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# Providing Tools For Victory In The Third World

By

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In January 1987, President Reagan approved a United States National Security Strategy paper addressing low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the Third World. This initiative establishes security assistance as the principal military instrument for meeting U.S. objectives in low intensity conflict. Since this strategy also seeks to avoid committing U.S. combat troops, the success of U.S. supported combat operations in the Third World hinges on the capabilities of the military forces of countries we support. In turn, the types and amount of materiel we supply to indigenous forces will determine how successful the joint effort will be in meeting U.S. national security objectives.

Today the U.S. military has, at best, a marginal ability to effectively execute national strategy through support provided to Third World countries involved in counterinsurgency operations. Four major impediments work against U.S. military efforts to provide assistance designed to combat insurgencies: restrictive U.S. legislation on security assistance, perceived U.S. strategic interests, technological incompatibilities, and our insistence on "Americanizing" both problems and solutions. These four interrelated barriers have the potential to render our military assistance efforts largely irrelevant to the struggles of Third World nations.

We need to challenge the current process of applying conventional U.S. military solutions to Third World conflict, focusing instead on how we can provide the proper tools so those we support can win *their* war.

The term "low-intensity conflict" is subject to widely varying interpretations. The type of low-intensity conflict addressed in this article concerns an internal insurgency that is in, or has the potential of entering, the guerrilla warfare stage. The article deals with situations in which the United States Government (USG) is furnishing assistance to a government(s) involved in counterinsurgency operations. This assistance to another government's counterinsurgency efforts is called Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

The term "Third World," often associated with low-intensity conflict, also deserves clarification because it is often used to describe countries with widely varying characteristics. In this discussion, Third World nations are countries characterized by severely limited industrial, technological, economic, and political development. Countries such as Korea and Turkey are too sophisticated to be addressed by this article, while Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and Sudan provide examples of countries which meet the basic criteria.

The tools needed by Third World militaries are not necessarily the same highly sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons and support systems that would be used if U.S. troops were committed. The countries we choose to support will have a much better chance of defeating insurgencies if the U.S. logistical system can provide efficient, simple, and affordable equipment that is easily and economically operated and maintained. At present, such support is not readily available from the U.S. logistical system, and will not be until we overcome the barriers we have erected, and assign both the responsibility and budget to a single point within the Department of Defense for developing FID-unique equipment.

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## COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

The strategy advocated to defeat insurgencies depends upon the U.S.-assisted government providing essential services to its population. The most basic of these activities--personal security--is essential in developing the loyalty that ultimately serves to undercut and defeat the insurgency. To provide wide-ranging security, the assisted government's primary need is the means to reach its population. It follows that one of the best ways for the U.S. to support a Third World nation would be to supply simple aircraft systems that can reach all segments of the affected population while also increasing the combat power of government forces. Such "low-tech" aircraft would provide two-pronged support for the counterinsurgency strategy. Methods and procedures for furnishing FID aircraft, discussed below, could be adopted to also provide naval and land systems.

Systems designed specifically for use in counterinsurgency operations are essential, simply because much of what we can presently provide is not appropriate in a Third World setting. What will be available in the future will be even less suitable as our technology continues to grow more sophisticated. Forces facing guerrillas need air and ground mobility and signal equipment they can take with them. The equipment provided must operate without a sophisticated logistical and maintenance infrastructure.

U.S. and allied industrial bases are capable of providing alternatives to our highly sophisticated weapon and support systems. Providing Third World forces with such systems would be an immediate boon. Although most of these systems might have only marginal utility for U.S. Special Operations forces, they undoubtedly would be well received by Third World armies. In supporting Third World forces it is better to spend \$3 million on 30 aircraft that can be used in a counterinsurgency environment rather than on three F-5s that cannot be kept airworthy because of limited national resources.

The real challenge in this issue is to overcome our prejudices and implement a non-traditional solution that is not tied to conventional U.S. military methods of operation.

## LEGISLATIVE BARRIERS

Congress has enacted laws for security assistance that affect our ability to achieve U.S. national strategy objectives. Our Security Assistance and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) laws serve primarily to support NATO allies and other advanced countries that are not confronted with the problems unique to the Third World. Because these laws deal with technology transfer, financial considerations, and other issues germane to relationships with better developed nations, they constrain our support alternatives throughout the Third World. The laws often prevent simple and inexpensive solutions to problems unique to combatting insurgents. For example, many Third World nations desperately need short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft. However, we cannot develop it for them because this type of aircraft is not in the USAF inventory, and R&D funds cannot be spent for systems other than those intended for U.S. forces.

In addition to legislative impediments, Congressional priorities sometimes work against national security interests with respect to LIC. For instance, due to a valid concern over financial matters involving Third World indebtedness to U.S. banks, Congress passed the Brooke-Alexander Amendment. This legislation requires that any country which is in arrears in excess of one year on any foreign assistance loan (including its FMS-financed loans) shall not receive any further assistance authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act until the arrearage is brought under the one-year point. Peru, which is fighting a communist insurgency, cannot always pay its bills. As a result of Brooke-Alexander, the U.S. was forced to cut off aid without regard to other factors affecting U.S. interests. It is obviously not in the U.S. interest to have Peru's insurgency prevail;

however; because of U.S. legislation concerning financial matters, we run the risk of hindering Peru's counterinsurgency efforts and impede our own national security strategy.

As seen in Figure 1, most of the financial support in the various security assistance programs (63.8 percent) goes to Egypt and Israel, while Guatemala and Morocco (both of whom are engaged in counterinsurgency operations) together receive only 2 percent of the total. Whatever future assistance we provide throughout the Third World is going to have to be based on relatively inexpensive equipment if our friends are to acquire enough systems to make a difference.

**FIGURE 1**

<b>Major Security Assistance Recipients, Fiscal Year '88*</b> (Dollars in Millions)			
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Total Country Program</u>	<u>Percent of FY88 Program</u>
1	Israel	\$3,000.00	37.40
2	Egypt	2,116.50	26.40
3	Turkey	525.30	6.60
4	Pakistan	480.82	6.00
5	Greece	344.10	4.30
6	Philippines	301.60	3.80
7	El Salvador	271.50	3.40
8	Honduras	126.20	1.60
9	Portugal	116.55	1.50
10	Costa Rica	90.14	1.10
11	Guatemala	87.15	1.09
12	Morocco	73.00	0.91
13	Thailand	50.65	0.63
14	Jordan	45.18	0.56
15	Tunisia	40.30	0.50
16	Somalia	31.50	0.10

\* Includes FMSCR, MAP, IMET, and ESF appropriations totalling \$8,017.16 million

Congress has passed legislation dealing with issues involving NATO, protection of U.S. industry, and other priorities that focus attention on the concerns of the U.S. and its major allies, rather than on Third World concerns. Overcoming these legislative barriers, and focusing on the unique needs of the Third World will require new legislation authorizing the waiver of certain legislative prohibitions and the establishment of a single central point within the Department of Defense (DOD) to test and develop FID-unique equipment and systems.

## **U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS**

The Third World is not generally perceived as being as important to U.S. strategic interest as Europe or the Middle East. Because of the larger threat to vital U.S. interests, the U.S. military, like Congress, focuses on the concerns of NATO and other major allies. Properly, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assigns more importance to being prepared to fight the big wars that might have to be fought by U.S. forces than to preparation for the little wars being fought by Third World militaries.

The emphasis has considerable impact on the re-supply priority Third World nations receive in the Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS), the system that determines re-supply priorities in peace and war. Two factors determine a particular country's or organization's priority under UMMIPS: the Force Activity Designator (FAD) I-V, and the Urgency of Need (UND) Designator. The FAD is assigned by the JCS and the UND is assigned by the requesting country/organization. The two combined translate into a supply priority from 1 to 15.

UNIFORM MILITARY MOVEMENT AND ISSUE PRIORITY SYSTEM (UMMIPS)						
	FAD	I	II	III	IV	V
UND	A	01	02	03	07	08
	B	04	05	06	09	10
	C	11	12	13	14	15

The JCS assigns a country its FAD on the basis of that country's importance to U.S. security interests. Third world nations usually receive FAD III, IV or V, reflecting an honest appraisal of their perceived relative importance to the U.S. These nations respond by using an "A" UND on many, if not most, of their re-supply requisitions in an effort to secure as high a priority as possible. As the chart shows, a FAD IV with an "A" UND results in a 07 priority. Such a priority does not result in swift action within the U.S. logistical system. The overuse of the "A" UND also makes it extremely difficult for logistical personnel to identify truly urgent requirements.

The FAD system has a major flaw in that it does not give credit for ongoing combat operations. Foreign Military Sales is a peacetime system for the orderly transfer of military equipment and there are limited provisions for converting to a wartime footing for selected countries. The only way we can compensate for the effects of combat is to upgrade a particular country's FAD or to waive selected policies. FAD upgrade is becoming less useful for supporting the Third World because the systems they fly are usually obsolete, or are rapidly becoming so, and the required parts are not available within Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) stocks. This shortfall can be addressed with contractor support for nonstandard aircraft (aircraft that are no longer, or which never were, in the USAF inventory.)

The emphasis placed on supporting major allies who would fight with us in a big war is prudent, given the potential costs to U.S. interests if a major military engagement were to be lost. What is not prudent is our inability to deal effectively with the host of current and potential little wars. While it may be true that there is no catastrophic cost to U.S. interests if a government we support loses a small conflict, the collective effect of several regional losses could be devastating. As the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's 1986 Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Final Report pointed out: "Yet, without understanding and a national commitment (to fighting little wars), the United States faces the slow but steady whittling away of its international posture until it is without effective response." The long-term challenge to vital U.S. strategic interests is not only in threats to NATO and major allies--we can be outflanked and defeated on the periphery without ever engaging in the "big war."

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## TECHNOLOGICAL INCOMPATIBILITY

Our technology has outstripped the Third World's needs and capabilities. In an age when U.S. military forces have difficulty supporting the sophisticated systems we need for the high-intensity battlefield, we shouldn't expect a Third World nation to tie up its scarce technological expertise supporting sophisticated military systems. It makes better sense to use our high-technology know-how to develop simple, easily supported and maintained systems that the Third World countries can afford to acquire and operate.

U.S. military support and weapon systems are generally sophisticated, expensive, and require technically skilled operators as they are designed to defeat a sophisticated threat. The U.S. military can afford these systems and has the required skilled operators and maintenance personnel to make them effective. Third world nations, even if they could afford these highly sophisticated systems, do not have the numbers of technologically competent personnel needed to operate and maintain them. The utility of sophisticated U.S. systems in a counterinsurgency environment is also questionable.

For years we have provided Third World military forces with hand-me-down systems as they are phased out of the U.S. inventory. Today, even some obsolete Western systems are too sophisticated and expensive to be effectively employed by Third World military forces.

## AMERICANIZATION

In dealing with Third World nations, the U.S. "overseers" tend to assume that our solutions will solve their problems. Generally, we are culturally reluctant to accept the premise that American solutions are not universally applicable. When assisting developing countries, we are often accused of attempting to impose U.S. methods of operation on militaries unprepared to accept such methods. As an example, the U.S. government's solution to a lack of computers in the Third World (to interface with the U.S. logistical system) has been to have the concerned country purchase computers. This often causes frustration because computer systems and knowledge to interpret computer products are not always a first priority for those fighting for survival. An officer from El Salvador put it this way: "Are foreign supply officers to use part of their inadequate funds on computers so that they may then use what is left to buy a portion of what they needed in the first place?"

Much of the "Americanization" mental set is the result of how the U.S. military thinks about low-intensity conflict. This mental set has led to a major conceptual error on the part of many U.S. planners in the core question being asked by U.S. personnel interested in, and planning for, low-intensity conflict in the Third World. The core question being asked is: "How can we fight/win this war?" This question leads to "Americanized" solutions that involve U.S. conventional equipment and doctrine that have often proven inappropriate for this type of war.

The proper core question should be, "Whose war is it?" If this core question is put forth, an entirely different set of doctrinal, tactical, logistical, training, and associated needs becomes evident. The war will be won or lost by the Third World forces we support. U.S. support must consider all the unique needs of a country's environment and culture, and be tailored to meet its requirements and capabilities.

This problem is not unique to the U.S. The Soviets have had little success in dealing with Third World insurgencies. In supporting the government of Ethiopia against the rebels in the province of Eritrea, the Soviets have provided hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and advanced fighter bombers, including MiG-23s. Russian Generals have planned massive offensives in which more than 100,000 Ethiopian soldiers have participated. The Eritrean rebels

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consistently defeat these massive attacks. The Soviets are beginning to learn that what worked on the way to Berlin in 1945 doesn't work in the Africa of the 1980s.

## THE FUTURE

We can achieve a significant improvement in the counterinsurgency capabilities of governments we choose to support by making the relatively small investment needed to develop FID-unique equipment. However, development of equipment specifically designed for use by other nations is not, at the present time, a priority.

If Chadian forces can defeat Libyan tanks from pickup trucks, the possibilities for innovative thinking are virtually limitless. But before the U.S. military can sponsor testing and development of equipment specifically designed for use by other nations, the legislative impediments discussed earlier must be overcome. Even if this happens, unless FID-unique systems, supporting materiel, and services become a priority project of a designated organization within the U.S. military establishment, the disparate, disjointed effort will be, at best, wasteful, and at worst, will go for naught.

What is missing is an entity within DOD that has the charter to define needs and test proposals to meet the unique equipment needs of the Third World. This organizational entity would have to combine expertise on small wars, and intimate knowledge of the country concerned, with exacting knowledge of the security assistance system. Such an entity does not now exist, nor is one likely to be developed independent of currently existing organizations. However, the key for using security assistance in the future to support our national strategy on LIC in the Third World is to use the existing infrastructure within DOD to meet the Third World's unique needs. Proper coordination within the existing DOD organizational structure can result in our developing the ability to deliver the right systems to the right place and at the right price to meet the needs of those we support.

## ROLES

At present, all of what is needed to develop such an infrastructure is in place. We have unified commands which are familiar with the problems of Third World militaries in their respective areas of responsibility. Over the past forty years we have developed a viable and effective security assistance system that can deliver required equipment of any type to any country. In addition, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the capability to develop the organizational expertise needed to support those engaged in little wars. These organizations could interface and provide the U.S. military services with the ability to meet the challenges of support for Third World militaries.

The Unified Commands' role would be to define (in coordination with concerned countries) the needs of those countries within their areas of responsibility having requirements for FID-unique equipment. For instance, the problem might involve removing wounded. Instead of ordering an expensive, difficult to maintain helicopter to perform this function, they might re-define requirements to state that Country X needs a simple, inexpensive aircraft requiring low pilot skills to carry at least two litter patients 50 miles in no more than 30 minutes, and should not cost more than \$50,000 a copy. A basic premise of this proposed system is that American industry can, and will, produce anything if there's a profit in it. For instance, an autogyro also could be used to meet the above requirements.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) would serve two vital functions in a system to provide FID-unique systems. They would act as a broker of information and control the

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budget for developing and testing these systems. The need to test is based on a belief that it would be wrong to provide FID-unique systems to a country involved in combat operations without any prior system testing. The counterpoint to this argument is that the country buying the equipment should pay for testing. This leads to a major dilemma faced by those charged with assisting Third World nations: countries who can afford the testing generally don't need the equipment; those needing the equipment can't afford the testing. This is one case where a little money up front can greatly increase our effectiveness in supporting our national security strategy for LIC in the Third World. The initial DSAA budget for such testing would not have to be very large (several million dollars should be adequate) to meet testing costs. In the initial setting up of this system it may be necessary to forego formal testing if funding is not made available. A short-term solution to the lack of such testing would be to accept applicable international or United States civil standards for FID-unique systems. Meeting U.S. military specifications is definitely unnecessary.

The role of DSAA as an information broker would consist of an office in its Weapon Systems Division to notify industry that they will accept proposals for U.S. manufactured FID-unique military equipment. These proposals, including production capabilities, would be provided to Security Assistance Organizations (SAO) in booklet form which would be updated periodically. The SAO would be authorized, under Unified Command supervision, to inform nations involved in LIC of what was available to meet their needs. [Editor's note: The Director, DSAA, in a 10 January 1989 Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operation/Low-Intensity Conflict) (I-88-19082) initiated action for the development of a catalogue of Non-Standard U.S. Manufactured Equipment.]

Once a country has expressed interest in an item, a decision would have to be made concerning whether to buy the equipment off the shelf, as is, or to test the item prior to sales. If testing is selected, the costs associated with that testing would be paid by funding provided to DSAA for that purpose. DSAA would not actually supervise the testing; that task would best fall to USSOCOM.

USSOCOM would also serve two functions in this infrastructure. They would supervise testing of FID-unique equipment under DSAA sponsorship, and provide training on that equipment when contractor support or internal capabilities were not available. The USSOCOM is assigned responsibilities under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act to support FID efforts and it could provide valuable support to the regional commands. DSAA is not going to develop expertise on fighting little wars and the regional commands, while interested in supporting friendly Third World countries involved in LIC, are primarily interested in conventional warfare. They do not have the resources to train on FID-unique systems. It is also necessary to develop some corporate knowledge and depth in the U.S. military's ability to support/fight these little wars. The logical place to do so is at the USSOCOM.

Having the authorization and budget to develop and test FID-unique systems is needed for the future. Such authorization would enable us to provide singularly effective equipment for counterinsurgency operations. Before any entity within DOD can sponsor the development of unique FID items, the sections of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act concerning integration with service programs, and "at no cost to the USG" must be waived for this class of items.

It should be noted that these recommendations would not affect the vast majority of security assistance programs. Even in FID-unique cases, the financial management structure of the FMS programs would remain exactly the same as it is now. All that is needed is to exempt the relatively small cost of developing and testing FID-unique items so we can provide the simple, inexpensive systems needed to combat insurgencies in the Third World.

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DSAA, in conjunction with the Regional Commands and USSOCOM could be an effective source of the types of equipment that no other U.S. military entity is chartered to develop. Once the Regional Command defines requirements, DSAA could sponsor the development and testing of a prototype FID-unique item (selected aircraft would be tested by Air Force Systems Command), with USSCOM evaluating its usefulness for LIC operations in other theaters. If further production is feasible, the item could be purchased through FMS channels like any other piece of nonstandard equipment. Logistical support for FID-unique equipment could be provided through a new Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) program initiative--Nonstandard Items Parts and Repair Support (NIPARS)--which manages nonstandard items. Provisions for such logistical support by AFLC will be in effect by October 1989. [See further discussion of NIPARS provided in a separate section which follows.]

## FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) UNIQUE SYSTEMS

There is virtually no end to the types of systems that could be proposed for use in the Third World. American Industry can meet the Third World's needs by providing systems that are competitive in the Third World markets. Although the following discussion covers aircraft, there are many other possibilities for naval and ground forces.

Let us begin the discussion with a conventional aircraft. Today the *Tucano* T-27 of Brazilian manufacture [Embraer] is one of the hottest selling combination trainers and light attack aircraft in the Third World. The U.S. has nothing comparable to offer and loses whatever political benefits that providing such systems to a Third World government generate. The Arocet Development Company of Arlington, Washington, is developing an AT-9 aircraft based on the Glasiar Kit aircraft that has the potential of providing the U.S. with competition for the *Tucano*. The AT-9 will, according to the developer, have a top speed of 380 miles per hour, climb at close to 4,000 feet per minute, have a range of over 1300 nautical miles, have a useful load of 1200 pounds, and will take off over a 50 foot obstacle in 875 feet. This aircraft, except for its useful load (400 pounds less than the *Tucano*), outperforms the *Tucano* in all areas at a much lower price. The AT-9 is projected to cost between \$600,000-\$800,000 per copy, whereas the *Tucano* costs over \$1.2 million per aircraft.

An inexpensive, Lightly Armed Surveillance Aircraft (LASA), that could provide aerial reconnaissance and light fire support for ground operations is another example of an urgent need that now cannot be met. Such an aircraft would have little, if any, utility on the high-intensity battlefield; consequently this low-order weapons technology will not be sponsored within the conventional U.S. military without a patron concerned with meeting FMS unique needs. U.S. industry has systems that probably already fulfill many Third World requirements without the need for new developmental funding.

The development of drone technology has resulted in several manufacturers proposing putting pilots into derivatives of drones and arming them with missiles and/or guns. These modified drones could meet the LASA requirements. An example is the Sadler A-22 produced by the Sadler Aircraft Corporation of Scottsdale, Arizona. The A-22, according to the developer, is based on a proven aircraft design from Australia, can be carried in the rear of a 2-1/2 ton truck (with wings folded), takes off in 300 feet, has a bullet-proof pilots pod, runs on regular gas, and is powered by a modified Chevrolet V-6 engine that is turbo-charged and water-cooled. It has two wing-mounted 7.62mm machine guns and can carry up to 1000 pounds of stores. Its service ceiling is projected to be 18,000 feet with a top speed of 225 mph. This aircraft is projected to cost approximately \$80,000 each. A foreign Air Force is already engaged in negotiations on a commercial sale which may allow them to co-produce this aircraft. They intend to use the A-22 as a LASA, Forward Air Control (FAC), and anti-helicopter platform.

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The Applied Technology Division of Litton Electronic Warfare System Group is now testing a low-cost, high-performance composite drone/piloted test-bed aircraft incorporating the latest in electronic/radar devices. The test-bed aircraft is capable of carrying a wide variety of electronics to perform signals intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance, weapons targeting and delivery, electronic warfare, and other missions. The follow-on aircraft to this test-bed model will feature a larger engine, the standard 160hp Lycoming engine. Performance will be in the 200 mph range with approximately seven hours endurance at 65 percent power. Without electronics or armament, it will cost about \$75,000. A fully remoted aircraft with all options, could cost up to \$800,000. Several of these aircraft have been sold already to Middle-Eastern countries.

Drone derivatives are not the only potential sources to address the Third Worlds needs. There has been a resurgence in interest in autogyro technology, which a number of companies are exploring. One of these companies, Wind Ryder of Boulder Colorado, is developing a two-seat autogyro based on 1930s technology enhanced by computer design and modern composite materials. This aircraft will take off in less than 150 feet (depending on wind) and can carry two people. It will be powered by a standard Lycoming turbo-charged engine which is in widespread use throughout the Third World. Its utility as a Third World liaison and medical evacuation aircraft should be explored by personnel with FID experience. The autogyro requires low pilot skills and due to its low cost (under \$50,000) it would be an economical way to get medical, agricultural, and relief personnel out into the villages which are not accessible by road.

Another concept worth examining is a unique twin-engine STOL transport aircraft, built by the Skytrader Corporation, that may have great utility in the Third World. This fully instrumented aircraft has been designed from the ground up to be capable of operating in austere environments without support equipment. The power plant is the French *Turbomeca* which is built in cooperation with Rolls Royce Aircraft. This transporter, which costs \$3.5 million fully equipped, would be of great value in re-supplying the "bush" as it can operate from 500-foot unimproved runways, or waterways when fitted with pontoons. It is a fully capable para-drop platform for aerial re-supply or delivering paratroopers. A recent modification includes the installation of 30 mm cannons and a Forward-looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), which will permit nighttime gunship operations. The Philippines Air Force has recognized the value of this aircraft in meeting its counterinsurgency and nation building missions and have contracted to co-produce 50 to 75 of these aircraft in the Philippines.

Each of these systems has the advantage of being relatively inexpensive, easy to maintain, and simple to operate. Each is within the technological capabilities of the Third World and requires little in the way of sophisticated support.

The United Kingdom (UK) electronics company, MEL, has successfully demonstrated that a market exists for easy-to-operate equipment. In the late 1970s, MEL decided to respond to the specific communications needs of the Third World with a High Frequency (HF) radio designed to satisfy the performance and maintenance requirements of its intended users. This new HF radio, designated CALLPAC, was also designed with consideration given to the widely varying skill levels of its intended operators. CALLPAC designers disregarded UK and NATO operational requirements in their efforts to develop a suitable radio for Third World users.

Early on, MEL realized that CALLPAC would have to incorporate very advanced technology in order to produce radios that were simple to operate and maintain, and which fit into the constrained budgets of their intended users. The system also had to be operationally flexible and suitable for manpack, vehicular, and base station use.

During the Falklands campaign, British soldiers used some pre-production CALLPAC models during their combat operations. Their after-action reports praised the radio's performance and voice clarity; their few recommended improvements were subsequently incorporated into

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CALLPAC before the first production run. The result is a completely self-contained radio station that serves as a basic building block for a network that can include radios mounted in fighting vehicles, river patrol boats, fast patrol boats, or military and police vehicles. The ability to quickly convert a 100-Watt boat or vehicle radio into a 20-Watt manpack is one of the reasons CALLPAC is now in service with six African nations.

## **NONSTANDARD ITEM PARTS AND REPAIR SUPPORT (NIPARS)**

Once appropriate systems are developed and fielded, the next major stumbling block to using low-order non-standard systems is logistical support. This can be provided by the Air Force's new Nonstandard Item Parts and Repair Support (NIPAR) concept.

NIPARS is a new concept in logistical service that has as its basic premise the idea that it is more effective and economical to contract out FMS item management for nonstandard aircraft and equipment than to attempt to perform the service using Air Force resources. Under the NIPARS contract, the U.S. Air Force's Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) International Logistics Center (ILC) will integrate activities of the contractor operating NIPARS into the ILC's standardized computerized Security Assistance Management Information System (SAMIS). This will allow the contractor to respond to requisitions for nonstandard parts while updating the present security assistance computer system. The NIPARS contractor will be responsible for providing logistical support for the approximately 1600 non-standard aircraft AFLC now services. It would be a relatively simple matter to expand the NIPARS to include FID-unique items, since these items are by definition nonstandard, and contracting out logistical support makes economic sense. For the re-supply of FID-unique items, the ILC would deal with a civilian contractor instead of current Air Force sources of supply. As far as the user is concerned, the USAF would still be in charge, as all requisitions will go through the ILC, and the Air Force will supervise the NIPARS contractor performance. This would continue one of the traditions that makes U.S. systems desirable in the Third World--reliable long-term follow-on logistical support. To win the NIPARS contract, contractors could be required to support FID-unique items.

Although the NIPARS contract can be expanded beyond simple item management, one of the basic tenets of the FID-unique systems concept is that the systems will be simple and not greatly modified. The goal should be that any competent tool and die, electronics, aircraft engine, etc., manufacturer could produce parts for a basic FID-unique system.

The NIPARS contract method of supporting FID-unique items has the added advantage of being integrated with the current security assistance accounting and authority networks. Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC) financial accounting requirements would be met through the ILC maintaining the same accounting procedures for NIPARS transactions as it does for other FMS transactions. Each of the current decision-making bodies (HQ USAF/PRI, DSAA, State) would remain in place without any lessening of their influence or power. NIPARS is programmed to go into effect by October 1989.

## **OPTIMIZING EFFORTS**

If the United States military establishment is going to carry out its responsibilities under the President's U.S. National Security Strategy, we must adapt our systems to Third World needs and capabilities. Equipment and systems used to support conventional U.S. forces are not going to meet the needs of our Third World allies into the 21st century. We must be able to develop and supply the simple, inexpensive systems needed for tomorrow's wars against insurgencies in the Third World.

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Developing such systems will require providing a single focal point within DOD with the authority and the budget to sponsor such system development. The Defense Security Assistance Agency, supported by the Unified Commands, as well as the United States Special Operations Command, are logical choices to do this. DSAA has the charter to support worldwide security assistance efforts and it maintains established lines of communication with regional commands and foreign countries affected by insurgencies.

We have the ability to provide simple, inexpensive, easily operated and maintained systems that will work throughout the Third World. It is time to organize ourselves to develop and provide these systems in the interest of U.S. national security objectives.

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