
Planning for the Security Assistance Organization: Or How Do We Get There From Here?

By
Gary Taphorn
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

MEMO FOR: All Personnel
Office of Defense Cooperation
American Embassy Bandaria

FROM: Colonel Butch Shawkinaugh
Chief, ODC

SUBJECT: Summary of Taskers from Weekly ODC Staff Call

1. Urge Bandarian Air Force to sign Amendment 2 to BN-C-YCY before it expires on the 28th of the month.
2. Work with Bandarian Training Directorate to identify an English language qualified field grade officer to attend U.S. Army Command and General Staff School before we lose the quota.
3. Set up hotel reservations and rental car arrangements for the HMMWV maintenance mobile training team (MTT) coming next week.
4. Take the necessary actions with embassy housing, the international school, and the combatant command budget folks to accommodate inbound Major I. M. Kumming, the replacement for Major Nuisance, who will arrive in ten weeks with four children.

If you have served in a security assistance organization (SAO), the actions outlined above, whether in writing or expressed orally, should sound familiar. The common theme in all of the taskers above from Colonel Shawkinaugh is that they are short-term in nature, the so-called 50-meter targets. As with any other organization, the SAO inevitably becomes pre-occupied with near-term issues. While there is nothing wrong with this, focusing on these actions to the exclusion of long range issues can potentially be fruitless - or worse - counterproductive. In today's environment where an increasing number of SAO personnel are serving one-year unaccompanied tours, a ten-week suspense to prepare for the arrival of Major Kumming might seem like a mid-term action, when in reality it is a mere blip on the radar scope. The SAO must be equally concerned with the so-called 400-meter targets, those goals or actions which will likely not happen on his watch, but on that of his successor, or even his successor once or twice removed.

This is the crucial planning function of the SAO, in which it helps to shape the organization and capabilities of the host nation military, as well as its capability and willingness to work with the United States on issues of regional or global security.

Planning Guidance

Fortunately, the system has plenty of safeguards and guidance to aid Colonel Shawkinaugh in his planning responsibilities. Both the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) have, over time, developed planning processes which apply uniformly and globally to all embassies and SAOs. Moreover, since the onset of the Global War on Terror, DoS and DoD have more closely

coordinated their goals and programs. To this end, and for the first time, the two departments convened a two-day security cooperation summit in Washington in April 2006.

This article examines the four planning processes for the SAO chief, one with DoS and three within DoD. It also describes the resultant documents and explains their benefit to the SAO and to the bilateral relationship with the host nation. Each planning process was developed independently and in response to separate requirements and each operates on its own annual cycle. Collectively, however, they make for a complete matrix of planning guidance for the SAO chief. The four processes are as follows:

- The Mission Performance Plan (MPP)
- The country component of the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy (TSCS)
- The Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP)
- The foreign military financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool

The Mission Performance Plan

From personal experience as a Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) instructor, the author can attest that most students bound for SAO billets are well aware of the combatant commander's theater security cooperation strategy (TSCS). However, strikingly few have heard of the Mission Performance Plan (MPP) for their embassy.

In fact, the MPP is more important. It is the single planning document within the U.S. government that defines our national interests in any given foreign country. The MPP coordinates the efforts and establishes the performance measurement among all U.S. government agencies represented on the embassy country team (including the SAO and the defense attaché office) or which otherwise have interests in that country. The MPP is not intended to limit the scope of the activities of federal agencies. Rather, it creates a framework for all agencies to define priorities, articulate the goals and objectives of their programs, and directly relate program accomplishments to agency-specific and government-wide strategic goals. The MPP process is thus a truly interagency activity.

At each U.S. embassy, the plan is created by the country team under the leadership of the chief of mission, normally the ambassador. Guidance provided to members of the country team stresses the importance of congruity between the MPP and each agency's strategic plan (for DoD, the country component of the TSCS). The MPP addresses not only foreign policy and national security issues, but also establishes benchmarks for internal embassy administration, staffing, and budget efficiencies. Finally, the MPP acts as a transmission document for the request of appropriated funds under the DoS-managed foreign operations budget. Of key interest to SAO chiefs are the requests for FMF and IMET funding.

Upon approval by the ambassador, the MPP is sent to the DoS where it undergoes interagency review. All concerned agencies, including DoD, then have the opportunity to review and comment on each individual country MPP. Each of the more than 180 DoS missions around the world executes this process annually. The MPPs for fiscal year 2008 were submitted to DoS for review in February, 2006. In part, this is to meet the timelines for the submission of the foreign operations budget request to the Congress. Timelines are discussed in more detail below.

Individual MPPs are typically unclassified documents, but are marked Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU), the DoS equivalent of For Official Use Only (FOUO) and, as such, must be controlled. MPPs follow a standardized and highly structured format and are organized to reflect how an embassy supports DoS's four broad, enduring strategic objectives and its twelve strategic goals, as reflected in

the fiscal years 2004 through 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan. (This document can be found at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/>).

The chart below outlines these objectives and goals. While Colonel Shawkinaugh and his fellow SAOs support at least indirectly most or all of DoS's twelve strategic goals, their work most directly impacts on **regional stability** and **counterterrorism**.




Figure 1. Department of State four strategic objectives and twelve strategic goals, as outlined in the fiscal years 2004-2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan. Security assistance supports primarily the strategic objective of Achieve Peace and Security.

The Theater Security Cooperation Strategy

Since the end of World War II, United States military forces have been continuously involved in a myriad of peacetime missions and activities to help shape the strategic environment. For decades, however, most of this was done on an *ad hoc* basis, with no overarching guidance on prioritization of partner countries and use of DoD resources. It was not until 1998 that DoD formalized its peacetime engagement process and strategy. It did so by establishing the requirement for geographic combatant commands to develop and implement theater engagement plans (TEPs) that would shape the environment in their areas of responsibility.

Under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's tenure, the TEPs were renamed security cooperation plans, and now security cooperation strategies. Secretary Rumsfeld's personal stamp on the process is seen primarily through the *Security Cooperation Guidance* (SCG), which was issued initially in

April 2003 and followed by a more robust version in November 2005 (and amended in June 2006). The SCG provides the basis for all further security cooperation planning and activities within DoD. This document acts as the foundation for all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the president's National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense's *National Military Strategy*. The requirement to produce a security cooperation strategy now extends to all combatant commanders (both geographic and functional), as well as to secretaries of the military departments and directors of Defense agencies. The SCG makes reference to four ways in which we accomplish our strategic objectives, as articulated in the March 2005 *National Defense Strategy*. They are:

- Assure allies and friends
- Dissuade potential adversaries
- Deter aggression and counter coercion
- Defeat adversaries

The SCG then identifies a total of nineteen objectives which collectively support the four goals above. As geographic combatant commands develop their theater security cooperation strategies, they align their programs, activities and priorities with these SCG goals and objectives. The TSCS is comprised of various sections, including strategies for sub-regions within the combatant commander's (COCOM) area of responsibility (known as regional strategies) and strategies of the COCOM component commands. However, for Colonel Shawkinaugh and other SAO chiefs, the key component of the TSCS is the country-specific portion of the document, now typically called a country campaign plan (although the name varies among the COCOMs) and enclosed as an appendix. While the country campaign plan is drafted by the COCOM J5, it is utilizing input from the other COCOM directorates, the component commands, and above all the SAO. Indeed, the SAO becomes the unofficial "point man" for the development and execution of most of the country-level portion of the TSCS. As the *de facto* expert within the COCOM on his partner nation, the SAO is in the best position to recommend the nature of peacetime engagement and the types of activities which will yield optimal benefits to both the United States and the host nation, and with the most efficient expenditure of resources. The SAO and other players within the COCOM utilize a classified data base called Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) to schedule, track, and assess specific security cooperation activities and events.

In summary, just as the MPP is the ambassador's document, so is the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy the document of the area combatant commander. While the SAO is not the lead agency in either process, it has a key role to play in both formulating and executing the plan and strategy. In rare instances, the SAO may detect conflicting guidance or priorities between his ambassador's MPP and the combatant commander's TSCS. In such cases, the SAO chief must seek clarification or resolution at the first opportunity. While the SAO chief is in the occasionally difficult position of responding to two masters, he is also uniquely positioned to understand both the combatant command and the embassy, balance their respective priorities, and leverage their resources.

The Combined Education and Training Program Plan

The *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM, para C10.4.1) is the genesis of this third planning requirement. Specifically, it requires that:

SAOs *in coordination with host country counterparts* (author's italics) develop a Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP).

The same paragraph specifies that the CETPP is part of the SAO input to the budget process, including the ambassador's MPP and the combatant commander's TSCS. The format of the CETPP is spelled out by SAMM Figure C10.F1.




Figure 2. Like the MPP, the TSCS utilizes an annual cycle. The above diagram depicts European Command's annual planning cycle. The country campaign plan (CPP) is the key document for engagement with each country. As of 2006, COCOMs are required to submit a formal assessment to the Joint Staff and OSD within sixty days after the end of each fiscal year.

The CETPP is the SAO chief's "deliverable" for the annual Training Program Management Reviews (TPMRs), hosted each spring by the combatant commands. The country plans created for the spring 2006 TPMP cycle are for budget year 2007 and beyond. The SAO is required to prepare the CETPP as an unclassified document and upload it to the Security Assistance Network (SAN) for review prior to the TPMP. (Beginning in 2005, the CETPPs migrated to the SAN web). More than any of the other planning documents, the CETPP illustrates the requirement for the SAO to coordinate its planning with that of the host nation. Put differently, if Colonel Shawkinaugh's training officer (or foreign service national employee) returned to Bandaria from the TPMP and announced that all training requested on the CETPP was approved, it would be no surprise to Bandarian counterparts. Since it is not always possible that all requested training will be approved, or otherwise become available, the SAO must also work closely with the host nation on alternative plans. For example, if Bandaria requests a senior service school, such as the U.S. Army War College, through its IMET program, an alternative plan must in place in the event that Bandaria does not receive an invitation to the course.

The CETPP is required to address the execution of all training with DoD, regardless of the source of funding. In theory, the host nation has unlimited ability to request training through FMS cases which are paid with customer funds. At this point, the constraint may be DoD training resources. However, the reality remains that many countries are so limited in budgets that, unless the U.S. pays for both the cost of the training course (i.e., tuition), as well as the associated travel and living allowances, they can not afford the training at all. Most nations receive at least some U.S. appropriated funds for training. The IMET program alone provided training funds to at least 135 countries in fiscal year 2006. Other U.S.-funded sources of training include, for example, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Finally,

the new authority for the President under section 1206 of the fiscal year 2006 *National Defense Authorization Act* (commonly referred to as “building partner capacity” or simply “1206 authority”) also provides for U.S.-funded training.

2. Combined Education and Training Program Objectives
 - a. Specific U.S. Program Objectives. U.S. training program objectives should support objectives articulated in the Mission Performance Plan (MPP), Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and in the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG). While the TSCP provides a seven-year focus and the SCG is limited to five years, training objectives should be near-term (two years) and be unclassified.
 - b. Host Country Objectives.
 - c. Significant Accomplishments Toward Meeting These Objectives. Provide tangible examples of how individuals applied Security Assistance training to achieve program objectives.
 - d. Future Objectives and Program Requirements. This paragraph should address U.S. and host country out-year objectives with regards to Security Assistance training program requirements. Data (e.g., IMET, FMF, FMS) must closely match the inputs developed by the U.S. Country Team for the MPP and data found in the TSCP.
3. Program Planning and Implementation
 - a. Program Development. This should include a brief description of the training planning process, highlighting host country and SAO roles, problems (if any), and plans for improvement. The objective is to demonstrate an orderly process in the shaping of a training program that is in the U.S. interest and supportive of MPP, TSCP and SCG.

Figure 3. An extract of Part One of the CETPP format, as found in the SAMM, Figure C10.F1. It emphasizes the importance of the training program meeting both U.S. and host nation objectives. While the SAMM indicates that the CETPP should be limited to two years, combatant commands now consider the CETPP a multi-year document, with the number of “out-years” variously defined.

The Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool

The final planning document is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s FMF and IMET Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool. This document differs from the other three planning tools in that it applies only to countries which receive (or are proposed to receive) IMET and/or FMF as assistance. This excludes the so-called purely “cash customers” such as traditional North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and miscellaneous other high income countries ranging from Australia and South Korea to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The web tool has become the automated successor to the older Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA), in which embassies submitted their annual requests by cable narrative to the DoS. The web tool is managed by DSCA on a password-protected web site in which the access of the various DoD users is customized according to their position (SAO, combatant command, etc.). DSCA reminds SAOs that budget requests should be consistent with the objectives and priorities in the Secretary of Defense’s *Security Cooperation Guidance*.

Web tool submissions by SAOs work their way through the combatant commands, the Joint Staff and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) level offices before being used by OSD and DSCA in discussions with DoS. Depending on the justification by Colonel Shawkinaugh, the importance of his host nation to U.S. foreign policy and national security, and numerous other factors, the original SAO submission may be endorsed, reduced, or (rarely) increased at the combatant command level

or higher. The end result of this process is the annual *Congressional Budget Justification* (CBJ), submitted in January at the beginning of each session of Congress. The FMF and IMET budget process within DoD channels is outlined in the figure below.




Figure 4. The annual flow of SAO requests for country FMF and IMET is depicted here, as per DSCA's FMF and IMET Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool. SAOs made their submission for fiscal year 2009 in October and November of 2006.

The lengthy timelines associated with this process are symptomatic of what some would call the cumbersome nature of security assistance. For example, DSCA initiated the budget cycle input for fiscal year 2009 with a call-up message on September 29, 2006. That tasker required SAOs to submit their IMET and FMF requests and justification by 10 November to meet a DoS deadline of March 30, 2007. The administration uses the next ten months for interagency discussions, including with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to finalize the budget request before submission to Congress the following January. Congress typically requires typically a full annual session or more before passing the resultant foreign operations appropriations bill. As often as not, this spending bill is part of an omnibus package after a series of continuing resolutions early in the following fiscal year. Effectively, then, the SAOs are being asked to make budget requests for fiscal year 2009 when Congress has not yet acted on even the fiscal year 2007 budget and the 2008 budget request has not yet even been submitted to Congress. By this author's calculation, Colonel Shawkinaugh can now expect a turn-around time of 26 to 28 months between his submission on the Web Tool and eventual allocation of funds to Bandaria. By that time, Colonel Shawkinaugh has likely moved to his first or

even second follow-on assignment while his successor (possibly once removed) must live with the results. The DSCA chart below illustrates the complete budget cycle.

In fairness, the budget submission through the web tool is only slightly longer (perhaps ninety days) than that through the Mission Performance Plan. DSCA is cognizant of the difficulties that these timelines impose on the SAO. It provides as much guidance to SAOs as possible by including in the web tool the current recommended levels of funding within the administration for the interim years (in this case, fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008). However, the lengthy budget process continues to impede the ability of SAOs and combatant commands to react swiftly to changing realities and emerging challenges in their regions. This is a primary reason why DoD has asked for (and received) from the Congress the authority to “build partner capacity,” as outlined in the fiscal year 2006 *National Defense Authorization Act* (section 1206).




Figure 5. The complete budget cycle for traditional security assistance funding and most other categories of foreign aid. The President’s annual Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) is enacted by the Congress through the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act approximately one year later.

There is no formal DSCA requirement that SAO funding requests for FMF and IMET be identical in both the MPP and the web tool. However, the combatant commands realize the importance of coordinating both efforts and in general are now ensuring that SAO input into both processes is consistent. It should be mentioned that the annual FMF and IMET submission is actually a four-year plan. In this case, the fiscal year 2009 submission is actually for fiscal years 2009 through 2012. In part, this is designed to meet a Congressionally-mandated requirement for a national security assistance strategy.

The final fiscal year 2006 appropriation for FMF, after a one percent rescission, was \$4,464,900,000. Of this amount, Congress earmarked certain amounts to specific countries. These earmarks, as in prior years, were almost entirely for the three Middle East peace partners, specifically, \$2,280,000,000 for Israel, \$1,300,000,000 for Egypt, and \$210,000,000 for Jordan. There were also approximately \$40 million in earmarks for nine other countries, of which \$30 million was for the

Philippines. Even excluding the smaller earmarks, the FMF dedicated by Congress for the big three alone amounts to 84 percent of the total. This means that Colonel Shawkinaugh and the vast majority of his SAO chief counterparts are effectively competing for less than \$700 million of the entire FMF pie.

A word about execution of FMF is appropriate here. For obvious reasons, the SAO should work closely with the host nation to promptly commit FMF monies through the FMS process. The ever-present factor of inflation alone should drive early commitment of funds, under the premise that the same articles and services will almost certainly cost more six months or a year from now. However, the increasing scrutiny of resources at all levels, from the combatant command to the State Department, is also a factor. If the Bandarians “sit” on their FMF for a year or so after its allocation, it will sooner or later make Colonel Shawkinaugh’s job harder to justify continued funding for the Bandarian country program.

To summarize the four processes just discussed, a notional SAO planning calendar is provided below. The timelines indicated are for calendar year 2006.

Event Or Function	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Mission Performance Plan	Assist COM & Country Team with FY 08 MPP (due to State 1 Feb 06)											
Theater Security Cooperation Strategy				Draft (2-star level) COCOM TSCS due to JS by 15 Apr			Final TSCS published by 1 Aug			Assessments of completed TSCS		
FMF & IMET Budget Web Tool	Obtain access to special DSCA web site at https://63.97.161.12/ thru DSCA desk officer. 2005 suspense for SAOs was 18 Nov 2005.			Inter-agency roundtable (COCOMs, DSCA, OSD, State) on FY 08 Request						Submit request for FY 09-14 SA funds (FMF and IMET) to COCOM		
Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP)	Prepare CETPP (Jan – Mar) for FY 2007. Go to http://www.disam.dsca.mil/itm/ and see instructions. Attend COCOM TPMP (Mar – May). Suspenses vary by COCOM											

Figure 6. Notional SAO Planning Calendar. Dates provided are for calendar year 2006.

The Assessment Environment

A decade or so ago, it was not unusual for FMF and/or IMET funding within individual country programs to “cruise” at the same level for a number of years with only casual scrutiny in Washington. For most countries, however, those days are long gone as both the executive branch and the Congress are more closely examining the “bang for the buck” in foreign operations appropriations. Congress has played a key role here through the *Government Accountability and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993*. This law requires most federal agencies, including the Department of State, to complete three plans, which can be summarized as follows:

1. A strategic plan of at least five years in duration. In response to this requirement, Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) produced their Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009, which was referenced above.

2. A performance plan on an annual basis, designed to reflect performance based on the budgetary resources for that year. Performance goals and indicators are to be expressed in an objective and quantifiable manner. The DoS's current performance plan also produced with USAID was published in February 2006 and is titled *Fiscal Year 2007 Joint Performance Summary*. It is on-line at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/2007/>.

3. A performance report, also on an annual basis, which reviews the success of achieving the previous year's performance goals, identifies any causes of failure in meeting those goals, and evaluates the current year's performance plan in light of last year's successes or failures. DoS satisfies this requirement with its *Performance and Accountability Report* (PAR), the most recent (2005) of which can be found at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58402.pdf>.

In its 2005 performance report, DoS rated itself "on target" for all twelve strategic goals, including regional stability and counterterrorism. However, when evaluating the 195 performance indicators supporting the strategic goals, only 78 percent of them were considered "on target" or above. Put differently, 43 performance indicators were rated "below target" or "significantly below target". Additionally, the performance report summarized the results of surveys by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) using its Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). OMB uses this tool to assess all federal programs against performance-related criteria. Of the 39 PART reviews conducted of DoS programs (as of the 2005 performance report), 22 were rated effective, five as moderately effective, and twelve as adequate. All four of the assessments directly involving security assistance were considered effective. An extract of these from the 2005 report is below.

<u>Strategic Goal</u>	<u>State Bureau</u>	<u>Program Name</u>	<u>Score and Rating as of October 2005</u>
Regional Stability	African Affairs	Security Assistance Sub-Saharan Africa	97% – Effective
Regional Stability	South Asian Affairs	Security Assistance	93% – Effective
Regional Stability	Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)	Security Assistance	90% – Effective
Regional Stability	International Organization Affairs	Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities	86% – Effective

In its 2007 performance plan, DoS identified seven initiatives and programs under its strategic goal of regional stability. Of these, two were directly related to security assistance. The first of these focused on the number of foreign military personnel receiving training under the IMET program and the second on U.S. military training for African units deployed in peacekeeping operations.

Separately, the geographic COCOMs have been submitting annual assessments to the OSD annually since 2004. As of 2006, that requirement is extended to the military departments, defense agencies, and the functional combatant commands. All such DoD entities have sixty days after the end of the fiscal year to submit a report to OSD. These assessments are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of their security cooperation functions and activities, help shape the future use of

resources for maximum effectiveness, and lastly identify constraints that can be fixed by changes in law and/or policy.

The point of this discussion is to emphasize that, whether at the global, regional, or country level, the degree of oversight of foreign operations programs is steadily increasing. The lesson for Colonel Shawkinaugh is that his plans for utilizing FMF, IMET, and other appropriations and resources must be well-justified, fully coordinated with the host nation, and fully supported by both the ambassador and the combatant commander.

From their first days in uniform, military personnel are taught the importance of teamwork. SAO personnel in particular, who work largely in small offices, understand this concept. But the transient nature of personnel serving in SAO billets, the lengthy timelines associated with budget processes, and the complex nature of equipping and training any military organization all combine to add a new dimension to teamwork for the SAO. The SAO team includes those U.S. personnel who have not yet been identified for the assignment, or perhaps not yet even promoted to the appropriate grade, and who will not arrive in Bandaria for another two, three, or five years. Only by carefully following the planning processes described here, and working closely with counterparts, will Colonel Shawkinaugh ensure the continued success of the SAO team.

About the Author

Mr. Gary Taphorn is an assistant professor at DISAM and a retired U.S. Army officer. He previously served in two security assistance offices and currently manages the Security Cooperation Officer Overseas (SCM-O) course.