
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

By

ANDREW K. SEMMEL

Apart from the defense budget and the need to strengthen our own armed forces, there is no effort more important to the global defense posture of the United States than our various defense-related international cooperation programs, which include security assistance and arms sales. These programs have been successful instruments for furthering United States foreign and defense policy over the years. Success however, must not breed complacency. There is a continuous need for improving them and for ensuring their mutually reinforcing roles in order to keep pace with changes in the real world.

In the broadest terms, our security assistance programs advance our relations with other countries by helping them to make the most of their own resources so that they are better able to defend themselves against external threats or against externally-inspired threats to internal stability; and to modernize or upgrade their armed forces to keep pace with changing geo-strategic realities.

But our programs also directly support our own defense goals. They help us retain foreign bases for United States forces, gain critical overflight privileges and access to important overseas military facilities, and enhance combined United States and friendly force effectiveness through rationalization and standardization. Improved commonality with friends and allies is important if ever we are called upon to operate or fight together against a common adversary.

At the same time, our programs provide a valuable vehicle for promoting foreign policy objectives important to the United States, such as the continuing search for peace in the Middle East; and gaining the opportunity, where possible, to influence other countries' actions in ways favorable to our own.

There are, in addition, identifiable domestic benefits. For example, we have estimated conservatively that the services have saved roughly \$3 billion in costs over the past five years from foreign military sales. Others have calculated that foreign military sales deliveries of between \$5 billion and \$10 billion equate to about 200,000 and 300,000 jobs in the United States. These benefits are real and tangible and should not be overlooked. But they are clearly secondary to the strategic and foreign policy benefits of foreign sales.

These benefits and objectives don't come without some cost. But, when compared to other domestic and international programs and when measured

Reprinted from the Defense 83 (December 1983), pp. 16-21.

against the benefits we and our friends derive from them, the costs to the taxpayer are relatively small. It is not hyperbole to state that our security assistance and arms transfer programs are the overseas counterpart of our own defense efforts because they help strengthen our forward defenses and improve the overall global defense posture of the West.

Having said this, it may come as a surprise to some and a disappointment to others to learn that security assistance is not always a popular program, that it lacks a broad, coherent constituency, and that the American people generally look upon the program with doubt and suspicion (the informed public is much more supportive). Some of this complicates the execution of the program and limits, to a degree, the goals we can seek in the program.

The fragile public support for security assistance stems mostly from popular misperceptions about our goals and intentions and from our inability to explain how the benefits to the American people actually exceed the costs. This is due, in part, to the American public's fears of overseas entanglements, which are deeply entrenched.

The Executive Branch and the Congress work carefully and continuously together to achieve a balanced foreign aid package in support of foreign policy. The Administration submits a foreign aid proposal each year, including security assistance, and the Congress gives it fine-tooth comb scrutiny. Congress is also notified of all major proposed arms sales and exercises extensive oversight authority on the program as a whole. Virtually all major sales, all budget requests, and all country programs, have full congressional scrutiny. It is the most openly run security assistance and arms sales program in the world. But it does not enjoy much public visibility or understanding, so misperceptions persist.

Consequently, improvements are always being explored. For example, the Presidential Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, hopefully will generate recommendations, insights, and actions which will help strengthen the public support and financing of our program.

A number of specific issues have surfaced in recent months that are worth noting including offshore use of credits, access to Defense Security Assistance Agency data, and foreign military sales/commercial sales.

Offshore Use of Credits. This issue includes requests from foreign military sales recipients to use United States Government credits for purchases from their own economies, for purchases from third countries, and for payment of foreign subcontractors for items included in end items produced in the United States. This is a complex issue.

The law is very clear on this: Section 42(c) of the Arms Export Control Act states, in effect, that United States-provided credits should be used for purchases only in the United States. The law does provide for waivers in exceptional circumstances, and, over the years, there have been some cases where the benefits to the United States clearly outweighed any possible adverse impact on the United States economy and the industrial mobilization base.

Offshore use of foreign military sales credits is the rare exception, not the rule. It should be noted that our procedures for authorizing use of credits outside the United States now require agreement among the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury. One of our main strengths with the public and with key constituencies -- like industry -- is that these credits, and practically all sales, are spent in the United States and benefit our economy.

Foreign Military Sales by Category

	FY 1980 (\$15.2B)	FY 1981 (\$8.2B)	FY 1982 (\$21.5B)	FY 1950-1982 (\$135.2B)
Weapons & Ammunition	47%	28%	38%	37%
Support & Equipment	8%	14%	18%	12%
Spares & Modifications	11%	29%	18%	18%
Support & Services	35%	29%	26%	33%

Access to Defense Security Assistance Agency Data. Requests for access to the Defense Security Assistance Agency data base presents another ticklish issue. On balance, the Defense Security Assistance Agency will continue to give favorable consideration to most requests for release of sales information. But, we will weigh these requests against the expressed concerns of foreign governments that data release may reveal sensitive information about their defense programs. The real conundrum here is that generally we do not want to get directly involved in the marketing of United States defense articles and services and are content to leave that task to private industry. At the same time, the Defense Security Assistance Agency doesn't want to be an obstacle to that process. There may be situations where unclassified sales data may become sensitive and require a classification status when collated into a single report. In this instance, we will opt for non-release. In general, the Defense Security Assistance Agency will respond to all requests by trying to balance the concerns of United States industry with those of foreign governments.

Foreign Military Sales/Commercial Sales. The United States Government does not compete with, attempt to outbid, or seek to wrestle advantages over commercial sales. We respond to formal requests from foreign governments indicating an interest in government-to-government purchases. Within limits, it is the purchasing government which decides to go the foreign military sales or commercial route. In fact, our general practice is to refuse to provide foreign military sales price and availability information if a foreign defense department is negotiating directly with a contractor. Part of the growth trend in commercial sales in the past few years is traceable to the successive raising of the dollar ceiling levels for commercial sales and, in 1981, to the removal of the dollar ceiling altogether.

Funding our various country programs has been a recurring problem for this and previous Administrations. Despite increases in program level funding under the Reagan Administration, we face numerous deficiencies in a number of important areas.

Fiscal Year 1982 Foreign Military Sales,
Including Construction

	<u>Number of Countries</u>	<u>Sales Value (\$ in billions)</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Industrialized Countries	22	\$ 6.7	31.2
Affluent Developing Countries	11	9.9	46.2
Other Developing Countries	33	4.7	21.9
Other	-	0.1	0.7
Total	66	21.45	100.0

Fiscal Year 1982 Foreign Military Sales:
Largest Cases
(\$ in millions)

	<u>Case</u>	<u>Value</u>
Saudi Arabia	AWACS, etc.	\$3,433.2
Australia	F-18	2,125.6
Egypt	F-16	1,210.2
Pakistan	F-16	1,091.5
Korea	F-16	931.2
Venezuela	F-16	615.3
Israel	F-15	485.4
Egypt	Tanks	401.6
Netherlands	F-16	273.4
Taiwan	F-5E/F-5F	232.3
Tunisia	F-5E/F-5F	205.0

Insufficient funds. Except for Israel, we do not have adequate funds to meet known requirements and, in some cases, to enable credit or grant recipients to meet scheduled progress payments for materials already on order. A number of credit countries do not have resources to make up the difference between their needs and what Congress provides. When that happens, our friends must forego needed procurements, cut back on programs already on order, or, most dramatically, cancel programs, with consequent vulnerabilities in their defense.

Repayment Terms. The funds which are available, for many countries, are guaranteed credits which are difficult to repay because they carry high interest charges and short repayment terms. Grants provide only a small portion of our military assistance funds. Still, many countries in critical need of funds are compelled to accept the stiff terms we are required to make, because indebtedness to the United States, though painful, may be preferable to a weakened national security. A better mix of grants and loans or softer terms would help alleviate this problem in the future, but many countries will still face serious debt repayment problems stemming from past and present loans.

Fiscal Year 1982 Foreign Military Sales Contracts by Country

	(\$ in billions) FMS Value	Percent of Total
Saudi Arabia	\$7.4	34.8
Australia	2.9	13.5
Egypt*	2.1	10.0
Pakistan	1.5	7.1
Korea	1.1	5.3
United Kingdom	.7	3.3
Israel	.7	3.1
Venezuela	.6	2.9
Turkey	.5	2.5
Taiwan	.5	2.2
Japan	.5	2.5
Netherlands	.4	1.9
Tunisia	.3	1.6
Germany*	.3	1.4
Greece	.2	1.0

*Includes military construction sales
(These countries accounted for 90 percent of 1982's foreign military sales agreements.)

Soviet and U.S. Arms Deliveries to the Third World
(1972-1981)

Category	USSR	U.S.
Tanks & SP Guns	13,220	7,440
Artillery	16,400	8,225
Combat Aircraft	3,275	2,600
Surface-to-air Missiles	23,250	7,440
All Major Weapons (Ground, Naval, Air)	74,000	44,000

Source: Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World 1972-81, August 1982, U.S. Department of State.

Flexibility. In recent years, Congress has been inclined to earmark many of the funds it approves. This limits our ability to distribute them to the non-earmarked countries. Roughly three-quarters of all military assistance funds approved by Congress in Fiscal Year 1983, for example, were earmarked, squeezing our options in the use of the remaining 25 percent. Moreover, contingency funds are virtually non-existent, so we must resort to requesting supplementals, which take a long time to get from Congress, or initiate unpopular drawdowns from DoD stocks. These problems are most acute for those countries needing to make progress payments, for countries embarking on long-overdue modernization programs, and for those countries struggling to survive against real internal or external threats to their security.


Uncertainty of Funds. We never know quite how our requests will come out of the congressional process. We never know whether we will get a

foreign aid bill, and typically, we do not. We get continuing resolutions instead.

This makes it difficult for recipient countries to plan their procurement needs; it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to meet our commitments abroad; and, it makes it difficult to explain to foreign leaders why they must adjust their plans and expectations downward. Overall, this pattern of uncertainty and the accompanying pattern of starts and stops in funding does very little to obtain, nurture, and retain the confidence of other countries in our ability to assist them in meeting their defense requirements.


In working with other countries, we want to provide them the very best equipment and services, including follow-on support and spares. But we must work with them in determining what is most suitable to their needs. It's important that we not unnecessarily or unwittingly raise their expectation beyond our ability to assist them or beyond their capacity to absorb the equipment we do provide.

In some cases, an effective country program may be one which tempers rather than tempts foreign country appetites for United States technology and knowhow. Similarly, we have a responsibility to avoid overloading a country beyond its ability to absorb or its ability to finance imports from the United States. We don't want to simultaneously assist a country to meet its bone fide defense needs only to help plunge it into hopeless debt.




Six F-16 aircraft were delivered to El Libertador Air Base, Venezuela, late this year under terms of a foreign military sales contract valued at \$615 million. The first South American country to buy the F-16, Venezuela will receive 18 more of the aircraft by the end of 1985.

Foreign Military Sales and Deliveries




Commercial Sales and Exports



Cumulative arrearages or defaults do the countries little good and certainly undermine the purposes of our security assistance. Finally, it bears repeating that we also need to be alert to the possible effects of our sales on regional military balances.

In all of our security assistance programs, the overriding factor driving their management must be how these programs further our foreign policy and defense objectives.

Dr. Andrew K. Semmel came to DoD in 1979 as an Intergovernmental Personnel Act Fellow and was a policy analyst in the area of international security affairs before becoming a foreign affairs specialist with the Defense Security Assistance Agency. He has taught as an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Cincinnati. Dr. Semmel received a BA degree from Moravian College, an MA degree from Ohio University, and a PhD degree from the University of Michigan. He is currently Chief, Analysis Division, Defense Security Assistance Agency.



Dr. Semmel

MFO: PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By

MAJOR CORNELIS HOMAN, ROYAL NETHERLANDS MARINE CORPS

Since 25 April 1982, for the third time in history, an international peacekeeping force has been operational in the Sinai Peninsula. Unlike the earlier United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I and UNEF II,[1] the Multi-national Force and Observers (MFO) supervises implementation of a peace treaty instead of an armistice line and, moreover, does not operate under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Another peculiarity is that, for the first time, the United States is participating in a peacekeeping operation.[2]

BACKGROUND

Indirectly, the history of the MFO goes back to the 1973 Middle East War when Egypt, in a surprise move, crossed the Suez Canal and inflicted severe losses on the Israeli Defense Forces. Partly, thanks to the United States, the Israelis were able to retake the initiative. However, their self-confidence was badly shaken, and, after this war, they were more inclined to talk about a peace settlement. At the same time, the West had become more willing to accommodate Arab views. The Arab states reduced oil production and began an oil boycott against the United States and the Netherlands.

In January 1974, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger successfully negotiated a troop disengagement agreement. The Israelis withdrew a considerable distance into the Sinai. A peacekeeping force of the United Nations (UNEF II) was stationed between the Israeli and Egyptian troops to supervise the agreement.

Although other agreements followed, a real peace treaty appeared to be elusive. President Anwar Sadat forced a breakthrough in 1977 with his visit to Jerusalem. In an address to the Knesset, Sadat offered a peace treaty under the condition that Israel withdraw from the Sinai. Through President Jimmy Carter's efforts in autumn 1978, the so-called Camp David Agreements were concluded. A foundation was established for a peace treaty that was negotiated between Egypt and Israel, witnessed by the United States and signed on 26 March 1979.

The treaty provided for the complete withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai within three years. To provide maximum security for both parties, two security measures were established: military restrictions in the Sinai and the border area of Israel, and the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force and observers in the area.

Reprinted from Military Review, Volume LXIII, No. 9 (September 1983), pp. 2-13.

The approval of all permanent members of the UN Security Council was required to establish such a peacekeeping force. The USSR, which had opposed the Camp David Agreements, also opposed the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. This became obvious when the USSR did not support continuation of UNEF II's mandate. UNEF II ceased operations in June 1979.

The USSR's objections remained, and, on 18 May 1981, the president of the Security Council indicated that the council was unable to reach the necessary agreement on the proposal to establish a UN peacekeeping force and observers. In a letter attached to the peace treaty, from Carter to Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Sadat, a provision was made for this eventuality:

If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable multinational force.

Acting with full respect for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, a protocol was negotiated between Egypt and Israel, witnessed by the United States and signed on 3 August 1981. This protocol established the MFO as an alternative to the UN peacekeeping force and observers. On 25 April 1982, after 15 years of Israeli rule, the remaining part of the Sinai was returned to Egypt, and the MFO began operation.

ORGANIZATION

In the framework of international law, the MFO is an international organization, established by the protocol to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The director general, who was appointed by both parties for a term of four years, is responsible for the direction of the MFO in the fulfillment of its functions and is authorized to act on behalf of the MFO.

The role of the director general could be likened to that of the secretary-general of the United Nations. The protocol directs that the post of director general will be held by a US national. The current director general is Leamon Hunt, a former State Department officer whose last assignment was as head of the Sinai Field Mission. His staff is mainly US nationals; his headquarters is in Rome, Italy.

Subject to approval by both parties, the director general appoints, for a term of three years, the force commander who is responsible for the daily command of the MFO. The force commander reports to the director general and the appointed representatives of Israel and Egypt. He exercises command of all forces and civilians assigned to the area of operations. The force commander, who is a non-US national with the rank of general, is Lieutenant General Frederik V. Bull-Hansen whose last assignment was as commander, Allied Forces, North Norway. The force commander's headquarters is located in El Gorah in northeastern Sinai. It consists of a US chief of staff and 70 staff officers drawn from all participating countries (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
MFO HEADQUARTERS STAFF BY NATIONALITY AND RANK

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Total</u>
Australia	12	1	13
Colombia	2	1	3
United Kingdom	9	29	38
Fiji	3	5	8
France	3	-	3
Italy	3	-	3
Netherlands	4	2	6
New Zealand	6	1	7
Norway	4	-	4
Uruguay	4	-	4
United States	20	15	35
	<u>70</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>124</u>

MFO - Multinational Force and Observers

MISSION


The MFO is to supervise the implementation of the annex to the peace treaty and to employ its best efforts to prevent any violations. To provide maximum security for both parties, the peace treaty provides four limited-force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory (Figure 2). The military restrictions within each zone allow:

- Zone A - An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division with up to 22,000 personnel, its military installations and field fortifications.
- Zone B - Egyptian border units of four battalions with up to 4,000 men equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles.
- Zone C - Only MFO and Egyptian civil police.
- Zone D - Four Israeli infantry battalions with up to 4,000 personnel, their military installations and field fortifications.

In addition, the peace treaty provides some restrictions concerning the aerial military regime, the naval regime and early warning systems in these zones. The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are considered international waterways, open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendible freedom of navigation and overflight.

The MFO's principal responsibilities are to survey and observe activities in the area of operations, to verify and report findings, and to observe and report that confirmed treaty violations are rectified. It is the parties' responsibility to rectify violations confirmed by the MFO within 48 hours of such confirmation, and it should be stressed that it is not a duty of the MFO to enforce rectification of violations. Rather, the MFO is present at the request of both parties, and both parties have indicated in the treaty their desire to rectify such violations as are reported. The task of the MFO is to continue to report such violations until they are rectified.

FIGURE 2
LIMITED-FORCE ZONES PROVIDED BY ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY



EXECUTION


To accomplish its mission, the MFO fulfills the following tasks:

- Operates checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along the international boundary and within Zone C.
- Performs periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of Annex I to the peace treaty (not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the parties).

- Performs additional verifications within 48 hours after receipt of a request from either party.
- Ensures the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the peace treaty.

To meet these requirements, the MFO has at its disposal civilian and military units (Figure 3).

FIGURE 3
ORGANIZATION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS




The 34-man civilian observer unit is composed of US nationals, many of whom served in the former Sinai Field Mission. Half of the observers are officers from one of the foreign affairs agencies of the US Government. The remaining half are former members of the Armed Forces with considerable service experience. They carry out verifications by air and vehicle in all four zones, on a regular and random basis as prescribed by the force commander. A report of their findings is forwarded by the force commander to the parties and the director general within 24 hours of the completion of the mission.

The area of operation of the military units in the MFO is restricted to Zone C. The force operational units consist of three infantry battalions and a coastal patrol unit which are deployed as follows: a battalion from Fiji in the north, a Colombian battalion in the center and a US battalion in the south.



A UH1 helicopter of the US battalion leaving the Isle of Tiran.



A ship off the coastal patrol unit patrolling in the Strait of Tiran.

The headquarters of the Fiji and Colombian battalions are located at the North Base Camp in El Gorah, and the headquarters of the US battalion is located at the South Base Camp near Sharm al-Sheikh. The Italian coastal patrol unit is also stationed at Sharm al-Sheikh.

The infantry battalions have established observation posts within Zone C as well as checkpoints and observation posts at designated international boundary crossing sites and along routes of significance. The coastal patrol unit maintains observation over the Strait of Tiran and its approaches.

The battalions and the coastal patrol unit are assigned individual areas of responsibility. The battalion commanders command through sector control centers (equivalent to a company command post) to the observation posts, checkpoints and patrols. The soldiers deploy to the various sites, usually in squad strength, for 20 to 30-day periods. In addition, the battalions conduct random patrols by air, by wheeled vehicle and on foot. The coastal patrol unit consists of three Italian patrol ships which patrol the Strait of Tiran and its approaches.

The civilian observer unit and force operational units are supported by several force support units: the force military police unit (the Netherlands); the fixed-wing aviation unit (France); the headquarters unit (United Kingdom); the logistic support unit (United States); the rotary-wing aviation unit (Australia and New Zealand); the force signal unit (the Netherlands); and the transportation unit (Uruguay).



Change of command of the US battalion in February 1983.

Since Norway is represented by the force commander and some staff members, 11 countries contribute to the MFO. The personnel strengths of these contributions are shown in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4
Personnel Strengths of the MFO

Australia	109
Colombia	502
United Kingdom	36
Fiji	500
France	35
Italy	88
Netherlands	102
New Zealand	35
Norway	4
Uruguay	75
United States	1,110
	<u>2,596</u>

Although technically not part of the force, the support contractor is a US firm called E Systems, based in Greenville, Texas. It performs some of the logistical functions for the force.

LOGISTICS

The logistical mission of the MFO is to provide life support and to ensure the mission effectiveness of the force. Some 2,600 military members of the MFO and varying numbers of civilian employees must be housed, fed and supplied. More than 500 major vehicles and trailers, 23 helicopters and three fixed-wing aircraft are assigned to the force, all of which require maintenance and fuel.

Logistical operations are conducted in an austere environment, and the area of operations is quite large for a force of this size. The distance and driving time factors are very great and are seldom encountered in a typical brigade-size operation. Mountain ranges, the rugged desert and a very poor road network hamper lines of supply. In some cases, the only method of supply is by air. The main supply route is 450 kilometers long, about half of which is marginal dirt road. The climate and road conditions place a heavy toll on vehicles, and maintenance requires continuous effort.

A large portion of the MFO's supplies come from the United States through both the Department of Defense supply system and civilian procurement by the MFO. Items from the United States average more than 90 days enroute. About 15 percent of the supplies are obtained from Egypt and Israel. When one considers all of these physical factors and operations in a politically sensitive region, the logistic support function becomes a very special operation, presenting problems and solutions that do not always follow standard logistic doctrine.


Logistical support includes both base camp support and field logistics. Support is provided in all areas of supply, maintenance, services and facilities engineering. The center of support operations is in the North Base Camp where the force headquarters, logistic support unit and support contractor are located. Similar support is provided at the South Base Camp although at a reduced level.

The force mission requires a network of checkpoints and observation posts in Zone C. There are 24 observation posts, 14 checkpoints and five sector control centers located throughout the zone. Each comprises sleeping and living quarters, communications rooms and, in some cases, communications shelters. There are electrical generators to supply power. Fuel and water are stored at each location. The locations are supported through sector support sites located with selected observation posts.



The local inhabitants of Zone C: Bedouin women with goats.

The sector support sites provide additional fuel and water and are situated along the main supply route where they can be resupplied by the logistic support unit. Logistical operations are carried out by individual contingents, the logistic support unit and a support contractor.




Observation post in the Colombian sector.

The logistic support unit is the principal operator of the logistic system. It is a US combat service support organization of 340 personnel drawn from various support units throughout the United States. It has subordinate supply and maintenance, medical, transport and headquarters units which perform the following logistical services:

- Line haul cargo from ports.
- Operate depots for all classes of supply.
- Provide fuel points at both base camps.
- Line haul fuel and water to sector support sites.
- Operate a movement control center.
- Provide maintenance.
- Provide explosive ordnance disposal.
- Operate medical dispensaries at both base camps.
- Operate Army post office and finance (for US personnel).

The support contractor provides the MFO a 300-man multinational labor force. The force is divided between the two base camps with approximately



Soldier of the US battalion patrolling on the Isle of Tiran.

180 people in the north and 120 in the south. These workers are augmented, as available, by Egyptian personnel.

The support contractor performs the following logistical functions:

- Operates the multinational dining facility at El Gorah.
- Provides second and third-level vehicle maintenance.
- Provides the maintenance of the commercial radio equipment and telephone system.
- Provides custodial services.
- Operates power generators for the base camps.
- Operates the laundry, barber, tailor and force exchange.
- Provides fire service.
- Provides the commercial procurement of supplies.

COMMUNICATIONS

The success of the MFO mission depends largely on a reliable communications network. To this end, a comprehensive communications system exists to link the battalion commanders with the force headquarters and the force commander.

The force communications system is composed of a commercial multichannel telephone system and various radio nets. It is a nonsecure system, and no attempt is made to encrypt any traffic. At each observation post or checkpoint, there are two VHF radios. One radio is located in the operations building, and the other is vehicle-mounted. Mobile patrols normally have a VHF and/or HF radio.



Sector control center in the Fiji sector.



North Base Camp in El Gorah.

The observation posts, checkpoints, patrols and aircraft report to a sector control center which has fixed station and mobile VHF and HF radios. Each sector control center normally reports to the battalion via the microwave

multichannel telephone system and, as a backup, an HF radio reporting net. The sector control centers also have a radio-wing integration capability that can link directly to the force commander when necessary.

The microwave system from the North Base Camp provides telephone trunks to the South Base Camp and access to the international telephone system. Additionally, at the force headquarters, there is teletype and facsimile service to the south. The force also maintains direct communications with Egypt, Israel and the director general.

TRAINING

A former UN commander once remarked that peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only soldiers can do it. However, the MFO's role of peacekeeping calls for a different approach by the soldiers and changes in training emphasis.

Training for the Sinai concentrates on ensuring that each member of the MFO is fully aware of the provisions of the treaty, the protocol and the MFO standing operating procedures. Daily operations have demonstrated the importance of accurate and timely reports. The sensitive nature of the reports demands that soldiers be knowledgeable of equipment identification and treaty restrictions.

The use of patrols is key to the MFO's verification mission, and the need for skilled map readers at squad level is obvious. The entire zone has numerous minefields, some of which are known and plotted on every patrol leader's map. Minefields have been used by one force or another for decades, and many are not accurately plotted or have shifted during floods. As a result, it is exceedingly easy for personnel to find themselves in a minefield. Knowledge of how to clear a minefield or how to recover personnel from a minefield is critical.

Soon after the MFO became operational, the importance of checkpoint operations and proper search techniques was recognized. The MFO searches its own personnel and vehicles at all crossings in and out of Zone C. This requires knowledgeable, professional soldiers who are firm and thorough.

The biggest threats to the MFO in the Sinai, other than military action, are the terrain and weather. High daytime temperatures, cold nights, high winds and sandstorms are common. The extremes in weather and terrain emphasize the need for preventive medicine training. This includes not only first aid but also proper hygiene practices, disease prevention, heat-injury prevention and maintenance of proper body fluid balances. Finally, especially important in some areas where resupply must be carried out by air, is the need for personnel to be knowledgeable of helicopter operations such as marking landing zones, proper ground techniques, sling load operations, recovery of injured personnel and procedures.

USE OF FORCE

Contrary to military operations, in peacekeeping operations, force is used only as the last course of action. Only when all other measures have

failed is the use of force contemplated and then only the minimum amount necessary to restore order.

In other words, the arms carried by the members of a peacekeeping operation are designated only for self-defense. Every military member is issued a Use of Force Instruction Card with this guidance:

Your principal duty as a member of the MFO is to observe and report. You are armed with your individual weapon for self protection. The firing of your weapon at another individual will be done only as a last resort and to protect your life or the life of another member of the MFO. Never use more force than necessary. Whenever possible request orders from your commander before you use force.

It should be kept in mind that, in peacekeeping operations, the political significance of the presence of the peacekeeping force can be considered as more important than its military effectiveness.

EVALUATION

The MFO has been operational for more than a year. The most effective weapon of this force has been the collection of accurate and reliable information. Unlike many of the UN peacekeeping operations, the dissemination of this information is restricted to the parties of the treaty and the director general. This very critical procedure allows the parties to rectify violations and maintain open communication without the external pressures of media or other parties. Finally, it appears that, in the absence of unanimity in the UN Security Council, a peacekeeping force, which is established outside the UN framework but based on established principles of international law, can contribute positively to international peace and security.

ENDNOTES

1. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I operated after the Suez crisis as a buffer between Egypt and Israel (1956-67). UNEF II supervised the armistice line between Egypt and Israel after the 1973 Middle East War (1974-79).
2. In accordance with the exchange of letters to the annex of the protocol of the Multinational Force and Observers, the United States contributes an infantry battalion, a military logistic support unit and a group of civilian observers.
3. Article II of Annex I, "Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements," to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
4. The US-operated Sinai Field Mission manned surveillance stations in the strategically important Mitla and Gidi Passes from February 1976 until April 1982. It also verified the phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
5. The US battalion is provided by the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Airmobile Division on a rotating half-year basis.

Major Cornelis Homan, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, is a lecturer in strategy at the Royal Naval College, Den Helder, the Netherlands. He received a PhD in law from the University of Amsterdam and a PhD in political science from the University of Leyden and is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia. He served as a staff officer at the Headquarters of the Multinational Force and Observers in El Gorah, Egypt.

[Editor's Note: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is one of the seven US security assistance programs. The above article treats one US application of PKO funds.]