
Democratic Development In Costa Mesa: Aviation Support To Nation Building And Security

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INTRODUCTION

This is the sixth in a series of articles by the authors exploring various roles, missions and functions of aviation in low intensity conflict (LIC) in support of U.S. foreign and security policies.¹ In our last article, "Internal Development in Costa Mesa: An Airpower Case Study in Nation Assistance," we portrayed the development, adoption and early stages of implementation of the Costa Mesa national internal defense and development (IDAD)² campaign plan. A likely range of U.S. foreign internal defense (FID)³ advice, assistance, training, and materiel support, from many Federal departments and agencies, was suggested along with political and bureaucratic obstacles the Costa Mesa government had to overcome to embrace and implement the plan.

The initial (1994) Costa Mesa five-year IDAD campaign plan featured the following prioritized missions for the employment of aviation assets, largely by Costa Mesa's air force (CMAF) :

1. Transport to remote, short landing strips of medical personnel (civilian and military teams), their equipment and supplies, and public health administrators.
2. Airlift and insertion (landing, rappelling or parachuting) of patrols, reaction teams, and rotational security forces personnel into rural/remote areas under attack, or at significant near-term risk of attack.
3. Airborne surveillance of key power production and water treatment/control sites by fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, during periods of heightened vigilance, especially at night (requiring flares, goggles, infra-red or other night vision equipment).
4. Transport and resupply of teams of medical inspectors, educators and sanitation specialists.
5. Aerial photography, topographic surveying and natural resources assessment; engineering equipment delivery.
6. Transporting government, civic and military leaders to population segments previously ignored; leaflet and loudspeaker public information missions.

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7. Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance to detect illegal narcotics processing, storage, distribution/transportation nodes; rapid movement of law enforcement teams and security forces to seize evidence and suspects.

There was considerable progress made in field programs that constructively engaged and assisted poor and isolated population segments, and in the joint military-police counter-insurgency efforts of the campaign structure's "Counter-Subversion Group" operations. (See Figure 1.) However, despite reasonably effective aviation, intelligence, and ground force security efforts, destabilizing violence has continued. As the guerrilla forces of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Costa Mesa (PFLCM) were defeated, captured, or chased across the northern border into socialist El Sol—the country whose government had long been sponsoring Costa Mesa dissidents—a new pattern of bombings, shootings and kidnappings developed.


THE STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY NEW DEVELOPMENTS

As the October 1996 national elections draw near, government officials in Costa Mesa note with concern a series of seemingly random events which are increasingly reported in local and international media. Despite an effective initial two years of the internal defense and development campaign, with counter-insurgency emphasis, domestic tranquillity as a prevailing condition has not been achieved. Aggressive counter-guerrilla patrolling and ambushing within Costa Mesa, and a competent (U. S. and Canadian influenced) counter-intelligence program, have eliminated El Sol-sponsored guerrilla operations other than an occasional squad-size action. A well focused public information and psychological operations campaign has increased popular support for the Costa Mesa central government, encouraged defections from Costa Mesa guerrillas and El Sol infiltrators, and largely negated the antigovernment propaganda beamed from a clandestine radio station in El Sol, near the common border to the north. Despite these successes, military and civilian leaders are perplexed at their inability to stabilize their steadily democratizing society. Continued random shootings of government and security forces officials, disruption of electric and telephone services, and an occasional car bomb generate fears and anxiety in the population. The Costa Mesa intelligence system is unable to pinpoint the perpetrators of the terrorist-type attacks which seem to aim at creating disruption and confusion in the society to embarrass the central Costa Mesa government and highlight the inability of security forces to protect the people.

At a private meeting with the U.S. Ambassador, the President of Costa Mesa expresses his frustration and concerns, and his views on the upcoming national elections. There is a close working relationship built on mutual respect after several years of counter-subversion advice and nation building support by the U.S. After consultation with Washington, the Ambassador agrees to offer assistance in the form of an *ad hoc* intelligence assistance team made up of military services, CIA, DIA, DEA and other agencies. The initial charter: pinpoint the source of support and the key operatives of the recent widespread attacks; determine their strategy; coordinate a plan for their defeat through joint operations by Costa Mesa government forces. The timeline: two months. Serving to underscore the urgency of the situation, that evening, a chartered bus carrying Japanese tourists from the airport to a beach hotel is fired on by two masked men with submachine guns. One tourist is killed, seven are wounded. The international press provides graphic coverage.

FIGURE 2

GOVERNMENT OF COSTA MESA
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD)
Campaign Structure (Suggested)



* (Vice/Deputy Ministers, Staff from Ministries; a few specialists/advisors/contractors)

*The four Groups will have government Ministries representatives forming the (relatively small) permanent staffs. Each group will have a different mix of Ministries' personnel as appropriate to the functional responsibilities and skills/experience requirements.

- Food and Agriculture
- Emergency Zones Civil-Military Administration
- Military Counter-Subversion Offensive Campaigns
- Police Counter-Subversion Activities
- Rural Security and Law Enforcement
- Remote Area Resource Development/Settlement
- Civic Action/Civil Assistance = Continuous Government Presence/Positive Actions
- Administration of Justice (Police, Courts, Legal Defense, Prisons)
- Transportation Network Development
- Telecommunications
- Human Services: Health, Education, Job Training, Social Safety Net
- Export Development and Trade Negotiations

INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE: CAST THE NET WIDER; TIGHTEN THE MESH

The 26-person, multi-agency U.S. intelligence assistance team arrives in Buena Vista, the capital of Costa Mesa, nine days after the U.S. Ambassador forwarded the urgent request. At their in-briefing with the Country Team, it was decided the assistance strategy would be to build on the small but dedicated Costa Mesa national intelligence service's capability developed over four years to counter subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Members of the Costa Mesa civilian and military intelligence apparatus will work continuously with their U. S. counterparts to facilitate optimal use of organic resources and avoid duplication of effort.

The next day, the ad hoc intelligence assistance team (IAT) met with Costa Mesa intelligence planners and operators and drafted a strategy to broaden the collection of key types of intelligence, from human intelligence (HUMINT) to electronic intelligence (ELINT), and to determine the source, or sources, of the continuing violence. When specifically identified, the operatives will be targeted for attack by Costa Mesa national level authorities, with implementation by the security forces (police and military). The strategy will parallel and complement that developed two years earlier to combat the insurgency.

A review of available in-country resources highlights several shortfalls in collection, correlation, analysis, and targeting capabilities for this expanded effort. The IAT outlines the following augmentation requirements to be met from U. S. resources, where appropriate and available:

- Additional coastal and riverine surveillance capability (SEAL, Coast Guard, and special boat units).
- Two additional airborne ELINT platforms with covert systems installed (Army aviation twin-engine turboprop aircraft).
- Enhanced urban surveillance and counter-intelligence training (CIA, Army, FBI, and USAF OSI).
- Installation of four man-portable HF surface wave radars along the Pacific coast for over-the-horizon detection of small boats and low flying light aircraft (Army, and USAF radar operators and analysts).
- Installation of a dense string of concealed, remoted ground sensors at natural border crossing points from El Sol (Air Force/U.S. Army Special Forces/two U.S. defense contractors).
- Installation of an artificial intelligence (neural network) all source intelligence fusion station to assist in analysis, collation, correlation, pattern and source identification, and event prediction (USSOCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and two U. S. defense contractors).
- A technology/information disclosure team with authority to remove sensitive sources and methods from intelligence data and release the sanitized intelligence information to Costa Mesa and U. S. analysis and estimation teams on a near real-time basis (DIA/CIA/Office of Technology Transfer).

Within ten days, these additional collection and analysis assets are provided and are sited to augment the existing basic systems.

Several days of operation provide considerably more detailed intelligence over a broader range of activities, but no significant analytical breakthroughs are achieved. Then, during the second week of operation, the ad hoc team detects certain apparently unrelated data that suggest a pattern. One of the airborne communications intelligence (COMINT) platforms detects HF radio signals from a transmitter in Buena Vista, but cannot pinpoint the site because of the brevity of the broadcasts. The signals recur every few days. The team requests an American defense contractor to deploy a prototype time-difference-of-arrival (TDOA) system to Costa Mesa to attempt to pinpoint the clandestine transmitter. Other shorter range, frequency-hopping radio transmissions are detected at three sites along the coastline, but rarely from the same locations. One of the HF surface wave radar stations detects a regular transit activity by small aircraft and boats well offshore. Unusual behavior by a few Costa Mesa fishing boats is also noted by harbor police and U.S. Coast Guard advisors: night sailings within two days of the offshore aircraft and ship transits, with few or no fish unloaded upon return. Bombings and shootings continue in Costa Mesa urban areas.

The intelligence fusion work station, linked to sanitized USSOUTHCOM intelligence data bases, is categorizing and analyzing large quantities of data. Random events are linked to form patterns, and what emerges is a surprise to almost every analyst on the combined IAT/Costa Mesa team. Virtually no infiltration of guerrillas has been detected across the border with El Sol. Ground sensors remain quiet for days at a time. However, coded radio traffic is occurring on a regular basis between urban areas of El Sol and Costa Mesa. A frequency hopping DF system, manned by a U.S. Army and Air Force team operating along the Pacific coast, detects and records a full message between two portable transmitters. Cryptologists break the code. It is a rendezvous instruction for a remote coastal inlet. Costa Mesa officials, augmented by U. S. riverine transport and observer assets, set a trap by infiltrating the area under cover of darkness and concealing themselves. Aircraft and government vehicles are kept out of the immediate area. Only farm-to-market truck traffic is noted on the coastal highway.

Just after two in the morning, a rubber raft is observed landing on the beach. Several wooden crates are off-loaded and pulled into the underbrush. Costa Mesa authorities remain concealed while the two-man crew launches their raft through the surf and paddles out to sea. Their exfiltration is tracked by one of the HF surface wave radar sites. A fishing trawler is noted merging with the raft, before departing southbound.

At five in the morning, just before first light, two produce trucks stop on the highway adjacent to the underbrush concealing the crates. The load is divided and one truck heads north to the capital while the other drives south to a small river town in a remote province. Costa Mesa authorities shadow both vehicles.

Upon entering the capital, the truck proceeds to the farmer's market, where the crates remained concealed under piles of produce until late in the day, when they are opened and their contents distributed among a half dozen produce "customers." Plain clothes police shadow six individuals to three locations which are placed under 24-hour police surveillance.

The U. S. commercial time-difference-of-arrival (TDOA) system arrives in the capital and is installed in two trucks. Within three nights, by specific positioning of the two mobile stations, the TDOA equipment pinpoints the elusive HF transmitter in an apartment building, and probable floor. Police surveillance spots two men departing the building about midnight after loading a cardboard box into a minivan. The pair is trailed to the local telephone exchange where they forcibly entered and were in the process of planting a bomb when the police captured them.

Other pieces of the puzzle are falling into place. Offshore aerial surveillance of the El Sol Atlantic coast (by Costa Mesa's "skyvans" and U.S. P-3 aircraft) reveals frequent, non-commercial air and ship traffic from South America into the Gulf of Mexico, with layovers at several El Sol airfields and sea ports. DEA officials working with the IAT confirm from their sources that many of the ships and aircraft are known narcotics carriers. The IAT effort concludes that the continuing violence in Costa Mesa is being actively supported by narcotics traffickers with the encouragement and cooperation of the El Sol government. Their apparent objective is to cause Costa Mesa authorities to focus on an ostensibly revived guerrilla insurgency employing terrorism, thus missing the narcotics flowing over, around, and through their territory. What began four years ago as an insurgent infiltration from El Sol has now been transformed into sophisticated, deceptive narco-terrorism. Bankrupt, aggressive El Sol now has wealthy collaborators.

THE POLITICS OF ATTAINING SECURITY AND STABILITY

Armed with evidence of narcotrafficker and El Sol collaboration to use and destabilize his country, the President of Costa Mesa took to the field to inform and mobilize the population for the struggle ahead, and to campaign for his party's candidates. The natural choice for transportation was the CMAF, and heavy use was made of the AVRO Skyvan transports and UH-1B helicopters, with occasional reliance on the long range C-130A. He was enlightened enough to offer available space on aircraft to his party's incumbent candidates, responsible (his definition) opposition candidates—and of course the news media.

The CMAF and police sought assistance from the U. S. Embassy on additional physical security measures that could be taken, air-to-ground communications privacy upgrades, and staging and scheduling techniques for spare aircraft and aircrews. The USAF's Foreign Internal Defense Aviation Group (FIDAG), already fielding a small training and planning assistance team in Costa Mesa, was asked to help. The Department of State and the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped with funding and, opportunistically, with the selection of a few U. S. electoral campaign technical observers, as requested by the Organization of American States' (OAS) elections oversight group.

As the elections of October 1992 approached, the Costa Mesa IDAD campaign leaders faced several dilemmas that steadily increased in consequence. First, balancing the limited aviation support between "politics," security and development (hearts, minds, root causes of violence and instability, basic social services, etc.) proved vexing. Secondly, a continued reactive approach to the narcotrafficker-insurgent threat would risk an unacceptable stalemate as a probable outcome. This could in turn destroy governmental—and democratic—legitimacy in the eyes of uncertain and uncommitted rural Costa Mesans.

A curious resolution to the Costa Mesan national policy planning dilemma came about when the U. S. government—itsself preparing for the Presidential elections of November 1996—offered to apply serious pressure to the sources of the terrorism and subversion, and respect the putative "non-involvement" posture of Costa Mesa's government. Specifically, the cooperative regional progress made toward a hemispheric free trade zone in the past three years convinced the U. S. President that the subversive aggression sponsored or conducted by the government of El Sol and the large Umberto narcotics cartel was unacceptable to all regional governments, and thus could be dealt with through vigorous, but plausibly deniable means. A presidential intelligence "Finding" was issued authorizing limited, and carefully controlled, interagency unconventional warfare (UW) style operations against the sponsors and hostile operators. Aviation would figure prominently here as well: clandestine insertion, extraction, resupply and strike missions; rescue and recovery; intelligence and target reconnaissance.

PROSECUTING IDAD AND UW: SEPARATE, DISTINCT, BUT COMPLEMENTARY

The strategic concept agreed to by the U. S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Mesa, and the interagency task force in Washington, D.C., was simple: the FID activities of the U.S. (and by this time of Canada, and a major Latin American country) would continue as requested and approved by Costa Mesa, per the IDAD campaign plan; the UW operations would be transparent, minimizing level and time of presence in Costa Mesa, and would focus on demonstrating to the opposition that they would pay an unacceptable price for continued subversive aggression and destabilization activities.

Small, separate and specialized U.S. and former El Sol aviation, ground, and maritime forces would be employed for the UW operations. All post-mission recovery would occur in pre-arranged territory outside of Costa Mesa and El Sol. The operational targeting included three categories, which are indicated here, with examples of each:

- A. Counterforce: terrorist/guerrilla/narcotrafficker staging bases in remote El Sol areas near the Costa Mesa border; ground and aviation transportation used to supply or move operatives to or across the border; where possible, direct riverine and air attack on guerrilla and narcotrafficker personnel approaching the border with Costa Mesa;
- B. Persuasion: destruction of propaganda broadcast facilities of the El Sol government (transmitters, towers, power supply) and selected bridges significant to movement towards the border.
- C. Retaliation: heavy U. S. interagency pressures—beyond routine operations—on the known and reasonably isolated facilities of the Umberto cartel, in El Sol, and other countries (by conventional DEA and other programs); selected attacks on El Sol military assets directly supporting the subversive operations; electrical power grid disabling actions.

The intended effects of the separate, simultaneous FID and UW efforts included denial of sanctuary, attacks at the sources, and constant pressure applied to the enemy on both sides of the border.

By early October 1996, just weeks away from Costa Mesa's election, there was clear evidence that the UW operations were having a major effect. The IAT had as many defectors as it could handle for interrogations and exploitation; the CMAF Tucano aircraft border air patrols were largely uncontested (thanks to the elimination of 6 El Sol long range radars); the incidence of terrorist attacks (bombings, shootings, kidnappings) was reduced to a small fraction of the early 1996 numbers; the U.S. and OAS election campaign observers were reporting relieved and enthusiastic pre-election local attitudes during the aviation supported rural "stumping" by the candidates. However, this was a corner turned, not a journey near its end. The requirements of a national IDAD campaign, especially those focused on attaining longterm peace and stability, are formidable and resource intensive. (See Figure 2.)

FIGURE 2
PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCIES/REQUIREMENTS OF COSTA MESA SECURITY FORCES IN COUNTER SUBVERSION PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

1. INTELLIGENCE:

- Target identification (and development) procedures
- Maps, charts, photo reconnaissance support
- Intelligence correlation and fusion process
 - Field level (operational needs)
 - National level (strategic analysis needs)
- Interrogation and interviewing
- Photo interpretation
- Document exploitation
- Counter intelligence

2. PSYOPS:

- Campaign design and development
- Politico-military integration of campaign
- Themes and messages
- Design and production of audio, visual, and studies materials for operational distribution

3. JOINT MILITARY PLANNING:

- Multi-service operations
- Special operations forces missions
- Counter-insurgency planning with national police forces
 - Military campaign
 - Tactical operations
 - Exploitation and consolidation of field successes

4. PATROLLING AND REPORTING:

5. COMMUNICATIONS:

- Command and control framework
- Operational security
- Electronic/communications intelligence
- Countermeasures, voice jamming, deception

6. TACTICAL MOBILITY:

- Fixed wing and helicopter transport
 - Logistics (airframe availability)
 - LOW level flight
 - Night vision devices
- Forward positioning of air and ground vehicles
 - Security of assets
 - Refueling
 - Austere area maintenance/repair
- Riverine equipment/capabilities

BACK TO BASICS: REPLANNING FOR INTEGRATED REQUIREMENTS

By February 1997, the Costa Mesa and U.S. national elections had passed, with minimum violence during both, and the UW campaign achieved significant success as measured against its overall goal of "dissuasion." The mid-cycle review of Costa Mesa's first (1994-1999) national IDAD campaign plan was in progress in Buena Vista, concurrently with the 1997 annual program update (delayed several months by the elections and preceding counter-subversion surge activities). Among the products of the working sessions was a list of questions prepared by the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense aviation requirements planners, intended to be shared with the U. S., Canadian, OAS, and United Nations aid and development observers. (See Figure 3).

FIGURE 3 AVIATION ISSUES FOR IDAD CAMPAIGN RE-PLANNING

- How much of each type of aviation will be needed?
- How much will be affordable?
- How will the necessary aircraft, supporting systems, aircrews and sustainment be resourced?
- What countries and international agencies will be able to provide financial assistance to continue and expand the IDAD aviation program?
- What countries will produce and transfer to Costa Mesa the aircraft, and training and support systems, that are required?
- How will periodic, scheduled maintenance and aircraft depot overhaul or refurbishment be programmed, funded, and accomplished?
- At what government level, and through what method, will priorities be established for the application of available IDAD aviation (by mission, time period, and aircraft/systems)?
- Will the regional free trade agreement better facilitate the flow of necessary aviation and systems technology and training without major delays?

At one of the final aviation planning sessions, an educational seminar was conducted with invited attendance by the FIDAG, a few U.S. Embassy staffers, USSOUTHCOM plans and operations personnel, and the U. S. contractor consortium representatives who had been assisting in Costa Mesa for over three years. The conclusions of the presentations and discussions were summarized for the attendees in seven vu-graph transparencies. These placed in context the aviation situation, recent operational experience, and the most pressing needs (Appendix A). The Costa Mesa air fleet, though small and aging, was generally appropriate in composition for the next IDAD campaign plan period. It would require some aircraft overhaul and modification, and expansion (perhaps 70% more airframes) to meet the ground and maritime forces core needs, while simultaneously supporting mobility and logistics for the health and development agencies. Financial realism prevailed, curbing the desire for more, newer, and technically advanced systems that could throw out of balance the funding available for the prioritized (and unchanged) objectives of the five-year campaign plan. (See Figure 4.)

FIGURE 4

PRIORITIZED OBJECTIVES OF THE COSTA MESA FIVE-YEAR IDAD PLAN

1. Medical and dental services expansion and extension, with emphasis on remote area delivery.
2. Protection of population from guerrillas
3. Protection of essential resources, especially key elements of the transportation, communications and electric power infrastructure.
4. Sanitation and health education
5. Engineering and construction for potable water systems, roads, schools, and electrical power distribution grids.
6. Psychological operations to counter and isolate the insurgency; aggressive public affairs to inform and encourage the population.
7. Counternarcotics program to reduce production, demand, trafficking, and money laundering.

CONCLUSION

The rudimentary representation of security and nation building challenges offered in our (now completed) trilogy of "Costa Mesa" articles is based on this suggestion: internal defense and development (IDAD) remains as difficult and complex as ever, and is perhaps even more important to those Third World governments attempting it in the post-cold war "violent peace" world. We also believe modern IDAD to be aviation dependent and to a significant degree reliant upon friendly external "training, advice and assistance", or foreign internal defense (FID), executed through formal security assistance, combined exercises/training exchanges, and several other methods of funding and deployment.

The U. S. military FID doctrine of the very early 1960's was farsighted and, with recent updating, remains on the mark with respect to the low intensity conflict (LIC) environment and issues of today. The LIC situations within Third (developing) World countries frequently feature disenfranchised, alienated and impoverished populations that ultimately will support any government, insurgency, or other powerful agent of change which they believe can improve their lives, or those of their children. If the legitimate governments of these populations do not attempt IDAD (by whatever name), and are not assisted in the attempt by FID efforts of friendly governments with definable interests there, the field is abandoned to one or more of the post-World War II scourges: insurgency, terrorism, narcotrafficking, war lords, etc. We do not want, and may not be able to tolerate, such outcomes in certain countries.

The authors believe that the U. S. government has an adequate range of policy choices in FID (and by implication, in revised security assistance, collective security arrangements, etc.) wherein wise decisions can further the interests and values of our country and those we choose to help. There are important moral, political, and legal distinctions between constructive involvement and intervention. FID as a foreign and defense policy instrument should facilitate the former, and cause us to be very circumspect about the latter.

¹Article One: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Airpower in Foreign Internal Defense" a paper presented at the 58th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 12-13 June 1990.

Article Two: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Toward An Integrated U. S. Strategy for Counternarcotics and Counter Insurgency," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 13 , No. 2 , Winter 1990-91, pp. 51-58. Also presented at the 2nd Annual SO/LIC Symposium sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, D.C. , 9-11 December 1990;

Article Three: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Building A Practical United States Air Force Capability for Foreign Internal Defense," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 4, Summer 1991, pp. 80-91. Also presented at the 59th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 11-13 June 1991;

Article Four: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Trouble in Costa Mesa: An Airpower Case Study in Peacetime Engagement," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2 , Winter 1991-92, pp. 99-108. Also presented at the 3rd Annual SO/LIC Symposium sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, D.C. , 8-10 December 1991.

Article Five: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Internal Development in Costa Mesa: An Airpower Case Study in Nation Assistance," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Summer 1992 , pp. 79-89. Also presented at the 60th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 22-24 June, 1992.

²Internal Defense and Development (Joint Publication 3-07): The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD and IDAD strategy.

³Foreign Internal Defense (Joint Publication 1-02): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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APPENDIX A

GOVERNMENT NEEDS

MOBILITY

VISION

PRESENCE

POWER PROJECTION/FORCE APPLICATION

RESPONSIVENESS

FORCE MULTIPLICATION

FUNCTIONS

TRANSPORT: People, Material, Information

RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE

ATTACK/DEFENSE

SEARCH, RESCUE, AND RECOVERY

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS

INTELLIGENCE

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

AIRCRAFT SELECTION

- **EASE OF MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR**
- **FLEXIBILITY: Function, Reconfiguration, Adaptation**
- **TRAINING REQUIRED: Aircrews and Support**

USEABLE LANDING AREAS

RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY

SURVIVABILITY

COMMONALITY AND COMPATIBILITY

SERVICING CHARACTERISTICS

FUEL EFFICIENCY

SMALL FAMILY CONCEPT

- **FIXED WING, single engine, TURBOPROP**
- **FIXED WING, twin engine, TURBOPROP**
- **HELICOPTER**
- **DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS**
 - **COMMONALITY**
 - **SUPPORT SIMILARITY**
 - **MULTI-MISSION DESIGN**

TYPICAL IDAD AVIATION SUPPORT PROGRAMS

PROGRAM	OBJECTIVE	PRIORITY /RISK	EST COST	AVIATION RESOURCES
RURAL HAMLET SECURITY	PROTECT THE POPULATION PREVENT INSURGENT CONTACT	H/H	H	TRANSPORT, SURVEILLANCE, LIGHT STRIKE
PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS	PREVENT ISOLATION OF RURAL TOWNS, INSURE COMMUNICATIONS, FACILITATE COMMERCE	H/H	M	SURVEILLANCE, LIGHT STRIKE, HELO
RURAL PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS	INSURE PUBLIC ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE, PRENATAL COUNSELING, DENTISTRY, IMMUNIZATIONS	M/L	M	TRANSPORT, HELO
MOTION PICTURE/ TV/RADIO SERVICE	BUILD PUBLIC AWARENESS/INCREASE SENSE OF INVOLVEMENT	M/L	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS	BUILD PUBLIC AWARENESS/SENSE OF COMMUNITY, IMPROVE GOVERNMENT IMAGE	L/M	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
RURAL PUBLIC EDUCATION	IMPROVE LITERACY, RAISE INDIVIDUAL EXPECTATIONS FOR PROGRESS	M/L	L	TRANSPORT
PSYOP-BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT	INCREASE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT, SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY	H/M	L	TRANSPORT
PSYOP-GUERRILLA DISAFFECTION	ENCOURAGE DEFECTIONS/SURRENDER TO HOST GOVERNMENT FORCES	H/L	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
GOVERNMENT-RURAL POPULATION INTERFACE	EDUCATE PUBLIC ON MANY ROLES OF GOVERNMENT, ENHANCE RESPECT AND SUPPORT FOR LAW/ORDER	M/L	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
RURAL VETERINARY MEDICINE	ELIMINATE DISEASES FROM FARM LIVESTOCK/PREVENT INFECTIONS	M/H	M	TRANSPORT
RURAL WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT	INSURE EVERY VILLAGE HAS ADEQUATE PURE DRINKING WATER	H/M	L	TRANSPORT

COUNTERINSURGENCY TASK	RELATED FID AVIATION CAPABILITY												COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK
	VISUAL RECCE.	ELINT	PHOTO RECCE.	NIGHT VISION	AIR TRANSPORT	VTOL INFIL/EXFIL	STOL INFIL/EXFIL	ATTACK	HUMINT	INTEL ANALYSIS	SECURE COMM	PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION	
FIND THE GUERRILLA	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X		FIND THE TRAFFICKERS
DETERMINE HIS STRATEGY									X	X	X		DETERMINE PATTERNS
SEAL OFF SANCTUARIES/DESTROY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	PINPOINT BASES/PLANTS
DEVELOP GOVT. INFRASTRUCTURE					X	X	X				X	X	DEVELOP COUNTER-CAMPAIGN
IMPROVE PUBLIC SUPPORT					X							X	PUBLIC AWARENESS
PROTECT THE POPULATION	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	PREVENT REPRISALS

FIG 1. Basic FID Aviation Tasks

COSTA MESA AIRCRAFT INVENTORY	RELATED FID AVIATION CAPABILITY												
	VISUAL RECCE.	ELINT	PHOTO RECCE.	NIGHT VISION	AIR TRANSPORT	VTOL INFIL/EXFIL	STOL INFIL/EXFIL	ATTACK	HUMINT	SIDE FIRING GUNSHIP	SECURE COMM	PSYOPS	
AVRO SKYVAN TRANSPORT (5)		X	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	2 PALLETIZED ELINT SYSTEMS; C3
C-47 TRANSPORT (5)				X	X			X		X	X		BEST GUNSHIP CANDIDATE
C-130A TRANSPORT (2)				X	X					X	X		HEAVY CARGO, PRIMARY
TUCANO TRAINERS (6)	X		X	X				X			X		V.R., LIGHT STRIKE/ STRIKE CONTROL
UH-1B HELICOPTERS (9)	X		X	X		X		X			X		INFIL/EXFIL, V.R., LIGHT STRIKE

FIG 2. Available Assets Versus Required Aviation Tasks