

---

## THE JCS ROLE IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role the Joint Chiefs of Staff have played in the security assistance program since its inception and to review the issues that have concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the past ten years. The examination of issues has been limited to broad, general areas and does not treat specific recommendations for individual countries.

### THE BEGINNING OF THE PROGRAM

The current US security assistance program dates back to 1947. In that year, President Harry S. Truman approved emergency military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey to prevent them from falling under Soviet influence. Following the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty the next year, the United States began to furnish military aid to the Western European allies to build a position of strength against Soviet expansion. Simultaneously, the European Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan, extended economic loans and grants to 16 European nations. The separate US foreign aid programs were brought together and given a common legislative basis in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

The fall of China to the communists succeeded by the outbreak of the Korean War brought an expansion of US military aid programs to the countries of the Middle East and Asia. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 supplemented the 1949 law and set up the Mutual Security Agency in the Executive Office of the President to supervise both military and economic assistance. In 1953, as part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's reorganization of the Executive Branch, the Mutual Security Agency was abolished and replaced by the Foreign Operations Administration, an independent agency in the Executive Branch. The new agency supervised, directed, and coordinated all foreign assistance operations, under policy guidance from the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury. The Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended in 1955, eliminated the Foreign Operations Administration. It was replaced by the International Cooperation Administration (subsequently renamed the Agency for International Development), within the Department of State, responsible for coordination of all foreign assistance programs and for administration of all aid programs except security assistance, which was the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act replaced the 1954 Mutual Security Act, but did not change the organizational responsibilities for foreign assistance programs. The 1961 Act remains in effect and is the authorizing legislation for the Military Assistance Program (grants), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and peacekeeping operations (PKO).

---

Editor's Note: This study was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division -- updated, 23 March 1984. Parts of it have been deleted.

Throughout the 1950s and during the early 1960s, US military assistance was primarily grant aid in the form of materiel and training, but foreign military sales (FMS), the extension of credit on favorable terms to purchase equipment with loan repayment guarantees, gradually increased. By 1964, FMS exceeded MAP grants for the first time. (See following table.)

US Security Assistance[1]  
(Dollars in Millions)

FY:	1950	1955	1960	1965
MAP (grants)	\$1,335.6	\$1,624.2	\$2,334.4	\$1,173.1
FMS (sales)	\$ 50.8	\$ 84.2	\$ 241.9	\$1,781.9
Total	<u>\$1,386.4</u>	<u>\$1,708.4</u>	<u>\$2,576.3</u>	<u>\$2,950.3</u>

The Foreign Military Sales Act, passed in 1968, became the basis for foreign military sales on both a cash and credit basis. The 1968 law was replaced in 1976 by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, known as the AECA, which is the current authority for the foreign military sales program. Both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act are amended each year by the annual security assistance authorization act. In addition, the actual Congressional appropriations for security assistance are provided in the annual Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act.

JCS PARTICIPATION

During the early 1950s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed procedures for participation in the preparation of the annual military (subsequently redesignated security) assistance program of the US Government. A team of US military advisers, usually styled the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), was accredited to each country receiving US military assistance. These advisers, in cooperation with the military authorities of their host nation, supervised the dissemination and use of the US military aid and prepared recommendations for additional assistance. On the basis of the MAAG recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied military advice to the Secretary of Defense annually to guide the overall security assistance program. This advice took the form of annual "force bases," which listed units as well as materiel and training requirements for the various countries that the United States should support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended general policies for the provision of equipment to foreign countries. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) used the JCS submissions in the preparation of an annual security assistance program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had an opportunity to review the program before final Secretary of Defense approval. Once the Secretary approved, the program went to the Department of State for inclusion in the overall foreign assistance program which the President submitted for Congressional action -- both authorization and appropriation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff instituted their Joint Program for Planning (now the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)) in the 1950s and submitted the first Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) to the Secretary of Defense in 1958. Two years later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated the force

recommendations for foreign countries into an annex, Free World Forces, to the JSOP.[2] In 1968, the Free World Forces portion became a separate book of the JSOP. During the 1960s, the security assistance program, prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was extended to cover a five-year projection, beginning with the approaching fiscal year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to review these programs before final Secretary of Defense approval.

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE 1970s

With the Presidency of Richard M. Nixon, foreign assistance, both economic and security, assumed a much larger role in US foreign policy. In the "Nixon Doctrine," announced in July 1969, the President announced that the United States would keep its treaty commitments, but expected friendly nations to handle their own internal security and military defense problems. The United States, he pledged, would give economic and military assistance for these efforts. Announced initially for Asia, President Nixon subsequently extended the doctrine to all friendly countries.[3]

Soon after he became President, Richard Nixon asked a task force of experts from outside the government to review the US foreign assistance programs and make recommendations for improvement. The task force, headed by Mr. Rudolph A. Peterson, President of the Bank of America, submitted its report in March 1970. With regard to security assistance, the task force recognized that these programs had been an "integral" part of US foreign policy for more than two decades. The task force made two recommendations: (1) that security assistance programs, including grants and sales, be combined into one piece of legislation, an international security cooperation act, separate from economic assistance; (2) that responsibility be assigned to the Department of State for setting policy and directing and coordinating security assistance programs, but with administration of military grant and sales programs remaining with the Department of Defense.[4]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the Peterson task force report. Although they concurred in the recommendation for separation of security assistance from developmental assistance and the combining of both grants and sales security assistance into a single act, they doubted that such an action would resolve the dilemma faced in obtaining "the modest but critical funding" for these programs under the current separate Foreign Assistance Act and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act. They pointed out that Congressional committee jurisdiction over the Defense and security assistance budgets was split, with the Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees considering security assistance matters while the Armed Services Committees handled the DoD budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees would receive jurisdiction over any unified security assistance bill and that the split committee jurisdiction would continue, making it "most difficult to relate savings in the regular DoD budget derived from US force reductions to moderate cost increases chargeable to MAP and the credit sales program." As an alternative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that all security assistance (grants, sales, and training) be transferred as a separate "MAP line item" in the DoD budget and as an addition to the Service budgets.[5] The Secretary of Defense supported the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this recommendation.[6]

As a result of the Peterson task force recommendations, President Nixon instituted various changes in procedures for economic assistance on 8 August 1970. At that time, he deferred action with respect to security assistance pending further review [7] and, in the end, made no changes at all. For on 25 March 1971, President Nixon continued the responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense for security assistance without change.[8] As a consequence, no action resulted on the JCS recommendation for inclusion of security assistance as a line item in the DoD budget. This proposal, however, became one the Joint Chiefs of Staff have supported ever since that time.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, was convinced that security assistance was becoming increasingly important. New steps, he said on 6 April 1971, needed to be taken to incorporate grants and foreign military sales totally in the planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB) cycle. In addition, he thought new procedures were required for orderly JCS participation in the DoD formulation of security assistance objectives and in the overall management of security assistance resources. He asked the Director of the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, for appropriate proposals.[9] Ten days later, the Secretary of Defense asked that security assistance programs be properly integrated in the total force concept. To that end, he wanted both grant and sales programs brought into the PPB system[10]

\*\*\*\*\*

In a related action to improve management of security assistance in the Department of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) on 11 August 1971. The new Agency, under the "direction, authority, and control" of the Secretary of Defense with staff supervision by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), was charged with the direction, administration, and supervision of DoD security assistance plans and programs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) continued to be responsible for developing DoD security assistance programs and policies; the Joint Chiefs of Staff would continue to provide military advice on security assistance matters, including force objectives, priorities, missions, and requirements for force development. The Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Defense Security Assistance Agency direct communication with the unified and specified commands and MAAGs on matters related to implementation of approved security assistance programs. All DSAA and Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) directives and communications with the MAAGs, unified and specified commands, and Military Departments that pertained to security assistance and had "military operational implications" were to be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Similarly, all JCS directives and communications to the MAAGs, unified and specified commands, and the Military Departments pertaining to security assistance were to be coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).[11]

The Deputy Secretary of Defense also established the Defense Security Assistance Council (DSAC) to advise the Secretary of Defense on security assistance matters. Membership included the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), chairman; the Director, DSAA; and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate DoD elements. (The Defense Security Assistance Council was abolished in 1976.[12])

During the 1970s, worldwide events, including rising energy costs and global recession made it more difficult for many countries receiving US assistance to meet FMS loan repayments. Increased grant aid, which the US Government had planned to eliminate entirely by the early 1980s, became necessary.

In March 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the Secretary of Defense of the impact on US national security that would result from the reduction being considered in the Congress to reduce grant security assistance in the FY 1973 program from \$705 to \$500 million. They recommended that "every effort" be exerted to make the Congress aware of the national security implications involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also used the occasion to repeat their recommendation to make security assistance funding a separate line item in the DoD budget.[13]

Other aspects of the security assistance program troubled the Joint Chiefs of Staff in succeeding years. In 1976, as part of the action to implement the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of Defense proposed to assign the MAAGs to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)/Defense Security Assistance Agency, to report through the Director, DSAA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately objected. They believed that the proposed arrangement would adversely affect unity of effort, "especially in the essential program formulation phase." The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred that the MAAGs continue to be responsible to the unified commander of their region in order to insure the "regional coherence" of the US security assistance program. The Secretary of Defense Accepted the JCS recommendation and the MAAGs continued to report through the unified commanders.[14]

Meantime, in May 1975, President Gerald Ford had ordered a review of policy on arms transfers, and the resulting study of 25 August 1976, which was not provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review, recommended various management changes. No action resulted, however, before the Ford Administration left office in January 1977.[15]

During the Nixon and Ford Administrations, the dollar volume of security assistance increased tremendously with the increase occurring in the sales area. The following figures are indicative:

US Security Assistance[16]  
(Dollars in Millions)

FY	1969	1976
Grants	\$2,819.6	\$ 369.6
Sales	\$1,160.6	\$14,277.8

\*\*\*\*\*

CHANGES IN JCS PROCEDURES FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

In June 1978 in the second year of President Jimmy Carter's Administration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instituted changes in their Joint Strategic

Planning System documents to facilitate the PPB system. They eliminated the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and the Joint Force Memorandum, replacing them with the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM), respectively. As a part of the change, the Support to Other Nations Annex of the Joint Forces Memorandum became the Security Assistance Program Annex to the new Joint Program Assessment Memorandum.[17]

\*\*\*\*\*

On 1 June 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM) to replace the Support to Other Nations Annex to the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum.[18/25]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the first Joint Security Assistance Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 25 July 1979.

\*\*\*\*\*

As a supplement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also provided the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum Supporting Analysis (JSAMSA).[19/26]

\*\*\*\*\*

In April 1982, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the current system for security assistance planning, programming, and budgeting should be improved. They pointed out that the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 had established the Special Defense Acquisition Fund\* and expanded the authority of overseas security assistance organizations to include evaluation and planning of the host government's military capabilities. These legislative changes, together with the President's 8 July 1981 arms transfer policy, the Army and Air Force Chiefs said, had set the stage for more "pragmatic" management of security assistance. An improved system was needed, they continued to complement the Department of State process, to improve the JCS contribution, and to assist the Services in their mid- and long-term planning to support security assistance customers with weapons and materiel needs. Specifically, they recommended enhancement of the part of the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis covering allied and friendly forces and expansion of the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum and its Supporting Analysis to include strategic implications of security assistance programs and specific funding profiles associated with procurement of weapons systems to match to the best extent possible the force structure recommended in the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis.[19]

---

\* A revolving fund under the control of the Secretary of Defense, separate from other accounts, for the acquisition of defense articles and services in anticipation of transfer to eligible foreign countries and international organizations. PL-113, 29 Dec 81 (U).

The full Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the Army and Air Force members and they informed the Secretary of Defense on 11 May 1982 that the current security assistance PPB system should be enhanced in order to meet more successfully the needs of friends and allies and to avoid adverse impact on the readiness of US forces. They listed the following two initiatives that, if implemented, would bring immediate and significant improvement: (1) integration of the security assistance program with US force structure operational planning; and (2) preparation of a comprehensive plan in the near term for the Caribbean and Latin American area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Secretary of Defense to raise these matters with the Secretary of State.[20]

The Deputy Secretary of Defense replied on 1 July 1982. He acknowledged the need for improvements in the security assistance planning, programming, and budgeting system and requested specifics from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on what could be done within the Department of Defense. With regard to the Caribbean and Latin America, the Deputy Secretary said that an interdepartmental group, with Joint Staff representation, was currently developing "a comprehensive regional plan" as a result of the Falklands war. He preferred to await the outcome of that effort before taking further action.[21]

\*\*\*\*\*

As a result of a 20 July briefing to the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Director of the Joint Staff to provide rationale and recommendations for changes to legislation: to establish uniform "costing procedures" for all FMS training, to authorize exchanges of unit level military training on "a cost-free reciprocal basis," to place the training portion (IMET) of security assistance under the control of the Secretary of Defense, and to relax constraints on overseas security assistance organizations with respect to advisory and training activities.[22] Then, on 13 August 1982, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy requested JCS and Service recommendations, in the form of either revised or new legislation, to remove restrictions on or expand authorities for security assistance matters.[23]

On 7 September 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the rationale and recommendations for the four specific matters requested by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).[24] A week later, on 15 September 1982, they supplied a number of recommendations for additional legislative initiatives in response to the request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The latter proposals included: (1) establishment of a Secretary of Defense security assistance appropriation account and a treaties and base agreement account, (2) amendment of the Arms Export Control Act to expand instances for which reduction or waiver of nonrecurring costs (NRCs) was permitted, (3) expansion of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund function to include acquisition of materiel in anticipation of foreign requests by removing legislative ceilings and appropriation restrictions, (4) standardization of repayment and grace periods for FMS credit sales, (5) authorization for reciprocal one-for-one exchanges of students between senior and intermediate military schools of the United States and foreign countries on a reimbursement-in-kind basis, (6) increased Presidential authority to provide emergency military

assistance through cash disbursement or limited procurements, (7) modification of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to allow training of police in "mini-states" that had no military and used the police as a paramilitary force for defense purposes, (8) addition of a provision to the Arms Export Control Act allowing sale of defense articles manufactured in US Government-owned facilities to US industry in support of approved direct commercial sale, (9) permission for US forces to exchange logistic support with non-NATO allies with whom they might be based or engaged with in combined exercises, (10) full restructuring of the Arms Control Export Act to clarify the intent and to preclude "continuous" misinterpretation, (11) repeal of the section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that required termination of specified forms of security assistance to a country if that country received assistance from a third country in enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear materials, and (12) addition of a section to the Arms Control Export Act to restrict issuance of export licenses for major defense equipment sold under direct commercial contracts.[25] These submissions marked the first time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended legislative initiatives for security assistance. Heretofore such proposals had always come from the Services.

\*\*\*\*\*

#### THE INFLUENCE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff influence the overall direction and scope of the security assistance program although the exact degree of influence is difficult to assess. Generally, the JCS recommendations have been followed with respect to the policy for and direction of the program even though actual JCS funding recommendations have not been accepted.[26]

\*\*\*\*\*

With regard to MAP grants, the Administration in the majority of instances has lowered the amount, and the Congress reduced the figure recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in every instance. For foreign military sales (credits), the Administration has consistently increased the figure, and the Congress has increased the amount in the majority of cases, sometimes significantly. For training [International Military Education and Training (IMET)], there is a less consistent pattern but, for five years, both the Administration and the Congress reduced the amount for training [IMET] below what the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended.

It is necessary to consider certain other factors as well. First, the JCS recommendations for grants and training are not fiscally constrained -- in the sense that they are based on military justifications. In both the Administration and Congressional reviews of the programs, however, economic and political factors have to be taken into account. As a result, the amounts desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are usually reduced. For foreign military sales, approved figures have been the extension of credits and did not require full appropriations. As a consequence, both the Administration and the Congress have usually been willing to recommend and approve larger amounts than those recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the JCS security assistance recommendations for FYs 1976 and 1980 through 1983 did not include Israel. Both the Administration proposals and the finally approved programs for those years, however, contained large foreign military

sales credits for Israel and help explain the substantial increases in the FMS portions of the security assistance program above the JCS recommendations.

\*\*\*\*\*

### THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CYCLE

By law, the Department of State supervises security assistance. The Department of Defense, however, plays a major role in the formulation of the yearly programs and administers the approved programs. The security assistance program cycle begins with the Department of State issuance of "call-up" messages to the country teams where there are US security assistance programs. In response, the country teams prepare Annual Integrated Assessments of Security Assistance (AIASAs) for their countries. The US MAAGs or military missions in the various countries make a major contribution to the AIASAs.[27]

The AIASAs are submitted to the Department of State with copies provided to the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) of the Joint Staff, the commanders of the appropriate unified commands, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), and other US Government agencies, such as the AID and ACDA, as appropriate. The commanders of the unified commands review and report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the AIASAs for the countries in their areas of responsibility, commenting on the proposed funding levels and giving priority listing for those levels in their regions.

The regional divisions of J-5 consider the AIASAs, together with the submissions of the unified commanders, and prepare the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum Supporting Analysis. Simultaneously, the Department of State regional bureaus review the AIASAs and prepare Unit Overviews for each country. At this stage, there is informal consultation between the Department of State, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA) in preparation for subsequent formal interdepartmental consideration of the security assistance program.

When the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum Supporting Analysis is complete, the Security Assistance/Arms Transfer Division of J-5 uses it to prepare the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum, a priority listing by country of security assistance requirements for the forthcoming fiscal year. Upon review and approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum becomes the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the current security assistance program.

Formal interdepartmental consideration of the security assistance program follows in the Security Assistance Program Review Working Group (SAPRWG) of the Arms Transfer Management Group (formerly the Arms Export Control Board). Both the working level body and the parent group are chaired by the Department of State and include representatives from all concerned departments and agencies. JCS representation in the Working Group is at the division chief level of the Security Assistance/Arms Transfer Division, J-5, while the Director, J-5, represents the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Arms transfer Management Group.

The Joint Security Assistance Memorandum and the Unit Overviews serve as the JCS and State positions, respectively, in the SAPRWG consideration. This interdepartmental review begins even before completion of the JSAM, and the CINC comments on the AIASAs receive major consideration during the initial stages of this process. The result of the SAPRWG effort is a proposed security assistance program that is then submitted to the Arms Transfer Management Group. There most differences are resolved; remaining issues are reviewed by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). Should any differences still persist, the Secretary of State makes the final decision.

The Secretary of State then forwards the completed security assistance program to the Office of Management and Budget. Here further staffing occurs and funding level adjustments are made. At this point, the agencies that participated in the Arms Transfer Management Group consideration have a chance for rebuttal. Then the Office of Management and Budget submits the final proposed security assistance program to the President. Following his approval, the Department of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency jointly prepare the Congressional Presentation Document, which supports the security assistance program request that is relayed to the Congress.

After hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees, and possibly by other committees such as the Armed Services Committees, if they choose, the Congress enacts, first, an authorization and, finally, an appropriation for the annual security assistance program. Since the Congressional authorization and appropriations rarely equal the Administration's program request, the SAPRWG meets to make the necessary apportionment of the available funds.

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the post-World War II years to the present, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have always placed great importance on the strategic value of security assistance. This commitment to the program and its strategic objectives has been and continues to be a key element in defense planning. The JCS participation in the security assistance area, however, has followed an evolutionary route, reflecting both the policy changes and budgetary developments.

In the period 1947 through 1960, the primary JCS concern was to determine, on an ad hoc basis, whether weapons transfers to allies and other friendly countries supported regional capability levels to meet containment objectives. During the 1960s, the depletion of excess equipment stocks combined with an improved worldwide economic climate brought a changeover in the primary security assistance approach from grant aid to the extension of favorable credit for the purchase of military materiel. These developments coincided with the advent of the planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS) as a planning tool throughout the Executive Branch of the Government, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to monitor the security assistance process more closely to assure that budget planning and allocations supported strategic priorities.

The 1970s and early 1980s have seen expanded Congressional control over the security assistance budget and an increasing tendency to use security assistance for political ends. As the Congress has exercised tighter control, and as the political demands on the program have increased, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have grown increasingly concerned. They want the security assistance program funded to the fullest extent possible and oriented toward strategic objectives. To this end, they have been anxious that their advice on security assistance have as much clout as possible and have reviewed ways to improve their effectiveness in this regard. During the past year, they have been particularly attentive to strengthening their impact on security assistance. Some improvements have been accomplished; others remain to be achieved.

In the spring of 1982, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force suggested that the JCS planning documents include the strategic implications of the security assistance program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and the current FY 1984 Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM) has, for the first time, a "Policy and Strategy" section. The new section is brief and will be expanded in subsequent years to explain in more specific terms how security assistance supports US national strategy. Another possibility in this regard is for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take the lead, in both DoD and interagency deliberations, to reorient the security assistance program to reflect strategic and military objectives with "diplomacy" assuming an important, but lesser role.

As a means of exercising more control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have for the past ten years advocated transfer of security assistance funding from the Foreign Assistance budget to the DoD budget. The Department of State, however, has always opposed such a change and continues to do so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also considered the need to improve the integration of the security assistance program with US force planning. This area is currently under study by both the Services and appropriate unified commanders, but no specific proposals have yet been set forth.

In June 1982, the Chief of Naval Operations called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a "much more active role" with the Congress to insure enactment of the adequate security assistance appropriations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and directed preparation of a briefing and other materials for their use in presentations to the Congress on security assistance. This objective is being incorporated in the testimony of the Chiefs in their regularly scheduled appearances before Congressional committees. Another way of approaching the Congress is by means of increased emphasis on security assistance in the Chairman's annual posture statement. The FY 1983 statement presented security assistance in terms of the importance of the program and the issues to be resolved rather than merely a description of the program as was the case in earlier statements. The FY 1984 statement carries this "editorial" approach even further, stressing the strategic objectives of security assistance and justifying more grant aid, better concessionary credit, and increased training assistance.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have continued to increase their efforts to influence the security assistance program. In February 1984, just before both houses of Congress began the "markup" of the security assistance bill,

they held a series of meetings with selected groups of Congressmen and Senators. The Chiefs attended these meetings as a corporate body and personally expressed their specific concerns about the program. These included the need to increase the size of the program, to provide more grant aid, and to make loans available to recipient countries at concessional rates. They commented on inequities they perceived in allocations and in Congressional earmarkings. They also made specific legislative proposals to help make the security assistance program more flexible and relate it more to the strategic objectives of the United States. They followed up with a meeting on security assistance with the Secretary of Defense and finally, they carried their message to the White House, where they discussed their concerns about the program with the President. In a significant development, they received approval of both the Secretary of Defense and the President to have their legislative initiatives introduced in both houses of Congress as bills separate from the foreign aid bill. The initiatives are already included in the foreign aid bill, but it is anticipated that Congress, in an election year, will probably not pass the foreign aid bill. The Chiefs' bills, however, stand a good chance of passage separately.

Current organizational arrangements also influence the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the security assistance area. As presently authorized, CINCs may communicate directly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on security assistance matters. This situation can result in the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff being bypassed. It would be better to require the CINCs and OSD to communicate through the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters involving security assistance. Within the Joint Staff, responsibility for security assistance is organized in a matrix fashion. The Security Assistance/Arms Transfer (SA/AT) Division, J-5, has overall responsibility while assistance for individual countries falls under the appropriate regional divisions of J-5. Finally, Joint Staff effectiveness as an active, innovative element in the security assistance community is hampered by the small size of the SA/AT Division. The four officers of the Division have to coordinate with NSC, Department of State, and OSD personnel in the development of policy, legislative, and budgetary actions.

A final area for improvement is the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum. As mentioned above, the newly added strategy section could be expanded and strengthened. Moreover, the JSAM comes late in the budget cycle and should be presented earlier to be more useful. The JSAM, however, is dependent on receipt of the AIASAs, which conform to the Department of State programming and budgeting cycle with different reporting dates. Additionally, the format of the JSAM might be simplified for an easier understanding of the actual dollar recommendations.

#### ENDNOTES

1. DSAA, Fiscal Year Series, Sep 81, pp.2-3 (U).
2. JCS 2143/114, 25 Nov 60 (S), JMF 3130 (21 Nov 60).
3. Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (1971) pp. 544-549 (U). Papers, Nixon, 1970 (1971), pp. 118-119, (U).

4. Rpt to Pres., from Task Force on International Development (Peterson Rpt), "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s, A New Approach," 4 Mar 70, Encl to Att to JCS 2315/486, 9 Mar 70 (U), JMF 495 (5 Mar 70).
5. JCSM-203-70 to SecDef, 30 Apr 70 (JCS 2315/492) (U), JMF 495 (29 Apr 70).
6. Memo, SecDef to Pres., 6 May 70, Att to JCS 2315/492-1, 11 May 70 (C), same file.
7. NSDM 76, 8 Aug 70 (C), JMF 001 (CY 1970) NSDMs, sec 3. Spec. Msg. to Congress on Reform of the Foreign Assistance Program, 15 Sep 70, Papers, Nixon, 1970 (1971), pp. 745-756 (U).
8. Memo, Dr. Kissinger to Secs State and Def and Chmn, NSC USecys Cmte, 25 May 71, Att to JCS 2315/501-6, 26 Mar 71 (S), JMF 495 (19 Aug 70).
9. CM-786-71 to DJS, 6 Apr 71, Att to JCS 2458/779, 6 Apr 71 (U), JMF 495 (6 Apr 71).
10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, ASD(ISA), and ASD(SA), 17 Apr 71, Att to JCS 2315/526, 20 Apr 71 (U), same file.
11. DoD Dir 5105.38, 11 Aug 71 (U).
12. Ibid., (U). Memo, SecDef to secys of MILDEPs et al., 28 Jul 76, Att to JCS 2315/612, 2 Aug 76 (U), JMF 129 (28 Jul 76).
13. JCSM-101-72 to SecDef, 7 Mar 72 (JCS 2315/551) (U), JMF 495 (2 Mar 72).
14. JCSM-305-76 to SecDef, 30 Aug 76 (JCS 2315/617-2) (U); Memo ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 26 Nov 76, Att to JCS 2314/617-3, 8 Dec 76 (U); JMF 129 (28 Jul 76). SecDef approval indicated by handwritten notation by Mil Asst to SecDef on ASD(ISA) memo.
15. NSSM 223, 19 May 75, Att to JCS 2315/600, 21 May 75 (C-XGDS); Memo, Asst to Pres for NSA to SecDef et al., 9 Dec 76, Att to JCS 2315/600-1, 13 Dec 76 (C-GDS); JMF 499 (19 May 75).
16. DSAA, Fiscal Year Series, Sep 81, pp. 2-3 (U).
17. See JCSM-247-78 to SecDef, 31 Jul 78 (JCS 2522/27-1) (C-GDS), JMF 557 (17 Jun 78) sec 2A.
18. See #25 in JC65.
19. CSAM 12-82/CSAFM 90-82 to JCS, 21 Apr 82, Att to JCS 2315/690, 23 Apr 82 (U), JMF 495 (21 Apr 82).
20. JCSM-95-82 to SecDef, 11 May 82 (JCS 2315/690-1) (U), JMF 495 (21 Apr 82).

21. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 Jul 82, Att to JCS 2315/690-2, 21 Jul 82 (U), JMF 495 (21 Apr 82).
22. Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 5 Aug 82, JCS 2315/693, 18 Aug 82 (U), JMF 495 (5 Aug 82).
23. Memo, USecDef(P) to DJS, 13 Aug 82, JCS 2315/692, 18 Aug 82 (U), same file.
24. JCSM-197-82 to SecDef, 7 Sep 82 (JCS 2315/693-1) (U), same file.
25. JCSM-209-82 to SecDef, 15 Sep 82 (JCS 2315/692-1) (U), same file
26. Interviews, Willard J. Webb, JCS Hist. Div., with COL J.P. Coyne and Mr. Leslie A. Gilson, SA/AT Div., J-5, 10 Dec 82 and 13 Jan 83.
27. All information on the security assistance program cycle is from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, May 81, pp. 7-16, 7-24 (U), and Interviews, Willard J. Webb, JCS Hist. Div., with Leslie A. Gilson, SA/AT Div., J-5, 27 Aug and 8 Sep 82 (U).