
The Future of NATO And Europe's Changing Security Landscape

by

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Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the future of NATO within the context of Europe's changing security landscape. When the Cold War ended—that symbolic midnight moment on December 25, 1991, when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time—it was inevitable that Americans would talk of ending, or sharply reducing, their global commitments—of coming home.

A half-century ago, at the end of World War II, the United States faced another time of great change, another time of enormous opportunity and uncertain peril, another time when Americans wanted nothing more than simply to go home. But we soon found that freedom's wartime victory was incomplete and that the post-war period would require continuous and active American engagement to marshal the forces of freedom for a new kind of war—a cold war.

Among the challenges that Harry Truman, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and their Democratic colleagues faced was to build a new post-war order in cooperation with a new Republican Congress. And to the lasting benefit of our nation and the world, they met that challenge. They found allies among Republicans who recalled the consequences of isolationism after World War I—a period that also began with a Democratic President facing new Republican majorities in Congress. They forged a bipartisan consensus based on the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the postwar institutions of the West, and sustained American leadership.

Now, a half-century later, we have the opportunity—and the responsibility—to marshal the forces of freedom for a new kind of European peace—one that is just and enduring. We have the opportunity—and the obligation—to work with our European partners to extend freedom's victory to all of Europe.

It is fair, of course, to ask why it is in the national interest of the United States to continue to play an active role in the restructuring of Europe's security. It is tempting to say, at the end of the Cold War, that we will leave it to the Europeans themselves to work out a new concert of Europe, while we focus on problems at home.

We must resist this temptation for a simple reason: our own narrow self-interest. The context for U.S. relations with Europe may have changed, but bedrock American interests in Europe endure:

- A continent free from domination by any power or combination of powers hostile to the United States;
- Prosperous partners open to our ideas, our goods, and our investments;

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- A community of shared values, extending across as much of Europe as possible, that can facilitate cooperation with the United States on a growing range of global issues;
 - A continent that is not so wracked by strife that it drains inordinate resources from the United States or the rest of the world.

These interests require active U.S. engagement in Europe. They point to close cooperation with our European partners.

President Clinton's four trips to Europe last year underscored an inescapable fact: the United States has become a European power, an enduring and essential element of a stable balance.

Many thought our presence in Europe would no longer be necessary when the Soviet threat ended, but after only a few years—and the disastrous results of our early non-involvement in the Yugoslav tragedy—it is time to recognize that Europe cannot maintain stability on its own. An unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests of the United States, and Europe still needs American involvement to keep the continent stable. Our national security requires continued American participation in maintaining European stability and promoting an undivided continent.

During the Cold War, Americans played an indispensable role in containing ancient conflicts by creating a framework of cooperative security across the western half of the continent and on its always explosive southeastern Aegean flank. Today, American power and presence remain essential to extend these habits of cooperation across the entire continent, the eastern portion of which seethes still with unresolved historic legacies. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it is still necessary for “the New World to redress the imbalances of the Old.”

Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return of historic grievances have replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. Western Europe and the United States must jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past are contained and solved.

Europe's diversity and historic rivalries remain a determining aspect of efforts to maintain stability. Maintaining peace in Europe has traditionally depended on a complicated set of structures that balanced often conflicting interests. Disappearance of Cold War structures has left important parts of Europe without a sense of security provided by a credible framework. This sense of insecurity is related less to the perception of a new threat than it is to the need to generate a climate of confidence in which difficult economic and political reforms can be advanced.

In this context, building a new security architecture for Europe means providing a framework to build democracy, market economies, stable societies, and, ultimately, a stable and just peace across the continent. If we are to realize our goal of a peaceful, democratic, prosperous, and undivided Europe, we must work with our European partners to re-establish a sense of overall security.

Today, the early euphoria that surrounded the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire has yielded to a more sober appreciation of the problems—new and old. The tragedy of Bosnia does not diminish the responsibility to build a new comprehensive structure of

principles guiding the expansion process, i.e., that each nation will be considered individually on its own merits.

We must be very careful about unilaterally and prematurely trying to choose certain countries for NATO membership over others or to set specific guarantees. The Washington Treaty is not a paper guarantee. New members have to be in a position to undertake the solemn obligations and responsibilities of membership, just as we will extend our solemn commitments to them. Our gradual, deliberate, and transparent approach to NATO enlargement is designed to ensure that each potential member is judged fairly and individually, by the strength of its democratic institutions and its capability to contribute to NATO's goals.

By following this approach, we give every new democracy a powerful incentive to consolidate reform. Arbitrarily looking into law advantages for certain countries would discourage reformers in countries not named and encourage complacency in countries that are. Indeed, the effect of these measures before Congress could be to encourage the very instabilities and imbalances we seek to avoid. The Senate bill also does not acknowledge the key role played by PFP in increasing defense cooperation with partner countries and, thus, helping to prepare them for eventual NATO membership.

The view shared by this Administration and each of its allies is that in the process of expanding NATO, we should not draw new lines in Europe but should reach out to all countries emerging from communism. We must remember that the decision on expansion is not to be made by the United States alone but by the allies collectively. The U.S. should not prejudice issues that ultimately will be subject to consensus among NATO's 16 members and ratified by legislatures in those countries.

We also do not believe that "observer status" in the North Atlantic Council, as provided in the Senate bill, is desirable given the highly sensitive nature of discussions, including on the subject of NATO expansion. Both PFP and NACC provide ample opportunity for NATO's partners to participate in appropriate meetings and other activities.

While we also attach high priority to improving the English-language skills of partner defense forces, as reflected in our FY 1996 International Military Education and Training Program—IMET—and Partnership for Peace program requests, we oppose the specific IMET earmarks in the bill. As a general proposition, we think the bill gives the President insufficient flexibility to meet shifting demands. We would much prefer a bill that provides what the President "may" do, as opposed to what he "shall" do.

Finally, we are concerned about the reporting requirements in the bill. They would place the President in the untenable position of having to make a public and unilateral evaluation of a country's suitability for NATO membership. This could generate disagreements with our allies and further complicate the expansion process.

We hope that Congress will make the necessary changes in the proposed legislation. Congress and the Administration share the same goal with respect to NATO expansion. Working together, without unnecessary legislative constraints, we will reach that goal more quickly.

Fortifying the European pillar of the alliance contributes further to European stability and to transatlantic burden-sharing. It improves our collective capacity to act. It means establishing a new premise of collective defense: The United States should not be the only NATO member that can protect vital common interests outside of Europe.

For these reasons, the United States promoted the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force—CJTF. CJTF offers a practical vehicle for making NATO assets and capabilities available to our European allies, should the alliance as a whole, including the U.S., decide not to participate. It is based on the notion that Europe's emerging defense identity should be separable but not separate from NATO. CJTF can become an important vehicle for the United States to develop more effective sharing of military burdens with its European allies. NATO will still have the right of first refusal to deal with crises that do not automatically invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but if the alliance as a whole chooses not to act, smaller coalitions of willing members can draw on NATO assets to deal with such crises. CMF also provides a means to accommodate participation of forces from non-NATO allies, including members of the PFP.

NATO expansion cannot occur in a vacuum. If it did, it would encourage the very imbalances and instabilities it was seeking to avoid. In addition to NATO and PFP, the new architecture involves both the EU, other arrangements such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and a parallel track developing a pragmatic partnership with Russia.

The European Union

For more than 40 years, both Democratic and Republican Administrations have supported peaceful European integration. The European Union has become a vital partner in trade, diplomacy, and security. Close partnership between the United States and the European Union is essential to our common agenda of democratic renewal. This Administration has strongly supported the European Union's efforts at European integration.

Although the European Union is usually viewed as a political and economic entity, it is an essential pillar of European security. The integration of western European nations on the basis of democracy and free market economics has virtually transcended old territorial disputes, irredentist claims, social cleavages, and ethnic grievances that tore apart European societies in earlier eras.

Throughout its history, the Union has strengthened the democratic impulse of a wider Europe. The extension of the Union eastward will be immensely important both politically and economically. It will integrate and stabilize the two halves of Cold War Europe.

Expansion of NATO and the EU will not proceed at exactly the same pace. Their memberships are not and will not be identical, but the two organizations are clearly mutually supportive. Expansion of both is equally necessary for a stable Europe.

The Organization for Security And Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Both EU and NATO expansion are proceeding within the broad context of a new European security architecture. Neither is being pursued in isolation. Integration of Central Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union into the OECD, the GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization, and such institutions as the Council of Europe all complement and support the gradual expansion of NATO and the EU.

But neither NATO nor the EU can be everything to everybody, and the other organizations mentioned above are focused on narrower issues. This points to the need in the new European architectural concept for a larger and looser region-wide organization that can deal with a variety of challenges which neither NATO nor the EU is suited to address.

Fortunately, the core for such a structure has existed for some years—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its broad structure of human rights commitments, consultations, and efforts at cooperative or preventive diplomacy had begun to fill a niche in the new Europe. But it was clear by the middle of last year that CSCE, while offering intriguing possibilities, was wholly inadequate to the opportunities or the challenge. Under the leadership of the United States, a significant evolution of this organization, including a new name, was started in December at the Budapest CSCE summit.

Where NATO and the EU begin with the assumption that their members share common goals, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, as it was renamed, presumes that many of its participants disagree on how its standards are to be implemented. The OSCE takes such disagreement as a given and then works to find common ground.

Security in Europe today means solving conflicts—many of them centuries old—before they escalate as Bosnia has. This is why we have strengthened OSCE mechanisms, are making vigorous use of its norms, ensuring full implementation of its commitments, and increasing political and material support for its conflict prevention activities. At the Budapest summit, a comprehensive framework for the future of conventional arms control was developed; uniform nonproliferation principles were established among 52 nations; greater political and material support was pledged for support for the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Preventive Diplomacy Missions, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; and Russia and the OSCE, as a whole, agreed to merge negotiating efforts on the difficult issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and provide peacekeepers there once a political agreement is reached—all important steps on OSCE's path to becoming a more meaningful organization with greater capabilities, operating without regard to old Cold War dividing lines.

These decisions complement our efforts at NATO and the efforts of the European Union to pursue cooperative, integrated security structures for Europe. But they do not make OSCE a substitute for NATO or the EU. In no way can OSCE be made superior to NATO. Because the functions, as well as the structures of OSCE and NATO are entirely different—and shall remain so—OSCE will not become the umbrella organization for European security, nor will it oversee the work of the NATO alliance. But we must develop new methods to identify and deal with future potential Bosnias by addressing at an early stage the causes of conflict. The OSCE must prove its worth in this area, as the CSCE did in spreading democratic values and legitimizing human rights. More must be done.

A Pragmatic Policy of Engagement With Russia and the NIS

This brings me to another essential pillar of the new security architecture: relations with Russia. If the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, into a stable European security system.

Since his first day in office, President Clinton has pursued a pragmatic policy of engagement with Russia and the other New Independent States as the best investment we can make in our nations's security and prosperity. As Secretary Christopher said last week, "Our approach is to cooperate where our interests coincide, and to manage our differences constructively and candidly where they do not. We support reform because, in the long run, its success benefits not only the people of the region but the American people as well."

The U.S. objective remains a healthy Russia—a democratic Russia pursuing reform, respecting the rights of its citizens, and observing international norms. This is why the events in

Chechnya are so disturbing. Chechnya is a setback in the evolution of the Russian Federation into a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic state.

But as President Clinton stated in January, as Russia undergoes a historic, painful transformation, it would be a mistake to react reflexively to each of the ups and downs that it is bound to experience, perhaps, for decades to come. If the forces of reform are embattled, the United States must reinforce, not retreat from, its support for them.

Enhancement of stability in Central Europe is a mutual interest of Russia and the United States. NATO, which poses no threat to Russian security, seeks a direct and open relationship with Russia that both recognizes Russia's special position and stature and reinforces the integrity of the other New Independent States of the former Soviet Union.

It is in our interest for the NATO-Russia relationship to develop in parallel with NATO expansion. As Secretary Christopher told Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva two weeks ago, it is in Russia's interest to participate constructively in the process of European integration. Russia has an enormous stake in a stable and peaceful Europe. No country has suffered more when Europe has not been at peace. Russia's path to deeper involvement in Europe is open. It should not choose to isolate itself from this effort.

NATO and Russia already have a solid relationship through Russia's membership in the NACC and through active diplomatic contacts. The next step is Russian acceptance of the documents, which it has already negotiated with the alliance, setting forth the terms of the relationship both within and outside of PFP. This will include cooperative efforts in areas where Russia can offer special expertise or capabilities, including nuclear non-proliferation.

Any such arrangements as part of a new security architecture must also consider the special case of Ukraine. Its geostrategic position makes its independence and integrity a critical element of European security. Considerable cooperation is being pursued between NATO and Ukraine under the PFP. Strengthened relations should also be pursued beyond the PFP. We have an intensive dialogue with Kiev on the evolving European security architecture. Moreover, last year President Clinton negotiated a trilateral understanding with Russia and Ukraine that sets Ukraine on the path to becoming a non-nuclear power. In so doing, Ukraine joined Kazakhstan and Belarus in agreeing to give up nuclear weapons. We are leading efforts to dismantle their weapons and safeguard nuclear materials under a bipartisan program sponsored by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus more specifically on the ways we are matching our European security policy with our resources to advance U.S. national interests.

Security Assistance For Central Europe

The evolution of Europe's security architecture, guided in large part by the U.S., will fundamentally transform our security relations with the Central European states. Our FY 1996 security assistance requests reflect the high priority we attach to nurturing these relationships.

Our requests are carefully designed to support our central security policy goals in the region, including advancing PFP, enhancing U.S.-Central European defense cooperation, promoting regional stability, fostering regional cooperation, and encouraging other states to play a greater role in multinational peacekeeping activities.

In previous years, we have been able to devote limited security assistance resources to the region. This year, we have requested increased resources in support of major policy initiatives, including PFP, and it is critical that we receive this increase. All of the democracies in Central Europe are eager to participate in cooperative defense activities with us, but most lack the wherewithal to do so.

We have designed a set of distinct, but mutually reinforcing security assistance requests to advance U.S. policy objectives in Europe. We believe our efforts are consistent with the spirit of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, as well as the bills described above that are now pending before the Congress.

First, the Administration has requested \$60 million in military assistance for Central European countries and the New Independent States under the Partnership for Peace program. In addition, the Department of Defense budget request contains \$40 million for Partnership for Peace activities more appropriately conducted under DOD authorities. Collectively, this \$100 million will meet the commitment made by the President last summer in Warsaw to support the Partnership for Peace. These funds will facilitate partner participation in PFP activities, improve the compatibility and interoperability of these countries' militaries with NATO forces, build bilateral ties between U.S. and Central European militaries, provide us the opportunity to influence the evolution of these defense establishments, and finance a range of cooperative multilateral security activities.

In addition, \$25 million is proposed for Central European defense infrastructure, peacekeeping, and related programs. These funds will continue the process of equipping and training the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion and will support the reorientation of Central European militaries to defensive postures, regional cooperation based on uniform standards of equipment, and expanded military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO.

Third, \$25 million is requested to assist Central European states in the deployment of units to multilateral peacekeeping operations. While dedicated peacekeeping units are now being established in most nations of the region, many would be unable to finance their deployment to non-UN operations, for example. This fund is intended to alleviate that problem, thereby integrating the military forces of these nations into broader, cooperative security arrangements, improving their interoperability with NATO forces, and reducing the need for U.S. forces in peacekeeping situations.

Finally, the Administration has requested \$7 million for the IMET program, which provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. IMET is an extremely cost-effective component of U.S. foreign policy. It provides training in defense management concepts, civil-military relations, human rights and military justice for civilian and military defense officials, members of national parliaments charged with defense oversight, and NGO personnel from Central Europe. It provides U.S. access and influence in a sector of society which often plays a critical role in the transition to democracy.

Political and Economic Assistance

Our efforts at building a viable security architecture for Europe can only succeed if democracy and market economies take root throughout Central Europe. Democratic reform in this region is as important to U.S. interests now as when the SEED Act was passed in 1989. The success of these democratic and market reforms makes us all more secure: they are the best answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds uncorked by the end of the Cold War. But the process of political and economic transformation is jeopardized today by a host of

challenges—organized crime, ethnic tensions, unemployment and other social dislocations, the return of historic grievances, and the fire that continues to rage in the Balkans.

Democratic institutions have been established, but they remain fragile. Credible and transparent elections have been held, but in some countries the governing coalitions are unstable. Participatory structures for local government are still rudimentary. There is an urgent need for social sector restructuring throughout the region to solidify popular support for continued reform and reduce heavy burdens on weak budgets.

In FY 1996, we are requesting \$480 million through the SEED program, primarily to maintain our core assistance for democratic and economic reform in Central Europe. These funds will promote small business development to spur job creation. They will restructure the financial sectors of the Central European countries, and they will establish legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks conducive to private investment. In addition, they will help build accountable, responsive public administration at the central and local levels and promote independent news media. They will also help combat organized crime. Finally, they will support social sector reform in areas like health and housing. Beyond such core activities, our request includes significant funding for assistance to Bosnia and for helping South Balkan states cope with critical infrastructure needs.

The SEED program remains transitional in nature, its “sunset” in each country determined by the progress achieved. The program is reducing assistance in some countries of the northern tier, allowing a gradual shift in U.S. assistance to those in the southern tier, which have further to go in their transitions. The shift of resources from north to south will be carefully monitored to assure that programs are not withdrawn from countries before democracy and market economics are firmly established. In short, because these funds help Central European nations consolidate their democracies and market economies, they are an essential underpinning to our efforts to enhance security for the entire region.

Taken together, the political, economic, and military initiatives I have outlined underscore our efforts to strengthen and extend NATO within an inclusive framework that expands democracy, prosperity, and a sense of security across the entire European continent. It will take some time before the forms and patterns of a new era settle into place. In the meantime, we must expect continuing change and upheaval in Europe: at times, promising; at times, frightening. There are great problems, but there are also great opportunities. To turn away from the challenges would only mean paying a higher price later.

The United States will be an active participant in Europe for a simple reason—our self-interest requires it. As we proceed along this course, I look forward to close cooperation with members of this committee and with Congress, in general.