIA/NEAR EAST REGIONAL | 12,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12,500 |
| BRUNEI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| BURMA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 260 | 0 | 260 |
| CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE | 5,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5,000 |
| FIJI | 0 | 0 | 300 | 50 | 0 | 350 |
| INDONESIA | 0 | 0 | 10,000 | 1,900 | 0 | 11,900 |
| KOREA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,800 | 0 | 1,800 |
| MALAYSIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,100 | 0 | 1,100 |
| PAPUA NEW GUINEA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| PHILIPPINES | 124,000 | 0 | 110,000 | 2,600 | 0 | 236,600 |
| SINGAPORE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| SOLOMON ISLANDS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 30 |
| SOUTH PACIFIC REGIONAL | 11,200 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11,200 |
| THAILAND | 5,000 | 0 | 45,000 | 2,200 | 0 | 52,200 |
| TONGA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| REGIONAL TOTAL | 157,700 | 0 | 165,300 | 10,140 | 0 | 333,140 |
| <u>EUROPE & CANADA:</u> | | | | | | |
| AUSTRIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 60 |
| CYPRUS | 3,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,000 |
| FINLAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 60 |
| GREECE | 0 | 350,000 | 0 | 1,130 | 0 | 351,130 |
| ICELAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 40 |
| IRELAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 30 |
| MALTA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| PORTUGAL | 60,500 | 100,000 | 0 | 2,550 | 0 | 163,050 |
| SPAIN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,900 | 0 | 2,900 |
| TURKEY | 70,000 | 550,000 | 0 | 3,500 | 0 | 623,500 |
| YUGOSLAVIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| REGIONAL TOTAL | 133,500 | 1,000,000 | 0 | 10,420 | 0 | 1,143,920 |
| <u>NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA:</u> | | | | | | |
| AFGHAN HUMANITARIAN | 22,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22,500 |
| ALGERIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| BANGLADESH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 | 0 | 300 |
| EGYPT | 815,000 | 1,300,000 | 0 | 1,650 | 0 | 2,116,650 |
| INDIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 500 | 0 | 500 |
| ISRAEL | 1,200,000 | 1,800,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,000,000 |
| JORDAN | 18,000 | 48,000 | 0 | 1,800 | 0 | 67,800 |
| LEBANON | 300 | 0 | 0 | 475 | 0 | 775 |
| MALDIVES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 30 |
| MOROCCO | 15,000 | 40,000 | 0 | 1,450 | 0 | 56,450 |
| NEPAL | 0 | 0 | 500 | 100 | 0 | 600 |
| OMAN | 15,000 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 15,150 |
| PAKISTAN | 250,000 | 240,000 | 0 | 915 | 0 | 490,915 |
| SRI LANKA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 160 | 0 | 160 |
| TUNISIA | 12,500 | 30,000 | 0 | 1,450 | 0 | 43,950 |
| YEMEN | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | 1,000 | 0 | 3,000 |
| REGIONAL TOTAL | 2,348,300 | 3,460,000 | 500 | 10,080 | 0 | 5,818,880 |

FY 1989 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (CONTINUED)
BUDGET AUTHORITY
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

| TOTAL | ECONOMIC SUPPORT | FMS FORGIVEN | MAP (GRANTS) | IMET (GRANTS) | PKO | TOTAL |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----|-------|
| 225 | | | | | | |
| 2,100 | | | | | | |
| 445 | | | | | | |
| 125 | | | | | | |
| 2,560 | | | | | | |
| 50 | | | | | | |
| 75 | | | | | | |
| 125 | | | | | | |
| 125 | | | | | | |
| 744,620 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 12,500 | | | | | | |
| 50 | | | | | | |
| 260 | | | | | | |
| 5,000 | | | | | | |
| 350 | | | | | | |
| 11,900 | | | | | | |
| 1,800 | | | | | | |
| 1,100 | | | | | | |
| 50 | | | | | | |
| 236,600 | | | | | | |
| 50 | | | | | | |
| 30 | | | | | | |
| 11,200 | | | | | | |
| 52,200 | | | | | | |
| 50 | | | | | | |
| 333,140 | | | | | | |
| 60 | | | | | | |
| 3,000 | | | | | | |
| 60 | | | | | | |
| 351,130 | | | | | | |
| 40 | | | | | | |
| 30 | | | | | | |
| 50 | | | | | | |
| 163,050 | | | | | | |
| 2,900 | | | | | | |
| 623,500 | | | | | | |
| 100 | | | | | | |
| ,143,920 | | | | | | |
| 22,500 | | | | | | |
| 100 | | | | | | |
| 300 | | | | | | |
| ,116,650 | | | | | | |
| 500 | | | | | | |
| ,000,000 | | | | | | |
| 67,800 | | | | | | |
| 775 | | | | | | |
| 30 | | | | | | |
| 56,450 | | | | | | |
| 600 | | | | | | |
| 15,150 | | | | | | |
| 490,915 | | | | | | |
| 160 | | | | | | |
| 43,950 | | | | | | |
| 3,000 | | | | | | |
| ,818,880 | | | | | | |

NON-REGIONAL:

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| DEOB/REOB AUTHORITY | 12,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12,500 |
| GENERAL COSTS | 0 | 0 | 42,000 | 135 | 0 | 42,135 |
| MULTINATL. FORCE & OBSERV. (MFO) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24,377 | 24,377 |
| UN FORCES IN CYPRUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7,312 | 7,312 |
| NON-REGIONAL TOTAL | 12,500 | 0 | 42,000 | 135 | 31,689 | 86,324 |
| TOTAL BUDGET AUTHORITY | 3,281,000 | 4,460,000 | 467,000 | 52,500 | 31,689 | 8,292,189 |

The Role of Security Assistance in National Strategy

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

Security assistance is an essential instrument in the integration and implementation of the two pillars of our post-World War II approach to national security and the protection of U.S. vital interests: a foreign policy based on global engagement and collective security and a military strategy of deterrence and forward defense.

The United States draws upon its national resources to provide security assistance to foreign friends and allies for essentially the same reasons that it expends such resources to ensure the strength and readiness of its own armed forces--to protect and advance fundamental and enduring national interests:

- the preservation of U.S. territorial integrity, independence, and free institutions;
- U.S. economic prosperity and progress;
- a world order conducive to the expansion of human freedoms, the coexistence of states without use of force and intimidation, and to all nations' and peoples' pursuit of a better life.

In today's international environment these vital interests face an array of serious challenges: the strategic risks posed by the fundamental differences between the free world and the Soviet Union and its client states; endemic regional tensions; the aggressive designs of radical states bent on dominating, intimidating, or subverting their neighbors; externally supported insurgencies; terrorism and terrorist-narcotics trafficker alliances; and deep-rooted political, economic, and social inequities that breed internal stability.

For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union will continue to pose the primary threat to our interests and our national security. Since World War II, the United States has countered this threat by cooperating with other concerned nations, beginning with U.S. assistance to Greece and Turkey in the immediate postwar period. This broad-scope economic and military assistance to Western Europe from the late 1940's through the early 1960's undergirded the consolidation of a North Atlantic Alliance that has kept the peace in Europe and averted global conflict for over forty years.

In more recent decades, our funded security programs have continued to play a vital role in helping the countries on NATO's southern flank to strengthen their basic economic structures and to increase their capability to meet coalition defense commitments within the Alliance. These programs have been linked to facilities made available to the U.S. by these allies as reciprocal manifestations of an overall security partnership. The strengthening of NATO Europe is a premier security assistance success story.

Since the 1960's, however, the Soviet Union has used military supply relationships to secure footholds in the developing world for the expansion of its political influence and the global projection of its military power. It has provided large quantities of increasingly sophisticated arms to a host of radical countries--Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, Nicaragua, Ethiopia. In these, and in other countries, this investment in military assistance has enabled the Soviet Union to exacerbate regional tensions and rivalries, and to obtain an enhanced political role and forward operating bases in areas where it would not otherwise enjoy such advantages. The Soviet Union has used some of the major recipients of such largess, such as Cuba, North Korea and Nicaragua, as proxies for aggression and subversion against other developing nations.

While strong U.S. capabilities are essential, the United States cannot rely solely on its own forces to deter and defend against direct Soviet aggression or to contain the spread of Soviet influence in the developing world. Nor are U.S. capabilities sufficient to deal with regional threats to U.S. and allied interests. U.S. security assistance programs have been--and will continue to be--essential to enable friendly countries to resist such externally supported violence and destabilization efforts. Apart from enhancing military capabilities, they promote the political and economic reforms necessary for the safeguarding of internationally recognized human rights, the development of democratic institutions and progress towards economic and social justice.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

In the current international environment, much of our economic and military assistance effort must be directed toward meeting the challenges to U.S. interests posed by what has been termed "low intensity conflict."

Political-military confrontations below the level of conventional war frequently involve protracted rivalries of principle and ideology, as well as fundamental struggles for power by individuals and groups. The tactics range from subversion, through terrorism and target-of-opportunity guerrilla harassment, to the direct employment of small scale, but well planned and organized, military force.

These confrontations, generally occurring in the developing world, can have both regional and global implications for U.S. security interests. They can threaten our base and access rights and power projection capability; they can threaten free world access to energy supplies and other strategic materials; they can place severe strains on nascent democracies that are already struggling to overcome economic and social inequities; and they can hold the seeds of wider conflict that could lead to direct U.S. involvement.

Foreign assistance, including programs of security assistance, is the United States' principal instrument for assisting countries facing actual or potential low intensity conflicts. This help must take the form of a balanced package of economic and military resources that will encourage and support efforts by local authorities to alleviate the causes of conflict as well as to deter or contain outbreaks of violence. Neither economic nor military assistance can, by itself, rectify a low intensity conflict situation. Economic assistance does not provide the means to defeat or deter

internal or external security threats. Military assistance helps provide a prerequisite security shield, but this alone will not foster the economic development, political institution-building, and social justice necessary to prevent instability.

Security assistance has played a critical role in enabling friendly states in Central America, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South East Asia to deter or manage low intensity conflict. The increases in resources approved by Congress in the first half of this decade allowed us to establish programs to address low intensity conflict threats in an increasing number of countries important to U.S. interests.

Two of the most dramatic successes have been in El Salvador and Chad. In El Salvador, U.S. aid played a critical role in denying victory to leftist guerrillas, in curbing death squad activity and other human rights violations by the extremists on the right, and in fostering the evolution of democratic institutions. In Chad, a comparatively small amount of U.S. aid complemented French assistance in several critical areas to contribute to the defeat of invading Libyan forces.

We can, however, preserve and build upon earlier successes only through a sustained commitment of adequate resources. The aggregate cuts and extensive earmarks in security assistance in recent years have forced a reduction of our efforts in low intensity conflict countries, particularly with respect to military assistance. Military aid has declined for these countries by almost 40 percent from 1984 to 1987.

Deficit reduction imperatives make it unlikely in any foreseeable future that there will be sufficient funding to pursue an optimum and broadly based low intensity conflict strategy in the many threatened countries where our interest are sufficiently engaged. However, the Administration's FY 89 security assistance proposals have, within the aggregate limitations of the "Budget Summit," given significant attention to the needs of these countries. They presuppose the flexibility to make the most constructive use of the resources that are available.

Successful efforts to avert and contain low intensity conflict help provide for the United States:

- a free and growing international market for U.S. goods and services;
- a stable international financial system;
- secure access to strategic raw materials and irreplaceable foreign military facilities;
- and the broad political, economic, and security cooperation of friends and allies around the world.

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The vital interests of the United States are significantly affected by the interplay of economic, political, and military developments in all the geographic regions of the world. While there are clearly hierarchies in the seriousness of threats and urgencies of our concerns, protection of these interests requires that we maintain a global outreach and pursue significant foreign policy and security objectives on a global basis.

- *In our own hemisphere*, we are historically and deeply committed to deterring aggression, defending democracy, and promoting political, economic, and social progress.
 - In Central America, we continue to confront direct Soviet political and military involvement on the mainland of the Americas, as well as Soviet and Cuban support

for the consolidation of a totalitarian system in Nicaragua and the destabilization of neighboring democracies. U.S. security assistance programs have spurred significant political, economic, and social progress in Central America. The gains are, nonetheless, fragile and U.S. steadfastness of support remains vital to continued progress towards the security and development of the region.

- In the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the smaller island states of the Eastern Caribbean, our relatively modest economic and military programs are essential to continued progress toward economic reform and development, effective cooperation in narcotics interdiction, and overall security and stability in the Caribbean basin.
- In South America, our military and/or economic assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru makes a vital contribution to stability and to continued progress in cooperative efforts to stem the flow of drugs to the United States.
- *The Mediterranean littoral* is the stage for a series of interlocking strategic concerns of critical importance to United States interests and to world peace. All the major goals of U.S. national security policy are at play in the region.
 - Support for the political independence and territorial integrity of our allies on NATO's "southern flank" remains an integral part of our overall commitment to the common defense within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. A cooperative security relationship with these countries is also essential to U.S. access to essential military facilities and to the economic lifelines that pass through or near the Mediterranean Sea.
 - The promotion of peace in the Middle East is also a vital concern. Preserving the independence and security of Israel, encouraging a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and assuring free passage through the Suez Canal have long been central goals of U.S. foreign policy. These are goals to which we have dedicated great diplomatic effort and economic and military resources. They remain priority goals of our security assistance efforts, reflected in the major programs proposed for Israel and Egypt.
 - Our security assistance relationships with Jordan, an important friend in the region, is also pivotal in the search for progress towards viable arrangements for peace.
 - In North Africa, our security assistance programs cement long-standing cooperative relationships with Morocco and Tunisia, both voices for moderation in the Arab world. Morocco also accords U.S. forces valuable access facilities.
- *In Southwest Asia* our policy concerns center on the need to ensure continued free world access to the vast oil reserves of the region, to promote an end to the dangerous conflict between Iran and Iraq, and to encourage an end to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
 - Through funded programs of economic and military assistance as well as through arms sales on a "cash" basis, we seek to assist the countries of the region--from Saudi Arabia and Oman to Pakistan--to develop the capabilities for their own defense.
 - In the Persian Gulf area, our funded and non-funded security assistance strengthens friendly states in the efforts to deal with threats from Iran and encourages continued

cooperation with, and facilities for, U.S. forces helping to keep open the vital maritime choke point of the Western World's energy lifeline.

- Our substantial economic and military programs for Pakistan enhance that country's confidence and ability to resist the pressure and intimidation that have resulted from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
- ESF-funded humanitarian assistance improves the chances of survival of the Afghan people in the resistance-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and supports the U.S. policy goals of Soviet withdrawal and the restoration of Afghanistan's independence.
- In the vast areas of the African continent below the Mediterranean littoral, the degrees and types of foreign policy challenges and opportunities which our program proposals address vary greatly.
 - U.S. economic and military assistance to Chad will continue to complement French aid and play a key role in Chad's ability to consolidate its defeat of Libyan invaders and deter renewed attacks. This strong posture is essential, not only to preserving Chadian sovereignty but to discouraging Libyan aggression against other states of the area.
 - Our modest programs in sub-Saharan Africa, such as in small, democratic Botswana, that faces a continuing threat of intimidation and incursions from South Africa, foster constructive bilateral relationships and cooperation and contribute to regional stability.
 - Our relative larger scale economic and military assistance efforts in Kenya and Somalia, enhance the stability and security of these friendly countries, whose cooperation and facilities make an important contribution to the U.S. ability to operate effectively in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and play a key role in our basic strategy in the area.
 - Throughout sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn, our programs support the growing trend towards free market economies and offer an alternative to Soviet military aid, thus reducing opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence and presence in the area.
- In east Asia and the Pacific, both funded and non-funded security assistance programs help ensure essential strategic bases and access, support democracy, strengthen bilateral relationships, maintain regional stability, and reduce incentives for military cooperation with the Soviet Union.
 - In the Philippines, our substantial levels of economic and military assistance strengthen the democratic government of President Aquino, support its efforts toward economic reforms and ending a decades-old Communist insurgency. Our programs also support a continuation of historically close bilateral ties and vital U.S. facilities in the Philippines.
 - Our programs with Thailand strengthen that country's economy and defense capabilities in the face of continuing threats from the Vietnam-dominated regime in Cambodia.

- Our military supply relationships with Australia, Japan, and Korea help those countries to modernize their forces and contribute to regional stability. Sales of major equipment to Japan are consistent with, and supportive of, our desire to see Japan assume a greater share of responsibility for defense in the Pacific region.
- A measured pace of FMS cash and commercial sales programs with the People's Republic of China complements other U.S. initiatives in the diplomatic and economic spheres, encourages China to broaden contact with the West, and facilitates its modernization.

CONCLUSION

In this era of dwindling resources, the Administration is seeking every improvement in procedures and operations that can make programs more cost-effective. The budget request submitted to Congress reflects rigorous analysis and considered judgements as to foreign policy and security priorities. We have redoubled our efforts to plan carefully and constructively with our assistance partners. And, we are seeking from Congress authorities that will increase the policy payoff from the levels of funding available.

The move of recent years toward greater concessionality in our assistance is a major example of the initiatives we are searching for to stretch finite levels of resources to maximum advantage. In this budget request, the Administration asks the Congress to approval all Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR) as "forgiven," thereby increasing the "quality" of the assistance and avoiding an increase in the foreign debt burden our friends and allies already bear.

In terms of immediate buying power, lower program levels will, of course, mean reductions in needed goods and services that assistance recipients can acquire. In the broader economic sense, however, a move to "forgiven" credits will provide governments greater leeway to borrow in other channels for income-generating investments.

Similarly, the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF), which allows us to finance the procurement of defense items and services in anticipation of authorized Foreign Military Sales, will continue to make a significant contribution towards assuring maximum cost-effectiveness of the major military programs. Now fully operational and sustaining itself from sales receipts, the Fund promotes cooperative planning and allows economies of scale that lower unit costs for programs financed under FMS credits and the Military Assistance Program. At the same time, it enhances our ability to meet urgent foreign needs with minimal adverse impact on U.S. force readiness.

Security Assistance is not a philanthropic effort, operating to the detriment of domestic programs and priorities. It not only produces direct domestic benefits in terms of employment, export sales, investment opportunities, and access to raw materials for American industry, but it is also a fundamental investment in the overall national security and well being of the United States.

The examples highlighted briefly in this overview underscore the degree to which active U.S. cooperation with, and support for, friends and allies throughout the world is essential if we are to help shape a stable and peaceful global environment in which the United States can remain secure and prosperous.

The Administration seeks the collaboration and support of the Congress, so that we may continue to build on the successes to which the program has contributed in recent years--and adequately meet the challenges of the future.

The U.S. Security Assistance Program

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FINANCING PROGRAM

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program enables allies and friends of the United States to strengthen their self-defense capabilities by acquiring U.S.-origin military articles, services, and training. For fiscally-constrained countries where security interests coincide with those of the United States, the high costs of modern defense equipment make it difficult to obtain defense equipment and related services on a cash basis. A strong national defense capability contributes to regional stability and reduces the likelihood that regional conflicts will threaten U.S. interests. Thus, it is greatly to the advantage of the United States to assist friends and allies in maintaining the ability to defend themselves, by providing them the required financing for these procurements.

Given the magnitude and complexity of our global responsibilities, the United States alone cannot safeguard the free world's security interests. The FMS financing program permits friendly nations to share the burdens of collective security. By providing such financing, the United States lessens the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement during situations of instability and conflict, thereby helping to reduce demands on U.S. military resources.

The FMS financing program was initiated in the Mutual Defense Security Act of 1954 and was continued in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. In 1971, FMS financing exceeded grant assistance for the first time. In 1976, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) consolidated existing government and commercial sales legislation. Sections 23 (direct loans) and 24 (guaranteed loans) of the Act provided authorization for the program. Because of increased emphasis on cash sales in the late 1970s, the number of grant recipients and the size of the grant program decreased steadily through FY 1981.

Almost all FMS financing in the 1974-1984 period was in the form of guaranteed loans provided through the Federal Financing Bank at interest rates that were slightly higher than the cost of money to the U.S. Treasury. In the global recession of the early 1980s, repayment of previous FMS loans with higher interest rates exacerbated many developing countries' debt service problems.

By the early 1980s, Congress and the Executive Branch, spurred by the Bipartisan Commission on Economic and Security Assistance, expressed concern that high interest rate FMS financing was contributing to recipient country debt problems. This concern prompted the FY 1985 legislative mandate for totally "forgiven" (i.e., non-repayable) FMS financing for Egypt and Israel, and concessional (lower interest rate) loans for other selected countries.

In FY 1988, all FMS financing is in the form of either forgiven or concessional interest rate loans. (All of the credits for Israel and Egypt continue to be forgiven. At Congressional direction, part of the Turkey and Pakistan FMS credit programs are also forgiven.) The Administration believes that such a program is fully justified. By enhancing the economic value of U.S. military assistance, many countries are better able to devote more of their scarce financial resources to economically productive activities.

The Administration is requesting an all-forgiven FMS financing program in the amount of \$4.46 billion for FY 1989. By providing forgiven FMS credits, those recipients that have the bureaucratic infrastructure with which to do so will be able to apply part or all of the FMS financing to commercial purchases, a process that is not possible under the grant Military Assistance Program (MAP), which is intended strictly for government-to-government purchases.

This all-forgiven initiative is consistent with the trend advocated by Congress to modify the FMS financing program in order to ease countries' debt burden.

In response to repeated requests by other countries and encouragement by members of Congress, the Administration developed several alternatives in 1987 to address the problem of heavy debt. The FY 1988 Continuing Resolution Appropriation Act allows for the refinancing of principal coming due after September 30, 1989 on FMS loans carrying interest rates of 10 percent or greater. The legislation also permits this refinancing to be carried out with a 90 percent guarantee. Under the law the implementing regulations are prepared by the Department of the Treasury.

Many countries have expressed interest in the refinancing program. Most, however, will not make a decision on whether to pursue the program until regulations are in effect and actual refinancing proposals are formulated in conjunction with commercial banks.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant funding assists allies and friends in financing the procurement of defense articles and services to help strengthen their self-defense capabilities. Without grant aid, many countries' would have to divert scarce domestic resources from economic development to purchase military equipment and training. Since FY 1982, MAP funds have been merged with recipient countries' funds and/or with Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing credits in the FMS Trust Fund to pay for FMS cases.

Established under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, MAP originally provided for the loan or grant of military equipment, materials, and services (including training) to allied and friendly nations. In line with U.S. foreign policy interests, from FY 1950 to about FY 1963, the MAP program was directed mainly toward Europe to contain the Soviet challenge. Subsequently, the United States provided MAP grants primarily to areas of the developing world where U.S. security interests were threatened.

From the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s, the East Asia and Pacific regions accounted for the greatest percentage of MAP assistance because of the war in Vietnam. Near East and South Asian countries were also important MAP recipients during this period. As a result of the generally improved global economic situation in the late 1960s and 1970s, and Congressional pressure to eliminate MAP, requests for MAP reached a low of \$104.4 million in FY 1981.

Beginning in FY 1982, and in response to the steady economic deterioration of several defense partners, the Administration increased its grant funding request. Congress provided gradual increases in MAP appropriations. Sustained Congressional support of MAP funding has partially compensated for the reductions in overall security assistance appropriations.

In FY 1988, \$700.75 million in MAP is being provided for 21 country and regional programs. The major recipients of these MAP funds are base rights countries and friends in Central America and the Middle East. In FY 1989, the Administration is requesting a MAP level of \$467 million, a reduction partly attributable to the fact that an all-forgiven FMS financing program is also being requested for FY 1989. The FY 1989 MAP request includes funding for 30 country and regional programs. The major MAP recipients in this request are strategically important countries in East Asia and Central America.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program is a grant aid, low-cost foreign policy instrument that provides a valuable channel of communication and influence with foreign military forces worldwide. Training has long been considered to be a more cost effective force multiplier than any other form of security assistance.

Since 1950, IMET and its predecessor program have trained more than 500,000 officers and enlisted personnel representing most countries of the free world. Training has taken place in more than 2,000 different specialities, from basic technical skills to professional military education. The training advances the efficiency, professional performance, and readiness of each nations' armed forces to support specific professional military requirements. In addition, English language training, which is essential to training in the continental United States, contributes directly to increased rapport with the United States and, in the long term, to a greater understanding of U.S. society, institutions, and ideas, and commitment to internationally recognized human rights.

The IMET program not only supplements other countries' indigenous training efforts, but also is often the only major alternative to Soviet-oriented programs. In addition to teaching military skills and U.S. military doctrine, IMET provides significant opportunities for future access to the civilian and military leadership of other countries. As in the past, a significant number of IMET trained military leaders are likely to hold positions of prominence in their countries. From 1979-1984, for example, over 1,540 IMET-trained personnel held such positions, including chiefs of military services, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, senior staff officers, field commanders, and commandants of senior professional military schools. This number included approximately 1,475 officers of general and flag rank.

As a long-term investment, IMET demands continuous management. As a result of extensive improvements in the administration of IMET, country programs today are more balanced. Such improvements include: adherence to a consistent policy to ensure effective program implementation; issuance of precise annual training guidelines; development of multi-year country training plans; and minimizing of high cost undergraduate pilot training in favor of less costly professional military education. Emphasis on less costly professional military education and training allows for an increased number of trainees to be exposed to U.S. values of military professionalism and non-involvement in civilian government.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) advances U.S. economic, political, and security interests by offering economic assistance to allies and developing countries of strategic concern to the United States. By fostering economic development and reform, ESF helps to avert or alleviate the economic and political disruption that can threaten the security and independence of key allies and friends. The Agency for International Development (AID) implements the ESF program under the direction of the Administrator of AID and in accord with the overall foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

ESF is used primarily to provide balance of payments support and to finance commodity import programs to ensure the acquisition of critical raw materials and capital goods when foreign exchange is not available. Depending on the recipient country's economic situation, the fast disbursing balance of payments or budgetary support provided through ESF creates leverage for the policy reforms required to facilitate sustainable economic growth by encouraging the adoption of more rational economic and fiscal policies. Where longer-term political and economic stability is the primary concern, ESF finances infrastructure development and other capital and economic development projects of direct benefit to the poor.

As has been the case throughout the 1980s, economic dislocation and political strife continue to place great strains on many countries. Many of these same countries have recognized that economic reform is key to enhancing the chances for economic and political stability and have begun to implement urgently required reforms. In the short term, however, measures to create more rational and efficient economic structures and practices can often exacerbate social and political tensions unless buffered by external assistance. The Administration's FY 1989 all-grant ESF request of \$3.281 billion reflects a firm U.S. commitment to economic development and growth. Funding at this level will help safeguard important mutual security interests of the United States and its friends and allies.

Among other things, ESF encourages continued progress toward a permanent peace and stability in the Middle East; promotes economic and political stability in countries with which the United States has base rights and military access agreements; buttresses efforts by the Central American countries to promote long-term growth and strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights; helps mitigate the impact of Soviet aggression by assisting Pakistan and the Afghan Resistance; and supports infrastructure development and the evolution of market-oriented economies in sub-Saharan Africa.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, Chapter 6, as amended, authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations which further U.S. national security interests. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai are two such international organizations. The Administration is requesting \$31.689 million in FY 1989 in support of both UNFICYP and the MFO.

United Nations Force in Cyprus. The FY 1989 request for UNFICYP is \$7.312 million. The United States has a clear and vital interest in preserving UNFICYP. Its demise would increase the risk of violence on Cyprus, tragic for its people and causing grave tensions in the region which could seriously weaken NATO's ability to defend its vital southern flank.

UNFICYP has 2,122 military and civilian personnel stationed in Cyprus. Six Western European countries and Canada provide troops; Australia and Sweden provide civilian police. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for the first half of 1988 is about \$12.6 million, which does not reflect the bulk of the costs which have been absorbed by the troop-contributing countries. The Force's deficit from previous years, a cost borne by the troop-contributing countries, is expected to reach \$160.9 million by the end of June 1988. The United States continues to try to reduce this figure in various ways, including actively seeking contributions from noncontributing U.N. members and seeking means to reduce operating costs. Failure of the United States to maintain its full contribution to UNFICYP would increase the deficit and would make more difficult efforts to increase contributions from others.

Multinational Force and Observers. The FY 1989 request for the MFO is \$24.377 million. The mission of the MFO, an independent, international organization, is to implement the security arrangements [originally] envisioned for the United Nations in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Congress authorized U.S. participation in Public Law 97-132. The United States has a firm political commitment to the governments of Israel and Egypt to finance one-third of the annual costs of the organization. For FY 1989, the MFO is planning on a budget of slightly over \$73 million (predicated on a U.S. contribution of \$24.377 million); however, the budget-reducing actions that were taken in FY 1988 cannot be repeated in FY 1989. Accordingly, the MFO Director General has sent letters to the countries which provide infantry battalions (Colombia, Fiji,

and the United States) requesting that, beginning in October 1988, each of their battalions be reduced by one hundred men.

The reductions will require closing nine observation/check points in the Sinai. While the MFO is confident that the planned cuts will not adversely affect mission performance, it has stated that further cuts will require changes to basic MFO operational concepts.

SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND

The Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) is a revolving fund, established in FY 1982 to finance the acquisition of defense items and services in anticipation of authorized Foreign Military Sales. The SDAF enhances the U.S. Government's ability to meet urgent foreign needs for military equipment while minimizing adverse impacts on the readiness of U.S. forces. The SDAF is authorized by Chapter 5 of the Arms Export Control Act. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for its management and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is the executive agent responsible for day-to-day operation of the Fund.

The SDAF was capitalized in prior years; however, Congressional authority to obligate SDAF funds is required in the annual appropriations legislation. The SDAF was capitalized to the statutory ceiling of \$1.07 billion by receipts from asset use charges; charges for the proportional recoupment of nonrecurring research, development, and production costs; and the SDAF sales of defense articles or related services. The Fund is now fully operational and sustaining itself from sales receipts.

The SDAF has become a very useful foreign policy tool which also promotes cooperative planning by allied and friendly governments. SDAF also benefits the broader military assistance effort, for its purchases result in economies-of-scale that lower unit costs for programs financed by MAP and FMS credit.

In these ways we are in a better position to help other nations resolve planning shortfalls or unforeseen developments. As a result, the existence of SDAF assets already under production reduces pressures on the DOD in emergency or other high priority situations that previously were met by either withdrawals from inventories or diversions from production. When withdrawals or diversions cannot be avoided, the SDAF helps reduce adverse impacts on U.S. readiness by accelerating replenishment using SDAF assets already under production. This avoids the longer lead times associated with having to begin the full procurement cycle over again.

Annual U.S. defense production is significantly enhanced by SDAF procurements. These include extending production lines, achieving higher levels of production, and establishing favorable add-on contracts for these items from current and projected procurement. During FY 1987, SDAF involvement was especially evident in the procurement of air-to-air missiles, counterbattery radars, man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, tactical radios, communications security equipment, PHALANX close-in weapons systems, and anti-tank missiles. Higher production volumes for these items resulted in lower unit prices for both DOD end-users, and NATO and other allied and friendly nations.

Sales agreements for SDAF items already concluded and in progress in FY 1987 demonstrate the SDAF's utility in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to build coalition defenses and enhance regional stability. Here are some highlights:

- Readiness and interoperability with NATO, Australia, and Japan have been sustained and improved by accelerating sales and deliveries of such items as TOW-2 anti-tank missiles, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), STINGER man-portable anti-

aircraft missiles, STANDARD surface-to-air naval missiles, PHALANX Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS), Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, Maverick air-to-ground missiles, Super Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff (SRBOC) rounds, tactical Army radios, Firefinder counterbattery radars, and 155mm artillery ammunition.

- In the critical Southern Flank region of NATO, SDAF procurements and sales are helping to smooth force modernization planning and accelerate deliveries of selected items.
- While minimizing drawdowns of U.S. assets, the SDAF has been used to overcome severe backlogs of tactical radios (man-portable and vehicular) needed by allied and friendly governments, such as the Philippines, Malawi, Thailand, Morocco, Central America, Caribbean, West Africa, etc. In fact, DOD has had to direct only one diversion of man-portable radios in the past few years and even that was followed up with an accelerated replenishment from SDAF assets.
- SDAF buys of various types of ammunition (for rifles to howitzers), vehicles (jeeps and trucks), and light arms (rifles, machine guns, and mortars) have greatly reduced pressures on the Army to withdraw on-hand stocks for sustainment of the counter-insurgency and border safeguarding missions of friendly governments. Examples of these efforts are programs with the Philippines, Chad, Thailand, Morocco, Central America, Bolivia, Caribbean, and Somalia.
- The SDAF has helped the National Security Agency (NSA) to implement more orderly planning and management and to stabilize procurements to foster interoperability of U.S. secure communications (COMSEC) with NATO, Australia, and New Zealand. Also, it has expedited replenishing the U.S. Air Force for Security Assistance-related withdrawals of COMSEC assets later needed for U.S. strategic systems.
- SDAF has invested \$50 million in a Supply Support Procurement program with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This program lowers reorder points and increases stock levels so that DOD can better respond to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) pressures on U.S. assets while maintaining critical stock quantities for the readiness of U.S. forces.

The obligation authority request for FY 1989 is \$350 million; this is the program level that can be supported with the capital and pending receipts from expected SDAF sales. A steady annual procurement program of \$350 million makes sense: first, in avoiding disruptive peaks and valleys over time of procurements and deliveries; second, in enabling the acquisition of diversified items to help on a range of programs under pressure by foreign needs; and third, in providing the capability to achieve more economical rates for defense and assistance with larger procurement orders.

SDAF would be even more useful if it was run in a business-like manner with extended obligation authority. DOD currently has three-year obligation authority while the SDAF is limited to one-year authority. Contracting opportunities have been missed when the expiration of SDAF obligation authority has precluded coordination between SDAF and DOD when protracted contract negotiations extended into the follow-on fiscal year. As a result, each year some SDAF programs slip into the next year's procurement cycle. This expiration problem also affects the DOD procurements when SDAF participation would have enabled the aggregation of the minimum procurement quantities necessary for economical purchases. This year the Administration, once again, is requesting two-year obligational authority to permit the more realistic synchronization of SDAF procurements with those of DOD and to reduce disruptions in its procurement cycles.

Based upon preliminary discussion with the DOD and surveys of country needs, the following items are possible SDAF procurement candidates in FY 1989:

- Communications Security Equipment
- Tactical Vehicles and Personnel Radios
- Military Vehicles
- Infantry/Cavalry Fighting Vehicles
- Towed Howitzers
- Machine Guns and Mortars
- Infantry Equipment, Ordnance, and Support Items
- Ammunition, and Ordnance of All Types
- Anti-Tank Missiles, Rockets, and Projectiles
- Air-to-Air Missiles and Ordnance
- Air-to-Surface Missiles and Munitions
- Surface-to-Air missiles and Gun Systems
- Anti-Shipping and Anti-Radiation Missiles
- Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and Rockets
- Tactical Radars
- Counterbattery Radars
- Aircraft Long-Lead Support
- Supply Support Procurement.