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# Collective Security: A First Principle of U.S. National Security Strategy

By

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## COLLECTIVE SECURITY

One of the first principles of our security strategy is to maintain vigorous alliance relationships that promote forward defense of the United States and collectively maintain peace with freedom through strength.

The United States currently is party to seven formal alliances:

- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance;
- The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance (although U.S. obligations to New Zealand are suspended as a result of New Zealand's decision to ban U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear capable ships from its ports);
- The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan;
- The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea;
- The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines;
- The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (which remains in effect with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, France, and the United Kingdom); and
- The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty).

In addition to these alliances, the United States maintains defense agreements and less formal arrangements with a number of other nations.

The alliance structure has succeeded because the United States and its allies share common political, economic, and security interests. The United States must continue to reaffirm the alliance policies that have kept it and its allies free and secure for 40 years. As we face new challenges, we must maintain our leadership role, since we are the only free power currently capable of responding to aggression in global terms. But in fulfilling that role, we will depend more than in the past on our allies to share the crucial responsibilities of our mutual defense.

As the United States seeks to maintain the vitality of its alliances, there are several major issues that must be addressed squarely. These include sharing the mutual responsibility for the common defense, international armaments cooperation, overseas basing, and security assistance.

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## SHARING THE MUTUAL DEFENSE BURDEN

Even as events unfold in a rapidly changing Europe, at the heart of American concerns about sharing the responsibility for the defense of free Europe is the continuing need to maintain NATO's deterrent and defense capabilities. Currently, our European allies (excluding France and Spain, whose forces are not integrated into the NATO command structure) provide the majority of the forces and equipment deployed in Western Europe. Many of our allies make an important contribution to the common defense by providing us base access free of charge.

The United States seeks to concentrate on providing capabilities for which U.S. forces have a comparative advantage and to avoid duplication of effort with and among our allies.

Accordingly, we are urging our allies to:

- Meet force goals, especially those highlighted in the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI);
- Improve sustainability (that is, the number of days of supply of war reserve stocks, munitions, petroleum products, and other basic supplies);
- Improve the readiness and efficiency of forces allocated to NATO; and
- Support long-term defense planning based on rationalization and division of labor, reserves, and mobilization capabilities and common and joint funding opportunities.

Our Asian allies also contribute substantially to the common defense. Japan provides the United States with bases at no cost to the U.S. at the most critical geostrategic location in Northeast Asia. In recent years, it has increased its share of the mutual defense responsibility, and now provides about 40 percent of the cost of stationing U.S. forces on its territory. Recently, the Japanese government agreed to fund approximately 50 percent of the total cost of Japanese labor employed on American bases in Japan. In addition, Japan now spends some \$30 billion a year on defense, which is roughly equivalent to the individual French, British, and West German defense budgets. But Japan should do even more in the area of cost sharing and in improving the quality and sustainability of its current forces.

The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea and the presence of U.S. forces in that country have sustained deterrence on the Korean peninsula for almost four decades and continue to contribute significantly to regional peace and stability. Korea's contributions to the alliance are substantial; its annual defense expenditures are slightly under 5 percent of GNP. In addition, Korea funds aircraft depot maintenance and the cost of maintaining war reserve stocks, contributes to theater communications, and supports military construction projects. During the 21st Security Consultative Meeting between the U.S. and South Korean governments in July 1989, both nations reiterated their commitment to retaining U.S. troops in Korea as long as the U.S. and Korean governments and people want them there. The Republic of Korea currently contributes approximately \$300 million per year out of its cash budget to offset the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in the Republic.

## INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS COOPERATION

The United States is making substantial progress in increasing cooperative weapon development programs with its allies. By promoting standardization and interoperability of weaponry, these programs are critical to allied effectiveness. They also reduce redundant expenditures. The Department of Defense considers cooperative opportunities to be an integral part of

major U.S. acquisition decisions, and NATO and Japan are moving toward integrating cooperative programs into their armaments planning systems.

Since 1985, the Congress has provided funds specifically for cooperative research, development, and testing efforts with NATO and non-NATO allies. One of these initiatives—the Cooperative R&D Program—is aimed at bringing coordination to the NATO nations’ otherwise separate programs for developing and building arms, thereby improving NATO’s conventional military strength. U.S. industry receives an important benefit from the requirement to spend U.S. funds allocated to these projects entirely in the United States on American-produced goods and services. The advantages to the United States and its allies, in addition to improved military effectiveness, can be considerable, including reduced R&D costs, improved access to technology, and eventual economies of mass productions. The program has proved successful, and our allies have signed memorandums of understanding committing them to pay approximately 60 percent of the cost shares of the associated research and development projects. Table 1 provides details on these projects.

**TABLE 1**  
**Cooperative Projects with Signed Agreements**  
**and Associated Burdensharing Ratios**

	United States Share (Percentage)
Ada Project Support Environment	43.7
Multifunctional Information Distribution System	28.0
NATO Identification System	46.5
Airborne Radar Demonstration System	38.0
Advanced Short-Takeoff/Vertical-Landing Technology	50.0
Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability Aircraft	65.5
Surface Ship Torpedo Defense	50.0
Post 2000 Tactical Area Communications	16.7
Hawk Mobility Enhancement	50.0
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System	50.0
LINK-11 Improvements	12.5
RPV Multimission Optronic Stabilized Payload	50.0
Total Cost Shares for MOUs Signed to Date—US:	40.0
	Allied 60.0

## OVERSEAS BASING

Executing effectively the strategy of forward defense is an important priority. Foreign bases enhance deterrence, contribute to regional stability, allow U.S. forces to reduce their response time in meeting threats, and enable the United States to implement its defense strategy in a more cost-effective manner.


Although many countries in which U.S. forces are stationed have sought increased foreign aid in exchange for basing rights, the United States does not view foreign assistance as "rent" or compensation for base access, but rather as one element of U.S. participation in mutual defense efforts with its allies. There are, of course, clear fiscal limits to what the United States can provide. If mutually satisfactory arrangements cannot be achieved with various countries hosting U.S. forces currently, the United States must be prepared to make alternative arrangements.

## SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security assistance to friendly foreign countries is an important part of our national security policy. It helps friends and allies deter aggression or defend themselves against external threats and enhances coalition defense by providing the additional resources needed to shoulder the common defense burden. Current U.S. security assistance priorities focus on encouraging peace in the Middle East, assisting our friends and allies in self-defense, contributing to mutual defense arrangements in which host governments in turn contribute, and aiding foreign drug-interdiction efforts.

There are two major components of our military assistance program: Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMSF), which provides direct credits or grants for the purchase of U.S. military goods and services; and International Military Education and Training (IMET), which is a low-cost, grant aid program that provides military education and training in the United States to approximately 6,000 foreign military personnel each year. The IMET program is one of the most cost-effective foreign policy tools of the U.S. government. Investing in the military education and training of military personnel from friendly countries greatly enhances the capability of those countries to defend themselves, at a lost cost to the American taxpayer.

**CHART 1**  
**Military Assistance Funding and Congressional Earmarks**  
**FY 1982—FY 1990**



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Unfortunately, resource constraints and Congressional earmarking of funds have made it difficult to fashion a security assistance program of sufficient size and with proper focus to protect and advance our security interests. Funding for FMSF has decreased by over 26 percent since FY 1984, while the percentage of funds earmarked by the Congress for a few favored programs has increased from 49 percent to 92 percent. Consequently, FMS funding available to non-earmarked countries has declined by over 90 percent since FY 1984, thus severely limiting our flexibility to address the security needs of numerous friendly governments. Chart 1 illustrates these trends.

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