

# JOINT PLANNING FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

## INTRODUCTION

Planning is an essential step in all military operations or activities, security cooperation included. At its simplest, planning is the process by which one understands where they are, where they want to be, and how best to get there. The plan is the product; how one intends to get from “A” to “B.”

At the operational level, planning focuses on ends, ways, and means. Planning allows the military professional to clearly identify where the command wants to go—the ends. Through operational art and design, the planner pinpoints how best to get there—the ways. Finally, the means, i.e., resources, are identified and applied. While the plan directs action to achieve the ends, it also serves as the justification for resourcing; planning is how DOD rationalizes security cooperation (SC).

What is different between operational planning and SC planning? In security cooperation, the political and military realms are one, and the planner must be an expert in all aspects of the Partner Nation (PN) and on the USG policy towards it. Also, SC is not war fighting, and SCOs do not wield weapons. The metaphorical weapons in SC are the SC programs—each with highly specific engagement criteria (i.e., the law); hence, it is important to know the rest of this textbook.

This chapter does not represent doctrine. Readers should review JP 5.0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011, prior to reading further, if unfamiliar with the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) or with operational art and design. This chapter will not reiterate joint doctrine but seeks only to present SC aspects and suggest a methodology.

## THEATER-LEVEL SC PLANNING

### Introduction

Theater-level planning, like all joint planning, is conducted using the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) (see figure 19-1) within the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system, as described in JP 5.0. While grand in scope and duration, the process is recognizable, and the finished plan has the familiar five-paragraph format. Our intent in this section is to illustrate how national-level guidance from the President flows logically down the chain-of-command, though the various documents and plans, to direct security cooperation.

**Figure 19-1**  
**Joint Operation Planning Process**

1. Planning Initiation
2. Mission Analysis
3. Course of Action Development
4. Course of Action Analysis
5. Course of Action Comparison
6. Course of Action Approval
7. Plan Development


Within joint planning there are four planning functions: (1) Strategic Guidance, (2) Concept Development, (3) Plan Development, and (4) Plan Assessment. Strategic guidance is an expression of the “ends,” i.e., what should the theater look like after plan is implemented. How does the Combatant Command (CCMD) know it has succeeded? For the CCMD, strategic guidance is stipulated in national-level strategy and defense planning documents. Concept development is the heart of planning, where planners determine how the CCMD is going to achieve its ends. This is codified in the Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). These documents express the “ways.” Finally, the “means” are individual activities, events, operations, and investments programmed by various planners and managers and laid out in the Country Plan.

## Strategic Guidance

### *Analysis of Higher Guidance*

Security cooperation planning begins at the national level with the National Security Strategy (NSS), produced annually by the President. DOD explains how it will achieve its part of the NSS, in the broadest terms, in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The National Military Strategy (NMS) is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) military advice on achieving the goals in the NDS (see Glossary for expanded descriptions of these strategies). On the Department of State (DOS) side, strategic planning similarly takes place with the Joint Strategic Goals and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) (see pp. 19-18 and 19-19 for a full discussion of DOS planning). Figure 19-2 illustrates the national planning flow.

**Figure 19-2  
Flow Of National Planning**



For DOD, these strategies are turned into specific guidance in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides direction to the Combatant Commander (CCDR) and Service Chiefs for the preparation of TCPs, operations plans, and contingency plans. This is the primary tool by which the CJCS links strategic guidance and joint operations planning. While tasks are specified, the CCMD must also integrate Phase 0 of any contingency plans (CONPLANS) into the TCP. Said differently, theater steady-state activities, e.g. mil-to-mil events run by the SCO, incorporate the Phase 0 actions of CONPLANS to be executed later.

The GEF is a classified document published by OSD every other year. It translates the strategic guidance in the NDS into direction on planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. Most importantly for SC planning, it provides the strategic end states for each CCMD. The well-informed planner also will have reviewed the relevant DOS Joint Regional Strategy (see pp. 19-18 and 19-19) as part of Mission Analysis.

Theater posture planning and five-year budgets are important factors that the CCDR must take into account when conducting theater campaign planning. Posture planning may have a direct effect on how forces can be used and the nature and capabilities of those forces in the future.

### ***Understand the Operational Environment***

When seeking to understand the operational environment, the theater-level planner should focus on regional dynamics. What are the roles of regional actors in the strategic balance of power? Detailed looks at these major actors are important and country-level experts from J-2 or J-5 will be central to the planning team during this phase. Fitting these pieces together and figuring out the optimal strategy to influence the situation is the result of operational art and design during concept development.

### **Concept Development**

Concept development is the very heart of joint planning. By use of operational design, theater planners develop, analyze, and compare courses of action (COA). CCDRs select a COA, which is approved during the In-Progress Review (IPR) IPR C (see figure 19-3). The approved COA is then fully developed during the third planning function, plan development.

### ***Theater Strategy***

The theater strategy is a broad statement of how the CCMD intends to achieve GEF strategic end states, thus serving as the link between national guidance documents and the TCP. It serves as the starting point for the Joint Operational Planning Process, with the TCP seeking to operationalize the theater strategy.

### ***Ends States and Intermediate Military Objectives***

The GEF strategic end states are the most specific description of the strategic objectives presented to the CCMD, or the “ends.” As specifically tasked in the GEF, the CCMD develops Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO). IMOs must demonstratively move the CCMD toward the strategic end states. It may only take one IMO to reach a strategic end state, but more commonly there will be multiple IMOs over the three- to five-year time frame of the TCP.

IMOs must be specific and achievable to ensure that the CCMD can measure progress. In preparing IMOs, the acronym “SMART” (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Results-oriented, Time-bound) should be observed:

- Specific—the reader knows what exactly must be done
- Measureable—empirically measureable so the CCMD knows when it has achieved the IMO

- Achievable—practicable within the time and resources provided
- Relevant—focused on an objective that moves the CCMD toward the end states
- Results-oriented—Focused on the results of actions, not on the process of doing them
- Time-bound—a clear deadline within the planning horizon

In addition to identifying Strategic End States and IMOs, the CCMD planner must also identify key planning assumptions and define “success and sufficiency,” as applicable to the TCP.


### Lines of Effort

Lines of Effort (LOE) link related IMOs by purpose, in order to focus efforts toward a GEF End State(s). This approach allows planners to bundle by purpose various activities, events, operations, and investments, thus logically linking more specific planning detail to strategic end states. Thus within an LOE, IMOs step forward in demonstrative ways toward the “Ends.” LOEs are useful to group near-term and long-term IMOs that must be completed simultaneously or sequentially.

### Lines of Activity

Lines of Activity (LOA) group activities, events, operations, and/or investments supporting a particular IMO. LOAs thus allow the planner to dive down in increasing detail to answer the question, “What activities, events, operations, and/or investments are needed to achieve the IMO?” Figure 19-3 illustrates the relationship between LOEs and LOAs.

Figure 19-3  
Notional Concept




## Ends—Ways—Means

Thus, End States are achieved by moving along LOEs, from IMO to IMO. IMOs are achieved by lines of activity, which are made up of specific activities, events, operations, and investments. Just as this process of increasing detail provides the planner a logical way to think through the problem, the plan will provide the program manager with justification as to why specific events must be resourced, i.e., how a particular three-day event fits into the overall plan to achieve the strategic end states. Hence, the TCP provides the “ways” to justify the “means” to achieve the “ends.”

## Plan Development

The actual plans preparation process will generally follow JOPP, but each CCMD will vary in its internal procedures and products. The TCP itself will generally be similar to the suggested format in JP 5-0, Appendix A, but likewise, this is not doctrinally required. APEX forms the external joint review and approval process through a series of formal In-Progress Reviews (IPR). Reference figure 19-4, each planning function correlates to one or more steps of the JOPP. As each planning function is concluded, an IPR is held to approve progress made so far (see JP 5-0, pg I-4).

**Figure 19-4**  
**Joint Operations Planning Functions, Approvals, And Process**



## Plan Assessment

The final planning function is plan assessment, which takes place during execution. The purpose of assessments is to tell the CCDR if his plan is working and if the command is succeeding in the mission assigned to it, i.e., reaching the GEF End States. When conducting plan assessments, there are three questions that must be answered:

- Are activities, events, operations, and investments being executed effectively?
- Is the CCMD moving toward its objectives (IMOs and Strategic End States)?
- Are resources being used in the most effective manner?

## COUNTRY-LEVEL SC PLANNING

### Introduction

What is meant by “country-level” planning? In this chapter, it refers to planning by DOD for SC with a particular nation-state or international organization. Despite the focus on DOD processes, country-level planners must coordinate with interagency counterparts in the Department of State (DOS), US Agency for International Development (USAID), and others agencies. Country-level planning does not necessarily mean “in-country” planning. DOD planning can be done at the CCMD headquarters or in-country by the SCO. Each CCMD differs on this. This section will orient joint country-level planners, typically the J-5 country desk officers, to the overall process and to suggest a methodology that has been successful.

### From Theater Campaign Plans to Country Plans

The TCP describes how the theater is going to achieve its Ends, but by definition, the TCP is too general to provide a starting point for scheduling specific SC events. With over fifty countries in some Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), the GCC will typically prepare Regional Campaign Plans (RCP) to provide increasing detail on how it will achieve the Ends in a sub-region.

**Figure 19-5**  
**Country-Level Planning Process**

1. Mission analysis
2. Capabilities-based analysis
3. Resource
4. Country plan development

Below RCP, Country Plans (CP) will start to leave strategy behind and manifest concrete action. Theater planners should work with service component and SCO personnel on brainstorming and developing specific activities to progress on lines of activity in the subject country toward a Country-level Objective (CLO). The goal of country-level planning is not truly the country appendix to the TCP, but the activities, events, operations and investments that can be programmed into budgets and scheduled on calendars (also see “Lines of Activity,” p. 19-4).

### Mission Analysis

#### *Analyze Higher Guidance*

For the country-level planner, the primary source of higher guidance is the TCP and the RCP. Furthermore, the content of each of the component campaign support plans must be considered. The planner must keep in mind DOS interests in the country, as expressed in the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), and the national interests of the partner nation (PN). It is where the three interests overlap, those of DOD, DOS, PN, that the “sweet spot” is found (see figure 19-7).


**Figure 19-6**  
**Mission Analysis**

1. Analyze higher guidance
2. Assess security environment
3. Define the desired security role for the partner nation
4. Identify what resources are available

It is particularly important for the planner at the GCC to remember that the country plan will serve two roles: (1) it will be a country-specific part of the RCP and the TCP, and (2) it will also be the DOD component of the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). Neither the planner in the HQ, nor the SCO in the embassy, should lose sight of these dual roles at any time.

Depending on the country and the situation, planners may need to take into account other actors, be they USG agencies (e.g. USAID), international organizations (IO), or other governments. Optimally, each agency would plan in parallel using their respective processes while coordinating. This can seldom happen. What can, and should happen, is that each agency should share information and synchronize plans as they are developed. Planners at the theater and component headquarters need to ensure open and frequent communications with all stakeholders, particularly the in-country DOD team.

**Figure 19-7**  
**Correlation of Interests**



Remember, it is the CCMD who needs the PN (to play a certain role in their TCP). The PN, on the other hand, is a sovereign nation that has its own national interests, which may or may not harmonize well with US desires. It is important for the country planner to understand the true position, policy, and interests of the PN. By doing so, the country planner is more likely to identify how PN efforts can be synchronized with USG policy, i.e., the strategic ends.

### ***Assess Security Environment***

There are many ways to study the security environment: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII), Center of Gravity (COG) analysis, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis, cultural studies, and terrain analysis. Any way it is done, its importance cannot be understated. Each time the US military has operated in a new corner of the world, it has often had to relearn the lesson that one needs to know culture, environment, or partners of a region. This research will inform the rest of the planning effort. Extra work here will pay off later in preventing false steps and restarts.

As stated earlier, it is critical to have a realistic picture of the PN's security environment; if the PN is to play a constructive role in the TCP, the planner must understand the PN's perspective. It is important the planner identifies: the PN's significant threats (real or perceived); breadth and complexity of operational demands; relevant geopolitical trends; and key security-related opportunities.

### ***Define The Desired Security Role For The Partner Country***

This is the central element where the theater strategy, the TCP, and RCP, bear on the country plan. How do these and national planning documents see the PN fitting into the CCDR's operational approach? Within theater and country-level plans, these roles are often labeled Country-level Objectives (CLO).

Not every country can or should play every role. Perhaps one country could play a role in its own internal stability, while another might be looked at as troop contributing country for the United Nations; it all depends on how the CCDR sees these various parts fitting together to achieve the ends. Particularly, in light of current fiscal realities, careful consideration must be given to this question.

### ***Assess Partner Desire to Play That Role***

Planners need to assess a PN's overall strategic willingness to play the desired role. Critical factors include positions of political leaders, public opinion vis-à-vis the role, national priorities, fiscal realities, security interests, military and political aspirations, and historic role in the region. Additionally, the degree of political accountability of the government and civilian control of the military will bear on the problem. In an often ironic manner, the less accountable the government or military, the more likely it is to act in the desired role. Conversely, if the desired role is counter to the national interest of the PN as it sees them, the plan must take this into account; wishing will not change nation-states.

### ***Determine Ability to Play That Role***

Planners must now look at the operational capability of the PN military to play the desired role. At this point this does not require a detailed assessment, but a general military capabilities study: What is their operational history? Can the PN self-deploy? Can it even leave garrison? Does it have a joint planning staff? How robust is its logistics?

### ***ID What Resources Are Planned or Available***

The final step in Mission Analysis is to identify existing or programed resources. While country planning is not "resource constrained," it must be "resource informed" if it is to have any basis in reality. Remember, there is always something currently planned. What are the current program budgets and manpower directed by the USG at the PN forces? What other resources are available? When considering this, look not only at DOD programs but particularly at DOS Title 22-funded programs. Equally, what actions are the PN or third parties already planning? If another country is already planning to address a capability, then the USG need not put resources against it. Perhaps more importantly, does the PN have the resources and will to maintain the capability over the long term.

### **Capabilities-Based Analysis**

Capabilities-Based Analysis (CBA), as presented here, is a modification of the doctrine used within the DOD, but significantly streamlined and re-focused on the Security Cooperation with foreign militaries. This is not by any means the only way planners could analyze the problem and recommend solutions, but this method has been successful. The eight steps are grouped into three phases, shown below. These phases are not so different from any problem-solving process.

**Figure 19-8**  
**Capabilities-Based Analysis for Security Cooperation**

<b>Problem Analysis</b>
1. Describe the role the CCMD wants the partner nation to play in the TCP
2. Identify military tasks the PN military needs to be able to do to play the desired role
3. Identify capabilities needed to execute the task
<b>Needs Analysis</b>
4. Assess PN current capabilities
5. Identify gaps
6. Assess risks
<b>Solutions Analysis</b>
7. Identify alternate solutions
8. Recommend solutions

### ***Problem Analysis***

Problem Analysis seeks to understand the situation in ever greater detail. It starts with clearly defining the “desired role,” which was determined during Mission Analysis, and asking what military tasks are needed to achieve that role. Perhaps the CCMD wants the PN to focus on providing peacekeepers to UN missions in the region. One military task for such a role may be “Conduct Stability Operations.” Next, capabilities needed to execute this task are listed out in priority order.

### ***Needs Analysis***

Needs Analysis takes the generic capabilities determined in Problem Analysis, and determines the actual needs of a particular PN in a specific situation. This process begins with Assessing Current Capabilities. By comparing the generic needs to the current capabilities, gaps can be identified.

### ***Assess the Current Capabilities and Identify Gaps***

While SCO and attaché personnel can provide general assessments, the service component commands should play a central role in assessing current capabilities. The Services have technical expertise and manpower to provide a detailed assessment of the PN’s capability. During Mission Analysis, a significant effort was made to understand the operational environment, to include PN forces, but this usually takes a more academic look focusing on open sources and intelligence information. During this step, however, service component commands apply detailed standards evolved for their own operations (while recognizing varying tactics, techniques, and procedures) to conduct a detailed on-the-ground evaluation of each capability. The delta between required capabilities and those present in the PN forces are the gaps.

While assessments are often central to wise investment, the country-level planner needs to keep the scale and priority of a particular country and effort in mind. All operations by US forces are expensive, to include assessments, and these assessments will usually consume the same program funds as the eventual assistance. Additionally, if the program is small, the planner must be wary of raising expectations of the PN too high; as if the USG was promising to address all the gaps. Lastly, assessments can wear on the patience of those being assessed; who among us likes inspections? If the scale of the overall effort is modest, it may not be cost effective or wise to conduct detailed, service-specific assessments. Perhaps in these cases, the assessment should be left to the SCO and attachés resident in country.

## Assess the Risks

Once these gaps have been identified, a thorough assessment of the risks must be performed. When looking at risk, the military planner must first assess the risk posed to the planned role for the PN if the capability gap persists. If it presents little risk, then there is little point in providing the capability, and limited USG resources should be applied elsewhere. If this capability gap presents a major risk to the proposed role, this would indicate a higher priority for resourcing.

In addition to this operational risk, the planner must also consider political risk. In the case of political risk, a planner must not only be concerned with the fallout from not providing a capability, but also the risk from providing one, e.g., atrocities by US-trained personnel. While the military planner might be reluctant to incorporate political concerns, rest assured the US ambassador to the PN will put these foremost when looking at how the GCC's country plan (CP) fits into his overall strategy for US relations with the PN.

This provides yet another example of the importance of country-level planning. It is at this level where the military and diplomatic planning efforts come together and must be synchronized. The only other place these planning chains formally come together is in the NSS itself, and then only in the broadest terms.

## *Solutions Analysis*

### Identify Alternate Solutions

Solutions Analysis is the longest phase of planning. There are two primary methods for working through a capability to identify alternative solutions to filling the capability gaps. The first is DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) as outlined in figure 19-9. The second is the War Fighting Functions (mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) as outlined in figure 19-10. In either case, each serves as a paradigm by which to logically work one's way through each proposed capability. In each case, the results of this brainstorming effort will be a list of complementary or alternative activities, events, operations, and investments that improve PN capability and move them toward playing the role described during Step 1 of CBA (see p. 19-9).

**Figure 19-9**  
**DOTMLPF**

<b>Doctrine</b> —the tactics and procedures of military operations and employment of military resources
<b>Organization</b> —the command structure and relationships among military units
<b>Training</b> —the preparation of soldiers, units, commanders and staff to execute their operational missions
<b>Materiel</b> —military equipment, including end items, spares and consumables
<b>Leadership and Education</b> —the preparation of commanders and senior leaders to lead, train, organize, and employ their units and resources
<b>Personnel</b> —the availability of qualified persons for specific missions or tasks
<b>Facilities</b> —the real property and facilities for military production, maintenance and storage

**Figure 19-10  
War Fighting Functions**

<b>Mission Command</b> —develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control
<b>Movement and Maneuver</b> —tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy
<b>Intelligence</b> —tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations
<b>Fires</b> —tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process
<b>Sustainment</b> —tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance
<b>Protection</b> —tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission

DOTMLPF is our recommended approach. DISAM feels it provides the planner the most clear and concrete answers to providing a capability. To apply this paradigm, planners work their way through each part of DOTMLPF asking themselves what is needed within each domain. For example, to provide a reconnaissance capability, “What additional doctrine is needed? Do PN forces need to be re-organized? What training is needed? What equipment is needed?” One major benefit of methodically working through DOTMLPF is that lower cost solutions may be identified.

This entire process is informed by the assessments conducted by the service components, and much of this specific step may be done at the service component command level. It is often best for CCMDs to task an Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) to do the Assessment and Recommended Solutions for particular capabilities. A typical example of this might be assigning the intelligence analysis to the J2.

**Recommend Solutions**

In analyzing alternatives, the planner must assess each to determine if each is affordable, feasible, and responsive. Thus, often in real-world application, this step becomes very iterative with the next step, resourcing, as possible solutions fail or succeed to secure funding or manpower.

In the end, the planner may find there is not an effective way to address the capability gap. In this case, two policy solutions may be available. First, change or drop the desired role the CCMD wants the PN to play in the TCP (i.e., change the TCP). Second, it might be necessary to change the rules for a program or create a new program to address the gaps over the long term (e.g., propose changes to legislation).

**Resourcing**

Resourcing is a highly iterative process where the country-level planners seek out resources to fill gaps, often over and over again. This can be due to competition from higher priority efforts, or because the program is a poor fit. There are currently over eighty SC programs which could be used to resource capability gaps. Each program is specifically designed to address a particular need. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, its authorities and prohibitions. It is critical that planners understand these programs if they want to apply them effectively. These programs are the “weapon systems” of SC; if planners do not understand them, they will never employ them effectively.

## *US Investment Considerations*

DOD wants to achieve the greatest overall improvement in the specified capabilities with the lowest possible investment. When looking at where to invest, the country planner must consider the factors listed below. Key among these factors is priority; priority based on risk and based on urgency. Risk represents the likelihood that a capability will not be achieved if resources are not provided, while urgency represents the importance of the resources based on time.

- Deriving—What strategy and environment are the missions and capabilities designed to address?
- Prioritizing—What shortfalls are most important and pressing? (based on risk and urgency)
- Integrating—Have investments been made across all Services to be effective as a joint force?
- Balancing—Are investments and attendant risk balanced across all the capabilities needed during the planning period?
- Sequencing—What is needed now? What can wait until later? Is there a logical order in which investments should be made?
- Resourcing—How much can the USG afford during the planning period?


## *Requirements Coordination and Integration*

In the end, these capabilities will have to be consolidated and prioritized across all of the PN's military services. The ability of PNs to conduct CBA and requirements integration varies widely across the globe. Many PNs will not present the SCO with a coherent plan and capability requirements. It will often be left to the country-level planner (GCC or SCO) to integrate PN joint requirements and determine which best fulfills the strategic requirement.

As with competing PN requirements and priorities, there will frequently be competing priorities within the USG. This can be particularly important if the resources are not DOD resources. To avoid this, it is important for the country planner to remember the concept of the sweet spot—where do the interests of DOD, State (or other agencies), and the PN overlap. What investment would have the broadest payoff, and hence, the most support among the interested parties.

If the planning was done correctly and logically, it will also serve as solid justification for program requests as they move up the chain of command. The country planner should remember that this same prioritization takes place across the theater, and at the national level, across the globe.

**Figure 19-11  
Resourcing Windows Overlaid on Notational Synchronization Matrix**



At this point, proposed activities, events, operations, and investments need to be laid out over time, up to five years into the future. This serves many purposes. As a planner, it will help to determine sequencing and identify critical paths. For the program manager, it will help them request resources in the three- to five-year window, as illustrated in figure 19-11.

Ideally, the planning time lines will take Global Force Management time lines into account, but this is not always so. Often plans have to be made, and events scheduled well after the point that forces need to be requested. Either the event will have to adapt to available forces or, ideally, planning time lines should be moved a year to allow for the Request for Forces (RFF) process.

**Country Plan Development**

In many ways, country plan (CP) development is the simplest of the four steps in the country-planning process. However, if corners were cut during mission analysis or problem analysis, serious conflicts with stake-holders will develop, mostly from not addressing the actual problem or by doing so in an unacceptable manner. This is particularly true with countries of less military importance or of significant political controversy. These countries may lack rock-solid policy, thus leaving an assessment of the plan open to more interpretation.

Plan development is, at its heart, the simple act of writing the plan. Currently, joint doctrine does not exist for the format of a CP. A notional CP format developed by JFCOM may be found at attachment 1 to this chapter. Typically, CPs are found as an appendix to the TCP. While there is no set doctrine for a CP, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans looks for the following issues to be addressed when reviewing CPs:

- Country Assessment
- Country Objectives

- Reference to the TCP and Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) directly
- Concept of Engagement
- Synchronization Matrix
- Coordinating Instructions

SC planning must be fully integrated with other DOD agencies and the DOS. The CP should make direct reference to the embassy's ICS, thus demonstrating this interagency integration. Likewise, the DOD country-planning process can form a significant input to the embassy's ICS and supporting Mission Resource Request (MRR), which feed Title 22 program requirements into the Foreign Operations budget. Plans must be assessed periodically for effectiveness and relevance. Updates should be produced as strategic conditions or funding changes, perhaps every other year.

### ***Annual Planning Meetings***

While the frequency of updates to formal, written CPs will generally be biannually, or less, country-level planning is continual. Of particular importance is the series of planning meetings that take place during the course of the year. While the particulars of each meeting will vary by CCMD and by country, each CCMD generally has a meeting to accomplish the function described.

### **Theater Strategy Conference**

The Theater Strategy Conference is hosted by the GCC to discuss policy direction and initiatives. It is attended by personnel from the embassies, typically the SDO/DATTs and the Deputy Chiefs of Mission, from OSD, and from DOS.

### **Regional Working Group**

Where the Theater Strategy Conference focuses on direction and policy, the Regional Working Group (RWG) focuses on SC activities. Attendees include personnel from the SCO, the service components, OSD, CCMD, and the services. Work will focus on detailed event planning and program by program reviews.

### **Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group**

The Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG) is an annual meeting hosted by GCC, usually between the months of March and June, to project training requirements one and two years out. Members of the SCO, DOS, and the services attend in order to coordinate and approve PN training requirements (See chapter 14, "International Training," for further details).

### **Annual Planning Conference**

The exact nature of these conferences varies widely, but all are intended to coordinate activities directly with PN militaries. They can be hosted in-country or at the GCC headquarters. They can be joint or single service. These conferences typically focus on coordinating military-to-military events, but could also cover training. During these meetings, the real work gets done on finalizing cooperation plans and getting PN buy-in (See chapter 1 for further discussion).


### ***Putting the Pieces Together in a Country Plan***

Please review figure 19-12, Notional Synchronization Matrix with Comments, before reading further. This figure provides a simplified example of how a country-level planner might pull together various SC programs into a synchronized plan to achieve a CLO. In this example, the CLO is seeking to build an airlift capability. The matrix only focuses on load handling, as a component of airlift, which was an identified gap in our scenario.

Initially, the SCO or SDO/DATT needs to build support among the players to support and participate in the effort to build this capability. To do this, the SCO plans a distinguished visitor (DV) visit to promote the idea. We also send observers to a regional exercise to raise awareness and to show how it is done. The airlift familiarization visit builds on this exchange of know-how, and likewise raises the profile of the US program within the PN air force. During the second phase, individual training and equipment acquisition begins in earnest. Trained load handlers are scheduled to complete training before the arrival of load handling equipment in country.

Once trained personnel and equipment are on hand, collective training can begin. A second DV visit is scheduled during this period to highlight the program and the progress, in order to maintain support within the PN and the US militaries. Finally, a maintenance phased is reached with continued training and spare parts.

**Figure 19-12**  
**Notational Synchronization Matrix with Comments**



## IN-COUNTRY EVENT PLANNING

A military career is excellent preparation for execution planning of in-country events. The key changes are translating the military infrastructure to that of the embassy and changing operational considerations from those of a soldier to those of a diplomat. Within an embassy and the country team, the organization, responsibilities, and capabilities are different than those of a military organization. For example, if one is trying to have some equipment moved, the General Services Officer (GSO), a sort of logistics officer, would be the person to see; for a funds transfer, the Management Officer (see chapter 4).

As to operational considerations, detailed knowledge of the PN, its military, its bureaucracies, and USG policy considerations, will be critical. The first three points hone in on one of the central roles of the SCO in country—getting things done. To do this, the SCO must have a deep understanding of how

the PN military operates in reality. For example, perhaps PN battalions are to rotate through American training, so the SCO knows to work with the junior J-3 planner to ensure the deployment dates and third-country training all mesh seamlessly.

One of the other major duties in country will be ensuring political support continues within the PN and within the country team. The ambassador is the central personality in this issue. It is critical he/she supports the concept and the details of the proposed event, and continues to do so. New ambassadors will need to be briefed, educated, and won over. Additionally, it is important that everyone on the country team understands how military activities they are asked to support are accomplishing not just the military's objective, but that of the embassy as a whole. See chapter 4 for more details on personnel, aircraft, and ship visits.

### **Common Considerations**

- **Size:** One of the first questions a SCO must ask themselves is “Can I, or should I, support this event internally within the office or do I need DAO or embassy assistance?” What support will be needed from the CCMD, e.g., public affairs or contracting officers?
- **Itinerary:** This is the very heart of any event planning. Itineraries have multiple lines of operation (LOO) and multiple phases. The itinerary must take into account LOO for separate, simultaneous elements of the event, logistics support, and preparation for future portions of the event. Plans must take into account overlapping phases: preparation, pre-advance party, advance party, main body, trail party, and cleanup.
- **Local customs:** At every step, keep the local culture in mind; the SCO is the expert. The SCO may need to guide US planning toward more locally acceptable implementation, e.g., avoiding local holidays or greeting the appropriate official.
- **Office calls:** Even simple events will often require a certain amount of formalities and pleasantries. Talking points and notes on customs should be prepared for planned and ad hoc office calls.
- **Social events:** As with office calls, social events are often planned even for tactical-level activities, e.g., an ice breaker social at the start of a course, or a cookout at the end of an exercise.
- **Press:** Have a proactive plan to deal with the press. Not only can unplanned press coverage create a problem, but lost press opportunities will cost the overall USG effort. Get the embassy Public Diplomacy Officer and the CCMD public affairs office involved. Talking points for planned and ad hoc press events should be prepared.
- **Clothing/uniform requirements:** Be sure to determine uniform policies and requirements for each element of an itinerary. Consider when civilian attire is needed or required.
- **Medical:** Keep local medical, hygiene, food concerns in mind. Is drinking water safe?
- **Interpreter support:** Few Americans will speak the local language. The SCO personnel should not attempt to serve as an event interpreter. Not only is interpreting a particular skill that SCOs are not trained to do, but SCO personnel need to be focused on the event. Likewise, if the senior military officer will need to participate in discussions, he/she should bring an extra person along to serve as a note taker.

## **Logistics**

- **Customs Clearance:** Often equipment brought into country will have to clear customs. The smooth, no-cost clearance should be coordinated in advance. Particular care should be exercised when goods are shipped in advance.
- **Contracting support:** Many in-country events will require the contracting of PN goods and services. For large military activities, a CCMD contracting officer should be sent into country well in advance of the event. For smaller events or TDYs, the embassy may be willing to provide contracting support.
- **Travel services support:** If the need for travel services is limited to that of typical TDY personnel, e.g., a rental vehicle or a room, the embassy travel office will usually be willing to support such routine travel. If the scale of the visit or event grows to the point where one is essentially talking about contracted service, the above contracting support applies.
- **Funding:** If the embassy is going to procure any goods and services for the event, fiscal data will be needed as early as possible. Keeping this business relationship between the embassy and the events' participants cordial will go a long way to ensuring embassy support for the next event. It is also important to confirm exactly which type of money the SCO or SDO/DATT should use to fund their participation (see chapter 17, "Resource Management").

## **Security**

- **Weapons Clearance:** If weapons will be required, get the Regional Security Officer (RSO) involved early. Many countries will require permits for USG personnel to carry weapon in the country, particularly concealed weapons.
- **Local law enforcement:** Discuss any law enforcement liaison requirements with the RSO. In addition to weapons, issues of traffic control, security, border control are often important depending on the PN.
- **Classified Information:** If classified information will be handled, where is it to be stored? Do the US participants need access to classified computers for communication back to their headquarters?

## **Contingencies**

- Remain flexible
- Remain in communication. Charge your cellphone. Bring a two-way radio.
- Remain mobile. Have your own vehicle standing by.
- Delegate. The senior person needs to be free to escort, politic, respond to contingencies. If he/she is tied down in the mechanics of the visit, they won't be able to direct a contingency response

## STATE DEPARTMENT PLANNING


DOS recently updated their planning process. Instead of the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP), the DOS has broken their plans at the embassy level into two parts: the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and the Mission Resource Request (MRR). This division of the plan into two parts is a logical manifestation of the change to their planning process.

The new planning process starts with the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR defines the strategic priorities that guide global engagement jointly at the DOS/USAID, and identify the diplomatic and development capabilities needed to advance US interests. As of March 2012, the QDDR also serves as the DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan. It sets institutional priorities and provides strategic guidance as a framework for the most efficient allocation of resources, which includes directives for improving how embassies do business, from strengthening interagency collaboration to increasing State and USAID engagement with civil society, the private sector and others. From this guidance, the regional bureaus at DOS and USAID (e.g., the Africa Bureaus) prepare a Joint Regional Strategy laying out their plan to achieve their part of the national strategy. This then flows down to the individual embassies and USAID missions, who develop their ICS (i.e., DOS and USAID). At this point in the planning process, plans start to flow back up the “chain-of-command” as resource requests. Individual embassies and missions send consolidated MRRs to bureaus, who prioritize and prepare a Bureau Resource Request (BRR). At the department level, DOS consolidates priorities and submits their budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget.

While DOS plans are coordinated with DOD plans, it is important to remember that the planning process is only hard-wired together at the National Security Strategy and the ICS. It is vital all planners along both planning chains keep their counterparts in the other department aware of institutional direction and planning intentions.

For the SCO or SDO/DATT, this system places a heavy burden of responsibility on their shoulders. It can be said that these two formal planning chains only come together at only two people, the SCO and the President. SCOs must be extremely adept at keeping all parties informed, facilitating cooperation, and deconflicting priorities of the various departments, agencies, and commands involved.

**Figure 19-13  
Department of State Planning Process**



## **SCO PLANNING TOOLS**

### **Partnership Strategy Toolkit**

The Partnership Strategy Toolkit (PST) is a web site that provides access to a searchable database of SC programs and partner building tools. An SC planner can use the database to find various SC programs intended to address a particular need. Searches can be limited to certain countries, program objectives, or tasks, e.g. counterterrorism training in country X. The searches will produce a list of applicable programs. Clicking on the program will lead you to program details and POCs. The site is hosted by OSD at <https://policyapps.osd.mil/sites/sctools/Pages/default.aspx>. To request access, send a digitally signed e-mail to [SCToolsAdministrators@osd.mil](mailto:SCToolsAdministrators@osd.mil).

### **Combined Education and Training Program Plan**

The SCO prepares the Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP). This document focuses on the goals and objectives for DOD-sponsored education and training for the PN. Guidance for preparation is contained in the SAMM, paragraph C10.5 and figure C10.F3. The SCO uploads the draft plan electronically onto the Security Assistance Network (SAN) for review and approval by the GCC. The approved plan is utilized each spring during the GCC's Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG). Further training program details are in chapter 14 of this textbook, "International Training." It is critical that the SCO develop a solid working relationship with the training departments of the PN military services early in the tour so their desires can be incorporated into the CETPP.

### **Security Assistance Budget Web Tool**

If the PN receives, or is proposed to receive, appropriated funds through FMF or IMET, the SCO will also make an annual submission and justification for these funds. This request is submitted electronically through the Security Assistance Budget Web Tool, managed by DSCA. This document is forwarded upward through channels for endorsement and comment, i.e., to the GCCs staff, the Joint Staff, DSCA and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy offices, where a final DOD position is developed for each country. This position is then used by DOD representatives in round table discussions with DOS in the development of an eventual Congressional budget justification to be submitted by the Secretary of State to Congress. SDO/DATs must coordinate their submissions (both the amounts of aid requested and the justification) with those in the MRR, because it is the MRR that will form the basis of DOS's proposed budgets.

## **SCO ANNUAL FORECASTING DOCUMENTS**

DSCA requires that SCOs worldwide submit two forecasting documents annually. It is important to note the distinction between planning documents and forecasting documents. The planning documents listed earlier all reflect a goal which is intended to be achieved. Conversely, a forecasting document simply reflects the SCO's best estimate of what defense articles and services the PN will purchase from the USG. For the below forecasting reports, DSCA sends a call-up message to SCOs (and other organizations) each April with input due in June. Beginning in 2011, DSCA merged the reporting requirements for both the Javits Report and the Sales Forecast Report into one submission for SCOs. It is important for SCOs to be as thorough and as accurate as possible in this submission. SCOs should consider historical FMS activity by the PN, current economic trends, and the availability of unexpended and anticipated FMF grant monies. It may well be appropriate to contact PN counterparts to obtain their estimates of essential and likely FMS sales, but it is important to avoid any "false impression" that the USG will approve (or has already approved) a future request.

## **Javits Report**

Required annually by the AECA, the Javits Report is the President's estimate to Congress of potential or proposed arms transfers during a given calendar year. The Javits Report is designed to identify potential sales by country, whether FMS or DCS. The two thresholds are \$7M of major weapons or weapons-related equipment and any proposed sale of \$25M or more. The Javits Report is not binding on PNs and is submitted to Congress as an advisory document.

## **FMS Sales Forecast Report**

A companion document to the Javits Report, the FMS Sales Forecast Report helps DSCA determine the resource requirements for FMS implementing agencies. Its reporting requirements are separate from, but largely overlap, those of the Javits Report. This report is a two-year projection by fiscal year (vice one calendar year for Javits) but only addresses potential FMS sales. Unlike Javits, it has no dollar thresholds, so all potential FMS sales should be listed.

## **REFERENCES**

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011

*Draft Theater Campaign Plan Planner's Handbook, USD(P) Strategy, Plans, and Forces*, February 2012

*Draft Planner's Handbook for Country-Level Steady State Planning*, JFCOM, 4 April 2011

# ATTACHMENT 19-1

## NOTIONAL COUNTRY PLAN FORMAT

### INTRODUCTION SECTION

1. Purpose
2. Overall USG Goals and Objectives
3. Summary of Higher-level DOD Guidance
4. Commander's Vision
  - 4.1. Commander's Intent
  - 4.2. End State 1
  - 4.3. End State 2
  - 4.4. End State 3

### SITUATION SECTION

1. Strategic Context
  - 1.1. Geopolitical Relevance of Country X
  - 1.2. Relevant PMESII-C Attributes
  - 1.3. Historical Relationship between US and Country X
  - 1.4. Partner Nation Interests, Political Commitment, Priorities
2. Operational Limitations
  - 2.1. Authorities
  - 2.2. Restraints
  - 2.3. Constraints
3. Contextual Assumptions
  - 3.1. Theater End State Assumptions
  - 3.2. Trend/Status Assumptions
  - 3.3. Impact Assumptions
4. Risk Assessment
  - 4.1. Risks to country and / or regional stability
    - 4.1.1. Risk 1
    - 4.1.2. Risk X
  - 4.2. Risks to country and / or regional partnerships
    - 4.2.1. Risk 1
    - 4.2.2. Risk X
  - 4.3. Risks to DOD plans
    - 4.3.1. Risk 1
    - 4.3.2. Risk X
  - 4.4. Should US posture toward the state be risk acceptant or risk averse and to what degree?
5. Risk Matrix

### CAMPAIGN SECTION

1. Overview
  - 1.1. Concept of Operations
  - 1.2. DOD Command and Control and Engagement Plan
  - 1.3. Resource Allocation

## 2. End State 1

### 2.1. Campaign Objective 1

#### 2.1.1. Background 1

#### 2.1.2. Theory of Change 1

#### 2.1.3. Line of Effort 1

##### 2.1.3.1. Line of Activity 1

###### 2.1.3.1.1. Implementation / Tasks

###### 2.1.3.1.1.1. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs

###### 2.1.3.1.1.2. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs

###### 2.1.3.1.2. Implementation / Tasks

###### 2.1.3.1.2.1. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs

###### 2.1.3.1.2.2. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs

##### 2.1.3.2. Line of Activity 2

###### 2.1.3.2.1. (similar sub-bullets as Line of Activity 1)

#### 2.1.4. Line of Effort 2

##### 2.1.4.1. (similar sub-bullets as Line of Effort 1)

#### 2.1.5. Related Strategies and Plans 1

### 2.2. Campaign Objective 2

#### 2.2.1. (similar sub-bullets as Campaign Objective 1)

## 3. End State 2

### 3.1. (similar sub-bullets as End State 1)

## **ANNEX A: TASKS-TO-END STATES**

## 1. End State 1

### 1.1. Campaign Objective 1

#### 1.1.1. Line of Effort 1

##### 1.1.1.1. Line of Activity 1

###### 1.1.1.1.1. Implementation / Task 1

###### 1.1.1.1.1.1. Task Mission / Description

###### 1.1.1.1.1.2. Contact Information for Task Lead

###### 1.1.1.1.1.3. Subordinate and Supporting DOD Elements

###### 1.1.1.1.1.4. Supporting and Supported non-DOD Elements

###### 1.1.1.1.1.5. Coordinating Instructions

###### 1.1.1.1.1.6. Potential Adversaries and Obstacles

###### 1.1.1.1.1.7. Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation Strategies

###### 1.1.1.1.1.8. Progress Assessment Plan

###### 1.1.1.1.2. Implementation / Task 2

###### 1.1.1.1.2.1. (similar sub-bullets as Implementation / Task 1)

##### 1.1.1.2. Line of Activity 2 (similar sub-bullets as Line of Activity 1)

#### 1.1.2. Line of Effort 2 (similar sub-bullets as Line of Effort 1)

### 1.2. Campaign Objective 2 (similar sub-bullets as Campaign Objective 1)

## 2. End State 2 (similar sub-bullets as End State 1)

## **ANNEX B: DETAILED STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

### 1. Geopolitical Overview of Country X

- 1.1. Country X's strategic importance
- 1.2. Country X's geographic location
- 1.3. Country X's demographics
- 1.4. Country X's interests, political commitment, priorities
- 1.5. Actors of interest in Country X

### 2. Relevant PMESII-C Attributes

- 2.1. Formal Institutions
- 2.2. People
- 2.3. Other influential entities
- 2.4. Culture
- 2.5. Interdependencies and key relationships

### 3. Relationship between Country X and the US

- 3.1. Historical recitation of the overall relationship between US and Country X, including long-term trends and major shifts
- 3.2. DOD activities in Country X over the past year
- 3.3. Non-DOD activities in Country X over the past year

## **ANNEX C: RELEVANT NON-DOD ACTORS AND ACTIVITIES**

### 1. US Department of State (DOS)

- 1.1. End State(s)
- 1.2. Objective(s)
- 1.3. Intent

### 2. US Agency for International Development (USAID)

- 2.1. End State(s)
- 2.2. Objective(s)
- 2.3. Intent

### 3. Other USG Agencies

- 3.1. End State(s)
- 3.2. Objective(s)
- 3.3. Intent

### 4. Multinational Partners, Alliances, and Coalitions (NATO, etc.)

- 4.1. End State(s)
- 4.2. Objective(s)
- 4.3. Intent

### 5. Non-Partner States, Adversaries

- 5.1. End State(s)
- 5.2. Objective(s)
- 5.3. Intent

### 6. Intergovernmental Organizations (WTO, UN, OSCE, etc.)

- 6.1. End State(s)
- 6.2. Objective(s)
- 6.3. Intent

7. Non-Governmental Organizations

7.1. End State(s)

7.2. Objective(s)

7.3. Intent

8. Interest Groups and Private Sector Actors

8.1. End State(s)

8.2. Objective(s)

8.3. Intent

**ANNEX D: COMBATANT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES**

1. Combatant Command responsibilities
2. Other Geographic Combatant Command
3. Functional Combatant Command
4. Defense Agency Responsibilities
5. Other USG Responsibilities