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## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING: A STUDY OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

By

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### Introduction

It has long been held that the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) returns more, dollar for dollar, than any other form of security assistance. As a result, except for isolated attacks on the program relating to human rights issues, the IMETP has been relatively free of criticism. However, it is now alleged that because of a confluence of factors the IMETP will be unable to use any sizeable increase in funds on a cost effective basis. The purpose of this study is to determine the validity of these claims and whether the program will be able to use such funds should they become available.

### Background

The long-held overall objective of the IMET program has been to shift emphasis from maintenance and operations training to military rapport, with increased emphasis on professional and influence training for individuals likely to occupy positions of prominence in their armed forces.

It is claimed that the training base in high demand areas is -- or soon will be -- at maximum capacity. In addition, it is alleged that without an increase in selected plant, personnel, and supporting resources, and/or in some cases, a change in established "quota" levels by the military departments, a decrease in program cost effectiveness will result because of the following:

- Increased technical and mechanical vice professional/influence training;
- Increases in enlisted over officer training;
- Programming of available training, instead of acquiring the best training;
- Increased Orientation Training Tours (OTTs), Observer Training (OBTs), and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), as opposed to CONUS core-type training;
- Increased use of funds for civilian undergraduate and postgraduate programs;
- A return to the discontinued practice of using IMET funds for the acquisition of books, publications, training aids, and other software, rather than by purchasing these items through Foreign Military Sales (FMS);

- Requests for similar software acquisitions using IMET funds to support FMS hardware purchases; and, finally,
- A decrease in IMET cost sharing by foreign governments.

While the above factors may fall within the IMET program purposes as cited in Chapter 5 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the program objectives noted in Chapter 10, Section I of the Security Assistance Management Manual, none falls in the category of influence training, which has been used to justify the sizeable IMETP dollar increases before the Congress since 1980. Moreover, it is alleged that, as the program increases, there are signs of less cost sharing by IMET recipients because countries are finding it difficult to assume the additional costs required of an increased program.

The factors leading to this alleged negative impact on the training program include the following:

- The increased purchasing power of the IMET dollar, beginning in 1980 under incremental pricing (Yatron Amendment), and resulting in an increase in trainee numbers and training spaces;
- The doubling of IMET program funds between 1980-84 which has added to the above numbers;
- The addition of 37 countries to the program since 1980; and,
- The growth of U.S. military training requirements to make up for prior year deficiencies.

All of this has occurred without a corresponding expansion of the U.S. military training base or an increase in existing supporting resources. A discussion of these factors follows.

#### Increases in the IMET Program

Following a period of stagnation during the late 1970s, the IMET program experienced a resurgence under the Reagan Administration. The table below summarizes the increase in program dollar levels, student numbers, and the number of training spaces since 1980.

**TABLE 1**  
Increased Program Levels/Number of Students/Number of Training Spaces FY 1980-84

	Fiscal Year				
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Program (\$M)	25.0	28.4	42.0	46.0	51.1
Students 1/	3,545	4,836	5,642	6,607	5,933
Training Spaces	5,607	5,850	8,278	10,970	10,486

1/ Includes Panama Canal Area Military Schools (PACAMS)

While the IMET program dollar has doubled since Fiscal Year 1980, IMET student numbers and training spaces have nearly tripled.[1]

In addition to the increase in program dollars since 1980, the IMETP benefitted from a windfall caused by a liberalization of pricing criteria for foreign military training as a result of the "Yatron Amendment" of 1980.

Prior to FY 1976, IMET training was priced on an "additional cost" basis, i.e., the program paid only those costs incurred as a direct result of foreign student attendance. The FY 1976 security assistance legislation required that the IMET pricing formula be changed to charge a full pro rata share of total training costs, exclusive of military pay and allowances. As a result, in combination with low IMET Program budgets and inflation, student numbers fell as the average cost per student spiralled sharply between FY 1975 and FY 1980 as indicated in Table 2.

TABLE 2  
IMET Training Summary  
(FY 1975-80)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Program (\$M)</u>	<u>Average Cost per Student (\$)</u>
1975 <u>1/</u>	8,449	24.7	2,925
1976 <u>2/</u>	5,603	22.0	3,922
1977	4,833	23.5	4,864
1978	4,542	31.5	6,937
1979	3,772	26.8	7,445
1980	3,545	25.0	6,891

1/ Excludes Service Funded (MASF) program for Southeast Asia.

2/ Excludes transitional quarter.

The situation was improved with the enactment of the International Development and Cooperation Act of 1980 which authorized the costing of IMET on an incremental (additional cost) basis, i.e., the Yatron Amendment. This increased the buying power of IMETP dollars over the previous full pro rata basis, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3  
CONUS Tuition Rate Reduction Percentages  
 (As a Result of Yatron Pricing")

(Overall DOD)

<u>Training Category</u>	<u>Percentage of Reduction (Est.) 1/</u>
Flying	23.6
Operations	51.5
Communications & Electronics	69.3
Maintenance	61.0
Logistics	68.5
Administration	45.3
Professional/Specialist	60.9
Missile	<u>65.5</u>
Estimated Weighted Average (EWA)	46.6

1/ These figures were developed in 1981. They excluded travel and temporary living allowance (TLA) and DOD Informational Program (IP) costs. Calculations were based on the total FY 1981 authorized program; however, the actual reduction for FY 1981 applied only to the last three fourths of the program year due to the non-retroactive aspect of the legislation.

Although no formal attempt has been made to refine these figures, based on an experience factor since 1981 it is generally agreed that experience would show a conservative estimated weight average (EWA) rate reduction of no less than 25%; or, at worst, the Yatron Amendment restored the buying power of the IMET dollar to the pre-FY 1976 level.

Increases in Country Numbers

At the same time that the increase in training numbers and training spaces has occurred, there has also been an increase in the number of participating countries, as illustrated in Table 4.

TABLE 4  
Increased Number of IMETP Countries

	<u>Fiscal Year</u>				
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Country Numbers	53	61	76	82	95

Although the increase in country numbers is reflected in training numbers and training spaces, the full impact of increased country numbers is not readily obvious. For example, initially, new countries offer minimal numbers of students to the program; but as programs materialize, student numbers increase dramatically. A recent case in point is the Eastern Caribbean. During Fiscal Year 1983, the first year of the program, a total of 21 students from the Eastern Caribbean attended Army schools; it is estimated that the number will double to 42 in FY 1984; and that similar exponential increases will continue in the outyears.

#### Impact on Training Management

The establishment of an IMET program for a new country or region (whether for 1 or 100 students) requires a large initial effort. The impact is less at the State/Defense levels, more at Service levels, and most at the Service training commands, schools, and training installations. For example, with respect to the Army, there has been no increase in associated personnel or resources at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) or at the schools or training installations since the Army reorganized its foreign military training program in 1978. In addition, there is also a paucity of higher ranking officers for foreign military training management positions because of other Army requirements. As a result, the average Army foreign training officer (FTO) rank has decreased from the O-5/O-6 level to the O-3 level.[2] Thus, today's Army FTOs generally have less rank and experience than their predecessors, but are responsible for more foreign military trainees at the installation level. Therefore, there is less Army foreign military training assistance, management, and oversight instead of more which is necessary to insuring maximum training results and a maximum training experience.

Similar situations exist in the other two uniformed services and at higher departmental levels. For example, U.S. Navy FTOs tend to be part-time, low rank (enlisted, ensign or lieutenant junior grade), which may be explained, in part, because foreign military training affects approximately less than 1% of Navy specialized training and only 2% of the Navy's general training effort. At the same time, however, foreign military training can constitute up to 10% of the training load at such activities as the Naval Amphibious School, Coronado, California, and 20% of professional development training. At this time, these loads are forecasted to remain at the same levels for the foreseeable future.[3]

#### Impacted Training Areas

The increase in foreign military training numbers is also impacting on selected training areas, thereby raising concern as to the ability of the Services to provide the desired training. In some areas, the Services have already placed quotas on the number of foreign trainees that may attend particular courses, or have postponed or denied requests for training. The problem involves all three military departments and principally concerns professional education and training. As yet, U.S. requirements have not posed a problem; the key factors are limited facilities, limited U.S. training and support personnel, and the need to keep a proper classroom ratio between U.S. and foreign trainees.

Although a surge in U.S. training requirements due to increased defense budgets has yet to develop as alleged, the "600 Ship Navy" could conceivably pose a problem if the Navy does not at the same time especially plan for foreign military requirements. Failure to plan for the latter could result in 600 ship training shortfalls or vice versa.

Finally, the military departments give priority to their personnel over foreign personnel for training on new systems, e.g., FIREFINDER, PATRIOT, MLRS, etc.

The following table outlines the problem areas and the contributing factors in each of the three Services.

TABLE 5  
IMPACTED TRAINING AREAS

<u>U.S. ARMY</u>		
<u>Training Program</u>	<u>Status 1/</u>	<u>Contributing Factors 2/</u>
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA	At Maximum Capacity	Limited facilities, housing, community support, school support, personnel, and seminar configuration. Limited to 16 fellows and invitation by Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS	Over Maximum Capacity	Facilities, housing, and person- nel. Limited to 96 foreign trainees. 158 requests in FY83; 132 requests in FY84.
Aviation School, Ft. Rucker, AL	Near Maximum Capacity	Availability of spaces dependent on two-year early identification of training requirements.
Engineer School, Ft. Belvoir, VA	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited housing facilities.
Infantry School, Ft. Benning, GA	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited housing facilities and administrative personnel support.
Ordnance School, Aberdeen PG, MD	Near Maximum Capacity	Housing and facilities and admin- istrative support.
Judge Advocate General (JAG) School, Charlottesville, VA	At Maximum Capacity	JAG graduate courses at absolute maximum, with demand exceeding capacity by 2 to 1. JAG basic course near maximum.

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<u>Training Program</u>	<u>Status 1/</u>	<u>Contributing Factors 2/</u>
Transportation School, Ft. Eustis, VA	Near Maximum Capacity	Extremely limited housing and administrative support.
Armor School, Ft. Knox, KY	At Maximum Capacity	Advanced course at absolute maximum as percent of foreign input in relationship to class size. (15%)
Medical Courses, Washington, DC	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited housing facilities during summer months.

1/ All schools are near maximum capacity in Officer Advanced Courses on basis of foreign-to-U.S. ratio. Average maximum foreign student input per class in Advanced Courses is 15%; all others are 10%.

2/ In descending order of impact.

#### U.S. NAVY/MARINE CORPS

<u>Training Program</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Contributing Factors 1/</u>
Naval Post Graduate School (NPGS), Monterey, CA	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited facilities, housing, instructor personnel.
Flight Training (Strike Jet), Pensacola, FL	At Maximum Capacity	Limited facilities, housing, instructor personnel.
Naval Command College, Naval Staff College, Newport, RI	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited classroom facilities, housing, instructor personnel.
Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited classroom facilities, proper seminar mix between U.S. and foreign students.
USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA	At Maximum Capacity	Limited classroom facilities, proper seminar mix between U.S. and foreign students.
Helicopter Training, Pensacola, FL	Near Maximum Capacity	Limited facilities, proper U.S. and foreign trainee mix.
USMC Basic Officer Course, Quantico, VA	At Maximum Capacity	Limited facilities, proper U.S. and foreign trainee mix.

1/ In descending order of impact.

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U.S. AIR FORCE

<u>Training Program</u>	<u>Status 1/</u>	<u>Contributing Factors 2/</u>
Air War College, Air Command & Staff College, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, AL	At Maximum Capacity	USAF requirements, limited facilities.
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Graduate Programs, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH	At Maximum Capacity	USAF requirements, limited facilities and housing.
AFIT Short Courses, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH	Over Maximum Capacity	High USAF requirements.
Undergraduate Pilot Training, Various Air Force Bases	At Maximum Capacity	Limited airframes, instructors, programmed flying hours, quotas for foreign trainees.
Undergraduate Navigator Training, Mather AFB, CA	Near Maximum Capacity	USAF requirements, limited facilities.
F-5 Training, Williams AFB, AR	Over Maximum Capacity	Limited airframes.
Physiological Training, Various Air Force Bases	Over Maximum Capacity	USAF requirements.
Security Assistance Management, Wright- Patterson AFB, OH	At Maximum Capacity	Limited facilities and instructors.
Flight Safety Officer, Norton AFB, CA	At Maximum Capacity	Contractor provided training. International quotas limited to a maximum of 25 per class. Two classes are contracted for international students each year.
Precision Measure- ments, Lowry AFB, CO	Over Maximum Capacity	Facilities, housing and personnel. Limited to 96 FMTs. 158 requests in FY83; 132 requests in FY84.

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<u>Training Program</u>	<u>Status 1/</u>	<u>Contributing Factors 2/</u>
Specialized Medical Courses, Brooks AFB, TX	Over Maximum Capacity	Quotas also very limited due to USAF, USAFR, and ANG requirements.

- 1/ Many initial skill training courses are also at maximum or near maximum capacity. However, some increases in foreign requirements in the advanced skill courses, including Field Training Detachment (FTD) training may be accommodated with 15 months' notice.
- 2/ Contributing factors in descending order of impact.

Correlation of Increasing IMETP Dollars, Training Numbers, and Training Emphasis

That a significant increase in student numbers and training spaces has impacted on the training base has been established. The situation will not improve unless there are changes in service policies concerning quotas and priorities for U.S. personnel, or increases in selected plant and supporting resources. Finally, the program appears to be approaching near maximum or to be at maximum capacity, especially in selected areas of professional and influence training, as shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6  
Enlisted vs. Officer Training and Education  
Technical vs. Professional Military Education (PME)  
(Comparison by Number of FMTs/Number of Spaces)

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>Y83</u>	<u>FY84 1/</u>
ENLISTED 2/					
CONUS 3/	357/435	485/607	543/746	639/890	1109/1526
OCONUS	769/782	1321/1328	2073/2231	2765/2802	3108/3268
TOTAL EM	1126/1217	1806/1935	2616/2987	3404/3692	4217/4794
OFFICER TECHNICAL					
CONUS 3/	1290/1943	1624/2227	2246/3266	2635/3702	3211/5218
OCONUS	261/303	493/497	316/320	505/594	501/596
TOTAL TECH	1551/2246	2117/2724	2562/3566	3140/4296	3712/5814
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION					
CONUS 3/	583/686	656/859	907/1128	1061/1342	1050/1321
OCONUS	33/33	55/55	51/51	57/57	54/54
TOTAL PME	616/719	711/914	958/1179	1118/1397	1104/1375
TOTAL OFF	2167/2965	2828/3638	3520/4745	4258/5696	4816/7189

1/ Estimated.

2/ Since most enlisted training falls into technical training, figures include all enlisted training.

3/ Includes Hawaii.

Except in cases of developing countries which have entered the program since 1980, it is difficult to prove a cause and effect relationship between increasing training numbers and decreasing professional training emphasis. Nonetheless, Table 6 shows that between FYs 1980 and 1984 the total enlisted and training spaces quadrupled, whereas total officer and training spaces only doubled and tripled respectively. In addition, the increases in officer technical training by number of trainees and spaces during this same period far outpaced professional military education which is directly equated with leadership and influence training. Therefore, the contention that there has been a sizeable increase in enlisted and technical training over officer and professional education and training between FY 1980-84 is substantiated.

**TABLE 7**  
**On-the-Job Training (OJT), Qualification, Observer Training (OBT)**  
**(Comparison by Number of Spaces/Man-Weeks)**

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84 1/</u>
<b>OJT/QUAL</b>					
CONUS 2/	325/2084	380/3065	326/1923	433/2255	673/3976
OCONUS	596/1275	310/1069	88/464	125/665	126/794
TOTAL OJT	<u>923/3359</u>	<u>690/3134</u>	<u>414/3397</u>	<u>558/2980</u>	<u>799/4770</u>
<b>OBT</b>					
CONUS 2/	89/663	94/464	113/649	91/646	71/442
OCONUS	88/127	113/247	147/389	100/157	73/82
TOTAL OBT	<u>177/790</u>	<u>207/711</u>	<u>260/1038</u>	<u>191/803</u>	<u>144/524</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1100/4149	897/3845	674/4435	749/3723	943/5294

1/ Estimated.

2/ Includes Hawaii.

As illustrated in Table 7 above, there has been no significant change in the overall number of spaces or man-weeks devoted to on-the-job training, qualification training, or observer training. However, although observer training for the most part remained relatively unvaried between Fiscal Years 1980-84, the significant jump projected for CONUS on-the-job and qualification training for FY 1984 would appear to stand watching to insure that it does not continue to increase greatly in the out-years.

**TABLE 8**  
**Orientation Training Tours (OTTs)**

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84 1/</u>
Requests	13	21	30	34	26
Conducted	13	21	19	21	19
Participants	53	183	205	149	100
Man-Weeks	146	431	543	353	235

1/ Estimated.

Orientation Training Tours (OTTs) are designed for selected foreign officers who may become future leaders and policymakers. Such tours enable these personnel to become familiar with U.S. military operations and management. The Army receives the major share of OTT requests; it conducts the major portion of OTTs annually, and it has the greatest number of OTT participants and man-weeks. As a result, effective in FY 1982, the Army established a limit of 14 OTTs (IMET and FMS) that could be effectively conducted, with participants to number no more than four for a normal tour. These limitations were due to a combination of factors. They included limited Army administrative capability; the inability of Army schools/installations to handle larger OTT numbers; and, most importantly, the need to insure that OTT objectives were accomplished in a professional manner. Since the other military departments did not have these problems, they agreed to handle any Army overflow in instances where an OTT included their installations.

Repetitive requesters-users of OTTs appeared to grow as country IMETP dollars increased, and generally were countries with large IMET dollar levels. In this regard, in 1983 it was emphasized that orientation training tours should be kept to a minimum as OTTs were expensive in terms of both service support resources and IMET funds; OTTs were intended for key personnel in situations which further the objectives listed in the SAMM; and that OTTs should not normally compose the major part of an established country program or otherwise be a routine use of country program funds.[4]

TABLE 9  
Degree-Producing Programs 1/

<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84 <u>2/</u></u>
22	68	116	108	92

1/ Involves civilian-type programs leading to an undergraduate or graduate degree.

2/ A 30% increase is projected for FY 1985.

The rise in degree-producing programs shown in Table 9 is the result of increased foreign military attendance at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School (NPGS), Monterey, CA, and the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Because of the nature of its training, the U.S. Army has an extremely limited degree-producing program.

Since AFIT training was at its maximum level, the USAF established a policy in 1983 to provide for a more equitable distribution of these spaces among countries by limiting them to one quota per country per year pending a review of worldwide requirements for the year. Further, almost 90% of all degree-producing programs for FY 1983 and 80% in FY 1984 involved training at the NPGS. As a result, the NPGS is at near-maximum capacity with regard to foreign students.

The increase in degree-producing programs between FYs 1980-1984 is also due in part to the increasingly limited available space in other professional and leadership training programs, such as Command and Staff and the War Colleges. For the most part, however, the increase can be attributed to increased IMET country dollar programs, and this would support claims that sizeable dollar programs help to nurture degree-producing programs. At the same time, potential excessive requester/user countries of degree-producing programs have been identified, and measures have been taken to require additional justification which will make approval more difficult for such programs.

### Mobile Training Teams (MTTs)

As with any other aspect of a particular IMET country program, the decision to use an MTT should be based on consideration of all of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the use of a particular MTT at a particular time and in a particular country. Despite the long-range advantages of formal training courses, the need for MTT training should be recognized where the situation dictates this to be the preferred way of meeting the military requirement. At the same time, a decision to use MTTs solely for their apparent cost benefits runs the risk of detracting from the accomplishment of overall U.S. foreign training objectives.

TABLE 10  
Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) 1/  
 (By Number of Teams/Number of Team Members/Man-Weeks)

FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84 2/
46/176/1161	87/258/2550	92/331/3060	132/562/5552	96/519/5787

1/ Includes survey teams (where necessary) in preparation for MTT.

2/ Estimated.

TABLE 11  
Mobile Training Teams  
 (\$ Millions)  
 As a Percentage of Total IMETP 1/

	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
Total IMETP	25.0	28.4	42.0	45.7	58.5 2/
MTT	1.0	2.3	3.5	4.5	3.5 3/
Percentage of Total Dollars	4%	8%	8%	10%	6%

1/ Estimated.

2/ Not adjusted to CRA \$51.1.

3/ Approved/funded.

TABLE 12  
Mobile Training Teams  
 (\$ Millions)

As a Percentage of Section 506, FAA of 1961, as amended 1/

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>
Total Training Program	-	-	1.5	3.8	2.0
MTT	-	-	.5	1.9	1.8 <u>2/</u>
Percentage of Total Dollars	-	-	35%	49%	93%

1/ Estimated.

2/ Approved/funded.

The above tables support the contention of an escalation in MTT numbers between FYs 1980-1984. Using FY 1980 as a base year, the number of MTTs doubled on an average, but, more importantly, they increased five fold as measured in man-weeks. However, when considered as a percentage of total IMETP dollars, MTTs averaged approximately only 5%, in contrast to the much higher percentages shown for MTTs provided under the emergency provisions of Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. At the same time, the higher percentages for MTTs under Section 506 is proper and warranted considering the emergency and time-sensitive nature of those programs.

This documentation does not support the claim that an excessive portion of IMET funds are being devoted to MTTs to the detriment of influence or CONUS training. In addition, action has been taken to see that MTTs do not surpass 10% as a percentage of the total IMETP dollars. Otherwise, given FMS/IMET pricing benefits and MAP merger authority, every attempt will be made to fund MTTs under FMS -- especially when a large number of MTTs are required. Finally, the justification requirements for MTTs have been tightened considerably in order to insure that alternative means for meeting MTT requirements have been investigated thoroughly and that, if approved, an IMET-funded MTT is the best means to meet the requirement.[5]

#### IMET Cost Sharing

It has been policy to encourage IMET countries to share costs in the IMETP. One method has been to have countries assume student transportation and temporary living allowance (TLA) costs, thereby, maximizing training within available country IMET allocations. This cost sharing policy has been used in testimony before the Congress to help justify the dollar increases in the program in recent years.

Experience indicates that even poorer countries may be able to assume some of these costs. For example, a country may use its national airline to transport students to the U.S. Other countries whose airlines do not have trans-oceanic routes may use its airline to fly students to international regional terminals, such as London or Paris, using IMET travel funds for the remaining trans-oceanic and/or CONUS segment of student travel.

In addition, some countries have been willing to pick up all or part of the student living allowance in order to apply the maximum amount of their IMET funds to training. Table 13 provides a status of TLA cost sharing by IMET countries for the years FY 1980-84.

TABLE 13

Status of Transportation and Living Allowance (TLA) for  
IMET Countries Cost Sharing

<u>Country Cost Sharing Categories</u> (Payments)	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>
	(Number of Countries)				
Full Living Allowance; Full Travel Allowance	13	15	18	18	18
Full Living Allowance; Partial Travel Allowance	2	2	2	2	3
Full Living Allowance; No Travel Allowance	1	2	1	1	2
Partial Living Allowance; Full Travel Allowance	0	0	1	1	3
Partial Living Allowance; Partial Travel Allowance	2	2	2	5	3
Partial Living Allowance; No Travel Allowance	1	2	4	3	4
No Living Allowance; Full Travel Allowance	5	5	2	1	1
No Living Allowance; Partial Travel Allowance	9	9	11	10	10
No Living Allowance; No Travel Allowance	20	24	35	41	46
Number of countries	53	61	76	82	100
Number of countries making payments	33	37	41	41	44
Percentage of countries making payments	62.3%	60.7%	53.9%	50.0%	44.0%

The record shows an increase from 33 to 44 in the number of countries participating in IMET cost sharing and a decrease from 62.3% to 44.0% as a percentage of the total countries participating in the program for FY 1980-84. The decrease as a percentage of countries assuming TLA payments may be ascribed in part to the fact that countries entering the IMET program since 1980 tend to be poor countries from geographic regions, such as Africa and the Caribbean. On the other hand, there are countries with national airlines which are still using IMET funds to defray transportation costs; and, in some instances, a country may be cost sharing for travel and/or living allowance for one or two of its services, but not for all. Finally, because of the differences that exist in a country's capability, or in some cases, a general reluctance to assume these costs, we cannot expect automatic increases in the number of cost sharing participants irrespective of the number of IMET countries. Encouraging cost sharing on a case-by-case basis with the following points in mind seems more prudent:

- Reward countries with program increases to the dollar amount of their cost sharing efforts.
- Limit or abolish program increases for countries which have been historically been reluctant to cost share (except, for example, in the case of countries that do not have a national airline that flies international routes, or who have cost shared in the past but now have come upon difficult times).
- Avoid instances where the assumption of cost sharing would make U.S. training more expensive and, thereby, cause countries to choose cheaper training elsewhere to the detriment of U.S. interests.
- Consider the cancellation of training for countries being subsidized by a third country which would not subsidize training that may have a high U.S. priority, but is not considered important by the subsidizing country.
- Consider countries which limit cost sharing because of diplomatic and political exigencies, or which will have to cut back priority training if required to pay TLA.
- Consider countries which supplement the living allowance portion with national funds, which thereby provide a form of cost sharing because the living allowance paid by the U.S., in their judgment, may be inadequate.

Nonetheless, travel costs and living allowances need to be monitored closely to insure that maximum IMET dollars are used for training. This would appear to be especially essential now to preclude the use of dollars under an increased IMETP for costs formerly shared by recipients. Otherwise, the advances of the past decade in this important aspect of the program could be lost.

## Conclusion

IMET has been a cost effective and relatively inexpensive instrument for the achievement of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. Information available at this time does not support allegations that IMET will be unable to continue in this vein in the future. On the other hand, trends have developed in many areas that make up or support the IMET Program which, if not curbed, could result in a decrease in program cost-effectiveness. In order to counter this trend, the Departments of State and Defense issued a series of policy messages during FY 1984. These messages reiterated former policy guidance that IMET objectives are best served by training which is conducted in the United States rather than overseas. Further, the messages stressed the need to place emphasis on formal leadership courses over technical training, MTTs, OBTs, OTTs, and excessive high cost training (such as pilot training, degree programs, etc.), in order to reach the greatest number of students who would most likely occupy positions of prominence or influence in their countries.

The answer to the question "whether IMET can use sizeable fund increases cost effectively" will depend, in large measure, upon the size of the annual increases beyond the inflation factor and/or an increased Services' training capability. Alternately, in the absence of a change in training capability, an increase in present quotas established by the military departments will be required to meet foreign needs, especially in the areas of professional military education involving leadership and influence training.

The rapid escalation of the IMET Program in recent years has also been accompanied by even more rapid growth for a few other major security assistance programs. Therefore, the increase of the worldwide IMET Program level should not be translated automatically into a corresponding upward spiral of all country levels, especially countries which already have levels as high as \$2.0M or more. For example, one such country has indicated realistically that because of budgetary restraints it would not now be able to continue at its historic high level, especially if MTTs, OJT's, and OTTs eliminated.

Finally, the quality of the program, as well as the relatively small and/or new country programs with only basic objectives, must be recognized and protected. This is especially true in the case of countries which, regardless of program dollar levels, will continue to find means to use the money in areas not calculated to lead to future leaders and policy makers.

## ENDNOTES

1. During the same period, FMS student numbers and spaces dropped from highs of 6966 and 14922 to lows of 5305 and 8362 respectively between early on and later in the period. In general, the decrease does not compensate for the higher increases in the corresponding IMETP numbers and, hence, the increased workload upon the military departments and training facilities.

2. FTOs are U.S. personnel who administer the program at schools and at training installations. They provide logistic and administrative support to the foreign trainee and, when necessary, serve as intermediaries between the school faculty and training cadres with respect to academic and personal problems. Finally, the FTO is responsible for the DOD Informational Program at the local level. As a result, FTOs are the ultimate linch pins in insuring that IMET funds achieve optimum results.
3. There are indications of a positive change in the U.S. Navy situation. In a personal memo to Commanding Officers on 6 Feb 84, the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) noted the importance of the FTO. CNET emphasized the FTO's role as "the official U.S. Navy representative who serves as the primary point of contact for international trainees during their stay in the U.S.;" that the individual selected as the FTO be "a positive representative of the U.S. Navy;" and that Commanding Officers "provide support to the FTO in carrying out this meaningful assignment." Copies of the memo were also sent to CNO, CNATRA, CNTECHTRA, COMTRAPAC, and CONTRALANT.
4. SECSTATE message 091111Z Dec 83 (State 349743).
5. See State message 091111Z Dec 83 (State 349743); included in Chapter 10 of the new Security Assistance Management Manual; and cited in DSAA presentations to each of the FY 1985 training workshops conducted by EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, and CINCPAC.

#### ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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