
FY 1992 Security Assistance Request

By

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Mr. Chairman, both Congress and the Administration recognize that our foreign aid program is one of the principal tools we have to advance our interests and objectives abroad. Today, I want to examine how the use of one set of our foreign assistance tools—the security assistance accounts—contributes to our broad foreign policy goals: to preserve and protect peace and stability among nations and to promote democracy and development within them. In particular, I want to discuss security assistance as it relates to two other key elements in our national security web: the fostering and maintenance of our alliances and the advancement of our arms control and non-proliferation agendas.

Promoting and Maintaining Collective Self-Defense Arrangements

Our efforts to promote and maintain collective self-defense arrangements begin with NATO. NATO has been the bedrock of Western security for nearly half a century. It is NATO that has enabled the allies to win the Cold War; it is NATO that will remain the keystone of European security for the long term.

Today, changes in and around Europe pose new security problems that require a renewed Atlantic alliance. Fortunately, we are no longer required to focus on a singular, direct threat. Indeed, the alliance is pursuing cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on many fronts. NATO is serving as one among several Western institutions which will engage the Soviet Union more fully in the world community.

We are adapting NATO to a new security environment. An example of how well NATO is evolving is provided by Desert Storm. The vital role of the alliance in support of coalition efforts in the [Persian] Gulf is clear. It was NATO's infrastructure bases, communications facilities, and command and control systems, which were so important in sustaining U.S. forces in the Gulf. Moreover, NATO political and security consultation helped ensure unanimity in support of war aims.

The meeting of NATO defense ministers last month agreed on important initiatives in NATO's military dimension, such as the formation of a multinational rapid reaction corps under European command. And, beyond the purely military dimension, NATO retains the initiative in arms control and other security negotiations, as well as the broader political agenda. At the last foreign ministers' meeting, NATO agreed on further steps in its liaison program with the Soviet Union and the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. It has taken a leading role in helping guide and develop the CSCE process. It is a forum for consultation, decision, and coordination on crises throughout Europe.

The role of security assistance here is clear. In order for several of our allies to have the confidence and capability to make a full contribution to the alliance, they need our help. Their

contributions to Desert Storm demonstrate the wisdom of our policies. I will outline our proposal for aid to NATO and other security partners later in my testimony.

Reducing Threats to U.S. and International Security

The second element of our efforts to promote security and stability abroad is the reduction of threats to our security and to that of others. There are a number of ways we do this, but there are two that I would like to discuss specifically: arms control and non-proliferation.

We have made significant progress in the area of arms control in these past few months. We believe that we have ironed out all remaining difficulties in the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, and we hope to be able to say the same soon for START [strategic arms reductions talks]. Throughout, though, we have been guided by two realities. First, arms control is a means to advance our security interest, not an end in itself. Second, arms control takes time. Recall that it has taken us almost two decades to achieve agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

Non-proliferation is a global problem that the Administration has been attacking on a global basis; indeed, in just a few days, I am making a trip to China that will focus on advancing our non-proliferation objectives. I hope soon to travel to South Asia to advance those same objectives. The presidential initiative announced May 12, under which we have proposed to destroy our entire stock of chemical weapons, has set the stage for achieving a global treaty banning chemical weapons within a year. In the Australia Group, U.S. leadership has produced a break-through in worldwide control of exports of chemical weapons and precursors and chemical weapons-related dual-use equipment. And in missile non-proliferation, U.S. activism in the recent past has promoted the expansion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) from 7 to 16 countries.

But while our overall non-proliferation concern is global, we intend to make a special effort in the Middle East, under the President's initiative on Middle East arms control. The Gulf war has heightened not only our concern, but the world's concern over the global impact of instability in the Middle East, and it highlighted the need to move forward expeditiously. The initiative is comprehensive, as you know. It contains proposals on missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, Iraq-specific measures, and conventional arms. Security assistance will play a key role here as well, in assuring that friends are confident enough in their own ability to defend themselves that they will accept the kinds of limits we are exploring under the President's arms control initiative. Security assistance in conjunction with non-proliferation and arms control measures allows us to assure stable balances that reduce tensions and the threat of war.

Helping Our Friends Defend Themselves

As we seek to persuade friends to take difficult steps toward non-proliferation and arms control, we must ensure that they can defend themselves against threats, both internal and external.

There are a number of different threats with which our friends may be concerned, and those threats vary on a regional basis. Addressing those threats calls for different discriminate responses.

For many, the threat is the familiar one: state-to-state violence, brought on by any one of the number of factors that can lead to war.

Some of our friends face purely internal threats, brought on by political and economic inequalities that have persisted over time, economic mismanagement, subversion, or natural disaster. Here our response is clear: we must promote and consolidate democratic values,

promote free market principles, encourage full respect for human rights, and meet urgent humanitarian needs.

Other friends face new, transnational threats—drug-trafficking and environmental degradation, in particular. These threats, too, must be met in the most appropriate fashion.

Indeed, some of our friends even face anachronistic Marxist revolutions, led by those who have not yet recognized the ideological bankruptcy of communism.

Where these threats can be met adequately with economic assistance, that is our clear preference. But, in many cases, they cannot. The reality is that, for the foreseeable future, assuring stability—and enabling our friends to protect themselves—will require that we continue to provide arms and related services and training when and where appropriate.

It is this logic that underlines the Administration's position on arms sales in the President's proposal on arms control in the Middle East. What we hope to prevent is one country's arming itself beyond legitimate self-defense needs and creating destabilizing military balances in a volatile region. Previously, there has been no multilateral system to monitor these types of build-ups. There were no international guidelines. No agreement exists among the nations that provide weapons to the region to allow transfers to be challenged as destabilizing.

I know that some would have us go further than this proposal. We might if this proposed regime can be achieved. The truth is, however, that this proposal will be tough for many of the other suppliers to accept. Based upon our preliminary discussions with them, we know that they have problems with transparency and other aspects of the regime. What we propose to do now is what politics—in "the art of the possible"—permits. We do not seek a regime that halts arms transfers, but we have proposed one that will seek to ensure that sales that do take place are responsible.

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I've told you that security assistance is an important tool for advancing our security interests; now let me demonstrate how our FY 1992 request is the right fit. Rather than "business as usual," we see this request as a blend of continuing priorities and new initiatives, a key vehicle for advancing our security interests. In Foreign Military Financing (FMF), we are requesting \$4.65 billion in budget authority to enable us to support a program level of \$4.92 billion, an increase of some \$215 million over program levels enacted in FY 1991. In Economic Support Funds (ESF), we are requesting \$3.24 billion in budget authority, supporting a program of the same size; our ESF request represents an increase of \$96 million over the ESF level provided in the FY 1991 appropriations bill. Measured against prior-year request levels, our ESF and FMF requests are smaller—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the budget and of GNP.

We believe that this request, if funded, would be money well-spent. One of my principal messages today is that—while we are responding to the changes in the world around us—the security assistance "system" isn't broken. Rather, the system of international security relationships that we have forged over time is fundamentally sound and supportive of vital U.S. interests, as Desert Storm clearly demonstrates. We need now to build on this success. Let me talk about our regional programs to show you why this is the case.

Near East and South Asia (\$5.51 billion)

The success of our international security relationships as well as the continuing needs are especially evident in the Near East and South Asia regions. In the Gulf war, Israel pursued a policy of restraint based on strength—military strength and the strength derived from strong U.S.-Israeli security relations. We remain unshakably committed to Israel's security, a commitment that we demonstrated with the deployment of U.S. Patriot missile systems and U.S. crews in the recent crisis. We are also committed to ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative edge, built upon superiority in advanced weapons, as well as in command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. Earlier this year, we requested, and Congress provided, \$650 million in supplemental Economic Support Funds to deflect the additional costs which Israel incurred as the result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Most recently, our commitment to Israel was reflected in Secretary [of Defense Richard] Cheney's agreement to provide 15 F-15 aircraft under the \$700 million drawdown authority authorized by the Congress, as well as a continued partnership in the ARROW program. Our request for \$1.8 billion in FY 1992 FMF grant financing and \$1.2 billion in ESF further underlines that commitment.

Egypt played a crucial role in mobilizing and maintaining support for the coalition. Over two divisions of Egyptian troops fought hard for the liberation of Kuwait. We expect that a moderate, stable Egypt with firm links to the West, with modern, well-equipped defense forces, and with stronger ties to the Gulf states, will continue to be a key partner in the region as we work to achieve a broader Arab-Israeli peace and to bolster moderate forces in the volatile Middle East. Our request for \$1.3 billion in FMF and \$815 million in ESF will provide vital support to those goals.

We are requesting security assistance for several other friends in the region whose help was critical to the success of Desert Storm, and whom we expect to be positive forces for stability in the post-crisis environment. In particular, I cite Morocco (\$40 million FMF, \$12 million ESF), whose forces deployed to Saudi Arabia along with our own; and Oman (\$5 million FMF, \$15 million ESF), where a decade-old security relationship proved its value.

As a result of developments associated with the Persian Gulf crisis, as well as our own budgetary limitations, we have reduced our requests for Jordan (\$25 million FMF, \$30 million ESF) and Tunisia (\$10 million FMF, \$3 million ESF).

We also request a total of \$214 million in security assistance for Pakistan. We have terminated aid to Pakistan since the President has not certified that Pakistan has met the requirements of the Pressler Amendment. However, we have not, and will not, cease in our efforts to convince the government of Pakistan that it can assure its national security through conventional means of defense. Our ability to make that effort credible rests on our being able to renew a security assistance relationship once Pakistan has met the requirements imposed by U.S. law and policy. We, therefore, request that the Congress provide adequate levels of security assistance—both FMF and ESF—to assure that the President has the resources to advance this vital element of our non-proliferation policy.

Europe (\$1.21 billion)

The Gulf crisis again underscored the long-term, strategic importance of Turkey in two theaters—Europe and the Middle East. Throughout the crisis, Turkey was vital to the success of coalition efforts. Turkey was among the first to take concrete, and costly, actions to enforce sanctions against Iraq. Its shutting down of Iraq's oil pipeline was as important to the isolation of Iraq as the naval blockade. The presence of Turkey's armed forces, deployed along its border with

Iraq, effectively pinned down 10 Iraqi divisions. Turkey provided key bases from which U.S. forces were able to carry out attacks on Iraqi military facilities. These and other supportive Turkish actions saved many American lives.

But these were not easy steps for a nation living in that neighborhood, and there can be no doubt that, by their courageous actions, the Turks incurred additional short- and long-term military risks. Turkey estimates that its support in enforcing the sanctions regime will cost it roughly \$6 billion, and the costs of deploying over 100,000 troops to the border have been put by Turkey at \$200 million for 1990 alone. We were able to provide Turkey with \$200 million in supplementary ESF in FY 1991 to defer a part of these additional costs, and others have made substantial payments and pledges as well, but Turkey's net loss remains substantial. Our security assistance effort (\$625 million FMF, \$15 million ESF) is designed to assist the Turks in continuing the multi-year program to modernize their air defense forces, and also in offsetting part of their military costs and economic losses, thereby deepening our relationship with this key partner for regional stability.

Programs in Greece (\$350 million) and Portugal (\$165 million in combined ESF and FMF) are important as well. We have a continuing interest in assisting Greece with the modernization of its military to support fulfillment of its NATO roles. Greece is a democratic state which can serve as a force for stability in the Balkans. Our program in Portugal supports that country's multi-year force modernization effort which focuses on air/sea defense of the North Atlantic sea lanes and on access to the Mediterranean Sea. Both these countries made important contributions during the Gulf crisis. Greece accepted deployment of logistics aircraft and furnished other assistance which greatly facilitated our operation. Likewise, Portuguese permission to use Lajes Air Base proved to be very valuable to the success of Desert Storm.

American Republics (\$980 million)

There are two major elements in our security assistance programs in the American Republics: support for the President's Andean counter-narcotics strategy and support for peace and economic development in Central America.

As the President said in his State of the Union address, the war on drugs remains a national priority. To that end, in addition to a request for \$171.5 million for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, we are requesting \$412 million in FMF and ESF for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help these democracies confront narcotics trafficking and develop their fragile economies. Our efforts, to date, have borne fruit: there have been significant improvements in counter-narcotics cooperation; coca cultivation has declined for the first time; trafficking organizations have seen their operations disrupted; and we have seen a corresponding drop in domestic cocaine use.

In Central America, much of our effort remains focused on war-torn El Salvador (\$120 million ESF, \$85 million FMF), where the reliability of our aid continues to be the element most likely to bring the conflict to a negotiated solution. Our economic assistance remains critical to the development of a comprehensive economic program to reform interest rates, narrow fiscal deficits, provide incentives for investment, and provide balance-of-payment support, just as it is in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica.

These assistance programs complement the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), and its key trade, investment, and debt proposals. While EAI is beyond the scope of my responsibilities, I hope this subcommittee will reverse action in the House which drastically cut back on our EAI request.

Africa (\$52 million)

In Africa, our security assistance is requested for countries that have been our close partners and for support of new movement toward democracy. For the Development Fund for Africa, our principal vehicle for overall assistance, we seek \$800 million to promote broad and sustainable economic growth. I want to highlight a new regional program in our ESF proposal which would provide feasibility in assisting African countries in making the transition to democracy. We also seek to expand our regional approach to military assistance to enable timely assistance in resolving Africa's devastating internal conflicts.

East Asia and Pacific (\$343 million)

Our clear emphasis in the East Asia and Pacific region is the Philippines (\$320 million in combined ESF and FMF). A stable, democratic, and prosperous Philippines with friendly ties to, and continued close security cooperation with, the United States is essential to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, as well as to broad U.S. strategic interests in Asia. Here again, our access provided important support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As you know, negotiations continue with regard to the continued use of facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic [Bay] Naval Base. We anticipate a successful conclusion. Assuring access to these facilities is just one aspect of a very important relationship.

IMET (\$52.5 million)

Last, but not least, let me add a word about the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET is a low-cost foreign policy and national security instrument that is recognized as one of the most effective components of U.S. security assistance. It provides valuable training for individual participants from foreign countries, and it promotes a greater understanding of the U.S. military and civilian control thereof, American culture and values, and respect for individual freedoms. And under an initiative promoted by this subcommittee, we are now sending civilian employees of defense ministries to U.S. schools to better promote the idea of civilian control of the military. IMET is a bargain at the \$52.5 million that we have requested for FY 1992 and should not be underestimated in its value as a very important element of our security assistance program.

We are faced with a number of difficult, but not impossible, challenges as we attempt to ensure security and stability abroad. Our international cooperation programs will play an important part in our efforts. We believe that we have a very good package in place and that the Administration's programs and requests make the proper adaptations for a changing world.