
Collective Security: A First Principle of U.S. National Security Strategy

By

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Strong alliances are fundamental to U.S. national defense strategy. The shared values, mutual defense concerns, and combined economic strength of friendly countries have provided a strong foundation for collective security that has served our nation well. Alliances have helped to protect U.S. interests around the world, have enhanced regional stability, and have served as an effective deterrent to Soviet expansion. Strong alliances remain critical in the post-Cold War security environment. Effective policy in a world of dynamic change continues to require strong alliances for both crisis response and long-term strategic planning. Additionally, in an era of changing security strategy where many threats are ambiguous, alliances may require special nurturing. Alliances that are allowed to erode require years to rebuild.

The United States is currently party to seven formal alliances, shown at Table 1. In addition, the United States maintains defense agreements and less formal arrangements with a number of other nations. Our membership in the United Nations also has collective security benefits and responsibilities. Most recently, the leadership role of the United Nations in responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has been impressive and serves as an example of effective implementation of collective security arrangements.

TABLE 1
U.S. ALLIANCES

- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance
- The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Alliance (although U.S. obligations to New Zealand are suspended as a result of New Zealand's decision to ban U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable ships from its ports)
- The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan
- The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Korea
- The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
- The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (which remains in effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand)
- The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the RIO Treaty)

The alliances and bilateral relationships which the United States maintains around the world facilitate communication among nations, improved integration among military forces, displays of military capability for deterrence of regional threats, training of lesser capable forces to better defend themselves, and most importantly, an overt demonstration of U.S. commitment to our friends. Additionally, through alliances and bilateral relationships, the United States gains critical access to regions for necessary forward presence and critical staging in the event of contingencies. The success of our alliances validates the long-held American belief that by helping to defend our friends, we best defend ourselves.

As the United States seeks to maintain the vitality of its alliances there are important activities that contribute to that effort. Among these are the following, several of which will continue to challenge mutual security relationships: sharing the responsibility for the common defense, international defense cooperation, overseas basing, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.

SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE

The United States seeks to concentrate on providing capabilities for which U.S. forces have a comparative advantage and to avoid duplication of effort with and among our allies. As the perception of a Soviet threat diminishes, publics and legislatures alike will expect to realize a "peace dividend" through reductions in forces and armaments. Nevertheless, as the U.S. considers defense responsibilities with its allies, the following issues remain paramount:

- The reduction of forces in consonance with reduced threats, arms reduction treaties, and consultation with allies;
- The improvement of the readiness, mobility, sustainability, and efficiency of forces;
- The support of long-term planning based on division of labor among active and reserve forces and mobilization capabilities, and further exploration of common and joint funding opportunities; and
- Further sharing in the costs and responsibilities associated with contingencies outside the alliance area by committing resources and, where appropriate, forces.

The security interests of the United States and its European allies continue to be closely tied. Through the shared political, economic, and military objectives and values of its member states, NATO has functioned as the most successful peacetime alliance in history. With the decline of communism and the emergence of free democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO will take on more political relevance as an institution of change and builder of security structures. NATO forces, while reduced in number, will continue to be structured to demonstrate cohesion and resolve and make the risks of aggression unacceptable. NATO is currently engaged in a strategy review to determine ways to adapt the alliance to these new circumstances in Europe.

In Asia, we have continued to make important progress in promoting the sharing of responsibility for mutual defense. Japan continues to provide substantial host nation support to U.S. forces in Japan, including rent-free bases, modern housing, and other facilities funded fully by Japan, and an efficient labor force funded more than half by Japan. Japan will increase significantly its support for U.S. forces in its next defense plan beginning in 1991. We also expect Japan to move ahead with improvements in its own defense infrastructure and to improve its anti-invasion defense capability as well as its ability to defend its sea lines of communication. The security relationship with Japan gives us the potential for access to interesting defense technologies

and significant opportunities to pursue dual-use technologies in support of our defense industrial base.

The changing calculus of security relationships in the region, and especially on the Korean peninsula, is exemplified by the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in October 1990 and prime ministerial discussions between South Korea and North Korea beginning in October 1990. The presence of U.S. forces in the ROK is still required to sustain deterrence against a militarily powerful North Korea. The U.S. presence also contributes significantly to regional peace and stability. The Republic of Korea has been increasing gradually its contribution to the costs of the common defense (its 1991 contribution will increase 115 percent) while maintaining defense expenditures of slightly under 5 percent of the gross national product (GNP). In addition, Korea helps fund depot maintenance of U.S. equipment and the cost of maintaining war reserve stocks on the peninsula, contributes to combined capabilities (including theater communications), and supports military construction projects. In November 1990, during the 22nd Security Consultative Meeting, both nations reiterated their commitment to retaining U.S. troops in Korea as long as the U.S. and Korean governments and people want them there.

The United States government continues to urge both Japan and Korea to assume a greater share of the mutual defense effort, not only in terms of defense money expended, but also in terms of building a credible defense capability. It is likely that U.S. forces deployed to East Asia will undertake wider regional and extra-regional roles—witness the recent deployment of Japan-based U.S. Marines and naval forces to assist in the Persian Gulf conflict. This makes it more important than ever that our strongest allies in Asia sustain the military capability to fulfill completely agreed-upon roles and missions in the common defense.

The crisis in the Persian Gulf has heightened the need for more effective security arrangements in that volatile region. U.S. and other forces from around the world in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries, at host-government invitation and in cooperation with the forces of those countries, are part of a multinational coalition. U.S. interests in the area, and those of many other nations including our allies, necessitate broad international cooperation in the development of long-term security arrangements with the nations of the region. The United States and its allies and friends in the region will continue to explore possible frameworks for arrangements based on the principle of collective security.

INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION

International defense cooperation demonstrates the global nature of the defense industrial base and the mutual benefits to be derived from cooperative research and development. Industrial defense cooperation improves overall U.S. and allied defenses and provides stability in production through sales, coproduction, cooperative development, technology exchange, and logistic support efforts. This cooperative approach supports the U.S. and allied industrial base, promotes modernization, and achieves critical economies of scale. The Department is seeking to take advantage of international cooperation opportunities, recognizing that such cooperation results in more efficient use of scarce defense resources of the United States and cooperating allies. The magnitude of international defense cooperation is impressive. As an example, there are 34 cooperative research and development projects under way with signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs). These have resulted in allied contributions of over 40 percent of the development costs.

OVERSEAS BASING

Overseas basing remains important to the execution of peacetime forward presence and to regional contingency operations during crisis. Foreign bases enhance deterrence, contribute to regional stability, and facilitate rapid response by U.S. forces in meeting threats.

The rapidly changing security environment has dictated changes to the overseas deployments of American forces. This will be most noticeable in Europe where a dramatic reduction in U.S. forward-based forces will occur. Even in Asia, where potential regional aggressors have long presented a more likely threat to stability than has superpower competition, some reductions will occur. A 10-12 percent reduction by the end of 1992 in the 135,000 personnel currently forward deployed to foreign countries in Asia is under way. In both Europe and Asia, a continuing forward deployed presence will be maintained in sufficient strength to deter aggression and fulfill mutual security treaty obligations.

In Europe, the United States will continue to maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces, modernized where necessary, to serve as the keystone to deterrence. The continuing U.S. presence there signifies our commitment to deter aggression and is vital to regional stability in an uncertain era of shifting military balances and political relationships. Similarly, our ability to reinforce Europe in a crisis, and to maintain the needed scaled-back but ready reception and basing facilities there, becomes increasingly important as our forward presence is reduced.

In Asia, the U.S. presence at bases in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines has historically been accepted and generally welcomed as a significant contribution to regional stability. Even if the U.S. basing structure in the region experiences changes in the years to come, continuing U.S. presence and access to the region will remain important to preserve strategic interests and regional stability.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The humanitarian and civic assistance programs of the Department of Defense have significantly advanced U.S. national security objectives. Provision of such non-lethal excess DOD materiel as medical supplies, clothing, tents, trucks, construction equipment, and food has assisted people in need in over 40 nations and strengthened our security relationships with friendly governments. This effort has included the use of U.S. military aircraft to transport privately donated humanitarian cargo and disaster relief missions worldwide.

Our assistance to the newly democratic states of Eastern and Central Europe, begun in 1990, has bolstered our developing relations in the region and reinforced our support for democratic institutions.

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs will continue to be coordinated with the Department of State and closely linked to related programs that are jointly administered by U.S. embassies and U.S. military commanders in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security assistance to allied and friendly nations is an integral part of U.S. national security policy. Its objectives are to assist allies and friends and protect mutual interests; to promote peace and stability; to maintain U.S. defense alliances; to aid U.S. friends and allies to defend themselves against external aggression, internal subversion, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking; to support

democratically elected governments and advance democratic values; and to help wage the fight against illegal drugs. Military aid and sales of weapons, equipment, and defense services enhance coalition defense by providing friends and allies with additional resources to assist in the common defense, and also by fostering interoperability with U.S. forces.

U.S. security assistance programs play a crucial role in sharing the responsibility for common defense in the new world order. Iraq's brutal aggression in the Gulf has shown clearly that the benefits of U.S. security assistance to allied and friendly nations are as important today as they were when the Soviet threat and its containment were the central focus of U.S. national security policy. U.S. security assistance programs have played a vital role in DOD's ability to speed deployment of U.S. forces for Operation DESERT SHIELD. Both the deployment and the remarkable U.S. success in marshaling foreign support for it would have been far more difficult without the political-military groundwork established by security assistance programs. The trust and familiarity built up over years of military cooperation were essential in Saudi Arabia's decision to invite U.S. forces to the region. Bases and access to facilities in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, and elsewhere have proved important to our ability to project power to the region. Egypt's strong response to the crisis demonstrates the wisdom of substantial security assistance investment in Egypt's armed forces.

In Latin America, experience shows that security assistance, in conjunction with other supportive policies, can help promote the conditions for stability with clear political, economic, and social benefits for the United States and the peoples of the region. During the past 14 years, such policies have been instrumental in creating an atmosphere in which dictators have been replaced by elected governments in nearly all Latin American countries. However, the process is still incomplete, most notably in communist Cuba. Despite great political progress, Latin America still suffers from massive economic and social problems.

Through security assistance, the U.S. can assist in three elements of an effective attack on the supply of drugs in Latin American source and transshipment countries: (1) economic assistance for development of legal alternatives to narcotic production and trafficking; (2) support to host country forces engaged in counternarcotics; and (3) cooperation with host country officials to sharply reduce drug trafficking. All three areas are vital to accomplishing this high-priority U.S. national security objective. Security assistance and improved host nation counternarcotics efforts are among the mechanisms for implementing the National Drug Control Strategy.


Security assistance objectives are met by the two major military components of the Security Assistance program: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. FMF provides direct credits or grants for the purchase of U.S. weapons and other defense equipment and services. The FMF program also promotes interoperability with allied and friendly forces, reduces unit costs of military equipment for U.S. forces by lengthening production runs, helps maintain the U.S. defense industrial base, and contributes to a more favorable U.S. balance of trade while protecting U.S. employment and tax revenues. IMET is a low-cost, grant aid program that provides military education and training in the U.S. to approximately 6,000 foreign military personnel each year. The IMET program is a remarkably cost-effective U.S. foreign policy tool. These foreign students return to their countries well trained and with an understanding of America and the American military profession. Within 10-20 years these high-calibre individuals frequently rise to position of influence in the armed forces or governments. The IMET program is also one of the most effective ways to strengthen the military capabilities of friendly countries.

In addition to these efforts, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, operating under State Department guidance, is an integral part of security assistance and has many of the same benefits to the U.S. as does the FMF program. FMS programs involving coproduction and codevelopment to

share increasing costs, while protecting key U.S. technologies, will become more important in the future.

Unfortunately, resource constraints and the lack of authority to redirect appropriated funds among countries as needed make it extremely difficult to meet all of the above-mentioned objectives. Funding for FMF, only 0.3 percent of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 Federal Budget (see Chart 1), has decreased steadily since FY 1984. At the same time the percentage of funds specifically earmarked in an appropriations act for particular countries by the Congress increased from 49 percent, reaching a high of 93 percent in FY 1989, and this year stands at 86 percent. As a consequence, FMS funding for those countries for which the appropriations act does not allocate a specific amount has declined by over 90 percent since FY 1984. In FY 1991, only 14 percent will be available to address the needs of the non-earmarked countries. Tying funds by law to specific countries provides little executive flexibility to address the rapidly shifting priorities that arise in these times of dramatic change.

In addition to FMF and IMET programs, counternarcotics support to Latin American countries has been provided through emergency assistance (in the form of defense materiel, services, and related training) from Foreign Assistance Act Funding, excess defense articles, and operations and maintenance funds.



Collective security is an extremely effective mechanism for the United States to preserve its global interests. Collective security arrangements must be viewed as long-term investments because they take time to build, nurture, and maintain. In the current environment of rapid change, we must be particularly sensitive to shifting roles mandated by new political, economic, and social realities. Collective security, however, will continue to be based on mutual interests and shared responsibilities.