Sustainable Development and National Security

By

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It is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon and to be part of the 1994 National Press Club Journalism Awards.

I am particularly delighted to be here for the presentation of the Robert L. Kozik Award for Environmental Reporting. The winning entry for this award is Jane Day's story about the influences straining the San Francisco Bay, an enormously famous and extraordinarily rich national, and natural, treasure. It is, as titled, a story about a "Bay in Peril." In turn, it is a story about one of the thousands of ecosystems around the world being stretched to the limits of nature—and about this historic moment in history when we have the opportunity and the responsibility to look beyond the crisis of the moment toward the underlying causes that are making the world ever more complex and redefining the priorities for long-term national security and global stability.

REDEFINING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The Cold War, which defined long-term security for more than 40 years, is fast becoming a distant era. In its place, we face a range of unfamiliar challenges in a world itself so unfamiliar as to be nearly unrecognizable.

The changes and the choices that the United States and the world community now confront are every bit as demanding as those we have known since 1945. But the nature, diversity, and speed with which the new challenges emerge dictate an urgent effort to understand the long-term challenges of our foreign policy and to reassess the priorities for American leadership in meeting new tests and forging a better world.

As always, our interest is in sustained peace and prosperity. What is novel are the diffuse trends that will determine those interests in the future, when we pass on the task of governance to our children. What I would like to do today is suggest that the pursuit of sustainable development—the lofty idea launched at the Earth Summit in Rio—must be a pillar of renewed American foreign policy and redefined national security for the 21st century.

Sustainable development fundamentally means that the economies of the world, including our own, should attempt to meet the needs of today's generation without compromising or stealing from future generations. Understood and pursued, the idea of sustainable development can integrate and harmonize the enormously powerful economic and environmental forces at work in today's world. It is a concept rooted in the recognition of the mutually reinforcing nature of economic and environmental progress. Ecological systems are the very foundation of modern society—in science, in agriculture, in social and economic planning. Over the long term, living off our ecological capital is a bankrupt economic strategy. At the same time, most peoples and nations aspire to economic growth and scientific and technological progress, which in turn are the essential building blocks of environmental protection.

Unhappily, for far too long, concern about the environment has been regarded as a peripheral, soft issue that can be treated as luxury in the context of prosperity. Far too many will nod their head, saying "Yes, I'm for the environment . . . as long as it doesn't cost jobs." And it is within this terribly mistaken analysis that we encounter the fundamental intellectual challenge to sustainable development.

The biggest obstacle to the pursuit of sustainable development—here in our country or around the world—is the misguided belief that protecting the environment is antithetical to economic interests. The fact is that the economy is inextricably tied to the environment and totally dependent upon it.

Five biological systems—croplands, forests, grasslands, oceans, and fresh waterways—support the world economy. Except for fossil fuels and minerals, they supply all the raw materials for industry and provide all our food.

- Croplands supply food, feed, and an endless array of raw materials for industry, such as fiber and vegetable oils.

- Forests are the source of fuel, lumber, paper, and countless other products.

- Grasslands provide meat, milk, leather, and wool.

- Oceans and fresh water produce food for individuals and resources for industry.

In short, that's about all there is. That's the bulk of the economy. That's the foundation for all economic activity and all the jobs. Stated in the jargon of the business world, the economy is a wholly owned subsidiary of the environment. All economic activity is dependent on the environment and its underlying resource base. When the environment is finally forced to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 because its resource base has been polluted, degraded, dissipated, irretrievably compromised, then the economy goes down to bankruptcy with it. Is this just a theoretical concept? Of course not.

It happened in Central and Eastern Europe, whose profound environmental destruction we are only now uncovering and comprehending. It is, in fact, happening all over the world, even in many of today's headlined trouble spots.

RESOURCE SCARCITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFICIT SPENDING

Resource scarcities are a root cause of the violent conflicts that have convulsed civil society in Rwanda, Haiti, and Chiapas. These conflicts could intensify and widen as ever-growing populations compete for an ever-dwindling supply of land, fuel, and water. Professor Tad Homer-Dixon, of the University of Toronto, warns that in coming decades, resource scarcities "will probably occur with a speed, complexity, and magnitude unprecedented in history."

Current conflicts offer a grim foreshadowing of the anarchy that could engulf more and more nations if we fail to act.

- In Rwanda, the unspeakably brutal massacres of recent months have occurred against a backdrop of soaring population growth, environmental degradation, and unequal distribution of resources. Rwanda's fertility rate is among the highest in the world—over eight children per woman. The nation's once rich agricultural land is so severely depleted and degraded that between 1980 and 1990, during a time of unprecedented population growth, food production fell by 20 percent.

• In Chiapas state, Mexico, resource conflicts underlie the insurgency to the south. Unequal distribution of land and rapid population growth has forced poor peasants—mostly indigenous people—to eke out a meager living by farming environmentally fragile uplands. But these lands are quickly degraded, plunging the increasing population even more deeply into poverty. A similar cycle has been observed in places as diverse as the Philippines, the Himalayas, the Sahel, Indonesia, Brazil, and El Salvador.

• In Haiti, dwindling resources are even more central to the social collapse that has overtaken an island nation that was once the crown jewel of the French Empire. Almost totally deforested, its poor croplands divided into smaller and less productive parcels with each generation, these problems are compounded by a predatory government that has drained the nation's scant resources and failed to invest in its people. Looming ominously over this environmental, economic, and political collapse is the fact that Haiti's population of 7 million already unsustainable by every measure—is expected to double in the next 18 years.

• In China—home to one in five of the earth's people—severe water shortages and soil erosion threaten that nation's ability to sustain its population. Between 1957 and 1990, China lost some 35 million hectares of cropland—an area the size of all the farms in France, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands combined. This depletion is prompting an exodus from the impoverished interior to the booming coastal cities, which along with the demands of rapid industrialization, will combine into an environmental wall which the Chinese economy will soon hit full speed.

And it can happen to us, where our biological systems are under varying degrees of stress. As we continue to degrade them, we are consuming our capital. In the process, we erode living standards—it is a dangerous and slippery slope.

• The timber environment of our Pacific Northwest was ravaged, and the rivers, fisheries, and cheap power complex are not far behind.

• We from the American West should watch and listen for the alarm bells, as we draw down water on our high plains and wait, often blindly, for the inevitable economic decline in these farm communities.

• And next door to us here, something as seemingly simple as the oyster population of the Chesapeake Bay, which used to filter the entire bay every three days, is now so depleted that this filtration occurs only once a year, sharply lowering the health and productivity of this remarkable system of life. Can total collapse be far behind?

We are learning that environmental capital cannot be measured simply by counting trees, stocks of fish, or ears of corn. It also encompasses complex ecological systems that filter wastes, regenerate soils, and replenish fresh water supplies. Those systems, which we have belatedly begun to understand, form the very basis of life on earth. Ozone depletion, species loss, and the increasing carbon content of our atmosphere are all reflections of the fact that the planet's ecological systems are under great strain.

Our deficit spending of environmental capital has a direct, measurable impact on human security. Simply put, the life support systems of the entire globe are being compromised at a rapid rate—illustrating our interdependence with nature and changing our relationship to the planet. Our security as Americans is inextricably linked to these trends. The security of our nation and our world hinges upon whether we can strike a sustainable, equitable balance between human numbers and the planet's capacity to support life.

Why has this new aspect of security only recently been recognized? Two trends tell the tale. First is the exponential growth of the human population. World population has doubled since 1950 and now stands at 5.6 billion. Every year, the world gains another 91 million inhabitants—the equivalent of another New York City every month, another Mexico every year, another China every decade. Ninety-five percent of that growth is taking place in the impoverished countries of the developing world, which are already struggling to provide jobs and sustenance for their people.

At the same time, the industrialized world has developed the capability and consumptive capacity to utilize resources and produce wastes at a rate that is unprecedented in human history. Although we comprise only one-fifth of the world's population, the industrialized countries use two-thirds of all resources consumed and generate four-fifths of all pollutants and wastes.

So we are getting ourselves into a terrible fix—the globe's population is growing at a rate that is matched or exceeded only by our growing capacity to consume resources and produce wastes. This is a completely unsustainable course.

PROGRESS, CHALLENGES, AND REASSESSMENT

It is now fair for you to ask: "Okay, you all were elected to run the show. What are you doing about it?" And the answer is "plenty."

The Clinton Administration has embraced the challenge of economics and the environment, which is the challenge of sustainable development. We've gotten the first part right, in many ways far beyond what anyone had hoped, and this economic success story has been pretty well explained and reported. We are working hard as well on the second environmental part of the sustainable equation—less understood, in many ways more difficult, but absolutely essential if we hope to hand on to our children and grandchildren a world that is as productive or looks anything like what was given to us.

Clearly, economics is an essential foundation for this new definition of national security and what we must do. That is why President Clinton has charted a course for economic renewal at home and partnership abroad, as he said last week, "to focus on global growth in the short run, and then to think about what the world will look like in the next century and what we must do to get there."

The G-7 summit was completed last week. And where are we related to our developed global partners-the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada? The numbers are a startling success story.

- The United States has 40 percent of the gross domestic product of the G-7 nations combined. But in the last year, we had 75 percent of the growth, almost 100 percent of the new jobs, twice the investment, twice the export rate increase, and highest rate of productivity growth.

- We have gotten our deficit down to being the second lowest, and next year we'll have the lowest deficit of all the G-7 countries.

- NAFTA is being implemented, the Uruguay Round has been concluded, and our trade policy has clearly embraced an open, robust global marketplace as crucial for our long term prosperity and national security.

But the agenda of this Administration is far wider and more ambitious—weaving our economic plans and hopes into a sustainable fabric that will be a worthy legacy for posterity. In a far ranging foreign policy address to the UN General Assembly last fall, the President described how the United States is working to assure a secure future by promoting sustainable development.

And as he reiterated in a speech to the National Academy of Sciences 10 days ago, at the top of this agenda is population stabilization.

Addressing Population Growth. Unchecked, the spiral of population growth will dim every hope for economic progress in the developing world and cast a pall over every environmental endeavor. Population—and the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development—must be and is at the top of our agenda for sustainable development. American leadership has been restored in international population policy, and we have helped create a plan for Cairo that will launch a consensus and a comprehensive approach to addressing rapid demographic change—making family planning and reproductive health services universally available; sharply expanding the education of girls and focusing on child survival, male responsibility, strong families, and the engagement of grassroots, non-governmental organizations.

Part and parcel of our strategy is the promotion of the social, political, and economic rights of women—extraordinarily important resources for growth and agents of change. The return on these initiatives—in terms of stability, environmental quality, and economic productivity—will outweigh the costs for generation after generation. And in the next year—at the Cairo Conference, the Social Summit in Copenhagen, and the Women's Conference in Beijing—this will be a common theme of American foreign policy and, we believe, an achievable goal early in the 21st century.

Providing Basic Health Services. Similarly, provision of basic health services is a wise investment for the community of nations and can be achieved at relatively little global cost. The elimination of four major, easily preventable diseases—measles, tetanus, whooping cough, and polio; eradication of iodine and Vitamin A deficiencies; and the global availability of oral rehydration therapy are all achievable early in the next century. Successfully done, these measures alone would save 3 million to 4 million lives annually and perhaps eliminate upward of 20 million early childhood deaths, ease immeasurable, unnecessary suffering and make a significant contribution to lowering pressures for larger families.

Part of our global health strategy also includes a major focus on AIDS, recognizing that while a cure may be decades away, we can help with aggressive prevention strategies in those parts of the world where the spread of the infection is epidemic.

Preserving Biodiversity. Biodiversity is a third priority—a broad umbrella for the task of preserving God's creation, the biological inheritance that comprises all living things. This vast wealth of genetic information is critical to our long-term economic and environmental integrity, and we must do all that we can to preserve it. The Clinton Administration has signed the biodiversity treaty, which in turn was passed almost unanimously by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and should be ratified by the full Senate this summer. We can then go to the first conference of the parties with the momentum we need to help launch a worldwide effort to catalog, prospect in, and sustainably utilize this great and largely unknown library of information. The next century will surely be the century of biology, and we must be engaged in order to fully utilize these remarkable opportunities for new sources of food, fuel, fibre, and pharmaceuticals.

Measuring True National Costs. Integrating environmental and economic imperatives at the national level is a fourth unmet task. Nations, including the United States, can no longer assume that we bear no cost for fouling the air or depleting our resources. Instead, we need to internalize those costs and allow the genius of the marketplace to help determine the most efficient means of achieving our environmental goals. Under the leadership of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, we are embarked on a serious and difficult undertaking to "get the prices right," to develop a so-called green accounting system that can give us proper, unsubsidized measures of what is really happening in our economy.

Reforming International Institutions. Fifth is the challenge of reforming our international institutions to better promote sustainable development. The World Bank, the most important public engine for development, will play a central role in fostering the transition to sustainable development. We must work harder to encourage changes in lending practices to make good on the promise of greater emphasis on smaller-scale, decentralized projects to promote alternative development, to protect the environment, to preserve the rights of local populations, and to recognize the role of crucial sub-populations—particularly women—in the development process.

Forging Common Cause—The Challenge of Governance. This goal of institutional reform is part of the sixth and final challenge, which I will call the challenge of governing in the 21st century. Traditionally, we have assumed that our relationships with the rest of the world were like a hub and a spoke; we are the hub in Washington, and individual spokes go out to capitals around the world—to London, Delhi, Tokyo, or Bogota. But much of this traditional way of managing our affairs and dealing with world problems is changing as we move up to broader, cooperative international alliances and organizations and down to the rapidly growing network of private, nongovernmental, voluntary organizations. Let me explain.

In this post-Cold War world, our problems spill messily across traditional lines—global climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity, refugees, narcotics—all these issues have become concerns which challenge us all and must be dealt with through stronger multilateral, cooperative organizations. President Clinton raised this issue with our C-7 partners last week: isn't it time to re-examine our international institutions to be sure they are adequate to the tasks of the 21st century?

This will not be easy. Walls can be brought down in a day. Changing the consciousness of individuals and forging common cause among institutions is much, much more difficult. But we have a rich, if complicated, framework on which to build. The United Nations Development Program, UNFPA, UNICEF, the Commission on Human Rights—creative and capable all—must rally behind common themes and a common sense of purpose. I believe sustainable development will be that cause for the 21st century.

These ideas are not only supported but are also being championed by the team put in place by the Administration to reinvent development priorities for the United States and the world. That is the challenge of the Global Affairs unit at the State Department and corresponding teams put in place at the NSC and the intelligence community. It is the unenviable and often thankless task that has been taken on by Brian Atwood, who is trying to transform sustainable development from concept to reality—supporting broad access by people to their country's economic, environmental, and political decision-making. It is the work of Gus Speth at UNDP, where he is working to improve UN coordination and focus on sustainable human development, which links the abstract goals of sustainable development to people and their lives.

And the challenge of governance goes down to the great wave of people organizing to have a say in the direction of their own lives around the world, who have been far ahead of government in recognizing the challenge of sustainable development. The phenomenal growth of non-governmental organizations around the world is one of the salient features of our time. The OECD counted over 2,500 NGOs among its 24 countries in 1990, up from 1,600 a decade before. But that is nothing compared to NGO growth in the developing world. Roger Riddell of the Overseas Development Institute suggests there may be 25,000 grassroots organizations in one Indian state, Tamil Nadu.

The heroes of the Earth Summit in Rio were not the heads of state but the NGOs who defined and drove Agenda 21. Women's groups from around the world played a leading role in the organization and agenda of the recent UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna; in fact, they saved the UN commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And the preparations for Cairo

have not only reinforced but surpassed these prior standards. Our challenge is to enlist and engage the sensitivity, enthusiasm, and creativity that grassroots groups offer—a new and highly promising challenge for those who presume to govern.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DEPENDENT ON GLOBAL WELL-BEING

Together, the momentum that is building in the Clinton Administration and the citizenry reflect an understanding that our nation's security depends on more than military might. It recognizes that our security is entwined with the well-being of our neighbors. Political boundaries are porous, environmental devastation and disease do not stop at national borders. And the increasingly globalized economy has drawn more tightly the bonds that connect us.

In the newly configured world, national security is closely linked to human security. Human security is built on a foundation of peace and political stability, physical health, and economic well-being. The primary threats to human security may not be as easy to recognize as, say, an enemy's nuclear arsenal, but they are no less deadly.

These are the threats posed by the abject poverty in which 1 billion of the world's people live; the hunger that stalks 800 million men, women, and children; the spread of HIV/AIDS, which will infect 30 million to 40 million people by the year 2000; and the combination of violence, poverty, and environmental degradation that have forced 20 million people from their homes.

Here in the United States and around the globe, we are coming to understand the close connections between poverty, the environment, the economy, and security. This historic transformation demands that we now liberate ourselves—from outworn policies, from old assumptions, from fixed views that only yesterday seemed to be the dividing and defining lines of our politics.

Crisis prevention and the challenge of sustainable development are among the great challenges for the remainder of this and into the next century. It is time to retool our approach to national security—recognizing that our economic and environmental futures are one and the same. And it is these challenges which will determine the future we leave to our children and grandchildren.

And we have no choice. Let me close by asking you to imagine that a man is out on the ledge of a high building, and you have been asked to talk him back, to persuade him not to jump.

That is where we are today; the United States must take the lead in persuading the world not to gravely hurt itself. Some will minimize the threat or say that we don't have enough knowledge to act now. Others, including many of you here, have noticed that the man on the ledge has a rope tied around his ankle. The other end is tied to us, and if he goes down, we all go down together.

The dramatic arms buildup by Iraq and its role in precipitating the Persian Gulf War led many to advocate strong measures to control similar conventional weapons transfers in the future. Members of Congress proposed measures to control weapons flows to the Near East region, and both Houses of Congress passed measures requiring an arms sales moratorium to that area pending a conference of major weapons suppliers. President Bush, beginning in May 1991, launched an effort to secure agreement among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to limit the nature and size of their weapons sales to the Near East, and to set in place a procedure for these five nations (the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) to notify each other before they made any arms sales to Near Eastern countries.

This Bush initiative collapsed by the Fall of 1992 due to the inability of all participants to agree on how to achieve the overall goal of reducing arms sales to the Near East, and China's withdrawal from the talks after the United States made a major combat aircraft sale to Taiwan. The failure of the Bush proposal, however, has not deterred initiatives by some Members of Congress to advance a variety of measures to curtail the conventional arms trade, particularly in the Third World, and the nature of U.S. participation in it.

Meanwhile, representatives of American industry have sought support in Congress for legislation that would provide loan guarantees to assist them in the sale of American weaponry abroad. The Clinton Administration, meanwhile, is reviewing the potential effect of foreign arms sales on the United States military industrial base, as it continues to formulate its approach to American conventional arms transfer policy. Given these circumstances, policymakers will continue to be confronted with the question of how best to reconcile the economic interests and concerns of domestic defense industries and their employees with the goal of reducing potentially destabilizing weapons transfers to nations in the Third World.

This report provides unclassified background data from government sources on transfers of conventional arms to the Third World by major suppliers for the period 1986 through 1993. It updates and revises the report entitled *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985-1992*, published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on July 19, 1993 (CRS Report 93-656F). The data in this new report completely supersede *all* data published in previous editions. Since these new data for 1986-1993 reflect potentially significant updates to and revisions in the underlying databases utilized for this report, only the data in this most recent edition should be used.

Special Notes

1. **Constant 1993 Dollars.** Throughout this report, values of arms transfer agreements and values of arms deliveries for all suppliers are expressed in U.S. dollars. Values for any given year generally reflect the exchange rates that prevailed during that specific year. In many instances, the report converts these dollar amounts (current dollars) into constant 1993 dollars. Although this helps to eliminate the distorting effects of inflation to permit a more accurate comparison of various dollar levels over time, the effects of fluctuating exchange rates are not necessarily neutralized. The deflators used for the constant dollar calculations in this report are those provided by the Department of Defense and are set out at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2 Unless otherwise noted in the report all dollar values are stated in constant terms. Because all regional data tables are composed of four-year aggregate dollar totals (1986-1989 and 1990-1993), they must be expressed in current dollar terms. Where tables rank leading arms suppliers to the Third World or leading Third World recipients using four-year aggregate dollar totals, these values must also be expressed in current dollars.

2. **Calendar Year Data Used.** All arms transfer and arms delivery data in this report are for the *calendar* year or *calendar* year period given. This applies to both U.S. and foreign data alike. United States Government departments and agencies, such as the Defense Department (DoD) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), routinely publish data on U.S. arms transfers and deliveries but use the United States *fiscal* year as the computational time period for these data. As a consequence, there are likely to be distinct differences noted in those published totals and those provided in this report which uses a *calendar* year basis for its figures. These differences result from using two very different twelve month tabulation periods. (A United States *fiscal* year covers the period from October 1 until September 30.)

3. **Definition of the Third World and Regions.** The Third World category includes all countries *except* the United States, Russia, the former Soviet Union, Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

4. **United States Commercial Arms Exports Excluded.** U.S. *commercial* sales and deliveries data are *excluded.* This is done because the data maintained on U.S. commercial sales agreements and deliveries are significantly incomplete and are less precise than those for the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which accounts for the overwhelming portion of U.S. conventional arms transfer agreements and deliveries. There are no *commercial agreement* data comparable to that for the FMS program maintained on an annual basis. Annual *commercial deliveries* data are obtained from shipper's export documents and completed licenses returned from ports of exit by the U.S. Customs Service to the Office of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DTC) of the State Department, which makes the final compilation. This approach to obtaining commercial deliveries data is less systematic than that taken by the Department of Defense for government-to-government transactions.

The annual *rank* of the United States in the period from 1986-1993 has possibly been affected once—in 1991— by exclusion of the existing data on U.S. commercial arms *deliveries* to the Third World. Since the total values of all U.S. deliveries are understated somewhat by exclusion of commercial arms deliveries figures, those commercial data are provided here to complete this portion of the available record. The values of U.S. commercial arms deliveries to the Third World for *fiscal* years 1986-1993 (in thousands of current U.S. dollars), according to the State Department, were as follows:

FY 1986	$1,523,605
FY 1987	$2,698,316
FY 1988	$1,990,913
FY 1989	$2,599,205
FY 1990	$1,749,002
FY 1991	$1,596,629
FY 1992	$537,016
FY 1993	$494,354

MAJOR FINDINGS

General Trends In Arms Transfers To The Third World

The value of all arms transfer *agreements* with the Third World in 1993 was $20.4 billion. This was by far the lowest yearly total for agreements with the Third World for any of the years during the 1986-1993 period, whether measured in nominal or real terms. The general decline in the value of new arms transfer agreements with the Third World during the late 1980s was dramatically reversed in 1990 as the result of major new arms agreements related to the Gulf War. In 1991, however, the pattern of overall decline in the value of arms transfer agreements with

developing nations resumed in an equally dramatic fashion. This pattern of decline continued in 1993 (Table 1A).

In 1993, the value of all arms *deliveries* to the Third World ($15 billion) was the lowest total by far for any year during the 1986-1993 period. This is the sixth consecutive year since 1987 that the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations dropped significantly from the previous year. These declines have been relatively steady from year to year. Values of deliveries in 1993 (in real terms) were slightly more than a quarter of what they were in 1987. This pattern reflects the impact of the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Cold War, and a winding down of other regional conflicts in the Third World (Table 2A). However, given the surge in 1990 of new arms transfer agreements with the Third World, the total value of arms deliveries may increase in future years if most of these agreements are fully implemented.

The United States has come to dominate the much reduced Third World arms market in the most recent period. From 1990-1993, the United States made $59.8 billion in arms transfer agreements with the Third World or 52.2 percent of all such agreements. In the earlier period before the Cold War had ended (1986-1989), the Soviet Union was the single leading supplier, making $77.3 billion arms transfer agreements with the Third World or 40.5 percent (in constant 1993 dollars).

The Third World arms market, from 1990 onward, has been comprised of three general tiers of suppliers. In the first tier is the United States whose position far surpasses that of any other arms supplier to the Third World. In the second tier are the United Kingdom, France, and Russia whose positions are notably below those of the United States, but distinctly greater than the remaining arms suppliers to the Third World. The four nations in the first two tiers have historically had the means to supply the most advanced weapons systems to developing nations in quantity and on a continuing basis. But as competition for a declining Third World arms market increases, some of them may have difficulty sustaining the market shares they have held in past. In the third tier are China, other European suppliers, and other non-European suppliers—that have generally been marginal or sporadic participants in the Third World arms trade. The names of countries in this third tier are likely to change over time, especially at its lower end, since some of these nations lack the means to be major suppliers of advanced military equipment on a sustained basis. Some of them, however, are capable of having an impact on potential conflicts within Third World regions because of their willingness to supply weapons based almost exclusively on commercial considerations, including types of weapons that other suppliers refuse to provide (Tables 1A, 1F, 2A, and 2F).

The Third World continues to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 1986-1993, the value of arms transfer agreements with the Third World comprised 71.7 percent of all such agreements worldwide. In 1993, the value of arms transfer agreements with the Third World constituted 64.2 percent of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (Table 1A).

United States

In 1993, the total value, in real terms, of U.S. arms transfer agreements with the Third World increased marginally from the previous year's total, rising from nearly $14.6 billion in 1992 to $14.8 billion in 1993. For the fourth year in a row, the United States ranked first by a substantial margin in arms transfer agreements with the Third World. The U.S. share of the value of all such agreements was 72.6 percent in 1993, up dramatically from 55.8 percent in 1992 (Tables 1A and 1B).

The United States' ranking in arms transfer agreements with the Third World in 1993 is directly attributable to costly new orders from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Saudis bought 72

F-15 fighter aircraft and associated missiles and bombs as well as expensive military support services. Kuwait purchased 256 M1A2 main battle tanks and a variety of other ground combat support vehicles as well as related ammunition and spare parts. In 1993, the total values of the arms transfer agreements of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with the United States were $9.5 billion and $2.2 billion respectively. These agreements collectively constituted 79 percent of the value of all U.S. arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 1993. The value of Kuwait's arms transfer agreements with the United States alone in 1993 exceeded the total value ($1.8 billion) of all arms transfer agreements made by the United Kingdom (the second leading supplier) with the entire Third World in the same year.

The signing of a few particularly large contracts for major weapons systems generally determines whether the total value of U.S arms transfer agreements in any given year is high relative to other years. The Third World agreements figure for the United States in 1993 illustrates this point. Exceptional arms agreements totals for 1990-1993 can be directly related to the Persian Gulf war. United States arms transfer agreements totals for 1990-1993 to the Near East region constituted 68 percent of the value of all arms transfer agreements made by all suppliers to that region during these years.

*Russia**

The total value of Russia's agreements with the Third World rose slightly, from $1.6 billion in 1992 to $1.8 billion in 1993, ranking it third among all suppliers in 1993. Russia's share of all Third World arms transfer agreements increased as well, rising from 5.9 percent in 1992 to 8.8 percent in 1993 (in constant 1993 dollars) (Tables 1A and 1B).

During the 1986-1993 period, Russian arms transfer agreements with developing nations ranged from a high of $27 billion in 1987 to a low of $1.6 billion in 1992 (in constant 1993 dollars). Each year after 1987, Russian arms transfer agreement totals have declined from those of the previous year, until 1993. These data document a progressive and dramatic fall in arms transfer agreements by Russia as the internal difficulties of the former Soviet Union mounted, hastening the ultimate political decision to dissolve the Union into independent states at the end of 1991. They also indicate that Russia no longer plays the leading role in the Third World arms market that it once did.

Russia has had long-standing supplier relationships with many of the leading purchasers of weapons in the Third World, relationships that were significantly motivated by Cold War considerations. Russia has provided these purchasers with a wide range of armaments from the highly sophisticated to the most basic, including a large quantity of munitions. It has also actively sought to export weapons as an important means of gaining needed hard currency.

Due to the domestic economic problems it has encountered in recent years, as well as the Cold War's end, Russia has terminated its grant military assistance program with most of its traditional arms clients in the Third World. At the same time, Russia has sought arms deals with countries such as Iran that can pay for weapons in hard currency. These developments, with the loss of Iraq as a major arms purchaser, are major factors that explain why the overall value of Russian arms transfer agreements dropped so sharply in recent years, while the value of arms agreements with Iran, by contrast, have increased. Among the weapons systems sold to Iran by Russia in recent years are MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter bombers, T-72 main battle tanks and Kilo class attack submarines. Russia has also resumed an important arms supplier relationship with China,

* Russia is used throughout the text, tables and charts, although data for *all* years prior to 1992 represent transactions of the former Soviet Union as a whole. Russia was by far the principal arms producer and exporter of all the former Soviet republics, and the political center for decision-making by the former Soviet Union. Data for *1992 and 1993* are for *Russia* exclusively.

after a lapse of two decades, selling Su-27 fighter aircraft in 1991, and continues to explore the prospects of new sales of other weapons. Russia is continuing an aggressive marketing effort to sell its weapons to developing nations aimed at old clients and new. It has reached agreement with Malaysia for the purchase of Mig-29 fighter aircraft and the United Arab Emirates for the purchase of armored vehicles. Other efforts by Russia to secure new clients for its arms have been less successful, due to an important degree to concerns by prospective buyers that Russia may not be a reliable supplier of the spare parts and support services needed to utilize its weapons systems, and the knowledge that comparable, if not superior equipment, is available from established Western suppliers.

China

In the 1980s, China emerged as an important supplier of arms to the Third World, in large measure due to agreements with Iran and Iraq during their war. The value of China's agreements with the Third World peaked at $5.8 billion in 1987. China ranked fifth among all suppliers in the value of its arms transfer agreements with the Third World from 1990-1993. Since the Persian Gulf War, the value of Chinese arms transfer agreements with developing nations has fallen dramatically, registering only $300 million in 1993 compared to $2.5 billion in 1990. China ranked sixth among all suppliers to the Third World in 1993 (in constant 1993 dollars) (Table 1A).

China's arms transfer agreements with the Third World fell sharply after 1990 because Russia displaced China as Iran's preferred arms supplier. Iraq, another important Chinese client, was barred from arms purchases by the U.N. embargo after August 1990. Beyond the Near East region, China has not had many arms clients with large financial resources or major weapons purchasing programs. China seems ill placed to sustain a high level of arms sales to the Near East region with stiff competition from suppliers such as Russia that can provide more modern and sophisticated weaponry.

Despite the overall decline in the volume of arms transfers, China's missiles have been of continuing interest to certain Third World purchasers. In the latter half of the 1980s, China sold and delivered CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to Saudi Arabia, Silkworm anti-shipping missiles to Iran, and anti-tank and other surface-to-surface missiles to various purchasers in developing nations. China's willingness to abide by the guidelines on missile transfers set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is ambiguous at best. China is especially sensitive to arrangements that it perceives infringe on is rights as an independent, sovereign, nation. With need to obtain hard currency, China's seems prepared to pursue arms sales opportunities it deems appropriate wherever they present themselves. China appears most reluctant to commit itself to an arms control regime that would undermine its ability to market military items or technology attractive to prospective buyers in developing nations.

Major West Europeans

The four major West European suppliers (France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy) registered a significant decline in their collective share of all arms transfer agreements with the Third World in 1993, falling to 12.7 percent from 28.8 percent in 1992. Of these suppliers, France posted a notable decrease in the value of its agreements from $4.1 billion in 1992 to $200 million in 1993. The value of the United Kingdom's agreements decreased from $2.2 billion in 1992 to $1.8 billion in 1993. Germany registered a comparable decrease from over $700 million in 1992 to $600 million in 1993. Italy's Third World agreements in 1993 were effectively nil, down from over $500 million in 1992 (in constant 1993 dollars) (Tables 1A and 1B).

Throughout the period 1986-1993, the major West European suppliers, as a group, averaged 19 percent of all arms transfer agreements with the Third World. Even as the Cold War wound down, the major West European suppliers have generally maintained their share of arms transfer

agreements. For the 1990-1993 period, they collectively averaged 17.9 percent of all arms transfer agreements with the Third World. Individual suppliers within the major West European group have had exceptional years for arms agreements, such as France in 1989 and 1992 ($4.4 billion and $4.1 billion respectively); and the United Kingdom in 1988 ($24.4 billion) (in constant 1993 dollars). Such totals have reflected the conclusion of a few large arms transfer agreements with a major Third World purchaser. (Tables 1A and 1B).

Because the four major West European suppliers produce both advanced and basic ground, air, and naval weapons systems, they have the capability to compete successfully with the United States and Russia, for arms sales contracts throughout the Third World. Because major West European suppliers, such as France and the United Kingdom, do not often tie their arms sales decisions to foreign policy considerations but essentially to economic ones, they have provided a viable alternative source of arms for some nations to whom the United States will not sell for policy reasons. Generally, strong government marketing support for foreign arms sales enhances the competitiveness of weapons produced by these major West European suppliers. But in the post-Cold War environment, and a shrinking global marketplace, individual West European suppliers may be hard pressed to secure large new arms contracts with developing nations on a routine basis. Therefore, they may choose not to compete for sales of some weapons categories, reducing or eliminating some weapons categories actually produced. They may also seek to engage in joint production ventures with other weapons suppliers.

Regional Arms Transfer Agreement Values

Two significant Near East conflicts, the Iran-Iraq War in its last years, 1986-1988, and the Persian Gulf crisis from August 1990-February 1991 played a major role in stimulating high levels of arms transfer agreements with nations in that region, during the period covered by this report. The Persian Gulf war, in particular, stimulated new demand by key nations such as Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for a variety of advanced weapons systems, not only in response to Iraq's failed aggression against Kuwait, but also to concerns about potential threats from a resurgent Iran. The end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Cold War and the Persian Gulf war have collectively led to a reorientation of efforts by arms producers in seeking sales opportunities in the Third World. Major new weapons sales have occurred recently in both Asia and the Near East regions. Data on regional arms transfer agreements from 1986-1993 reflect the particular importance of these two Third World regions as international arms markets:

Near East

- The Near East is currently the largest Third World arms market. In 1986-1989 it accounted for 56.1 percent of the total value of all Third World arms transfer agreements. During 1990-1993, the region accounted for 58.8 percent of all such agreements.

- The United States has dominated arms transfer agreements with the Near East during the 1990-1993 time period with 68 percent of their total value; in contrast, Russia and the United Kingdom collectively accounted for 45.6 percent in 1986-1989.

Asia

- Asia is the second largest Third World arms market and it is growing. In the earlier period (1986-1989), Asia accounted for 26.1 percent of the total value of all Third World arms transfer agreements. During 1990-1993, the region accounted for 38.1 percent of all such agreements.

- Russia ranked first in arms transfer agreements with Asia in 1986-1989 with 60.2 percent. This region includes some of Russia's largest traditional arms clients such as India, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. The United States ranked a distant second with 18.9 percent. The major West European suppliers, as a group, made 9.2 percent of this region's agreements in 1986-1989. In the later period (1990-1993), the United States ranked first in Asian agreements with 34.9 percent on the strength of a major aircraft sale to Taiwan. Russia ranked second with 30 percent. France ranked third with nearly 16 percent, primarily due to a major aircraft sale to Taiwan. The major West European suppliers, together, made 24.9 percent of this region's agreements in 1990-1993.

Leading Third World Arms Purchasers

Saudi Arabia has been, by a wide margin, the leading Third World arms purchaser from 1986-1993, making arms transfer *agreements* totaling $67.7 billion during these years (in *current* dollars). In both the 1986-1989 and 1990-1993 periods, the value of its arms transfer agreements were very high ($32.6 billion in 1986-1989 and $35.1 billion in 1990-1993). The total value of all Third World arms transfer agreements from 1986-1993 was $266.5 billion (in *current* dollars). Thus, Saudi Arabia alone was responsible for roughly one-fourth (25.4 percent) of all Third World arms transfer agreements during these eight years. In the most recent period—1990-1993—Saudi Arabia alone accounted for roughly one-third (32.4 percent) of all Third World arms transfer agreements ($35.1 billion out of $108.3 billion) (in *current* dollars). Saudi Arabia ranked first among all Third World recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 1993, concluding $9.6 billion in such agreements. The principal Saudi purchase contributing to this 1993 total was a $9 billion agreement with the United States for 72 F-15 fighter aircraft (Table 1I).

Eight of the ten leading Third World arms recipients during the 1986-1993 period registered declines in the value of their arms transfer *agreements* from the 1986-1989 period to the 1990-1993 period. Six of these were traditional customers of Russia. Iraq, which purchased $16.3 billion in 1986-1989, bought only $1.5 billion in the next four years, reflecting the cutoff of its arms supplies after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; Angola declined 87.3 percent, Vietnam 80.6 percent, India 70.2 percent, Cuba 61.2 percent, and Afghanistan 38.1 percent. These figures reflect the diminished financial support for these countries by Russia in the post-Cold War era. Two major U.S. customers registered increases in the values of their arms transfer agreements from 1986-1989 to 1990-1993. Taiwan rose by a very dramatic amount (527 percent) due to a major aircraft purchase in 1992, and Saudi Arabia rose 7.7 percent. Egypt fell 25.8 percent (Table 1I).

Despite some large decreases in the values of the arms transfer *agreements* of specific nations from 1986-1989 to 1990-1993, the top ten recipient nations in both time periods still accounted for the major portion of the total Third World arms market. During 1986-1889 the top ten collectively accounted for 67.3 percent of *all* Third World arms transfer agreements. During 1990-1993 the top ten collectively accounted for 76.9 percent of all such agreements. Arms transfer *agreements* with the top ten Third World recipients, as a group, totaled $18.1 billion in 1993 or 88.7 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in that year. This reflects a growing concentration of total Third World arms purchases by relatively few countries. Between 1986-1993 the top ten collectively made 65.8 percent of all arms transfer agreements in the Third World ($175.4 billion out of $266.5 billion) (in *current* dollars) (Table 1I).

Saudi Arabia ranked first among all Third World recipients in the value of arms transfer *agreements* in 1993, concluding $9.6 billion in such agreements. The United States was its principal supplier, selling it 72 F-15 combat fighter aircraft. Kuwait, ranking second in agreements in 1993 at $3.4 billion, made a major purchase of 256 M1A2 main battle tanks from the United States.

Saudi Arabia was by far the leading recipient of arms *deliveries* in the Third World in 1993, receiving $6.4 billion in such deliveries. Saudi Arabia alone received 42.7 percent of the total value of all arms deliveries to the Third World in 1993.

Arms *deliveries* to the top ten Third World recipients, as a group, constituted $13.3 billion, or 88.7 percent of all arms deliveries to the Third World in 1993. Six of the top ten recipients were in the Near East region.

Weapon Types Recently Delivered to the Third World

Regional *weapons delivery* data reflect the diverse sources of supply of conventional weaponry available to Third World nations. Even though Russia, the United States and the four major West European suppliers dominate in the delivery of the fourteen classes of weapons examined, it is also evident that the other European suppliers, and non-European suppliers, including China, are capable of being leading suppliers of selected types of conventional armaments to developing nations (Table 3).

Weapons deliveries to the Near East, the largest purchasing region in the Third World, reflect the substantial quantities and types delivered by both major and lesser suppliers. The following is an illustrative summary of weapons deliveries to this region by supplier for the period 1990-1993.

Russia:

- 600 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 290 artillery pieces
- 450 APCs and armored cars
- 1 major surface combatant
- 2 submarines
- 60 supersonic combat aircraft
- 30 helicopters
- 220 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
- 80 anti-shipping missiles

United States:

- 792 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 933 APCs and armored cars
- 225 supersonic combat aircraft
- 66 helicopters
- 1,265 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

China:

- 360 artillery pieces
- 60 supersonic combat aircraft
- 140 surface-to-surface missiles
- 60 anti-shipping missiles

Major West European suppliers:

- 190 artillery pieces
- 45 minor surface combatants
- 70 supersonic combat aircraft
- 1,080 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
- 120 anti-shipping missiles

All other European suppliers:

- 270 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 720 artillery pieces
- 270 APCs and armored cars

All other suppliers:

- 100 APCs and armored cars
- 150 artillery pieces
- 130 supersonic combat aircraft
- 130 surface-to-surface missiles

Large quantities of major combat systems were delivered to the Near East region from 1990-1993, especially tanks and self-propelled guns, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, supersonic combat aircraft, and air defense missiles. While some of the deliveries totals to the Near East in certain categories during 1990-1993 are lower than those made during the 1986-1989 period—at a time when the Iran-Iraq War and the Cold War were critical factors in precipitating them—they nonetheless represent significant levels of arms transfers. The United States, the major West Europeans, Russia, China, and all other non-European suppliers collectively, made significant deliveries of supersonic combat aircraft to the region. Russia, the United States, and all European suppliers collectively, other than the four major West Europeans, were the principal suppliers of tanks and self-propelled guns. These two weapons categories—supersonic combat aircraft and tanks and self-propelled guns—are especially costly and are an important part of the dollar values of arms deliveries of Russia, the United States, and the major West European suppliers to the Near East region during the 1990-1993 period. The cost of naval combatants is also significant and the delivery of two submarines and one major surface combatant by Russia and forty-five minor surface combatants by the major West European suppliers during this period also contributed notably to the total value of their respective deliveries to the Near East for these years.

It is also important to note that some of the less expensive weapons systems delivered to the Near East can be very deadly and create a significant security threat within the region. In particular, from 1990-1993, China delivered 60 anti-shipping missiles, Russia delivered 80, and the major West Europeans, collectively, delivered 120. China also delivered 140 surface-to-surface missiles, while all other non-European suppliers collectively delivered 130.

These data further indicate that a number of suppliers, other than the dominant ones, delivered large quantities of weapons such as artillery pieces and armored vehicles to the Near East from 1990-1993. China delivered 360 artillery pieces, European suppliers—excluding the four major West Europeans—delivered 720 artillery pieces and 270 APCs and armored cars, as well as 270 tanks and self-propelled guns. All other non-European suppliers collectively delivered 150 artillery pieces and 100 APCs and armored cars.

TABLE 1A

ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, BY SUPPLIER, 1986-1993
(In millions of constant 1993 U.S. dollars)

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL 1986-1993
United States	4,201	6,205	10,258	8,432	16,139	14,266	14,587	14,835	88,925
Russia	20,551	27,044	16,362	13,339	12,287	6,010	1,550	1,800	98,943
France	1,269	3,442	1,423	4,446	3,321	3,058	4,134	200	21,292
United Kingdom	1,015	615	24,425	912	1,439	316	2,170	1,800	32,692
China	2,283	5,778	2,964	1,824	2,546	527	310	300	16,532
Germany	634	1,721	237	456	443	1,160	723	600	5,974
Italy	761	246	237	342	221	105	517	0	2,430
All Other European	9,260	3,073	2,253	3,534	1,439	1,476	930	200	22,166
All Others	2,918	3,073	3,320	1,938	1,992	1,054	1,240	700	16,236
TOTAL	42,892	51,196	61,480	35,225	39,827	27,973	26,161	20,435	305,190

TABLE 1B

ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, BY SUPPLIER, 1986-1993
(Expressed as a percent of total, by year)

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
United States	9.80%	12.12%	16.69%	23.94%	40.52%	51.00%	55.76%	72.60%
Russia	47.91%	52.82%	26.61%	37.87%	30.85%	21.49%	5.93%	8.81%
France	2.96%	6.72%	2.31%	12.62%	8.34%	10.93%	15.80%	0.98%
United Kingdom	2.37%	1.20%	39.73%	2.59%	3.61%	1.13%	8.30%	8.81%
China	5.32%	11.29%	4.82%	5.18%	6.39%	1.88%	1.19%	1.47%
Germany	1.48%	3.36%	0.39%	1.29%	1.11%	4.15%	2.77%	2.94%
Italy	1.77%	0.48%	0.39%	0.97%	0.56%	0.38%	1.98%	0.00%
All Other European	21.59%	6.00%	3.66%	10.03%	3.61%	5.28%	3.56%	0.98%
All Others	6.80%	6.00%	5.40%	5.50%	5.00%	3.77%	4.74%	3.43%
[Major West European *	*8.58%*	*11.77%*	*42.81%*	*17.48%*	*13.62%*	*16.58%*	*28.84%*	*12.72%*]
TOTAL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

*Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy.

TABLE 1F
ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, 1986-1993: LEADING SUPPLIERS COMPARED
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)*

Rank	Supplier	Agreements Value 1986-1989
1	U.S.S.R.	63,700
2	U.S.	24,408
3	U.K.	22,700
4	China	10,600
5	France	8,900
6	Germany (FRG)	2,500
7	North Korea	2,200
8	Spain	2,000
9	Poland	1,800
10	Yugoslavia	1,700
11	Czechoslovakia	1,600

Rank	Supplier	Agreements Value 1990-1993
1	U.S.	57,061
2	Russia/U.S.S.R.	20,100
3	France	10,100
4	U.K.	5,500
5	China	3,400
6	Germany (Unified & FRG)	2,800
7	Czechoslovakia (Unified & Separate)	1,200
8	Spain	1,100
9	South Korea	900
10	Italy	800
11	North Korea	600

Rank	Supplier	Agreements Value 1986-1993
1	Russia/U.S.S.R.	83,800
2	U.S.	81,471
3	U.K.	28,200
4	France	19,000
5	China	14,000
6	Germany	5,200
7	Spain	3,100
8	North Korea	2,800
9	Czechoslovakia (Unified & Separate)	2,800
10	Italy	2,100
11	Poland	2,000

* All foreign data are rounded to the nearest $100 million. Where foreign data totals are the same, the actual rank order is maintained. Source: U.S. Government

TABLE II
ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE THIRD WORLD, 1986-1993: AGREEMENTS WITH THE LEADING RECIPIENTS
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)*

Rank	Recipient	Agreements Value 1986-1989
1	Saudi Arabia	32,600
2	Iraq	16,300
3	Iran	8,800
4	Afghanistan	8,400
5	India	8,400
6	Angola	7,100
7	Vietnam	6,700
8	Cuba	6,200
9	Egypt	6,200
10	Syria	5,800

Rank	Recipient	Agreements Value 1990-1993
1	Saudi Arabia	35,100
2	Taiwan	13,800
3	Kuwait	5,700
4	Iran	5,700
5	Afghanistan	5,200
6	South Korea	5,100
7	Egypt	4,600
8	China	3,100
9	India	2,500
10	Malaysia	2,400

Rank	Recipient	Agreements Value 1986-1993
1	Saudi Arabia	67,700
2	Iraq	17,600
3	Taiwan	16,000
4	Iran	14,500
5	Afghanistan	13,600
6	India	10,900
7	Egypt	10,800
8	Cuba	8,300
9	Vietnam	8,000
10	Angola	8,000

* All foreign data are rounded to the nearest $100 million. Where foreign data totals are the same, the actual rank order is maintained.

Source: U.S. Government

TABLE 2A

ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD, BY SUPPLIER, 1986-1993
(In millions of constant 1993 dollars)

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1986-93
United States	7,651	8,387	5,408	4,082	5,756	6,241	8,305	7,675	53,505
Russia	21,185	23,725	23,714	19,838	14,501	6,748	2,377	1,500	113,587
France	4,694	2,704	1,186	1,596	4,981	1,265	517	300	17,243
United Kingdom	3,425	4,794	4,268	4,674	4,096	4,007	3,927	3,600	32,791
China	1,649	2,581	3,557	2,736	1,660	1,476	827	900	15,387
Germany	507	738	474	342	553	1,160	207	400	4,381
Italy	888	615	356	228	111	105	103	0	2,406
All Other European	4,820	5,778	4,980	2,508	1,660	738	1,447	200	22,131
All Others	2,283	2,950	3,794	2,394	1,107	633	620	400	14,182
TOTAL	47,103	52,272	47,737	38,399	34,426	22,373	18,329	14,975	275,613

TABLE 2B

ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD, BY SUPPLIER, 1986-1993
(Expressed as a percent of total, by year)

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
United States	16.24%	16.05%	11.33%	10.63%	16.72%	27.89%	45.31%	51.25%
Russia	44.98%	45.39%	49.68%	51.66%	42.12%	30.16%	12.97%	10.02%
France	9.96%	5.17%	2.48%	4.16%	14.47%	5.66%	2.82%	2.00%
United Kingdom	7.27%	9.17%	8.94%	12.17%	11.90%	17.91%	21.42%	24.04%
China	3.50%	4.94%	7.45%	7.13%	4.82%	6.60%	4.51%	6.01%
Germany	1.08%	1.41%	0.99%	0.89%	1.61%	5.18%	1.13%	2.67%
Italy	1.89%	1.18%	0.75%	0.59%	0.32%	0.47%	0.56%	0.00%
All Other European	10.23%	11.05%	10.43%	6.53%	4.82%	3.30%	7.89%	1.34%
All Others	4.85%	5.64%	7.95%	6.24%	3.22%	2.83%	3.38%	2.67%
[(Major West European)*	*20.20%*	*16.93%*	*13.16%*	*17.81%*	*28.30%*	*29.22%*	*25.93%*	*28.71%]*
TOTAL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

*Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy.

TABLE 2F
ARMS TRANSFER DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD, 1986-1993: LEADING SUPPLIERS COMPARED
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)*

Rank	Supplier	Deliveries Value 1986-1989
1	U.S.S.R.	73,400
2	U.S.	20,995
3	U.K.	14,300
4	China	8,800
5	France	8,300
6	Poland	2,000
7	Czechoslovakia	1,800
8	Italy	1,700
9	Germany (FRG)	1,700
10	North Korea	1,700
11	Brazil	1,700

	Supplier	Deliveries Value 1990-1993
1	U.S.	26,831
2	Russia/U.S.S.R.	23,300
3	U.K.	14,900
4	France	6,500
5	China	4,600
6	Germany (Unified & FRG)	2,200
7	Czechoslovakia (Unified & Separate)	700
8	Canada	600
9	Spain	600
10	Belgium	600
11	North Korea	500

Rank	Supplier	Deliveries Value 1986-1993
1	Russia/U.S.S.R.	96,700
2	U.S.	47,826
3	U.K.	29,200
4	France	14,800
5	China	13,400
6	Germany	3,900
7	Czechoslovakia (Unified & Separate)	2,500
8	North Korea	2,200
9	Poland	2,200
10	Italy	2,000
11	Spain	2,000

* All foreign data are rounded to the nearest $100 million. Where foreign data totals are the same, the actual rank order is maintained.
Source: U.S. Government

TABLE 3
Number of Weapons Delivered by Major Suppliers to the Third World*

Weapons Category	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West** European	All Other European	All Others
1986-1989						
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	596	3800	210	140	760	305
Artillery	760	4290	2120	380	1100	1155
APCs and Armored Cars	627	6600	670	370	1720	345
Major Surface Combatants	0	11	1	17	7	4
Minor Surface Combatants	4	58	15	67	76	118
Guided Missile Boats	0	0	4	2	0	2
Submarines	0	10	0	2	2	1
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	327	440	80	120	10	70
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	20	120	30	60	0	0
Other Aircraft	169	250	30	110	240	240
Helicopters	117	640	0	300	40	50
Surface-to-Air Missiles	1025	11970	720	1830	440	1520
Surface-to-Surface Missiles	0	1800	100	0	0	230
Anti-Shipping Missiles	96	580	210	350	0	10
1990-1993						
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	877	1670	500	130	350	210
Artillery	254	1200	2070	260	910	280
APCs and Armored Cars	963	2440	40	190	370	280
Major Surface Combatants	0	3	4	15	1	2
Minor Surface Combatants	10	24	28	59	11	45
Guided Missile Boats	0	0	2	0	0	0
Submarines	0	5	0	1	0	0
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	273	200	190	80	0	250
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	88	0	10	70	0	30
Other Aircraft	104	90	80	70	140	190
Helicopters	167	190	0	140	50	20
Surface-to-Air Missiles	2260	2100	180	1510	300	60
Surface-to-Surface Missiles	0	380	140	0	0	130
Anti-Shipping Missiles	23	150	100	120	0	0
1986-1993						
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	1473	5470	710	270	1110	515
Artillery	1014	5490	4190	640	2010	1435
APCs and Armored Cars	1590	9040	710	560	2090	625
Major Surface Combatants	0	14	5	32	8	6
Minor Surface Combatants	14	82	43	126	87	163
Guided Missile Boats	0	0	6	2	0	2
Submarines	0	15	0	3	2	1
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	600	640	270	200	10	320
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	108	120	40	130	0	30
Other Aircraft	273	340	110	180	380	430
Helicopters	284	830	0	440	90	70
Surface-to-Air Missiles	3285	14070	900	3340	740	1580
Surface-to-Surface Missiles	0	2180	240	0	0	360
Anti-Shipping Missiles	119	730	310	470	0	10

* Third world category excludes the U.S., Russia, former U.S.S.R., Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. All data are for calendar years given.

** Major West European includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

Source: U.S. Government