

Strategy and the Military Relations Process

By

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This paper was written to articulate a concept for the U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM's) implementation of security assistance and other military relations tools in Latin America. This paper became necessary as a result of a decline in direct congressional funding for the grant Military Assistance Program (MAP) after 1985. This declining trend, instead of leveling off after 1987 as was hoped, did in fact decline a full 30% for Latin America between 1987 and 1988. Indeed, 1988 MAP funding was provided to only three countries in the region: El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. U.S. strategy relies upon strong relationships with friendly and allied countries around the world, and for this reason the decline in MAP funds forces this command to review the role of the Military Assistance Program in Latin America.

The discussion which follows is presented in three parts. Part One defines U.S. as well as USSOUTHCOM regional policy. The definition of policy allows us to encapsulate the goals of USSOUTHCOM's military relations efforts. Without a clear view of the command's objectives, our efforts to pursue U.S. policy goals will surely turn into a fragmented system based on crisis management and individual country needs, as opposed to the implementation of institutionalized coordinated measures for dealing with the different national military institutions in theater.

Part Two evaluates the relative decline of security assistance funds compared with the rise of a wide variety of JCS and service-funded military relations programs in the 1980s. This evaluation demonstrates that the Military Assistance Program has really not declined as dramatically over the long term as is popularly believed, but neither has it properly served as the ultimate tool of USSOUTHCOM strategy. Part Two also explains some specific recommendations with respect to the MAP program: that there is a need for USSOUTHCOM emphasis on spreading MAP around to a greater number of countries in spite of the lower dollar amounts; that concrete annual planning steps must be institutionalized if USSOUTHCOM is to ever have a voice in the allocation of MAP funds; and lastly, that MAP can only be viewed as one assistance program (albeit a very powerful one) amongst many.

Part Three proposes a notional system by which USSOUTHCOM should be implementing these various programs to advance U.S. strategic goals. Basically, this involves a system of prioritizing the several programmatic requirements for the 19 countries with which USSOUTHCOM strives to build military relations. Naturally, this sort of integration is already being accomplished to a large degree, but the discussion points out the need to use more analytic measures for planning and evaluating our efforts in different countries.

PART 1: THE EVOLUTION OF A REGIONAL ASSISTANCE POLICY

The USSOUTHCOM mission and key taskings are derived from U.S. regional policy for Latin America. The mission and tasks for USSOUTHCOM ideally will result in the achievement of specific and measurable goals (otherwise known as "ends" in the lexicon of military strategy thinkers). It is against these goals that the unified command must align its programs and assets ("ways and means" to achieve the strategy goals). This formulation is well laid out in the USSOUTHCOM Regional Security Strategy document and is briefly summarized here.

Since the Second World War, U.S. security strategy has been based upon two concepts: deterrence and collective security arrangements. This foundation will not change in the foreseeable future. The Western Hemisphere component of the overall global defense strategy, in turn, has been based upon three points; nuclear deterrence, cooperation with Canada, and collective security arrangements with the nations of Latin America. It is this last point that is of most concern to USSOUTHCOM.

Today, the U.S. predicates its security arrangements in Latin America upon broader policy goals which are summarized as the "four Ds": democracy, development, diplomacy, and defense. However, it should be remembered that these four objectives were not always components of the U.S. security strategy in Latin America. Critics of U.S. policy in the region frequently point out past violations of these principles, or the apparent failings of U.S. policy since Latin America is not yet totally democratic or sufficiently developed. These criticisms ignore the fact that over the years the maintenance of allied security arrangements has taken on different meanings as Americans have revised their view of their appropriate role in the world.

The concept of using collective security arrangements and foreign aid as elements of U.S. national security, though debated earlier, did not really jell until after 1949. By that time there had been several manifestations of Soviet hostility toward the West: the Berlin Blockade and harassment of U.N. relief workers in Europe being chief among them. The Soviets had also by then developed their own nuclear weapons capability. In response to these concerns, U.S. policy makers expanded their concepts of what constitutes U.S. national security. The ideas generated at that time were given a further boost as a result of the almost coincidental North Korean aggression against South Korea.

During this period, the U.S. embarked upon a series of mutual defense treaties first exemplified by the signing of the NATO Treaty in 1949. The U.S. also undertook to reorganize its military structure, to include dividing up the world into theaters under the responsibilities of U.S. unified commanders. This was begun under the auspices of the National Security Act of 1947. Finally, military aid to foreign countries was established as a component of national security through the enactment of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 and then the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

The earliest concept of military cooperation centered upon containment of communism. Much of the actual development of allied security capabilities was carried out through the gift or sale of U.S. surplus military equipment that still remained from World War II and the Korean Conflict. The concept of using economic and food aid to stem the root causes of social instability was not widely implemented until somewhat later. The groundwork on comprehensive developmental and economic assistance programs was laid out starting in 1957 with the enactment of the U.S. Development Loan Fund. However, economic assistance did not really come into the forefront of U.S. cooperative efforts in the third world until the European allies had gotten back on their feet and were contributing to multinational assistance efforts.

Thus, economic development, the second "D" in U.S. Latin American policy did not become a focus of attention until the early 1960s. At President Kennedy's urging, the Congress replaced the 10-year-old Mutual Security Act with the new Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in 1961. The FAA separated military from non-military assistance. Also in 1961, executive orders established the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development (AID). Of particular significance for Latin America at this time was the commencement of the "Alliance for Progress". This program stressed economic and social development as precursors to security and stability.

Dialogue and diplomacy have always been important elements of U.S. foreign policy, but they were not always emphasized in the third world. The center of international diplomatic power began to shift away from the developed nations and toward the third world after World War II.

This shift was accelerated in the 1960's by the sudden independence of a number of former European colonies in Africa and Asia. Political trends began to favor the nonaligned nations movement, which in the western hemisphere was also manifested as Latin American solidarity. The U.S. found that its traditional political hegemony in Latin America could no longer be automatically assumed. Accordingly, consensus building and the resolution of regional conflicts through diplomacy, rather than intervention, became important elements of U.S. regional policy.

The last "D" to enter the picture, democracy, did not become a high priority of the U.S. until fairly recently. Until the early 1970s, the U.S. was satisfied to carry out diplomatic, developmental, and even security assistance policies with Latin American nations that were, more often than not, non-democratic and military-controlled. The primary emphasis was still the containment of communism, and with the exception of Cuba, U.S. policy in this regard had been very successful. However, a number of factors converged by 1972-74 to provoke a dramatic change in policy. The American people and the Congress had become deeply troubled by the apparent impotency of U.S. assistance in bringing about security and economic development. Vietnam stood as a most prominent failure. The Alliance for Progress, into which the U.S. had poured over \$2 billion, also had only limited success to show for the effort. Revelations of alleged CIA involvement in third world revolutions (at that point the overthrow of Allende in Chile was particularly controversial) also called U.S. policy into question.

This dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy, particularly military aid programs, coupled with the weakened presidency as a result of the Watergate scandal, led to a radical revision of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974. The revised FAA gave increased emphasis to human rights concerns. Training of foreign police forces by U.S. military personnel was totally banned. The attitude of the Congress was that the U.S. was no longer going to contain communism and build third world stability at the expense of democracy and human rights. In Latin America, one impact of these changes was that the new human rights sanctions included in the law eventually led to the cut off of military assistance to Chile (1974); Uruguay (1976); Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and El Salvador (1978); and Suriname (1982). It is important to note that most of these countries have since had their security assistance programs restored after effecting changes of government and human rights policies.

And so today, as we look back on the history of U.S. foreign assistance in Latin America we do not see abject failure, but rather considerable success. When containment of communism was the ultimate U.S. goal, communism was contained. When economic growth was the goal, the region experienced unprecedented annual growth rates (although this new prosperity was not equitably distributed). When democracy and human rights supplanted the previous goals, the region's nations became democratic and observers of human rights. This is not to say that the U.S. was solely responsible for these changes, but at the very least the U.S. was at the vanguard. And although U.S. changes in policy direction have caused upheaval and discontent in the region, overall the U.S. enjoys basically good relations with all Latin American nations with two prominent exceptions: Cuba and Nicaragua.

USSOUTHCOM is primarily concerned with the advancement of the original "D": defense. But this has to be qualified so that "defense" is understood to mean defense of democratic values, human rights, economic development, and the diplomatic resolution of political conflicts. The four "Ds" have become the "Mom, Flag, and Apple Pie" of U.S., and consequently USSOUTHCOM policy in Latin America. Although some may argue that we have bitten off more than we could possibly chew, few would assail the lofty goals embodied in the four "Ds".

But what constitutes the "defense" mission of USSOUTHCOM? This question has been analyzed and reduced to key elements by the USSOUTHCOM staff. This analysis has been published in both the USSOUTHCOM Regional Security Strategy, and Mission, Tasks and Responsibilities documents. In its most recent iteration, General Fred F. Woerner, CINC,

reduced military tensions in South America), arms transfers to Latin America still average over \$2 billion per year.

In contrast with the great expansion of the Latin American arms market, the U.S. share of that market has fallen dramatically, from over 30% in the 1960s to roughly 5% by the late 1970s. Throughout this period, the U.S. government had made a conscious decision to limit its arms sales to the region. The reasons for this self-imposed restriction centered on avoiding regional conflicts by denying equipment, particularly high technology equipment, to third world nations. Later, human rights and nuclear non-proliferation concerns became the driving forces. Consequently, the Latin American nations began buying a larger share of their military goods from other supplier nations.

The arms transfer trend now appears to be reversing. As U.S. relations with Latin American nations have warmed, U.S. military assistance has resumed, and legislative sanctions have fallen away. In the early 1980s, U.S. arms transfers occupied about 15% of the regional market and that figure is rising.[3]

FIGURE 2
ARMS TRANSFERS TO LATIN AMERICA
(Market Shares)

1965-74 \$2.8B							
31.9%	18%	12%	6%	10%	7%	14%	
U.S.	FRANCE	U.K.	OTHER NATO	OTHER	PRC	USSR	
1974-77 \$4.0B							
15%	17.5%	7.5%	15%	7.5%	10%	27.5%	
U.S.	FRANCE	FRG	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER	USSR	
1978-81 \$10.6B							
5%	15%	25%	6%	4%	20%	25%	
U.S.	FRANCE	FRG	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER	USSR	
1982-85 \$9.0B							
14.4%	12.2%	3%	3%	6%	13%	38%	10%
U.S.	FRANCE	FRG	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER	USSR	WARSAW PACT

U.S. military assistance is a small component of overall arms transfers and goes through corresponding cyclical peaks and troubles. From 1978 to 1980, the U.S. Military Assistance Program was essentially terminated for Latin America. The loans extended under the FMSCR program were also sharply reduced after 1977. It was the growing Central American crisis of the 1980s that eventually brought about the resumption of MAP grants to the region. Presidents Carter and Reagan each made equipment available to El Salvador under presidential drawdown authority in early FY81. (This drawdown is included in totals as the equivalent of \$25 million of MAP

grants). In the subsequent two years, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica became recipients of increasing amounts of MAP funds. Aggregate MAP to the region hit its peak of \$271 million in 1984 and has been declining since then. However, during this same period, increasing numbers of countries were added to the MAP recipient list. Even the comparatively low level of \$132 million for FY88 MAP appropriations represents a truly enormous sum when compared with levels prior to 1984.

The implementation of the MAP program is of particular concern to the USSOUTHCOM and should be discussed in detail at this point. Unlike military sales in general, the U.S. government exerts a bit more control over MAP grants. This control usually extends directly from the U.S. embassy in the host country to the Departments of State and Defense. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is the primary coordinating agency for U.S. security assistance and maintains close liaison between DOD and State. In contrast, the regional unified command often plays only a limited role in advocating MAP and FMSCR programs. This is largely due to the routing of a document that is called the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA).

Each U.S. ambassador establishes his initial military assistance program recommendations for his host country in the AIASA document. Thereafter, the regional unified commander is unlikely to challenge the individual recommendations even if some of them conflict with overall regional priorities. This leaves most of the real prioritization and budget allocation work to State, DOD, and DSAA.

USSOUTHCOM has been pushing for an increased voice in the military assistance planning process. After much consideration over a period of two years, this effort has focused on providing unified command concerns directly to each embassy. USSOUTHCOM has organized a series of planning surveys in several key countries in the region. One planning survey has already studied a full range of combat arms, combat support, and combat service support issues in El Salvador. Other planning surveys have been tailored to address more specific areas. The recommendations generated by these surveys will be coordinated with the host country military officials for their concurrence. The ambassador and his staff can then incorporate this information into the AIASA. These initial surveys will be followed up as necessary with future year progress studies.

Part of the planning effort is directed at establishing realistic and coordinated budget recommendations at the embassy level. This is being accomplished through a final coordinating visit of the USSOUTHCOM security assistance staff to key embassies prior to AIASA submission. The primary goal of final coordination is to share ideas about predicted future security assistance budget levels and previous year requests from the entire region in order that the individual AIASAs fit into a solid regional plan.

A second important point of coordination is in the Washington community. The unified command has to conduct constant dialogue with the Department of State (PM-SAS) and DSAA. These organizations actually develop the security assistance allocations and conduct budget reviews. Contact with these agencies is needed to uphold USSOUTHCOM interests.

The degree of coordination expressed in the above listed steps is necessary to ensure that USSOUTHCOM strategy objectives are taken into consideration, especially now that MAP levels are on the decline.

Figure 3 lays out the funding history of the MAP programs in Latin America. This chart helps demonstrate that MAP allocations have been seriously unbalanced with respect to a few Central American countries since 1980.

FIGURE 3
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM*
(Millions of Dollars)

	FY74	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89 PROPOSALS
ARGENTINA	0.5	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BELIZE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.48	0.5	-	0.5
BOLIVIA	3.1	3.1	2.2	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.0	1.4	1.0	-	5.0
BRAZIL	0.94	0.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHILE	1.0	0.66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
COLOMBIA	0.56	0.74	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.2	3.5	-	5.0
COSTA RICA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	2.5	9.0	13.0	2.4	1.5	-	1.5
ECUADOR	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	-	4.0	-	3.0
EL SALVADOR	0.56	1.2	0.23	-	-	-	25.0	63.5	33.5	176.8	134.8	120.4	110.0	85.0	-	95.0
GUATEMALA	0.89	0.65	0.19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	5.0	7.0	5.0
HONDURAS	0.67	1.2	0.23	-	-	-	-	11.0	27.5	76.5	72.8	60.1	60.0	40.0	-	60.0
MEXICO	0.03	0.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NICARAGUA	0.95	1.1	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PANAMA	0.44	0.57	0.2	0.23	-	-	-	-	-	8.0	10.0	3.8	2.9	-	-	-
PARAGUAY	1.1	1.0	0.43	0.34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PERU	0.97	0.85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
URUGUAY	1.0	1.5	0.55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-
VENEZUELA	0.9	0.73	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	13.6	14.8	4.23	3.07	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	76.5	63.5	271.0	236.0	198.0	189.0	132.0	175.0

FY88 regional MAP funding was cut 30% from the FY87 level. As a consequence, only three nations, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, received funding while six nations were cut off. This distribution kept MAP levels up in the three most critical countries but risked a long term loss of military-to-military dialogue with those several countries that were unfunded because there were no more funds after worldwide priorities were settled by Washington agencies. This situation will almost certainly be repeated in FY89 unless all players in the planning process, from the embassy to the State Department and DOD, can be convinced that U.S. interests are better served by maintaining some small MAP programs even if they are funded at very low levels.

Beyond MAP and FMS there is a wide variety of military relations tools which provide training and establish military contacts with foreign nations. Many of these additional tools are available exclusively for Latin America. This has served to recognize the special importance that the U.S. attaches to maintaining relations with the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Aside from performing important relations functions in their own rights, these other programs can also help compensate for the lack of U.S. military sales and grants in certain countries.

IMET

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is arguably the most visible and flexible of the military relations tools. As its name implies, the IMET program is a means for providing training to foreign military members. Much of this training concerns professional military education as well as technical and combat skills. For this reason, it should be expected that the larger IMET programs will tend to be concentrated in those countries which are also perennial recipients of large MAP programs. However, the provision of training is far cheaper and less controversial than the provision of equipment. As a consequence, IMET is usually approved for far more countries than is MAP.

Figure 4 shows the levels of IMET that were granted to all continental Latin American nations from 1975 through 1988. These figures exclude the costs of running the Panama Canal area military schools (USARSA, IAAFA, and NAVSCIATTS) because those figures don't directly relate to the size of IMET programs to individual countries. Over the years, the region's IMET totals followed the general trend of MAP and FMS. IMET levels dropped from the mid 1970s (when the IMET program was created) until 1980 and then rose fairly steadily until 1985. IMET

has since hovered at about \$7 million. All indications are that IMET will continue to be funded for Latin America at roughly this level for the foreseeable future.

FIGURE 4

**IMET PROGRAM IN LATIN AMERICA
(Millions of Dollars)**

FY75 - 9.0	FY82 - 5.5
FY76 - 8.2	FY83 - 5.0
FY77 - 6.6	FY84 - 6.6
FY78 - 6.0	FY85 - 7.1
FY79 - 2.6	FY86 - 6.8
FY80 - 2.1	FY87 - 7.3
FY81 - 2.6	FY88 - 6.5

Combined Exercises

The USSOUTHCOM combined exercise program is made up of a mix of JCS directed exercises and JCS coordinated exercises. The JCS exercise fund covers transportation costs associated with these exercises. The purpose of all combined exercises is to train U.S. and friendly foreign forces in the conduct of combined military operations. It is important to remember that these exercise programs are justified on the basis of their benefit to U.S. forces. This is in contrast to the previously listed security assistance programs which are justified on the basis of their benefit to friendly foreign militaries. This distinction is important as it determines whether the JCS or the host country ends up paying for a particular exercise.

The transportation costs associated with JCS directed exercises are high compared with the other elements of the exercise program, although the funding level has been dropping since 1986. JCS directed exercises support USSOUTHCOM's operational plans and contingency plans in Honduras, El Salvador, and Panama. These exercises tend to be very large events in terms of U.S. manpower and visibility in the host country. They also tend to work in conjunction with the larger concentrations of MAP funds: the MAP funds purchase equipment needed by the host country to carry out the combined plan; the exercise trains and tests the execution of that plan. The major annual JCS directed exercises in theater are: Ahuas Tara with Honduras, Kings Guard with El Salvador and Honduras, and Kindle Liberty with Panama.

The *Fuerzas Unidas* exercises are JCS coordinated exercises which started in 1982 and today include the participation of seven South American countries. These exercises are much smaller in scope than the JCS directed exercises. Usually they consist of no more than a command post exercise that may or may not be augmented by a field training exercise. Although small in scope, the *Fuerzas Unidas* exercises provide combined training and contacts in several countries at relatively low cost.

The JCS directed UNITAS exercise series, managed by the U.S. Atlantic Command, is also conducted with a number of South American nations each year. The UNITAS exercises are sometimes also executed in conjunction with *Fuerzas Unidas*. Because UNITAS is managed by the Atlantic Command, it represents a "freebie" for USSOUTHCOM.

The last major exercise category is Deployments for Training (DFTs). DFTs are essentially small exercises conducted by individual units in a foreign country. Past DFTs in the region have included the deployment of construction, artillery, and medical units to perform work in a foreign environment. The DFT concept originated at USSOUTHCOM in 1984. Since then, DFT operations have been adopted by U.S. military organizations in other parts of the world.[5]

FIGURE 5

THE USSOUTHCOM EXERCISE PROGRAM
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>JCS</u> <u>DIRECTED</u>	<u>FUERZAS</u> <u>UNIDAS</u>	<u>DFTs</u>	<u>OPS/NATIONS</u>
		84 \$2	15/1
		85 \$3	35/1
86 \$27	86 \$1.5	86 \$6	58/4
87 \$23	87 \$3.7	87 \$8	89/7
88 \$20	88 \$3.3	88 \$8	124/9
89 \$18	89 \$3.0		

Humanitarian/Civic Action (HCA)

HCA deployments are conducted in conjunction with combined exercises. These deployments are authorized to provide: medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas; and the construction and repair of rudimentary roads, basic sanitation systems, and public facilities. HCA missions are conducted to promote U.S. and host country security and the readiness of U.S. service members. HCA projects have been allocated \$18 million for 1987-1990. The USSOUTHCOM HCA budget amounts to roughly \$3 million per year.

Personnel Exchange Program (IPP)

The PEP program is a two-way reciprocal exchange of personnel between U.S. and foreign military services that has been in existence since the mid-1940s. During the exchange period, the respective officers are fully integrated into their host country's military structure. These exchanges are established through government-to-government Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). The number of PEP positions currently established in Latin America has been rising in recent years. Today there are 41 positions filled and an additional six positions not yet filled for which MOUs have been signed. Figure 6 shows the current composition of PEPs in Latin America.

FIGURE 6

PEPS IN LATIN AMERICA

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>NAVY</u>
ARGENTINA	-	-	1
BRAZIL	3 (1)	-	2
CHILE	-	1	-
COLOMBIA	2	- (3)	1
ECUADOR	-	2	-
GUATEMALA	1	-	-
HONDURAS	2	-	1
MEXICO	1	2	1
PARAGUAY	1	-	-
PERU	5	3 (1)	3
VENEZUELA	5	2 (1)	2

Latin American Cooperation Fund

The Latin American Cooperation Fund, otherwise known as the LATAM Coop Fund, consists of three individual service run programs. LATAM Coop funds are used to pay for a wide range of military relations activities. Figure 7 demonstrates the growth of the LATAM Coop funds as well as the types of activities that are financed. All three services have increased the size and scope of their respective programs. In fact, the Air Force only began its LATAM Coop fund in 1986. While the Army and Air Force programs are centrally managed from Washington, D.C., management of the Navy LATAM Coop fund in contrast, is dispersed among a number of Navy commands, an arrangement that tends to lead to duplication and diminished effectiveness.

FIGURE 7

**LATAM COOPERATION FUND
(Millions of Dollars)**

	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>
ARMY	.12	.24	.31	.72	1.40
NAVY	.22	.27	.28	.28	.29
AF	-	-	.11	.25	.50

<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>NAVY</u>
ORIENTATION VISITS	ORIENTATION VISITS	CNO (OP-61)
SUBJECT MATTER EXCHANGES	SUBJECT MATTER EXCHANGES	LANTCOM
CADET EXCHANGES	CADET EXCHANGES	USMC
HONOR GRAD TOURS	SMALL UNIT EXCHANGES	NAV WAR COLLEGE
MILITARY REVIEW	HONOR GRAD TOURS	NAVSO
IADB	AIR POWER JOURNAL	TELCOM
CAA	PEP CONFERENCE	OCEANOGRAPHICS
IPP		NAV BASE SAN DIEGO
		PACCOM

Scholarships

The U.S. service academies offer scholarships to up to 40 foreign students at any time. These scholarships previously required tuition payments based on a recipient country's ability to pay. Starting in 1988, the Congress waived the requirement to pay tuition costs for all nations other than the NATO allies, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Up until now, Central American nations have been sending most of Latin America's students to the service academies. This change may encourage other Latin American nations to nominate candidates of their own.

A second scholarship program is being considered by Congress for implementation in 1989. The Military Scholarship Program for the Americas (MSPA) envisions the creation of 50 one to two year scholarships for Latin American military officers to attend U.S. universities having ROTC programs.

Integrated Personnel Program (IPP)

This is strictly a U.S. Army initiative. It operates like a one-way exchange: foreign nations are invited to send officers to work in the U.S. on cooperative projects of mutual benefit to

both the U.S. and the invited nation. This program has been conducted with the NATO allies for several years now. Starting in 1989, the Army will make 41 IPP positions available for Latin American nations. Some of the cooperative projects proposed include development doctrine and training for intensity conflict, mountaineering, and jungle warfare.

Joint Security Consultations (JSC)

Joint Security Consultations are high level military staff tasks conducted between the U.S. and its key allies annually. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile have been long-standing participants in JSC talks. Argentina unilaterally withdrew from the program in 1983 as a result of the Falkland/Malvinas War. It is currently planned for Argentina to again be added to the JSC schedule in February 1989.

A summary of the previously mentioned security assistance and military relations tools is shown below in Figure 8. In this diagram, the various programs are shown against their approximate costs to the U.S. government. In a few cases, the dollar figures are only notional. The PEP program is considered to be a "no-cost" exchange since the U.S. receives a reciprocal benefit. The \$9.5 million shown for intelligence sharing only represents the cost of using U.S. intelligence platforms.

FIGURE 8

MILITARY RELATIONS INVESTMENTS
(Dollars in Millions)

MAP	\$130.0
IMET	\$ 6.5
EXERCISES	\$ 18.0/\$3.0/\$8.0
HCA	\$ 3.0
PEPS	\$ 3.0
LATAM COOP FUND	\$ 2.5
SCHOLARSHIPS	\$ 1.0
INTEGRATED PERSONNEL PROG.	\$ 0.4
JOINT SECURITY CONSULT	\$ 0.2

SECTION 3: TOWARD A FUTURE INTEGRATED MILITARY RELATIONS PROGRAM

Up to now, this paper has mostly recapitulated history. Hopefully, the discussion has adequately laid out the USSOUTHCOM goals and the programs by which those goals are achieved. This section will now attempt to accomplish the more difficult task of formulating a method by which the command can integrate the nine or so military relations programs into a prioritization scheme for 19 Latin American countries.

The first step needed to solve this problem is to establish the relative amount of military relations effort that should be devoted to each of the 19 nations. To accomplish this, it is desirable to set up an analytic means of ranking the nations. Reliance upon intuition and gut feelings has some value, but it also tends to permit action officers to work from their own list of personal likes and dislikes. Without some commonly accepted guidelines, the staff effort may achieve a degree of effectiveness, but it will lose a great deal due to inefficient and conflicting arrangements of priorities.

The first listed tasking of USSOUTHCOM is to support allied counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-narcotrafficking operations. Therefore, the existing military threat in

each country should be an important factor in determining which countries should benefit from certain programs. The most straightforward evaluation of military threats is to rank countries according to the size of their active insurgencies, with some consideration given to conventional/drug threats posed by hostile neighbors or narcotics cultivation. The table below is based upon a February 1988 estimate of active insurgents per 10,000 population. The nations in the "conventional/drug" and "small threat" categories are listed merely by order of country size, since this one-factor evaluation has no means by which to rank them.

FIGURE 9

MILITARY THREAT

<u>SMALL THREAT</u>	<u>CONVENTIONAL/DRUG</u>	<u>ACTIVE*</u>	
		(INSURGENTS/10,000)	
	Mexico		
Brazil	Bolivia	El Salvador	15.00
Argentina	Costa Rica	Colombia	2.90
Uruguay	Belize	Guatemala	2.30
Panama		Peru	2.10
Paraguay		Honduras	0.65
Guyana		Suriname	0.10
		Chile	0.10
		Ecuador	0.03
		Venezuela	0.01

*For simplicity, the Nicaraguan anti-communist insurgency (numbering about 30 insurgents per 10,000 population) is not included in the above chart.

The table of military threats shows us what many may already know from experience. The most serious active insurgencies exist in El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru. Honduras also has a moderate though relatively dormant insurgent population. With the exception of Peru, which is periodically sanctioned from receiving security assistance for political reasons, these are the countries which have received the most combined MAP and IMET allocations between FY86 and FY88. Experience also seems to indicate that when the levels of active insurgents are low, as those found in Suriname, Chile, Venezuela, and Ecuador, they represent less than urgent threats to those nations.

From the perspective of this single indicator, it is inexplicable that Panama has received the fourth or fifth largest amount of security assistance in recent years, while Peru has received fairly insignificant amounts. However, political considerations pervade security assistance as they do all other areas of international relations. The Panama security assistance program has been bolstered as a result of agreements made in conjunction with the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and associated documents, while at the same time, Peru's programs have been curtailed due to U.S. legislative sanctions. [Editor's Note. It should be recognized that for FY 1988 (as well as the latter months of FY 1987) all U.S. assistance to Panama has been withheld due to the Panamanian Government's violent suppression of political demonstrations and other human rights violations. This ban is expected to continue in FY 1989 unless major improvements in Panama's political and human rights situation are effected.]

Measuring active insurgents provides one important indicator for determining where some of the security assistance and military relations effort should be directed. However, this one indicator is not sufficient for directing the entire range of military relations tools. A slightly more sophisticated way of evaluating military threats to Latin American nations is available from studies

published by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Publications are available which measure different indicators of military, political, and economic threats to stability.

These data give a more complex picture of what the insurgents are doing to a given country. A rise in the seriousness of insurgent armed attacks, or a rise in concerns over the legitimate government's security capabilities, could call for a gradual increase in U.S. security assistance. However, rising concerns over the host country's use of repressive or brutal police tactics may require the opposite action. At the very least, human rights violations should be answered with modification to the programs being offered to the recipient nation. There are also indicators which can measure ideological conflicts between the political and military leadership in the country. The appropriate U.S. military response to concerns in this category should again be tailored to avoid conveying the impression that the U.S. supports the military over the civilian leadership.

By now, it is becoming apparent that implementing the full range of military relations tools cannot be based on the military threat alone. Some very important nations, notably Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela are faced with low to negligible military threats. Since the key tasks of USSOUTHCOM include advancing U.S. military influence and foreign policy, these important but unthreatened allies cannot be ignored. It would seem that the implementation of relations programs in specific countries may logically fall into two groupings: a particular set of programs is appropriate for advancing relatively short term goals of assisting nations to combat the regional crises posed by insurgents and narco-traffickers; a different mix of programs is more appropriate for establishing long term military-to-military relations with the strategically important nations. For this reason, some measure of long-term strategic importance needs to be established.

There are, no doubt, many variables that contribute to a nation's importance on a regional or global scale. The size, location, resource base, population, level of education, industrialization, military capabilities, and linkages or influence with other societies are all indicators that come to mind. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to develop a foolproof scheme for ranking the importance of nations. However, this task is made a bit simpler in Latin America because of some regional commonalities: Latin American nations generally share the same social and cultural norms and extra-regional ties; they all fit the broad categorization of middle to upper income third world countries; and, there is a fairly high correlation in the region between a nation's land mass and the size of its population. For purely notional purposes, the following table establishes a hierarchy of Latin American nations based on a numerical factor achieved by multiplying land mass, in millions of square miles, by each country's gross domestic product (GDP), in billions of dollars. (It is interesting to note that the seven top ranked nations under these criteria encompass 90% of Latin America's manufacturing power and 82% of its population.)

FIGURE 10
GEO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCE[6]
(AREA X GDP)

<u>INDEPENDENT</u>		<u>MIDDLE</u>		<u>DEPENDENT</u>	
BRAZIL	617.0	BOLIVIA	1.40	PANAMA	0.140
MEXICO	136.0	ECUADOR	1.00	HONDURAS	0.110
ARGENTINA	82.0	PARAGUAY	0.60	COSTA RICA	0.070
		GUATEMALA	0.38	EL SALVADOR	0.040
VENEZUELA	17.0	URUGUAY	0.32	BELIZE	0.002
COLOMBIA	16.0			SURINAME	0.080
PERU	9.8			GUYANA	0.030
CHILE	6.5				

The three categories in the above table were laid out based on the assumption that below a certain level countries are somewhat dependent on assistance, or at least good will, from other nations. All else being equal, countries possessing larger amounts of population, natural resources, and having larger economies will tend to be more politically and economically independent.

At this juncture, we can make some additional assumptions and test these against past experience. It should be reasonable to expect that in the presence of military threats, the small and relatively poorer Latin American countries will have to rely on foreign aid, and that in most cases, the U.S. would provide it. In turn, the U.S. military relations effort, beyond MAP, IMET, and JCS directed exercises (which for the most part provide equipment and training to develop combat capabilities), should be concentrated on the economically better off nations. We can test this hypothesis by examining basic trends in the various equipment, training, and contact programs over recent years.

A comparison of the MAP and FMS programs provides the strongest indication that the security assistance programs do indeed tend to divide the recipient nations along these lines. The highest levels of U.S. military assistance, in recent years, has been given to those countries in which there is a convergence of high military threat and low economic wherewithal. In contrast, FMS sales correlate with the "geo-economic influence" rankings to a degree (although, perhaps the rankings should be factored to take into account high oil export incomes). Arms sales to Argentina and Chile seem to fall conspicuously low in light of the previous assumptions. However, during the indicated period, the U.S. made the decision to prohibit most FMS sales to both countries and this accounts for that discrepancy.

The FMS Credit program was last used in Latin America in 1986. This program has been terminated for the region for the near future. Figure 11 shows where the loans were extended over the last several years of the program's operation. As we might expect, the FMSCR loans generally went to a mix of lower income FMS buyers and higher income MAP recipients. Two obvious exceptions were Honduras and El Salvador who are both low income MAP recipients. Looking at the data alone, more MAP instead of loans would have seemed a better decision. However, as it turns out, most of these loans were made between 1982 to 1984. This was a period when Honduras and El Salvador needed more military assistance than the Congress was willing to grant. The administration accepted loans due to political realities.

FIGURE 11

EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>SALES (FMS) (1982 - 87)</u>		<u>LOAN FINANCING OF SALES (FMSCR) (1982-1988)</u>		<u>MAP FINANCING (1983 - 88)</u>	
VENEZUELA	\$562.0	EL SALVADOR	\$91.5	EL SALVADOR	\$659.0
MEXICO	\$102.0	COLOMBIA	\$34.5	HONDURAS	\$357.0
BRAZIL	\$ 72.0	HONDURAS	\$28.0	COSTA RICA	\$ 28.0
ECUADOR	\$ 70.0	PERU	\$26.5	PANAMA	\$ 25.0
COLOMBIA	\$ 43.0	ECUADOR	\$22.3	GUATEMALA	\$ 17.0
PERU	\$ 22.0	PANAMA	\$18.8	COLOMBIA	\$ 7.7
ARGENTINA	\$ 11.0			ECUADOR	\$ 6.0
				BOLIVIA	\$ 5.4
				BELIZE	\$ 2.0
				URUGUAY	\$ 0.5

It would be very convenient if the different training programs would exhibit strong correlations between threat levels, geo-economic wealth, and the type of U.S. activities conducted in each country. However, Figure 12 demonstrates that training matters are not so simple. For one thing, training programs cover a wider variety of functions. They develop combat skills and technical proficiency. They also provide professional military education which advances military-to-military relations. Exercise programs train U.S. service members in foreign locations, and in addition provide military contacts. There is a greater tendency to spread the wealth when it comes to training and exercise programs. And because there has rarely been a clearly stated set of region-wide priorities to guide and coordinate the training and exercise activities, it is not surprising that the picture is slightly confusing.

FIGURE 12
TRAINING PROGRAMS

<u>IMET (84-88)</u>		<u>DIRECTED EXERCISES</u>	<u>DFTs</u>	<u>HCA</u>
HONDURA	6.5	HONDURAS	HONDURAS	HONDURAS
EL SALVADOR	6.2	PANAMA	GUATEMALA	BOLIVIA
COLOMBIA	5.0	EL SALVADOR	VENEZUELA	PERU
ECUADOR	3.2		COSTA RICA	ECUADOR
PERU	2.6		ECUADOR	PANAMA
PANAMA	2.3		BOLIVIA	COSTA RICA
GUATEMALA	1.7		COLOMBIA	PARAGUAY
BOLIVIA	1.2		ARGENTINA	CHILE
		<u>FUERZAS UNIDAS</u>	<u>UNITAS</u>	
		FTX/CPX BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	
		FTX ECUADOR	CHILE	
		CPX PERU	PERU	
		CPX URUGUAY	COLOMBIA	
		CPX PARAGUAY	VENEZUELA	
		CPX CHILE	ECUADOR	
		MAPEX ARGENTINA	PANAMA	

Figure 12 also represents an attempt to qualitatively rank the level of the different training and exercise activities for each country. In the case of the IMET, DFT and HCA programs, most of the effort over the past few years has focused on Central American and Andean nations. In fact, the shuffling of MAP and FMSCR priorities, shown in Figure 11, is not very different from what is shown in Figure 12. However, the Fuerzas Unidas and UNITAS exercises are designed to reach South American nations, and this accounts for the obviously different list of countries cited under those two programs.

The equipment and training programs (other than FMS sales) very nearly ignore the largest and relatively wealthiest Latin American nations, particularly those that face no military threats. Presumably, these are the very countries which the U.S. and USSOUTHCOM most need to maintain long-term military relations. We should thus expect that the last category of military relations tools, the contact programs, would concentrate on these nations.

Happily, Figure 13 shows us that these expectations are, for the most part, fulfilled. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru all show up as receiving a larger share of the contact programs. Colombia and Venezuela are lower on the priority lists but still significant. However, Mexico is

not represented as well as we might expect. Also, Honduras is a good deal higher in term of PEPs and scholarships than may be desirable since Honduras receives a large share of MAP, IMET, and exercise programs as well. Additionally, the service academy scholarships appear to be out of synch with the rest of the contact programs. No doubt, this is partly due to the independent nature of candidate selection processes. Hopefully, the elimination of tuition fees this year will encourage more of the South American nations to nominate more candidates.

FIGURE 13
CONTACT PROGRAMS

<u>LATAM COOP 87</u> (THOUSANDS)				<u>PEP</u>	<u>ISC</u>	<u>SCHOLARSHIPS</u>		
<u>ARMY</u>		<u>USAF</u>						
BRAZIL	134	CHILE	30	PERU	11 (1)	BRAZIL	HONDURAS	5
ARGENTINA	40	ARGENTINA	21	VENEZUELA	9 (1)	CHILE	PERU	5
CHILE	40	BRAZIL	18	BRAZIL	5 (1)	(ARG)	COSTA RICA	4
PERU	33	PERU	17	MEXICO	4		EL SAL	3
EL SAL	25	URUGUAY	15	COLOMBIA	3 (3)		GUATEMALA	3
URUGUAY	22	COLOMBIA	11	HONDURAS	3		COLOMBIA	3
ECUADOR	21	EL SAL	11	ECUADOR	2		PANAMA	3
COLOMBIA	17	VENEZUELA	10	ARG	1		ECUADOR	3
				CHILE	1		CHILE	1
				GUAT	1		URUGUAY	1
				PARAGUAY	1		PARAGUAY	1

Up to this point, we have reviewed the USSOUTHCOM mission and tasks, and have also described the many programmatic tools have been put to use in recent years. One last element is now needed to set up a system for effective strategy implementation. This last necessary part is a feedback mechanism that will enable the USSOUTHCOM staff to collect and assemble information that indicates the effectiveness of the overall effort. These indications would then be fed back to the planners who ideally should be capable of making changes to the basic programs.


The first step in building the feedback loop is to establish reliable measures which will assess each program's effectiveness in achieving its goals. This may take the form of establishing essential elements of information which can be easily collected by SAO personnel, USSOUTHCOM component staffs, survey teams, mobile training teams, and others as necessary. This paper will not undertake to formulate a full range of program effectiveness measures, but some examples are addressed in the discussion which follows.

Those few countries that are actually fighting wars (e.g., Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador) usually have a much clearer idea of what they really require (as opposed to nice things to have) because their forces are under constant trial by fire. Their battlefield statistics provide the needed feedback information. In those countries not engaged in combat, U.S. combined exercises should provide an opportunity to evaluate host country training and material readiness. Serious shortfalls should be identified in after action reports. U.S. survey teams and mobile training teams are also frequently called upon to evaluate the condition of host country equipment and training. However, the host country must pay for surveys and training teams if it is receiving a majority of the benefit.

The feedback loop should be geared to evaluate many considerations beyond the narrow scope of military readiness. The U.S. security assistance and military relations programs also strive to build military relations and advance U.S. foreign policy. These are very broad areas where cause and effect are rarely measurable with any certainty. Nonetheless, there are indicators that may help. The willingness or unwillingness of a country's military establishment to participate in U.S. low-level exercises, personnel exchange programs, official visits, etc., helps to indicate the strength of military relationships. Certainly actions on the part of a regional military that are clearly against U.S. stated policy goals (i.e., coups against the civilian government, pursuit of regional arms races, widespread human rights abuses as a matter of policy, etc.) would indicate a poor state of relations. In the larger, wealthier nations, FMS sales also tend to act as barometers of the recipient militaries' respect and particularly their trust in future U.S. good will.

Along these lines, it is interesting to note that the militaries of two nations--Panama and Honduras--have tended to receive almost disproportionate shares of military assistance and relations efforts, but recently have either actively or tactily supported violent public demonstrations directed against U.S. embassies and U.S. military presence in the region. This may indicate that our military relations effort in those countries has been failing. It may also draw us to the conclusion that there is an upper limit to the amount of military-to-military and military-to-people contact that is desirable. In other words, as countries become saturated, familiarity may breed contempt. Certainly, there are many questions raised here that we cannot yet answer. Perhaps a military relations system could help provide some answers.

FIGURE 14
PROCESS



This paper will go no further than to present this theoretical basis for a military relations system. Most of the elements of this system are currently in place and operating, but they are operating semi-independently. The present situation allows individual personalities, rather than institutional concerns, to drive programs and priorities.

The next step required to formalize the process is to establish a comprehensive monitoring system, preferably automated. Country desk officer, SAO chiefs, USSOUTHCOM general officers and component commanders all need to be able to call up the exact levels and nature of past and present military relations efforts in given countries on at least a monthly and quarterly basis. A necessary feature of this information system is a display of trends. Since there is presently a lack

of historical continuity in the military relations effort even at the SAO level, it is usually impossible to access meaningful information concerning U.S. military relations activities that occurred over two years ago. This absence of institutional memory plagues the SAO and USSOUTHCOM staffs to be forever reinventing wheels and reacting to crises, and should be corrected before any other action is taken.

The creation of an integrated information system may seem a mundane recommendation considering this paper's sweeping topic. However, without this foundation upon which to base meaningful recommendations, USSOUTHCOM will never become more active in the military relations process. Those organizations possessing direct access to useful information, such as the U.S. Embassies, DSAA, military services, JCS, OSD, and State Department, will continue to exercise the real control over the programs; USSOUTHCOM will only provide a degree of coordination.

FOOTNOTES

1. *U.S. Southern Command Mission, Tasks, and Responsibilities (MTR)*. U.S. Southern Command J5 Directorate. 1 November 1987. Page B1.
2. Statement of General Fred F. Woerner, Commander-in-Chief, USSOUTHCOM to the House Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations, 22 April 1988.
3. *World military expenditures and arms transfers*. U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.
4. *Congressional Presentation Documents (CPDs) for Security Assistance Programs 1977-1988*. U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
5. A prime example of another "DFT-like" program is the Air Force Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS) in which the USAF pays to send aircraft repair teams to train under foreign conditions.
6. This table is based on figures from *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1988*. Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.