INTRODUCTION

Planning is an essential step in all military operations or activities, security cooperation included. At its simplest, planning is the process by which one understands where they are, where they want to be, and how best to get there. The plan is the product; how one intends to get from “A” to “B.”

At the operational level, planning focuses on ends, ways, and means. Planning allows the military professional to clearly identify where the command wants to go—the ends. Through operational art and design, the planner pinpoints how best to get there—the ways. Finally, the means, i.e., resources, are identified and applied. While the plan directs action to achieve the ends, it also serves as the justification for resourcing; planning is how DOD rationalizes security cooperation (SC).

What is different between operational planning and SC planning? In security cooperation, the political and military realms are one, and the planner must be an expert in all aspects of the Partner Nation (PN) and on the USG policy towards it. Also, SC is not war fighting, and SCOs do not wield weapons. The metaphorical weapons in SC are the SC programs—each with highly specific engagement criteria (i.e., the law); hence, it is important to know the rest of this textbook.

This chapter does not represent doctrine. Readers should review JP 5.0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, prior to reading further, if unfamiliar with the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) or with operational art and design. The purpose of this chapter is to present the highlights of joint planning, considerations for SC planning, and suggest a methodology.

THEATER-LEVEL SC PLANNING

Introduction

Theater-level planning, like all joint planning, is conducted using the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) (see figure 19-1) within the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system, as described in JP 5.0. While grand in scope and duration, the process is recognizable, and the finished plan has the familiar five-paragraph format. Our intent in this section is to illustrate how national-level guidance from the President flows logically down the chain-of-command, though the various documents and plans, to direct security cooperation efforts with our partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Planning Initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Course of Action (COA) Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>COA Analysis and Wargaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>COA Comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>COA Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 7</td>
<td>Plan or Order Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19-1
Joint Operation Planning Process
Within joint planning there are four planning functions: (1) Strategic Guidance, (2) Concept Development, (3) Plan Development, and (4) Plan Assessment. Strategic guidance is an expression of the “ends,” i.e., what the theater should look like after plan is implemented. For the Combatant Command (CCMD), strategic guidance is stipulated in national-level strategy and defense planning documents. Concept development is the heart of planning, where planners determine how the CCMD is going to achieve its ends. In the Plan Development phase, the concepts are codified in the Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). These documents express the “ways.” Finally, the “means” are individual activities, events, operations, and investments programmed by various planners and managers and laid out in the Country Plan. How does the CCMD know it has succeeded? In the Plan Assessment phase, these “means” and their outcomes are then assessed for effectiveness and the plan is then reviewed and updated as needed.

**Strategic Guidance**

**Analysis of Higher Guidance**

Security cooperation planning begins at the national level with the National Security Strategy (NSS). The President periodically produces the NSS to inform the Congress, the public, and foreign constituencies about the Administration’s vision of how to deal with potential national security concerns. The NSS then drives a series of strategies and actions throughout the Executive branch, potentially working its way to the SCO as SC events with our partners. Supplanting the NSS, the April 2013 Presidential Policy Directive number 23 (PPD-23) directs that executive branch agencies work together to maximize the effect of limited resources in achieving the NSS goals.

DOD explains, in broad terms, how it will align its strategy and actions with the NSS, in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). DOD guidance and goals are refined in a separate document every four years; the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The National Military Strategy (NMS) is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) military advice on achieving the goals in the NDS (see Glossary for expanded descriptions of these strategies). These DOD documents are the foundation for the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the distillation of broader strategies into a more “operational” directive for the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

While the GEF directs the CCMD to conduct operational planning and articulates strategic end states, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) actually tasks the Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and Service Chiefs to prepare operation, contingency, and theater campaign plans. For SC purposes, the CCMD must also integrate Phase 0 of any contingency plans (CONPLAN) into the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Said differently, theater steady-state activities, e.g., mil-to-mil events planned by the SCO, incorporate the Phase 0 actions of CONPLANs to be executed later. Ultimately, the plan to interact with our partners (derived from the TCP), nominally known as the Country Plan (CP), should guide the SCO in its engagement with the partner nation.

Executive Branch guidance also flows to the Department of State (DOS), where strategic planning takes place with the Joint Strategic Goals and refined by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) (a fuller discussion of DOS planning can be found later in the chapter). The DOS also has Regional strategies, which then inform the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) produced by the in-country Ambassadors. The ICS is also the critical DOS document for the SCO as it details the DOS direction for SC with our partners. As US foreign policy is the domain of the Department of State, the well-informed planner will have reviewed the relevant DOS Joint Regional Strategy and Functional Bureau Strategy as part of Mission Analysis.

Figure 19-2 illustrates the national guidance planning flow.
Figure 19-2
Flow Of National Planning Guidance

Theater posture planning and five-year budgets are important factors that the CCMD must take into account when conducting theater campaign planning. Posture planning may have a direct effect on how forces can be used and the nature and capabilities of those forces in the future. In an era of declining forces and resources, every theater planner and component force planner must be sensitive to the multitude of requests from SCOs, and reflect reality in their Theater Campaign Support Plans. SCOs and CCMDs will need creative methods of combining US-required training with partner engagement.

Understand the Operational Environment

When seeking to understand the operational environment, the theater-level planner should focus on regional dynamics. What are the roles of regional actors in the strategic balance of power? Detailed looks at these major actors are important and country-level experts from J-2 or J-5 will be central to the planning team during this phase. Fitting these pieces together and figuring out the optimal strategy to influence the situation is the result of operational art and design during concept development.

Concept Development

Concept development is the very heart of joint planning. By use of operational design, theater planners develop, analyze, and compare courses of action (COA). CCMDs select a COA, which is approved during the In-Progress Review (IPR) (see figure 19-4). The approved COA is then fully developed during the third planning function, plan development.

Theater Strategy

The theater strategy is a broad statement of how the CCMD intends to achieve GEF goals and objectives, thus serving as the link between national guidance documents and the TCP. It serves as the starting point for the Joint Operational Planning Process, with the TCP seeking to “operationalize” the theater strategy.
**Ends States and Intermediate Military Objectives**

The GEF goals and objectives are the most specific description of the national strategic objectives presented to the CCMD, or in Operational Art parlance, the “Ends.” Based on the GEF, the CCMDs develop Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO). IMOs must demonstrably move the CCMD toward strategic end states. It may only take one IMO to reach a strategic end state, but more commonly there will be multiple IMOs over the three- to five-year time frame of the TCP.

IMOs must be specific and achievable to ensure that the CCMD can measure progress. In preparing IMOs, the acronym “SMART” (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Results-oriented, Time-bound) should be observed:

- Specific—the reader knows what exactly must be done
- Measurable—empirically measurable so the CCMD knows when it has achieved the IMO
- Achievable—practicable within the time and resources provided
- Relevant—focused on an objective that moves the CCMD toward the end states
- Results-oriented—Focused on the results of actions, not on the process of doing them
- Time-bound—a clear deadline within the planning horizon

In addition to identifying Strategic End States and IMOs, the CCMD planner must also identify key planning assumptions and define “success and sufficiency,” as applicable to the TCP.

One method of aligning and synchronizing the IMOs in logical sequences in order to drive toward the end state are concepts this publication will refer to as Lines of Effort and Lines of Activity. Different organizations use slightly different terminology but the end result is the same.

**Lines of Effort**

Lines of Effort (LOE) link related IMOs by purpose, in order to focus efforts toward a GEF End State(s). This approach allows planners to bundle by purpose various activities, events, operations, and investments, thereby logically linking more specific planning detail to strategic end states. Thus within an LOE, IMOs step forward in demonstrable ways toward the “Ends.” LOEs are useful to group near-term and long-term IMOs that must be completed simultaneously or sequentially.

**Lines of Activity**

Lines of Activity (LOA) more clearly define the activities, events, operations, and/or investments supporting a particular IMO. LOAs become the “ways” to advance the strategy. LOAs thus allow the planner to dive down in increasing detail to answer the question, “What activities, events, operations, and/or investments are needed to achieve the IMO?” The individual activities are therefore the “means” by which we achieve the LOA. Figure 19-3 illustrates the relationship between LOEs and LOAs.

**Ends—Ways—Means**

End States are achieved by moving along LOEs, from IMO to IMO. IMOs are achieved by accomplishing lines of activity, which are made up of specific activities, events, operations, and investments. Just as this process of increasing detail provides the planner a logical way to think through the problem, the plan will provide the program manager with justification as to why specific events must be resourced, i.e., how a particular three-day event fits into the overall plan to achieve the strategic end states. Hence, the TCP (and, by extension, the Country Plan) provides justification for the “means” of the “ways” to achieve the “ends.”
Plan Development

The actual plans preparation process will generally follow Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), but each CCMD may vary in its internal procedures and products. The TCP itself will generally be similar to the suggested format in JP 5-0, Appendix A, but likewise, this is not doctrinally required. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) forms the external joint review and approval process through a series of formal In-Progress Reviews (IPR). Reference figure 19-4, each planning function correlates to one or more steps of the JOPP. As each planning function is concluded, an IPR is held to approve the progress (see JP 5-0, pg I-4).

Plan Assessment

The final planning function is plan assessment, which takes place during execution. The purpose of assessments is to tell the CCMD if the plan is working and whether the command is succeeding in the mission assigned to it, i.e., closing in on the strategic End States. When conducting plan assessments, there are three questions that must be answered:

- Are activities, events, operations, and investments being executed effectively?
- Is the CCMD moving toward its objectives (IMOs and Strategic End States)?
- Are resources being used in the most effective manner?
In an interesting paradox, strategic end states tend to aim for the mid-term solution, in the six to ten year range. Planners will create LOEs and LOAs to drive to those end-states. However, the required periodic reviews of strategic goals can, and often do, change the mid-term end-states. Significant changes in geopolitics can, and should, result in significant changes to the TCP and the supporting activities. In one sense, end states can never be attained due to the ever-changing international environment. As well, one would expect the end states to change due to periodic reviews and updates in national level guidance, thereby never achieving an individual end state. The Plan Assessments (from the top (HQ view) all the way down to the after-action reports for individual events) therefore are critical aspects for an understanding of the changing “baseline” of our strategic goals, our partner’s capabilities, and our future resource expenditures.

**COUNTRY-LEVEL SC PLANNING**

**Introduction**

What is meant by “country-level” planning? In this chapter, it refers to planning by DOD for SC with a particular nation-state or international organization. Tempering the focus on DOD processes, country-level planners must coordinate with interagency counterparts in the DOS, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and others agencies with equities in the country of interest. Country-level planning does not necessarily mean “in-country” planning. DOD planning can be done at the CCMD headquarters or in-country by the SCO, and preferably a combination of both. Each CCMD differs on this. This section will orient joint country-level planners, typically the J-5 country desk officers, to the overall process and to suggest a methodology that has been successful.
From Theater Campaign Plans to Country Plans

The TCP describes how the theater is going to achieve its Ends, but by definition, the TCP is too general to provide a starting point for scheduling specific SC events. With over fifty countries in some Geographic Combatant Commands (CCMD), the CCMD will typically prepare Regional Campaign Plans (RCP) to provide increasing detail on how it will achieve the Ends in a sub-region.

Below the RCP, Country Plans (CP) will start to leave strategy behind and manifest concrete action. Theater planners should work with service component and SCO personnel brainstorming and developing specific activities to achieve progress on lines of activity in the subject country toward a Country-level Objective (CLO). The goal of country-level planning is not truly the country appendix to the TCP, but the activities, events, operations and investments that can be programmed into budgets and scheduled on calendars (also see “Lines of Activity,” earlier in the chapter).

Mission Analysis

Analyse Higher Guidance

For the country-level planner, the primary source of higher guidance is the TCP and the RCP. Furthermore, the content of each of the CCMD military service component campaign support plans must be considered. The planner must also reflect both the DOS interests in the country, as expressed in the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), and the national interests of the partner nation (PN). It is where the three interests overlap (DOD, DOS, and the PN) that the “sweet spot” is found (see figure 19-7); the place where actions and activities will drive resources to the benefit of all.

It is particularly important for the planner at the CCMD to remember that the country plan will serve two roles: (1) it will be a country-specific part of the RCP and the TCP, and (2) it will also be the DOD component of the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). Neither the planner in the HQ, nor the SCO in the embassy, should lose sight of these dual roles at any time. The CP is therefore considered executable “guidance” for the SCO.

Depending on the country and the situation, planners may need to take into account other actors, be they USG agencies (e.g. USAID), international organizations (IO), or other governments. Optimally, each agency would plan in parallel using their respective processes while coordinating. As one might expect, this seldom happens. What can, and should happen, is that each agency should share information and synchronize plans as they are developed. In fact, for US Executive Branch agencies, this is required by Presidential Policy Directive-23 (PPD-23) dated 5 April 2013. Planners at the theater and component headquarters need to ensure open and frequent communications with all stakeholders, particularly the in-country DOD team.
Ultimately, it is the CCMD who needs the PN (to play a certain role in their TCP). The PN, on the other hand, is a sovereign nation that has its own national interests, which may or may not harmonize well with US desires. It is important for the country planner to understand the true position, policy, and interests of the PN. It is crucial that the planner not work in a vacuum; instead, a planner should use resources available throughout the CCMD J-staff, and closely coordinate with the SDO/DATT and SCO in country. By doing so, the country planner is more likely to identify how PN efforts can be synchronized with USG policy, i.e., the strategic ends.

**Assess Security Environment**

There are many ways to study the security environment: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII), Center of Gravity (COG) analysis, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis, cultural studies, and terrain analysis. Any way it is done, its importance cannot be understated. In times when the US military has operated in a new corner of the world, it has often had to relearn the lesson that one needs to know culture, environment, or partners of a region. It is also important to note that this is not something that can be rushed. It will take a focused effort of study and research to understand the PN and how the USG can best interact. This research will inform the rest of the planning effort. Extra work here will pay off later in preventing false steps and restarts.

As stated earlier, it is critical to have a realistic picture of the PN’s security environment; if the PN is to play a constructive role in the TCP, the planner must understand the PN’s perspective. It is important the planner identifies: the PN’s significant threats (real or perceived); breadth and complexity of operational demands; relevant geopolitical trends; and key security-related opportunities.

**Define the Desired Security Role for the Partner Country**

This is the central element where the theater strategy, the TCP, and RCP, bear on the country plan. How do these and national planning documents see the PN fitting into the CCMD’s operational approach? Within theater and country-level plans, these roles are often labeled Country-level Objectives (CLO).
Not every country can or should play every role. Perhaps one country could play a role in its own internal stability, while another might be looked at as troop contributing country for the United Nations; it all depends on how the CCMD sees these various parts fitting together to achieve the ends. The country planner must also reach out to other country planners in the region to understand how strategies for one PN can affect another. Particularly, in light of current fiscal realities, careful consideration must be given to this question.

**Assess Partner Desire to Play That Role**

Planners need to assess a PN’s overall strategic willingness to play the desired role. Do they have both the political and civil society consensus? Critical factors include positions of political leaders, public opinion vis-à-vis the role, national priorities, fiscal realities, security interests, military and political aspirations, and historic role in the region. Additionally, the degree of political accountability of the government and civilian control of the military will bear on the problem. In an often ironic manner, the less accountable the government or military, the more likely it is to act in the desired role. Conversely, if the desired role is counter to the national interests of the PN (as the PN sees them!), the plan must take this into account; wishing will not change nation-states. There is no need to expend limited USG resources on roles for which the PN has no desire.

**Determine Ability to Play That Role**

Planners must now look at the institutional capacity and operational capability of the PN military to play the desired role. At this point, this does not require a detailed assessment, but a general military capabilities study: What is their operational history? Can the PN self-deploy? Can it even leave garrison? Does it have a joint planning staff? How robust is its logistics?

**Identify Resources Planned or Available**

The final step in Mission Analysis is to identify existing or programmed resources. While country planning is not “resource constrained,” it must be “resource informed” if it is to have any basis in reality. Remember, there is always something currently planned. What are the current program budgets and manpower directed by the USG at the PN forces? What other resources are available? When considering this, look not only at DOD programs but also at DOS Title 22-funded programs, and in light of PPD-23, examine with the help of the SDO/DATT the activities of other executive agencies. Equally, what actions are the PN or third parties already planning? If another country is already planning to address a capability, then this should limit the resources the USG plans to expend. Perhaps more importantly, assess whether the PN has the resources and will to maintain the capability for the desired security role over the long term.

**Capabilities-Based Analysis**

Capabilities-Based Analysis (CBA), as presented here, is a modification of the doctrine used within the DOD, but significantly streamlined and re-focused on Security Cooperation with foreign security forces, especially in light of new authorities granted by Congress. This is not by any means the only way planners could analyze the problem and recommend solutions, but this method has been successful. The eight steps are grouped into three phases, shown below. These phases are not so different from any problem-solving process.
For many SCOs, this may be (or seem to be) a daunting task. Indeed, many SCOs are manned with only one or two military service members. It is entirely possible that the partner nation needs assistance with one of their services for which the SCO is unmanned. The first stop, of course, is to reach out to the SDO/DATT and the military attachés in the DAO. Their role in life is to understand the partner nation’s military and security forces. When that information source is exhausted, it is critical that the SCO reach out to the CCMD and its components to bring in experts to help with the analysis. It is not uncharacteristic for US military officers to have just a cursory knowledge of the other services. Trying to determine strengths and weaknesses requires a more finely-tuned analysis.

Problem Analysis

Problem Analysis seeks to understand the situation in ever greater detail. It starts with clearly defining the “desired role,” which was determined during Mission Analysis, and asking what tasks are needed to achieve that role. Perhaps the CCMD wants the PN to focus on providing peacekeepers to UN missions in the region. One military task for such a role may be “Conduct Stability Operations.” Next, capabilities needed to execute this task are listed out in priority order.

Needs Analysis

Needs Analysis takes the generic capabilities determined in Problem Analysis, and determines the actual needs of a particular PN in a specific situation. This process begins with Assessing Current Capabilities. By comparing the generic needs to the current capabilities, gaps can be identified.

Assess the Current Capabilities and Identify “Gaps”

While SCO and attaché personnel can provide general assessments, the service component commands should play a central role in assessing current capabilities. The Services have technical expertise and manpower to provide a detailed assessment of the PN’s capability. During Mission Analysis, a significant effort was made to understand the operational environment, to include PN forces, but this usually takes a more academic look focusing on open sources and intelligence information. During these assessments, however, service component commands apply detailed standards evolved for their own operations (while recognizing varying tactics, techniques, and procedures) to conduct a detailed on-the-ground evaluation of each capability. The delta between required capabilities and those present in the PN forces are the “gaps.”
While assessments are often central to wise investment, the country-level planner needs to keep the scale of effort and priority of a particular country relative to the TCP in mind. First, it is common and understandable that US forces will apply their US standards (i.e., mirror-image) against the PN operations. Planners and SCOs must carefully determine the extent of the desired assistance in order to limit excessive resource expenditures. The needs, as determined in previous steps, should drive the assessments. All operations by US forces are expensive, to include assessments, and these assessments will usually consume the same program funds as the eventual assistance. Additionally, if the program is small, the planner must be wary of raising expectations of the PN too high; as if the USG was promising to address all the gaps. Lastly, assessments can wear on the patience of those being assessed; who among us likes inspections? If the scale of the overall effort is modest, it may not be cost effective or wise to conduct detailed, service-specific assessments. Perhaps in these smaller cases, if the expertise exists in-country, the assessment could be left to the SCO and attachés resident in-country.

**Assess the Risks**

Once these gaps have been identified, a thorough assessment of risk must be performed. When looking at risk, the military planner must first assess the risk posed to the US strategy, i.e., the planned role for the PN if the capability gap persists. If it presents little risk, then there is little point in providing the capability, and limited USG resources should be applied elsewhere. If this capability gap presents a major risk to the success of US strategy for the proposed PN role, this would indicate a higher priority for resourcing.

In addition to this operational risk, the planner must also consider political risk. In the case of political risk, a planner must not only be concerned with the fallout from not providing a capability, but also the risk from providing one, e.g., future atrocities by “US-trained” personnel. While the military planner might be reluctant to incorporate political concerns, rest assured the US ambassador to the PN will put these foremost when looking at how the CCMD’s country plan fits into the DOS overall strategy for US relations with the PN.

This provides yet another example of the importance of country-level planning. It is at this level where the military and diplomatic planning efforts come together and must be synchronized. The only other place these planning chains formally come together is in the NSS itself, and then only in the broadest terms.

**Solutions Analysis**

**Identify Alternate Solutions**

Solutions Analysis is the longest phase of planning. There are two primary methods for working though a capability to identify alternative solutions to filling the capability gaps. The first is DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) as outlined in figure 19-9. The second relates to the War Fighting Functions (mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) outlined in figure 19-10. In either case, each serves as a paradigm by which to logically work one’s way though each proposed capability. In each case, the results of this brainstorming effort will be a list of complementary or alternative activities, events, operations, and investments that improve PN capability and move them toward playing the role described during Step 1 of CBA.
Figure 19-9
DOTMLPF

| **Doctrine**—the tactics and procedures of military operations and employment of military resources |
| **Organization**—the command structure and relationships among military units |
| **Training**—the preparation of soldiers, units, commanders and staff to execute their operational missions |
| **Materiel**—military equipment, including end items, spares and consumables |
| **Leadership and Education**—the preparation of commanders and senior leaders to lead, train, organize, and employ their units and resources |
| **Personnel**—the availability of qualified persons for specific missions or tasks |
| **Facilities**—the real property and facilities for military production, maintenance and storage |

Figure 19-10
War Fighting Functions

| **Mission Command**—develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control |
| **Movement and Maneuver**—tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy |
| **Intelligence**—tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations |
| **Fires**—tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process |
| **Sustainment**—tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance |
| **Protection**—tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission |

DOTMLPF is our recommended approach. DISAM feels it provides the planner the most clear and concrete answers to providing a capability. To apply this paradigm, planners work their way through each part of DOTMLPF asking themselves what is needed within each domain. For example, to provide a reconnaissance capability; “What additional doctrine is needed? Do PN forces need to be re-organized? What training is needed? What equipment is needed?” One major benefit of methodically working through DOTMLPF is that lower cost solutions may be identified before resorting to sometimes costly and perhaps inappropriate hardware solutions.

This entire process is informed by the assessments conducted by the service components, and much of this specific step may be done at the service component command level. It is often best for CCMDs to task an Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) to do the “Assessment and Recommended Solutions” for particular capabilities. A typical example of this might be assigning the intelligence analysis to the CCMD J2.
**Recommend Solutions**

In analyzing alternatives, the planner must assess each to determine if each is affordable, feasible, and responsive. Thus, often in real-world application, this step becomes very iterative with the next step, resourcing, as possible solutions fail or succeed to secure funding or manpower.

In the end, the planner may find there is not an effective way to address the capability gap. In this case, two policy solutions may be available. First, change or drop the desired role of the PN in the CCMD TCP (i.e., change the TCP). Second, it might be necessary to change the rules for a program or create a new program to address the gaps over the long term (e.g., propose changes to legislation).

**Resourcing**

Resourcing is a highly iterative process where the country-level planners seek out resources to fill gaps, often over and over again. This can be due to competition from higher priority efforts, or legislative limitations on lifespan of resources, or because the program is a poor fit. There are currently more than 100 SC programs which could be used to resource solutions to capability gaps. Each program is specifically designed to address a particular need. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, its authorities and prohibitions. It is critical that planners understand these programs if they want to apply them effectively. These programs are the “weapon systems” of SC; if planners do not understand them, they will never employ them effectively.

**US Investment Considerations**

DOD wants to achieve the greatest overall improvement in the specified capabilities with the lowest possible investment. When looking at where to invest, the country planner must consider the factors listed below. Key among these factors is priority; priority based on risk and based on urgency. Risk represents the likelihood that a capability will not be achieved if resources are not provided, while urgency represents the importance of the resources based on time.

- Deriving—What strategy and environment are the missions and capabilities designed to address?
- Prioritizing—What shortfalls are most important and pressing? (based on risk and urgency)
- Integrating—Have investments been made across all Services to be effective as a joint force?
- Balancing—Are investments and attendant risk balanced across all the capabilities needed during the planning period?
- Sequencing—What is needed now? What can wait until later? Is there a logical order in which investments should be made?
- Resourcing—How much can the USG afford during the planning period?

**Requirements Coordination and Integration**

In the end, these capabilities will have to be consolidated and prioritized across the all of the PN’s military services. The ability of PNs to conduct CBA and requirements integration varies widely across the globe. Many PNs will not present the SCO with a coherent plan and capability requirements. It will often be left to the country-level planner (CCMD or SCO) to integrate PN joint requirements and determine which best fulfills the strategic requirement.

As with competing PN requirements and priorities, there will frequently be competing priorities within the USG. This can be particularly important if the resources are not DOD resources. To avoid
this, it is important for the country planner to remember the concept of the sweet spot—where the interests of DOD, State (or other agencies), and the PN overlap. Which investments would have the broadest payoff, and hence, the most support among the interested parties?

If the planning was done correctly and logically, it will also serve as solid justification for program requests as they move up the chain of command. The country planner should remember that this same prioritization takes place across the theater, and at the national level, across the globe. There are well over 100 SCOs all competing for scant resources.

Figure 19-11
Resourcing Windows Overlaid on Notional Synchronization Matrix

At this point, proposed activities, events, operations, and investments need to be laid out (synchronized) over time, up to five years into the future. This serves many purposes. As a planner, it will help to determine sequencing and identify critical paths. For the program manager, it will help them request resources in the three- to five-year window, as illustrated in figure 19-11.

Ideally, the planning time lines will take Global Force Management time lines into account, but this is not always so. Often plans have to be made, and events scheduled, well after the point that forces need to be requested. Either the event will have to adapt to available forces or, ideally, planning time lines should be moved a year to allow for the Request for Forces (RFF) process.

Country Plan Development

In many ways, country plan (CP) development is the simplest of the four steps in the country-planning process. However, if corners were cut during mission analysis or problem analysis, serious conflicts with stake-holders can develop, mostly from not addressing the actual problem or by doing so in an unacceptable manner. This is particularly true with countries of less military importance or of significant political controversy. These countries may lack rock-solid policy both from the USG and their own political dynamics, thus leaving an assessment of the plan open to more interpretation.
Plan development is, at its heart, the simple act of writing the plan. Currently, joint doctrine does not exist for the format of a CP. A notional CP format developed by the former Joint Forces Command may be found at attachment 1 to this chapter. Typically, CPs are found as an appendix to the TCP. While there is no set doctrine for a CP, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans looks for the following issues to be addressed when reviewing CPs:

- Country Assessment
- Country Objectives
- Reference to the TCP and Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) directly
- Concept of Engagement
- Synchronization Matrix
- Coordinating Instructions

PPD-23 requires SC planning to be fully integrated with other DOD agencies, DOS, and the executive branch. The CP should make direct reference to the embassy’s ICS, thus demonstrating this interagency integration. Likewise, the DOD country-planning process can form a significant input to the embassy’s ICS and supporting Mission Resource Request (MRR), which feed Title 22 program requirements into the Foreign Operations budget. Plans must be assessed periodically for effectiveness and relevance. Updates should be produced as strategic conditions or funding changes.

**Annual Planning Meetings**

While the frequency of updates to formal, written CPs will generally be on an annual basis, country-level planning is continual. Of particular importance is the series of planning meetings that take place during the course of the year. While the particulars of each meeting will vary by CCMD and by country, each CCMD generally has a meeting to accomplish the function described.

**Theater Strategy Conference**

The Theater Strategy Conference is hosted by the CCMD to discuss policy direction and initiatives. It is attended by personnel from the embassies, typically the SDO/DATTs and the Deputy Chiefs of Mission, as well as policy makers from CCMD HQ, OSD, and from DOS, and finally the military services components in their role of implementers of the strategy.

**Regional Working Group**

Where the Theater Strategy Conference focuses on direction and policy, the Regional Working Group (RWG) focuses on SC activities. Attendees include personnel from the SCO, the service components, OSD, CCMD, and the services. Work should focus on detailed event planning and program by program reviews.

**Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group**

The Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG) is an annual meeting hosted by CCMD, usually between the months of March and June, to project training requirements one and two years out. Members of the SCO, DOS, and the services attend in order to coordinate and approve PN training requirements (See chapter 14, “International Training,” for further details).
**Annual Planning Conference**

The exact nature of these conferences varies widely, but all are intended to coordinate activities directly with PN militaries. They can be hosted in-country or at the CCMD headquarters. They can be joint or single service. These conferences typically focus on coordinating military-to-military events, but could also cover training. During these meetings, the real work gets done on finalizing cooperation plans and getting PN buy-in (See chapter 1 for further discussion).

**Putting the Pieces Together in a Country Plan**

Please review figure 19-12, Notional Synchronization Matrix with Comments, before reading further. This figure provides a simplified example of how a country-level planner might pull together various SC programs into a synchronized plan to achieve a country level objective (CLO). In this example, the CLO is seeking to build an airlift capability. The matrix only focuses on load handling, as a component of airlift, which was an identified gap in our scenario.

In the example, initially the SCO or SDO/DATT needs to build support among the players to support and participate in the effort to build this capability. To do this, the SCO plans a distinguished visitor (DV) visit to promote the idea. The SCO can also send observers to a regional exercise to raise awareness and to show how it is done. The airlift familiarization visit builds on this exchange of know-how, and likewise raises the profile of the US program within the PN air force. During the second phase, individual training and equipment acquisition begins in earnest. Trained load handlers are scheduled to complete training before the arrival of load handling equipment in country.

Once trained personnel and equipment are on hand, collective training can begin. A second DV visit is scheduled during this period to highlight the program and the progress, in order to maintain support within the PN and the US militaries. Additionally follow on Traveling Contact Teams, assessment visits or even Subject Matter Expert Exchange visits could take place to make sure the program is still on track. Finally, a maintenance phased is reached with continued training and spare parts.

![Figure 19-12 Notional Synchronization Matrix with Comments](image-url)

**Country Level Objective 3 (CLO-3): Provide Regional Airlift**

- **Aug**: Airlift Familiarization Visit
- **Sep**: Airlift Mobile Education Team
- **Oct**: Air Staff A3 Visit
- **Nov**: Air Combat Command Visit
- **Dec**: Combined Exercise
- **Jan**: 2 x Load Handler's Course
- **Feb**: 2 x Load Handler's Course
- **Mar**: Transport to Country

**Reasoning**

1. Build Support for Objective
2. Individual Training and Equipment
3. Collective Training
4. Maintain Support
5. Maintain Program
**In-Country Event Planning**

A military career is excellent preparation for execution planning of in-country events. The key changes are translating the military infrastructure to that of the embassy and changing operational considerations from those of a soldier to those of a diplomat. Within an embassy and the country team, the organization, responsibilities, and capabilities are different than those of a military organization. For example, if one is trying to have some equipment moved, the General Services Officer (GSO), a logistics officer-equivalent, would be the person to see; for a funds transfer, the Management Officer. Despite the DOS capabilities in country, SCOs must work closely with the components and CCMD to understand the availability of DOD assistance. DOS is not generally manned overseas to deal with large DOD forces working with the PN, so keeping the balance of the workload on DOD is preferred.

As to operational considerations, detailed knowledge of the PN, its military, its bureaucracies, and USG policy considerations, will be critical. The first three points hone in on one of the central roles of the SCO in country—getting things done. To do this, the SCO must have a deep understanding of how the PN military operates in reality. For example, if PN battalions are to rotate through American training, the SCO knows to work with the PN and USG J-3 planners to ensure the deployment dates and third-country training all mesh seamlessly.

One of the other major duties in country will be ensuring political support continues within the PN and within the country team. The ambassador is the central personality in this issue. It is critical he/she supports the concept and the details of the proposed event, and continues to do so. Ambassadorial support can be garnered by successfully coordinating with the rest of the country team. The country team “buy-in” paves the way for the Ambassador’s consent. New ambassadors will need to be briefed on proposed activities, and perhaps educated on DOD and CCMD goals and objectives. Additionally, it is important that everyone on the country team understands their support of military activities is accomplishing not just the military’s objective, but that of the embassy as a whole. For example, see chapter 4 for more details on personnel, aircraft, and ship visits.

**Common Considerations**

- **Size:** One of the first questions a SCO must ask is “Can I, or should I, support this event internally within the office or do I need DAO or embassy assistance?” Also, What support will be needed from the CCMD, e.g., public affairs or contracting officers?

- **Itinerary:** This is the very heart of any event planning. Itineraries have multiple lines of operation (LOO) and multiple phases. The itinerary must take into account LOO for separate, simultaneous elements of the event, logistics support, and preparation for future portions of the event. Plans must take into account overlapping phases: preparation, pre-advance party, advance party, main body, trail party, and cleanup.

- **Local customs:** At every step, keep the local culture in mind; the SCO is the expert. The SCO may need to guide US planning toward more locally acceptable implementation, e.g., avoiding local holidays or greeting the appropriate official.

- **Office calls:** Even simple events will often require a certain amount of formalities and pleasantries. Talking points and notes on customs should be prepared for planned and ad hoc office calls.

- **Social events:** As with office calls, social events are often planned even for tactical-level activities, e.g., an ice breaker social at the start of a course, or a cookout at the end of an exercise. Larger events may have a Distinguished Visitors day, which can add a higher level of complexity in arranging and controlling the DVs.
• Press: Have a proactive plan to deal with the press. Not only can unplanned press coverage create a problem, but lost press opportunities will cost the overall USG effort. Get the embassy Public Diplomacy Officer and the CCMD public affairs office involved. Talking points for planned and ad hoc press events should be prepared.

• Clothing/uniform requirements: Be sure to determine uniform policies and requirements for each element of an itinerary. Consider when civilian attire is needed or required.

• Medical: Keep local medical, hygiene, food concerns in mind. Is drinking water safe?

• Interpreter support: Few Americans will speak the local language. The SCO personnel should not attempt to serve as an event interpreter. Not only is interpreting a particular skill that SCOs are not trained to do, but SCO personnel need to be focused on the event. Likewise, if the senior military officer will need to participate in discussions, he/she should bring an extra person along to serve as a note taker.

Logistics

• Customs Clearance: Often equipment brought into country will have to clear customs. The smooth, no-cost clearance should be coordinated in advance. Particular care should be exercised when goods are shipped in advance. Arranging Customs Clearance is particularly critical when advance teams for DVs arrive with weapons (or any unit bringing weapons into the PN).

• Contracting Support: Many in-country events will require the contracting of PN goods and services. For large military activities, a CCMD contracting officer should be sent into country well in advance of the event. For smaller events or TDYs, the embassy may be willing to provide contracting support.

• Travel Services Support: If the need for travel services is limited to that of typical TDY personnel, e.g., a rental vehicle or a room, the embassy travel office will usually be willing to support such routine travel. If the scale of the visit or event grows to the point where one is essentially talking about contracted service, the above contracting support applies.

• Funding: If the embassy is going to procure any goods and services for the event, fiscal data will be needed as early as possible. Keeping this business relationship between the embassy and the events’ participants cordial will go a long way to ensuring embassy support for the next event. SCOs must ensure TDY teams bring their own ICASS accounting codes so that the embassy does not assume or subsume the TDY costs into the SCO’s annual bill. It is also important to confirm exactly which type of money the SCO or SDO/DATT should use to fund their participation (see chapter 17, “Resource Management”).

Security

• Weapons Clearance: If weapons will be required, get the Regional Security Officer (RSO) involved early. Many countries will require permits for USG personnel to carry weapons in the country, particularly concealed weapons.

• Local Law Enforcement: Discuss any law enforcement liaison requirements with the RSO. In addition to weapons, issues of traffic control, security, border control are often important depending on the PN.

• Classified Information: If classified information will be handled, where is it to be stored? Do the US participants need access to classified computers for communication back to their headquarters?
Contingencies

- Remain flexible
- Remain mobile. Have your own vehicle standing by.
- Delegate. For larger visits, create a team of action officers. The senior person needs to be free to escort, politic, respond to contingencies. If he/she is tied down in the mechanics of the visit, they won’t be able to direct a contingency response.

**State Department Planning**

As mentioned earlier, DOS plans at the embassy level in two parts: the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and the Mission Resource Request (MRR). The Ambassador creates the ICS as a three-year strategy, and annually submits the MRR to request funding to meet the strategy. The SDO/DATT and SCO will, of course, be an integral part of the ICS and MRR, in both the development and execution of the strategy. The following description of the DOS planning process is meant only as a cursory overview of the process as it might impact the DOD elements in the embassy, and in no way covers the full extent of the DOS activity.

The planning process starts with the National Security Strategy, from which the DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) is derived and, not surprisingly, defines the national strategic priorities that guide global engagement jointly for DOS/USAID. It identifies the diplomatic and development capabilities needed to advance US interests. The current version covers a four-year outlook, FY14-17, and can be found at the www.state.gov/s/d/rm website. It sets institutional priorities and provides strategic guidance as a framework for the most efficient allocation of resources, which includes directives for improving how embassies do business, from strengthening interagency collaboration to increasing State and USAID engagement with civil society, the private sector and others. DOD planners MUST be aware of the goals and objectives listed in the JSP, as many of the exigent objectives touch on areas in which DOD will be engaged (e.g., stability/conflict resolution, human rights, rebalancing, security cooperation, among others).

To supplement the multi-year strategy, DOS publishes an Annual Performance Plan, describing the diplomacy and development efforts of DOS and USAID to achieve the strategic objectives and performance goals set forth in the Joint Strategic Plan. In countries receiving Foreign Assistance from the US, the SCO will most certainly be involved in compiling data for the embassy’s input to the Performance Plan, the annual December data call for performance information. In the Performance Plan, the Ambassador describes achievements of the previous fiscal year: anecdotes, training numbers, major deliveries, as well as activities that occurred during the reporting period, regardless of FY funding. This information is submitted to the President, the Congress, and the public. Additionally, halfway through the fiscal year, the SCOs will also be asked for data for the Operational Plan, which details the spend plan for newly-appropriated funds.

From JSP guidance, the regional and functional bureaus at DOS and USAID (e.g., the Africa Bureaus) prepare a Joint Regional Strategy laying out their plan to achieve their part of the national strategy. These regional and functional strategies can be found in the Intellipedia website.

Separately, USAID also prepares the USAID Policy Framework, to provide its staff and partners with USAID’s core development priorities as well as operational principles. USAID also develops, for some countries, Country Development Cooperation Strategies. These documents can be found at the www.usaid.gov USAID website.
All of these documents guide the individual embassies and USAID missions in developing their ICS. At this point in the planning process, plans start to flow back up the “chain-of-command” as resource requests. Individual embassies and missions send consolidated MRRs to bureaus, who prioritize and prepare a Bureau Resource Request (BRR). At the department level, DOS consolidates priorities and submits their budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget.

The DOS and DOD requests flow through the White House and become the President’s proposed budget which is submitted to Congress for consideration. The document sent annually by the President is called the Congressional Budget Justification—Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. The CBJ details the operating expenses of the DOS, and all of the foreign assistance accounts requested for the upcoming year. The SDO/DATT and SCO will most likely have a hand in drafting part of the embassy’s submission to the CBJ.

While DOS plans are coordinated with DOD plans (and vice-versa), it is important to remember that the planning process is only hard-wired together at the National Security Strategy and the ICS. It is vital all planners along both planning chains keep their counterparts aware of institutional direction and planning intentions.

For the SCO or SDO/DATT, this system places a heavy burden of responsibility on their shoulders. It can be said that these two formal planning chains come together at only two people, the SCO and the President. As regards Security Cooperation, SDO/DATTs and SCOs must be extremely adept at keeping all parties informed, facilitating cooperation, and deconflicting priorities of the various departments, agencies, and commands involved.
Partnership Strategy Toolkit

The Partnership Strategy Toolkit (PST) is a web site that provides access to a searchable database of SC programs and partner building tools. An SC planner can use the database to find various SC programs intended to address a particular need. Searches can be sorted by multiple variables, such as: limited to certain countries, program objectives, or tasks, e.g., the SCO has a need for a mil-to-mil event discussing counterterrorism in country X. The searches will produce a list of applicable programs and/or funding sources which, if properly justified and allocated, may enable execution of the event. Clicking on any of the hyperlinked solutions (program or funds) will lead you to program details and POCs. The site is hosted by OSD at https://policyapps.osd.mil/sites/sctools/Pages/default.aspx and requires Common Access Card credentials to access. To request access, send a digitally signed e-mail to Pol.Eis.Apps.Server.Team@osd.mil.

For the country-level planner, ideas for making progress toward an IMO or End State will never come to fruition without funding. The PST can quickly enumerate multiple funding sources with a Boolean search, turning ideas into reality by discovering solutions perhaps previously unimagined.

Security Assistance Network and the Combined Education and Training Program Plan

The Security Assistance Network (SAN) is a multi-faceted database and resource. Part of the SAN contains the SCO budgeting and accounting system known as the Security Assistance Automated Resource Management System (SAARMS), discussed in chapter 17. Another portion of the SAN is used for managing international training; the Security Cooperation-Training Management System (SC-TMS) is discussed in appendix 1 of this book. In the SC-TMS, the SCO prepares the Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP).

For the country-level planner, the majority of actions taken with the PN will consist of education and/or training events or activities. The annual CETPP clearly spells out the timing of US training courses, the attendees, and a wide variety of PN-related training information. The SCO Training Officer will have access, as should the SCO Chief, and the CCMD SC training officer. Most of planning is simply the synchronization of multiple events; CETPP provides the information to create such a training synchronization matrix.

This CETPP focuses on the goals and objectives for DOD-sponsored education and training for the PN. Guidance for preparation is contained in the SAMM, paragraph C10.5 and figure C10. F3. The SCO uploads the draft plan electronically onto the SAN for review and approval by the CCMD. The approved plan is used each spring during the CCMD’s Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG). Further training program details are in chapter 14 of this textbook, “International Training.” It is critical that the SCO develop a solid working relationship with the training departments of the PN military services early in the tour so PN desires can be incorporated into the CETPP.

Security Assistance Budget Web Tool

The SAMM provides guidance on Security Assistance Planning in C2.1.3 to include discussions on FMF and IMET. If the PN receives, or is proposed to receive, appropriated funds through FMF or IMET, the SCO will also make an annual submission and justification for these funds. This request is submitted electronically through the Security Assistance Budget Web Tool, managed by DSCA. This document is forwarded upward through channels for endorsement and comment, i.e., to the CCMDs staff, the Joint Staff, DSCA and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy offices, where a final DOD position is developed for each country. This position is then used by DOD representatives in round table discussions with DOS in the development of an eventual Congressional Budget Justification to be submitted by the Secretary of State to Congress.
With that in mind, the SDO/DATT and SCO need a solid relationship with the embassy Political Section. The DOD submissions occur in the September/October timeframe, but the Ambassador’s MRR is submitted in the February/March timeframe (four months after the DOD submission). Obviously, there must be some discussion between the two embassy elements in the month leading up to the DOD submission. For the embassy to present a unified front to the “round table,” DOD and DOS elements must coordinate their submissions (both the amounts of aid requested and the justification) with those in the MRR, because it is the MRR that will form the basis of DOS’s proposed budgets. The SAMM C2.1.3.4 offers points on constrained and unconstrained requests. SCO FMF/IMET submissions for DOD should be in concert with DOS submissions or risk possible exclusion from the final budget. However, SCO submissions can be unconstrained to the CCMD such that tracking of future need is possible.

CAC access to the SA Budget Webtool is requested at https://fmfimet.dsca.mil and should be limited to the SCO Chief and those SCO-designees ready to assist in completing the database submission. The Documentation section of the Webtool is superb and not only offers help guides on how to use the Webtool, but also offers examples of “good” FMF and IMET submissions, and the annual associated guidance from DOS and DOD.

Chiefs must keep in mind that the Webtool will display all the Foreign Assistance funds received by the PN and indicate the amount of “uncommitted funds.” Chiefs must indicate each year the PN’s plan for using the uncommitted funds. As stated in the SAMM C2.1.3.4.3, “Funding provided under FMF grant-aid is obligated upon apportionment and the funds remain available in the country’s FMF Trust account indefinitely. However, annual budget submissions must explain the accumulation of uncommitted funds in the trust account. Uncommitted funds can weaken SCO justification for future FMF. SCOs should monitor and manage SA programs to insure against the accumulation of uncommitted funds.”

Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS)

As noted in SAMM chapter 12, humanitarian assistance (HA), foreign disaster relief (FDR), and humanitarian mine action (HMA) are security cooperation (SC) programs designed to improve DOD access, visibility, and influence in a PN or region, and build the capacity of the PN government while addressing a humanitarian need. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds are Title-10 funds administered by DSCA for these SC projects. OHDACA-funded activities are executed across the combatant commands, offering DOD the ability to promote regional stability and security to achieve Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) objectives to reach theater strategic end states, in accordance with the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), and national security and foreign policy objectives.

The DSCA ‘System of Record’ for OHDACA-funded activities listed above, as well as the JCS-approved Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) program, and other project types is the database known an Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS). OHASIS is a cradle-to-grave tracking system that incorporates information flow from project initiators to approval authorities starting with the country team (e.g., the Ambassador and the USAID representative) and working its way through the CCMD to DSCA for funding approval. It offers a variety of exportable products for presentations. Planning and Execution cycles are found in the SAMM chapter C12.3.5.

Access to OHASIS is found at http://www.ohasis.org and requires user registration.

The savvy country-planner will realize that access to our partners is aided by building relationships. These OHASIS-tracked HA, FDR, HMA, and HCA projects are excellent methods of building a broad public appeal for US action in country, which may lead to easier access for strategic goals and end states.
Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System

The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) mandates the use of the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS) to track US engagement with our partners.

G-TSCMIS brings together all Combatant Command, Service and Agency legacy TSCMIS systems into one enterprise system. With this “global view” the Security Cooperation (SC) community has a comprehensive view of steady-state activities conducted by all DOD components. Beyond the tremendous benefit of reduced IT infrastructure costs, G-TSCMIS provides the Department the capability to work across organizational lanes with a comprehensive global picture of SC activities. G-TSCMIS allows more effective planning and assessment of SC events through enterprise-wide situational awareness of past, current, and future activities.

Country-level SC planners will want access to G-TSCMIS to ensure no duplication of effort to minimize wasting resources, as well as noting other regional activities that may be available to accomplish IMO and end-state activities. Access to CAC-enabled G-TSCMIS is available through the CCMD G-TSCMIS point of contact. Initial training can be found at the Joint Knowledge On-line website. SCOs will need access to the system to initiate data input; OPRs in the components will need access to upload event data and after-action reports.

Security Cooperation Information Portal

An increasingly powerful database in the SCO’s planning toolkit is the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). SCIP is a secure, controlled, unclassified DOD web-based computer information system that provides authorized users with access to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs case-related data and reports to support management responsibilities for those cases. See appendix 1 for an in-depth discussion of the SCIP.

SCIP can be an asset to the country-level planner as it provides insights into the timing of the PN’s FMS acquisitions, thereby allowing the planner to develop training requirements for the pre- and post-equipment delivery. All SCOs should have SCIP accounts and access the system at least once every 30 days or risk having their account suspended. Non-access for 180 days will result in account deletion. SCOs can find answers to many questions (not all) raised by the partner nation regarding FMS cases. As well, for SCOs in countries with FMS cases, the SCIP End-Use Monitoring Community needs to be accessed at least quarterly to upload routine EUM reports.

SCO ANNUAL FORECASTING DOCUMENTS

SCOs are required to annually submit to DSCA, OSD, and DOS a forecast for possible future arms transfers to the partner nation. It is important to note the distinction between planning documents and forecasting documents. The planning documents listed earlier all reflect a goal which is intended to be achieved. Conversely, a forecasting document simply reflects the SCO’s best estimate of what defense articles and services the PN may be considering for purchase from the US.

For the forecasting reports below, DSCA sends a tasking message to SCOs (and other organizations) each April with input due in June; submitted by the SCO to the CCMD en route to DSCA Strategy, then State, and ultimately, to the Congress. SCOs submit a single report covering the material necessary for both reports, but DSCA extracts (and analyzes) the Sales Forecast Report from the single submission. As the criteria varies for the two reports, it is important for SCOs to be as thorough and as accurate as possible in this submission. SCOs should consider historical FMS activity by the PN, current economic trends, and the availability of unexpended and anticipated FMF grant monies. It may well be appropriate to contact PN counterparts to obtain their estimates of essential and likely FMS sales, but it is important to avoid any “false impression” that the USG will approve (or has already approved) a future request.
Javits Report

Named after former US Senator Jacob K. Javits, the report is required annually by the AECA. The classified Javits Report is the President’s estimate to Congress of potential or proposed arms transfers during a given calendar year. The Javits Report is designed to identify potential sales by country, whether FMS or DCS. The two thresholds for reporting are $7M of major weapons or weapons-related equipment, or any proposed weapons or weapons-related sale of $25M or more. DSCA will also ask the military services to submit lists of equipment that is expected to be declared Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The sum total of the Javits Report is the FMS, DCS, and EDA estimates. The DOS submits the Javits Report to Congress by February 1st each year. The Javits Report is not binding on PNs and is submitted to Congress as an advisory document. Congress uses the document to begin discussions on approval or denial of transfer requests. See chapter 2.1.3.5 and chapter 14 of the SAMM for more information on both those reports.

FMS Sales Forecast Report

A companion document to the Javits Report, the FMS Sales Forecast Report helps DSCA determine the resource requirements for FMS implementing agencies. The document when collated is also kept in a classified status, though individual country input is unclassified (unless requested for classification by the PN). Its reporting requirements are separate from, but largely overlap, those of the Javits Report. This report is a two-year projection by fiscal year (vice one calendar year for Javits) but only addresses potential FMS sales. Unlike Javits, it has no dollar thresholds, so all highly probable FMS sales (which DSCA defines as a 90 percent likelihood of occurring) should be listed. DSCA collates the data submitted by the SCOs, briefs the DSCA Director, and in January sends the FMS data to DOS for inclusion in the Javits Report to Congress in February.

Summary

Planning is an essential step in all military operations, including security cooperation. This chapter revealed how country-level SC planning flows from the National Security Strategy (NSS) through DOS and DOD. On the Department of State (DOS) side, strategic planning takes place with the Joint Strategic Goals and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Correspondingly, DOD turns the NSS and other strategies into the NDS and the QDR and ultimately, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The SCO, working with the CCMD and Embassy staffs, collates those overarching goals and objectives and develops the SC portion of the Ambassador’s ICS/MRR and the CCMD’s country plan. The country plan then drives events, activities, operations, and investments in order to make progress for USG strategy.

References

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011
Draft Planner’s Handbook for Country-Level Steady State Planning, JFCOM, 4 April 2011
ATTACHMENT 19-1
NOTIONAL COUNTRY PLAN FORMAT

INTRODUCTION SECTION
1. Purpose
2. Overall USG Goals and Objectives
3. Summary of Higher-level DOD Guidance
4. Commander’s Vision
   4.1. Commander’s Intent
   4.2. End State 1
   4.3. End State 2
   4.4. End State 3

SITUATION SECTION
1. Strategic Context
   1.1. Geopolitical Relevance of Country X
   1.2. Relevant PMESII-C Attributes
   1.3. Historical Relationship between US and Country X
   1.4. Partner Nation Interests, Political Commitment, Priorities
2. Operational Limitations
   2.1. Authorities
   2.2. Restraints
   2.3. Constraints
3. Contextual Assumptions
   3.1. Theater End State Assumptions
   3.2. Trend/Status Assumptions
   3.3. Impact Assumptions
4. Risk Assessment
   4.1. Risks to country and / or regional stability
      4.1.1. Risk 1
      4.1.2. Risk X
   4.2. Risks to country and / or regional partnerships
      4.2.1. Risk 1
      4.2.2. Risk X
   4.3. Risks to DOD plans
      4.3.1. Risk 1
      4.3.2. Risk X
   4.4. Should US posture toward the state be risk acceptant or risk averse and to what degree?
5. Risk Matrix

CAMPAIGN SECTION
1. Overview
   1.1. Concept of Operations
   1.2. DOD Command and Control and Engagement Plan
   1.3. Resource Allocation
2. End State 1
2.1. Campaign Objective 1
   2.1.1. Background 1
   2.1.2. Theory of Change 1
   2.1.3. Line of Effort 1
      2.1.3.1. Line of Activity 1
         2.1.3.1.1. Implementation / Tasks
            2.1.3.1.1.1. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs
            2.1.3.1.1.2. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs
         2.1.3.1.2. Implementation / Tasks
            2.1.3.1.2.1. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs
            2.1.3.1.2.2. Assessment Indicators / MOEs / MOPs
      2.1.3.2. Line of Activity 2
         2.1.3.2.1. (similar sub-bullets as Line of Activity 1)
   2.1.4. Line of Effort 2
      2.1.4.1. (similar sub-bullets as Line of Effort 1)
      2.1.5. Related Strategies and Plans 1
   2.2. Campaign Objective 2
      2.2.1. (similar sub-bullets as Campaign Objective 1)

3. End State 2
   3.1. (similar sub-bullets as End State 1)

ANNEX A: TASKS-TO-END STATES

1. End State 1
   1.1. Campaign Objective 1
      1.1.1. Line of Effort 1
         1.1.1.1. Line of Activity 1
            1.1.1.1.1. Implementation / Task 1
               1.1.1.1.1.1. Task Mission / Description
               1.1.1.1.1.2. Contact Information for Task Lead
               1.1.1.1.1.3. Subordinate and Supporting DOD Elements
               1.1.1.1.1.4. Supporting and Supported non-DOD Elements
               1.1.1.1.1.5. Coordinating Instructions
               1.1.1.1.1.6. Potential Adversaries and Obstacles
               1.1.1.1.1.7. Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation Strategies
               1.1.1.1.1.8. Progress Assessment Plan
            1.1.1.1.2. Implementation / Task 2
               1.1.1.1.2.1. (similar sub-bullets as Implementation / Task 1)
      1.1.2. Line of Effort 2 (similar sub-bullets as Line of Effort 1)
   1.2. Campaign Objective 2 (similar sub-bullets as Campaign Objective 1)

2. End State 2 (similar sub-bullets as End State 1)

ANNEX B: DETAILED STRATEGIC CONTEXT

1. Geopolitical Overview of Country X
   1.1. Country X's strategic importance
1.2. Country X’s geographic location
1.3. Country X’s demographics
1.4. Country X’s interests, political commitment, priorities
1.5. Actors of interest in Country X

2. Relevant PMESII-C Attributes
   2.1. Formal Institutions
   2.2. People
   2.3. Other influential entities
   2.4. Culture
   2.5. Interdependencies and key relationships

3. Relationship between Country X and the US
   3.1. Historical recitation of the overall relationship between US and Country X, including long-term trends and major shifts
   3.2. DOD activities in Country X over the past year
   3.3. Non-DOD activities in Country X over the past year

ANNEX C: RELEVANT NON-DOD ACTORS AND ACTIVITIES
1. US Department of State (DOS)
   1.1. End State(s)
   1.2. Objective(s)
   1.3. Intent
2. US Agency for International Development (USAID)
   2.1. End State(s)
   2.2. Objective(s)
   2.3. Intent
3. Other USG Agencies
   3.1. End State(s)
   3.2. Objective(s)
   3.3. Intent
4. Multinational Partners, Alliances, and Coalitions (NATO, etc.)
   4.1. End State(s)
   4.2. Objective(s)
   4.3. Intent
5. Non-Partner States, Adversaries
   5.1. End State(s)
   5.2. Objective(s)
   5.3. Intent
6. Intergovernmental Organizations (WTO, UN, OSCE, etc.)
   6.1. End State(s)
   6.2. Objective(s)
   6.3. Intent
7. Non-Governmental Organizations
   7.1. End State(s)
   7.2. Objective(s)
   7.3. Intent
8. Interest Groups and Private Sector Actors
   8.1. End State(s)
   8.2. Objective(s)
   8.3. Intent

ANNEX D: COMBATANT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Combatant Command responsibilities
2. Other Geographic Combatant Command
3. Functional Combatant Command
4. Defense Agency Responsibilities
5. Other USG Responsibilities