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# The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress

By

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and  
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[The following article is an expanded version of a report originally prepared by the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Department of State for presentation on 15 February 1990 to the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate. The material added to the original report is included in Appendices A-L which provide supplementary information on the IMET Program.]

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following report addresses questions raised by the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations as to the cost effectiveness, value and impact, and specific accomplishments of IMET (International Military Education and Training), a program which brings military personnel—officer and enlisted—to the U.S. to take courses designed primarily for U.S. military personnel. IMET gives foreign students exposure to U.S. military professionalism within the context of American life and culture.

The Administration takes the view (documented in the following pages) that IMET is an effective, low-cost component of the \$8 billion global U.S. security assistance effort. At the recent level of \$47.4 million per year, the program provides U.S. access to and influences foreign governments far out of proportion to its modest cost. The typical IMET program often costs \$100,000 a year or less; 15 programs cost more than \$1 million, and even the largest is less than \$3.4 million. Over 5,000 students are trained annually from nearly 100 countries. But far more important is the support which IMET provides to U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. For many U.S. Ambassadors or regional military Commanders in Chief, a small IMET program in a particular country has advanced much larger American interests, such as trade and investment, or military or political cooperation.

Members of the Congress have asked whether this education and training effort actually can change attitudes in foreign countries toward such core U.S. concerns as civilian control and human rights. There can be no rigorous proof either supporting or contradicting this proposition. The over 500,000 IMET-trained individuals worldwide come from many different cultures and political traditions. Many specific examples can be cited of military men, IMET-trained and democratically-minded, who have risen to senior positions in their profession while remaining loyal to civilian governments; a few contrary instances can also be found. Clearly, a country's own political traditions and culture are the main determinants of its own evolution, and of the attitudes and conduct of its military leaders. Probably no U.S. aid program, however large, could fundamentally alter such basic realities. On its own modest scale, IMET appears—on the basis of extensive anecdotal evidence—to help the U.S. reach and influence thousands of individuals who ultimately rise to positions of prominence, either in the governments or in the private sectors of their nations.

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In a rapidly-changing world, IMET also must evolve. Significant changes in the program already have begun. Based on consultations with the Congress, programs for a number of "high income" nations (those with an annual per capita Gross National Product above \$2,349) are being reduced, in some cases quite dramatically, or entirely eliminated.

At the same time, the allocation of program resources is taking new directions, in response to a changed global political scene. A major emphasis, in future years, will be on aid to countries which are cooperating with the United States in the global anti-narcotics struggle. Largely focused on the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) under current IMET funding, this effort will be expanded in the future to such areas as the nations of the Eastern Caribbean, the Bahamas, Barbados, Trinidad, and Jamaica. As these examples indicate, the Administration will consult with Congress when national priorities, such as the drug war, make it in the U.S. interest to aid countries in the "high income" category because of inadequate local resources or when other special policy issues must be considered.

At a time of declining defense and foreign aid budgets, IMET advances U.S. objectives on a global scale at a relatively small cost. In many countries, having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with firsthand knowledge of America will make a difference in winning access and influence for our diplomatic and military representatives. Thus, a relatively small amount of IMET funding will provide a return for U.S. policy goals, over the years, far greater than the original investment.

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, has requested this report be prepared as an objective evaluation of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.<sup>1</sup> The report addresses four principal areas identified by the Committee for evaluation: (1) the value and impact of the courses offered through IMET; (2) the specific accomplishments of the program in terms of advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives in the recipient countries; (3) the cost effectiveness of IMET; and (4) whether the program actually changes attitudes about respect for human rights and civilian control of government.

### Program Description

IMET is a component program of the United States Security Assistance Program, and provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly foreign nations. Since 1950, IMET and its predecessor programs have furnished education and training for over 500,000 international military students. [See Appendix A.] Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, identifies three purposes of the IMET program:

(1) to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security;

(2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and

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<sup>1</sup>United States Senate. *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1990*. Report 101-131 of the Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.R. 2939, September 14, 1989, pp. 161-62, 101st Congress, 1st Session.

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(3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

These objectives are achieved through a variety of military education and training activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces for foreign officers, enlisted personnel, and selected defense civilians. These include: formal instruction involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 U.S. military schools and installations; on-the-job training (OJT); observer training (e.g., for foreign medical personnel); orientation tours (for senior military personnel); and limited exported training (e.g., U.S. military teams conducting training in foreign nations). Program emphasis is placed on Professional Military Education (PME) at senior and intermediate U.S. service schools (e.g., war colleges and command and staff colleges). Additionally, since a proficiency in English is essential for all but a few special courses conducted in Spanish for Latin Americans, English language training is provided to those international military students who lack the necessary language qualifications. Also, all students attending a formal military course are exposed to a DOD-managed Informational Program (IP), a specialized activity designed to assist them in acquiring an understanding of U.S. society, institutions, and values, including an awareness of the importance the United States places on the role of the military in a democratic society, and respect for internationally recognized human rights. [See Appendices B-D.]

### **The Value and Impact of IMET**

IMET courses and related activities provide a wide variety of benefits to participating countries as well as to the United States. The program's value may be measured in terms of its important contributions to the enhancement of United States foreign policy objectives, national and collective security, and its direct military benefits. This program, however, has its own objectives and is not intended as a supplement to training funded through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Although there is significant linkage between the two, this section of the report focuses on the foreign policy and military dimensions of the IMET program.

### **The Advancement of U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Objectives.**

Notwithstanding the distinctive and direct military benefits associated with the IMET program, U.S. foreign policy opportunities arising from the program are a primary benefit.

Throughout the years, numerous senior U.S. officials have commented upon the positive influence of former IMET students and the valuable contributions of the relatively modest IMET program to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals. For many U.S. Ambassadors or regional military Commanders in Chief, a small IMET program in a given country has provided the opening for advancing important American interests in trade and investment, military cooperation, diplomatic support in international fora, etc.

In its relations with friendly countries, the U.S. pursues a host of foreign policy objectives associated with American political, economic, social, and security interests throughout the world. IMET has long served such interests directly by providing an increased understanding among foreign militaries of America, with a consequent improvement in mutually beneficial relations. When a foreign country sends its military personnel to be educated and trained by the United States, it casts a vote of confidence in America and its military institutions, and acquires information and insight upon which to base decisions on the desirability of cooperating with the U.S. on political as well as military matters. Personal military-to-military relationships of enduring value are forged in the training environment, as U.S. and foreign military personnel study together and work as a unified team in planning, programming, and decision-making exercises—educational experiences which provide the essential foundation for further cooperation. [See Appendix E.]

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One very important benefit in this regard arises from the various positions of prominence which former IMET students attain in their subsequent careers. During their IMET studies, and as a direct product of their exposure to curricular and extra-curricular activities, such students generally develop highly favorable attitudes toward the United States, expressing an often unabashed admiration for the American people and its culture, values, and institutions. It is unlikely that without such IMET experience such positive attitudes toward the United States would prevail so widely among foreign militaries. Coupled with frequently long-lasting friendships with their American classroom colleagues—friendships which commonly last for years—such students usually retain their favorable dispositions toward the U.S. throughout their subsequent careers, both in and out of the military. Documented data reveal a remarkable career success rate among such former students who have risen to senior policy and decision making positions not only in the military, but also in government, politics, industry, and commerce. In the six-year period, FY 1984-FY 1989, over 1,000 former IMET students held such key positions as heads of state, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, members of parliament, and chief executive officers of leading business enterprises, as well as chiefs of their military services, military commanders, academy superintendents, attachés to major world capitals, and senior NATO military officials. Furthermore, over 1,400 prior IMET students held active duty positions during this same period as general and flag rank officers. [See Table 1, Appendix J.] Such career successes should not be attributed directly to prior participation in IMET, since these individuals undoubtedly were originally selected for IMET in great part because of their already demonstrated skills and talents. (Of course, the successful completion of a U.S. military course enhanced their potential for advancement.) What is important here is that their prominent positions in society furnish them opportunities for inordinate influence upon public policy and foreign relations. Their generally favorable and enduring positive impressions of the United States, therefore, may translate into an advocacy for policies, programs, and positions on issues which are usually in the best interest of the United States.

The educational and training activities sponsored by IMET furnish the militaries of friendly foreign governments and allies a broad selection of instructional programs which are unavailable to them through their own training base or financial resources. Ranging from professional-oriented studies in military management, strategy, and leadership for mid-level and senior officers at PME schools, to technical proficiency courses for officers and enlisted personnel in specific military skill areas, IMET provides foreign militaries access to the gamut of education and training courses available to the U.S. armed forces.

At the same time, the allocation of program resources is taking new directions in response to a changed global political scene. For FY 1990, a number of "high income" countries (i.e., those with an annual per capita GNP above \$2,349), have had their IMET funding reduced, in some cases, quite dramatically, or entirely eliminated. Further funding reductions will occur. However, changing global conditions require that certain high income countries continue to be funded. For example, the Andean nations which are involved in the worldwide counternarcotics struggle, continue to require IMET assistance, and such funding will be expanded in the future to the nations of the Eastern Caribbean, the Bahamas, Barbados, Trinidad, and Jamaica. Thus, the Administration, in consultation with Congress, will respond to new national priorities, such as the drug war, by providing aid to countries in the "high income category" when it is in the U.S. interest to do so, and when local resources or other special policy issues mandate such assistance.

From a military perspective, the principal value of IMET courses is to enhance the military efficiency and effectiveness of the participant nations. Military skills and operational and maintenance capabilities are improved at all levels, thereby promoting self-sufficiency as well as furnishing many of the skills essential to nation building. This in turn, provides a wide range of benefits to the United States in terms of collective security, stability, and peace. As foreign militaries improve their knowledge of U.S. military doctrine and tactics, as well as learn how to operate and sustain U.S. equipment, military cooperation is strengthened. Similarly, opportunities

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for military-to-military communications, information-sharing, joint planning, and combined force exercises, as well as essential requirements for access to foreign military bases and facilities, are notably expanded. IMET fosters important military linkages throughout the world that are essential to preserving the security of our friends and allies, as well as for advancing the global security interests of the United States.

Numerous examples of the military value and effect of the IMET Program can be cited from the experiences and perceptions of U.S. military and other Executive Branch officials, as well as from the statements of members of Congress. A selection of such observations is included in Appendix K. Their views, in summary, support the conclusion that IMET raises professional military competence, substantially enhances the ability of friendly foreign forces to provide for their own security, offers important opportunities for the U.S. to work closely with such forces, and contributes directly to the security of the United States.

### Human Rights

One of the three statutory objectives of the IMET program involves increasing the awareness of international military students of the basic issues of internationally recognized human rights. (Section 543. FAA/61.)

Stimulating and reinforcing such an awareness is a principal purpose of the DOD Informational Program, as previously noted. This program provides human rights awareness through an exposure to U.S. values, contemporary U.S. human rights practices, and the fundamental democratic principle of civilian authority over a nation's military forces. In addition to formal instruction in PME courses, this is accomplished by a wide variety of activities, such as visits and discussions with representatives of local newspapers, radio and television stations, legislative assemblies, and police and court officials. To our knowledge, no other government which provides education and training to foreign militaries places an emphasis on human rights practices which even approaches the attention which the U.S. attaches to this subject in its military schools.

The issue of attitudinal or behavioral change is a different matter. There is no available evidence or quantitative method by which to ascertain whether or not IMET participation can actually effect fundamental changes in the basic orientations of participating international military students. These students are citizens of a wide array of diverse nations, with varying cultures and political practices. Some are representatives of countries with long traditions of democratic government, and with human right policies and practices akin to those of the U.S. In others, especially many of the emerging nations of the Third World, democracy is a relatively new phenomenon which has yet to achieve maturity, particularly with respect to human rights practices. While studying in the U.S., students from these latter countries usually express considerable interest in human rights issues and generally support U.S. human rights policies. But, we have no way of effectively assessing how enduring these attitudes remain upon the students' return to their home countries.

Many such countries lack the professional democratic military ethic that subordinates the military leadership to political authority. The numerous *coup d' etats* in the Third World, and the resultant rise of military governments, often accompanied by frequent severe violations of human rights, attest to the enormity of the challenge of implementing attitudinal or behavioral change. Numerous examples could be cited of former military personnel who participated in IMET programs and subsequently rose to prominent positions in their societies and who have strongly supported and remained loyal to democratic, civilian-controlled governments; but, there are cases where the opposite has occurred. The principal determinants of a nation's political system, and the role of the military in that system, are the product of a nation's political culture—the sum of its social, political, and military traditions, values, and norms. It is not likely that any U.S. assistance

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program, however well-funded and well-intentioned, could by itself effect desired change in the fundamental realities of such a political system. Nevertheless, given the modest resources made available for IMET, the anecdotal evidence provided in Appendix K indicates that the IMET program has enabled the U.S. to reach and influence thousands of military personnel who subsequently have achieved prominent positions in their societies and who have been strong adherents of democratic practices and have remained favorably disposed toward U.S. policies.

### IMET Cost Effectiveness

In comparison to other security assistance programs such as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the Economic Support Fund (ESF), whose annual appropriations each exceed several billion dollars, IMET is a far more modest program. As shown in Table 2, Appendix J, IMET appropriations reached their peak in FY 1985 at \$56.221 million, and since FY 1988 have been at or under \$47.4 million. Despite these relatively small appropriations, IMET reaches out to more countries than any other funded security assistance activity. Currently, nearly 100 countries and over 5,000 of their students participate annually in IMET-sponsored courses. [See Tables 2 and 3, Appendix J.] In many cases, IMET is the only assistance program which the U.S. government furnishes to a particular country.

Concern for cost effectiveness permeates IMET policy and procedure. The *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, DOD 5105.38-M, establishes numerous policy restrictions on the use of IMET funds. For example, high cost training exceeding \$30,000 (associated with flight training, advanced degree programs at military schools, etc.) is only approved on a case-by-case basis. Similar case-by-case approval is also required for funding other activities: Mobile Training Teams (and other such teams); courses less than eight weeks in duration (unless the country is paying for transportation and living allowances); etc. Before such approval is granted, several factors are carefully considered, including the state of development of the host country, the necessity for the requested training, and the balance of a country's overall training program.

State and DOD conduct a detailed planning and programming process for implementing annual IMET programs. The process involves: host country training personnel; U.S. Embassy and in-country Security Assistance Organization (SAO) personnel; and representatives of the Unified Commands, Military Departments, DOD, and DOS. The detailed procedures are designed to achieve maximum gain from the IMET dollar in meeting the essential education and training requirements of our friends and allies. [See Appendix F for an expanded discussion of this planning and programming process.]

Cost effectiveness has also been achieved as a result of various legislative and administrative initiatives associated with the pricing policy for IMET courses. Since FY 1980, a multi-tier pricing system has been employed for all military education and training courses provided on a sale or grant basis to foreign countries. Through the legislative elimination of a variety of costs, IMET tuition prices are substantially below those charged under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to purchaser countries. This pricing system thereby permits a significant expansion of the numbers of students and courses which can be accommodated through the limited annual appropriations provided for the IMET Program.

All of these methods of cost control have permitted this modestly funded program to maximize value gained for the dollar. Through a systematic planning and programming effort, which assures adherence to policy and statutory direction, funding allocations have resulted in the typical IMET country program costing only \$100,000 per year, or even less. There are 15 countries with annual programs of \$1.0 million or more, and even the largest program is \$3.4 million. Such funding management permits the IMET Program to deliver access and influence

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with foreign governments far beyond what might be otherwise expected from the available resources.

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## Appendix A

### Origins of IMET

Although the specific term, International Military Education and Training (IMET), was first formally introduced in a 1976 legislative change, an education and training program for international military students has been an integral part of U.S. military assistance for over 40 years. Similar to other foreign assistance programs which were initially authorized by a series of Mutual Defense Assistance and Mutual Security Acts during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, the substantive equivalent of the present IMET program has existed since the aftermath of World War II and has accounted for the training of over 500,000 international military students since 1950.

Between 1961 and 1976, military education and training was consolidated within the Military Assistance Program (MAP) authority in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA/61). In its Fiscal Year 1976 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), the Executive Branch requested funding for a separate IMET program in a new Chapter 5 to Part II of the FAA/61. The FY 1976 CPD justification for separating IMET from MAP centered around two basic points: (1) a change in funding procedures was recommended, "in recognition of the unique and lasting benefits which accrue to the United States from the training of foreign military personnel, and the need to ensure their continuing accrual as an independent and highly productive form of security assistance;" and, (2) "a separate [IMET] program will also more clearly identify its cost, objectives, and impact as an instrument of national security and foreign policy." The Administration and the Congressional authorization committees were also undoubtedly influenced by the desire of Congress in 1976 to terminate MAP equipment funding in the future. It is instructive to note that the report of the then House Committee on International Relations expressed no desire to terminate the military education and training portion of MAP, but rather strongly supported the new Chapter 5 (IMET) concept.

Concurrent with the statutory change in 1976 creating a separate IMET program, there was an attendant shift in the type of training which would henceforth receive emphasis. While military training was part of the overall MAP element prior to 1976, there was a significant and natural emphasis on obtaining technical training which was directly related to the support of the grant MAP equipment which was being provided. This was all the more logical because many countries which were receiving U.S. grant equipment could not afford to purchase the associated training relative to its operation and maintenance. With the announcement of the projected demise of the MAP grant equipment program in 1976, and the development of a separate IMET program that year, it was no longer appropriate to tie grant training to grant equipment. In fact, it was intended that countries, which could afford to do so, would purchase equipment-specific training through the FMS program. Accordingly, IMET, as a separate education and training program, took on an expanded thrust: a concentration on providing training to *individual students*, not especially coupled to military equipment deliveries. Moreover, the central focus of IMET was placed on providing *professional, leadership, and management training* for senior military leaders and for selected junior and middle-grade officers having leadership potential. While technical and operational courses would still be provided, advanced training would be emphasized. The goal was to strike a balance between providing technical courses that a poorer country could not afford to purchase, and professional "influence-building" training appropriate to the level of development of the country involved and the sophistication of the country's armed forces.

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## Appendix B

### Legislative Authority and Policy Guidance

The general authority for IMET is contained in Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA/61). This section reads as follows:

**Sec. 541. General Authority.**—The President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this Act as the President may determine (but whenever feasible on a reimbursable basis), military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. Such training and education may be provided through—

- (1) attendance at military education and training facilities in the United States (other than Service academies) and abroad;
- (2) attendance in special courses of instruction at schools and institutions of learning or research in the United States and abroad; and
- (3) observation and orientation visits to military facilities and related activities in the United States and abroad.

Similarly, the purposes of IMET are also found in the FAA/61, specifically in Section 543 which is quoted in its entirety.

**Sec. 543. Purposes.**—Education and training activities conducted under this chapter shall be designed—

- (1) to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security;
- (2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and
- (3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

#### Training Emphasis Areas

With the above statutory mandate in mind, DSAA has published amplifying guidance in its *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) (DOD 5105.38-M). In this regard, the SAMM, Chapter 10, addresses the principal *areas of emphasis* in international military training (both through Foreign Military Sales and IMET). These areas include:

- Training of individuals who are likely in the future to occupy *positions of influence or prominence* within the foreign country's armed forces.

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- Training which encourages *military professionalism and the interchange of military doctrine*, particularly by attendance at U.S. service schools at the advanced career, command and staff, and war college levels.
  - Training related to the *management of defense resources* at all levels within the foreign defense establishment.

### Training Objectives

Within the above areas of emphasis, the SAMM further depicts the objectives of providing international military training to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and IMET students:

- To create skills needed for *effective operation and maintenance* of equipment acquired from the United States.
- To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for *effective management* of its defense establishment.
- To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability. Development of *country self-sufficiency* depends largely upon the quantity and quality of instructors available to operate in-country training establishments.
- To reduce a foreign country's training dependence on the USSR and its allies. In other words, the United States should provide an *alternative to Soviet and other communist-bloc military training*.
- To promote military-to-military *rapprochement and understanding* leading to increased rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

### Informational Program

Subsumed within the above emphasis areas and objectives is the requirement for each student attending a formal course in the United States to be given the opportunity to participate in the DOD Informational Program (IP). The objective of the IP is to assist trainees in acquiring a balanced understanding of U.S. society, institutions, ideals, and to increase trainee awareness of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights. The IP has been in continuous operation since 1965 and is applicable to both IMET and Foreign Military Sales Training students.

The IP, which is in addition to the military training experience, is accomplished through visits to private homes, local industries, cultural exhibits, civic activities, and so forth. The student is further introduced to the U.S. judicial system, the two-party system, the role of our free press and other communications media, minority problems, the purpose and scope of labor unions, our economic system, our educational institutions, and the way in which all of these elements of American democracy reflect the U.S. commitment to the *basic principles of internationally recognized human rights*. In cases where international military education and training is conducted in Spanish (see Appendix C), the IP objectives are accomplished through Spanish translation. Finally, consistent with the responsibilities and duties of trainees, the provisions of the Geneva Convention (covering the principles and rules of law of armed conflict) are included in related course training and education.

### Policy Constraints

In furtherance of the aforementioned statutory purposes of IMET and implementing training emphasis areas and objectives, case-by-case approval by DSAA is required for a number of

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training courses or programs. These DSAA policy constraints exist so as to ensure that every IMET program expenditure provides the greatest return possible. In some situations, certain types of training (e.g., military police training) will not be provided at all or, if provided, will be furnished only to selected countries falling within strict statutory and policy guidelines. In other instances, particular training courses (e.g., training in support of FMS equipment) may be approved for one country, given its unique needs and capabilities, yet denied for attendance by another country under IMET. The point here is that the IMET program consists of very limited funding. There are three levels of management review for the funding. These funds are closely managed by the U.S. military security assistance organizations (SAO) in-country, the military departments in providing the actual training, and ultimately by DSAA and the State Department in cases which involve a proposed requirement for an exception to basic standing policies and procedures. The following are illustrative of IMET requests from countries which require DSAA case-by-case review and approval.

- Training in the United States for military personnel without career status.
- Training already provided in a quantity which, taking into account reasonable attrition, is sufficient to meet the military requirements of the requesting country.
- Any training when it appears unlikely, on the basis of experience, that the skills produced will be utilized properly by the requesting country.
- Training in support of FMS equipment (the rationale being that such training should be accomplished as part of the overall FMS agreement).
- Training at U.S. civilian schools.
- Training at U.S. military or civilian schools leading to a Bachelor or Masters Degree, or credits toward such degrees, as opposed to specific military training.
- Training of personnel whose status as members of a country's defense establishment or armed forces may be questionable.
- Training in the United States for less than eight weeks duration if all or part of the overseas travel is paid by IMET.



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## Appendix C

### Methods of Education and Training

The U.S. military services use the following methods to provide military education and training to international military students.

- **Formal Instruction.** This category principally includes Professional Military Education (PME) and technical proficiency training. PME, which is a major thrust of IMET, includes courses of instruction at such schools as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Naval War College, and the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA, Fort Benning, Georgia). Formal instruction can also include English Language Training (ELT) at the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC), Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, for students from those countries where no or little ELT is available. Such ELT is necessary in that, with the exception of USARSA, the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Homestead AFB, FL, and the Small Craft Inspection and Technical Training School (SCIATTS), at Rodman Naval Station, Panama where instruction is provided in Spanish, international military students sit in classrooms alongside U.S. students where the instruction is entirely in English. Finally, formal instruction can involve technical proficiency training (e.g., operator and maintenance procedures) for countries whose limited national resources do not permit funding such training through FMS, and where such technical training is critical to the country's security needs. Because of the high cost involved, flying training is rarely provided through IMET, and such training requires special approval by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

- **On-the-Job/Qualification Training (OJT).** OJT at U.S. or overseas installations is provided to selected officers and enlisted personnel. This special type of training enables international military students to learn specific military skills as well as to become familiar with U.S. training methods and techniques.

- **Observer Training (OBT).** Similar in many ways to OJT, OBT is provided when no U.S. military course covering the desired training is available, or when it is impractical or otherwise undesirable for international students to perform the tasks being demonstrated. An obvious example is medical training, where doctors and medical technicians who are not licensed to practice medicine in the United States can benefit from observing our techniques and procedures.

- **Orientation Tours (OT).** A limited number of relatively senior foreign military personnel will visit United States military installations as part of an orientation tour. The objective of such OTs is to provide selected officers an opportunity to become quickly acquainted with U.S. military doctrine, techniques, procedures, facilities, equipment, and organizational management practices and operations through a short-term orientation as opposed to attending long-term formal courses. In addition to the purely military objective to be achieved through orientation training, it is intended that OTs serve to enhance mutual understanding, cooperation, and friendship.


- **Overseas Training.** While the vast majority of IMET funded programs involve education and training in the United States, it is occasionally more cost effective or more practical to send a U.S. military training team abroad to present formal instruction in a host country. These in-country teams are referred to by a variety of names, based on their specific purpose and structure. The most common title is the mobile training team (MTT).

- **Professional Military Education (PME) Exchange Training** (Section 544, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended—FAA/61). Another important IMET program element involves foreign military training in U.S. PME schools which is provided on a

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one-for-one, reciprocal no-cost basis in exchange for U.S. military training in comparable foreign schools. For this purpose, PME involves Command and Staff Colleges and the War Colleges.

While each of the above training approaches differ in one degree or another, they all have one thing in common: support of the statutory objectives of the IMET program as identified in Section 543, FAA/61.



**International Military Students in the U.S. Army Armor Officer Advanced Course  
Ft. Knox, KY, 3 April - 7 September 1989**

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## Appendix D

### Profiles of IMET Courses

Appendix C examined the various forms of training conducted under the IMET program. This Appendix describes the composition of IMET classes for a representative year—1988—in order to demonstrate the various types of training provided under the IMET program. The results of this analysis are shown in Table D-1.

#### Categories of Training

Table D-1 summarizes the training funded under IMET for 1988. First, the courses are broken into four major categories in terms of their various forms. The largest of these categories is training in the Continental United States (CONUS) which accounts for 87 percent of student spaces and 85 percent of program cost. Training outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) accounts for 13 percent of student spaces and 6 percent of total cost.<sup>2</sup> The third major category covers training by Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) which accounts for 3.1 percent of total program cost. Finally, support expenses account for about 6 percent of program costs. Also, see Figure D-1.

#### Types of Training

Table D-1 further divides 1988 IMET training in CONUS into six broad types of training: Officer Professional Military Education; Officer Management Related Training; Officer Postgraduate and Degree Related Training; Undergraduate Pilot and Other Flight Training; Technical, Operations, Maintenance, Medical, and Enlisted Training; and Orientation Tours. OCONUS training is subdivided in a similar fashion. While the largest single category is Technical Training, which comprises 48 percent of spaces and 32 percent of program costs, most 1988 IMET training was devoted to officer training—that is, to the other five types of training which involve the training of foreign officers. Moreover, the proportion of training devoted to officers (as opposed to “officer training”) is, in fact, even higher since some foreign militaries use officer personnel to perform duties assigned to enlisted personnel in the U.S. Finally, although we group English Language Training with Technical Training, it is frequently a prerequisite for officer training and, except for English Language Instructor Training, is never a program objective in and of itself. Also see Figure D-2.

The U.S. Army is the largest provider of IMET training, accounting for 50 percent of total spaces. The U.S. Air Force ranks next with 31 percent of spaces, and the U.S. Navy accounts for 19 percent of all training provided under IMET.

Table D-1 also reflects the relative costs and the average duration of the different types of training. Officer Professional Military Education makes up 28 percent of total program cost, but only 24 percent of spaces because of its longer duration and resulting higher costs. A similar pattern can be seen with Officer Postgraduate and Pilot Training which represent very small proportions of student spaces but constitute significant shares of total program costs because these are relatively long duration/high cost courses.

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<sup>2</sup> OCONUS training in 1988 consisted primarily (60 percent) of training provided at the U.S. military schools which remain in the Panama Canal Zone (Air Force technical courses and Navy small craft training). The remainder involved training at schools or in units in Europe and the Pacific.

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## English Language Training

Essential to the successful completion of U.S. military training and professional education by international military students is an English language proficiency level which is adequate for the specific training and education for which the students came to the U.S. under either the IMET or the Foreign Military Sales programs.

Each year approximately 3,000 such students of all ranks attend the Defense Language Institute, English Language Center (DLIELC) to learn English, improve their English ability, or to learn to be English instructors or school administrators. The students learn the language (listening comprehension, speaking, reading, and writing) by being immersed in an English-only environment from the very first day of class. An average of 700 students are in residence on any typical day, and this is only the tip of the iceberg. It is estimated that on any given day, another 45,000 military students are in classrooms throughout the world studying the DLIELC exported American Language Course, and in many countries, are being taught by instructors previously trained in DLIELC's instructor development course. For some of these countries, DLIELC provides cost-reimbursable, on-site, or long- or short-term assistance to improve their students' English teaching capabilities.

The U.S. Security Assistance Training Program (SATP), except for USARSA, IAAFA and SCIATTS, cannot achieve its goals if international military students are not proficient in English since our military service courses are taught in English at U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard installations throughout the U.S. The training of these students support both the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the foreign military sales (FMS) training programs. At the same time, the students not only learn the English language but also gain an introduction to the customs and cultures of the American people. They gain an understanding of the American democratic political process, the free enterprise system, and much more. In summary, the English language training program at DLIELC is a linchpin to the success of the Security Assistance Training program and to our security assistance objectives.

This analysis makes it clear that IMET training is intended to impart either professional military skills or specific technical skills, including English language preparation, all relating to military management or operations. Frequently these skills have application in the civilian sector and allow the military forces of IMET recipient countries to contribute to national development. But, because of the relatively small size of the IMET program in contrast to other U.S. foreign aid programs, as well as limited IMET funding and total military requirements, these benefits, no matter how positive, can be expected to play only a small role in a nation's overall development.

**TABLE D-1**  
**1988 IMET Courses by Content**

Description	Student Space	Cost (dollars)	Average Duration (weeks)	Percent of Total Cost	Percent of Total Spaces
<b>A. CONUS Training</b>					
<b>(1) Officer Professional Military Education</b>					
PME-Senior Level	406	\$4,286,571	25	9.2%	4.20%
PME-Mid Level	953	5,648,377	16	12.1%	9.87%
PME-Basic	927	3,138,320	6	6.7%	9.60%
Sub total	2286	\$13,073,268		28.1%	23.66%
<b>(2) Officer Management Related Training</b>					
Defense Management	141	\$843,748	7	1.8%	1.46%
Intelligence/EW	149	477,692	8	1.0%	1.54%
Military Police/Security	32	125,298	9	0.3%	0.33%
Comm-Elect Mgt	31	86,090	9	0.2%	0.32%
Logistics Management	193	413,830	6	0.9%	2.00%
Engineering Mgt.	27	100,119	11	0.2%	0.28%
Pers/Manpower/Analysis	53	95,738	7	0.2%	0.55%
Administration	33	82,177	8	0.2%	0.34%
Maintenance Mgt	70	206,121	9	0.4%	0.72%
Computer/ADP Mgt	65	215,844	13	0.5%	0.67%
Finance/Accounting	64	98,250	5	0.2%	0.66%
Other Management	190	349,599	5	0.8%	1.97%
Sub total	1048	\$3,094,506		6.7%	10.85%
<b>(3) Officer Postgraduate and Degree Related Training</b>					
Postgraduate/Degree	108	\$2,833,602	24	6.1%	1.12%
<b>(4) Undergraduate Pilot and Other Flight Training</b>					
UPT/Flt High Cost	59	\$4,113,477	22	8.8%	0.61%
Other Flight	148	1,619,626	8	3.5%	1.53%
Sub total	207	\$5,733,103		12.3%	2.14%
<b>(5) Technical Operations, Maintenance, Medical, and Enlisted Training</b>					
Aviation, Non-Flt	292	\$527,635	3	1.1%	3.02%
Aviation Maintenance	199	611,878	10	1.3%	2.06%
Tech/Maintenance	763	2,590,401	10	5.6%	7.90%
Operations	1036	2,947,489	6	6.3%	10.72%
Missile	106	757,253	22	1.6%	1.10%
Comm-Elect	179	867,588	19	1.9%	1.85%
Logistics/Supply-Enl.	58	130,403	7	0.3%	0.60%
Computer/ADP-Enl.	29	88,613	10	0.2%	0.30%
Military Police/Security-Enl.	3	6,287	5	0.0%	0.03%
Administration-Enl.	17	34,682	7	0.1%	0.18%
Mgt Related-Enl	11	29,984	8	0.1%	0.11%
Instructor	342	383,503	3	0.8%	3.54%
Medical	140	598,072	11	1.3%	1.45%

TABLE D-1 (continued)

Description	Student Space	Cost (dollars)	Average Duration (weeks)	Percent of Total Cost	Percent of Total Spaces
<b>(5) Technical Operations, Maintenance, Medical, and Enlisted Training (Cont)</b>					
Damage Control	16	28,529	3	0.1%	0.17%
Contractor	1	9,526	9	0.0%	0.01%
English Language Prerequisite	915	2,899,661	12	6.2%	9.47%
English Language Admin	367	1,937,391	17	4.2%	3.80%
Country Liaison/Exchange	3	13,834	15	0.0%	0.03%
Other non-Mgt/Enl	145	227,872	3	0.5%	1.50%
Unidentified CONUS Tng	18	10,832	2	0.0%	0.19%
Subtotal	4640	\$14,701,433		31.6%	48.03%

<b>(6) Orientation Tours</b>					
OT-DV	4	\$8,000	1	0.0%	0.04%
OT-non-DV	44	199,772	1	0.4%	0.46%
OT-Other	97	82,448	0	0.2%	1.00%
Subtotal	145	290,220		0.6%	1.50%

<b>SUBTOTAL CONUS TRAINING</b>	<b>8434</b>	<b>\$39,726,132</b>		<b>85.4%</b>	<b>87.31%</b>
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**B. OCONUS TRAINING**

PME	1	2,250	5	0.0%	0.01%
Management	210	191,527	8	0.4%	2.17%
Flight	21	23,544	2	0.1%	0.22%
Tech/Maint	731	2,223,280	11	4.8%	7.57%
Operations	203	248,286	8	0.5%	2.10%
Medical	30	3,532	2	0.0%	0.31%
Other	30	9,052	2	0.0%	0.31%
Subtotal	1226	\$2,701,471		5.8%	12.69%

<b>TOTAL CONUS + OCONUS TRAINING</b>	<b>9960</b>	<b>\$42,427,603</b>		<b>91.2%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
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**C. MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS AND FIELD TRAINING SERVICES**


MTT-Management/General		12,097		0.0%	
MTT-Medical		111,414		0.2%	
MTT-Logistics Mgt		82,129		0.2%	
MTT-Pers/Manpower/Analysis		9,632		0.0%	
MTT-English Language		42,129		0.1%	
MTT-Aviation		95,788		0.2%	
MTT-Non-Combat Operations		74,096		0.2%	
MTT-Maintenance/Repair		67,088		0.1%	
MTT-Missile		27,696		0.1%	
MTT-Other		19,463		0.0%	
MTT-Survey		38,830		0.1%	
MTT-MTT Training Aids		41,835		0.1%	

TABLE D-I (continued)


Description	Student Space	Cost (dollars)	Average Duration (weeks)	Percent of Total Cost	Percent of Total Spaces
<b>C. MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS AND FIELD TRAINING SERVICES (Continued)</b>					
MTT-Lang. Lab Install		59,212		0.1%	
MTT-Supply Tech		20,200		0.0%	
FTS-English Language		737,193		1.6%	
Subtotal		\$1,438,802		3.1%	
<b>D. SUPPORT</b>					
Training Exercises		3,000		0.0%	
Escort Officer Services		103,176		0.2%	
Medical Cost-CONUS		23,204		0.0%	
Medical Cost-Overseas		328,822		0.7%	
Extraordinary Expenses		30,728		0.1%	
Training Support Department of State		125,000		0.3%	
English Language Labs (ELL)		487,000		1.0%	
ELL Spares		1,175,917		2.5%	
Army Books/Tapes/Pubs		1,434		0.0%	
AF Books/Tapes/Pubs		4,000		0.0%	
Army PCH&T		234,589		0.5%	
AF PCH&T		88,780		0.2%	
Subtotal		28,870		0.1%	
		2,634,520		5.7%	
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>\$46,500,925</b>		<b>100.0%</b>	

Figures may not add due to rounding

**FIGURE D-1**  
**1988 IMET FUNDING**  
**BY TYPE OF TRAINING PROVIDED**



**FIGURE D-2**  
**1988 IMET COURSES**  
**BY COURSE CONTENT**



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## Appendix E

### The Nature and Scope of IMET

The training and education which is provided under the IMET program is professional and non-political, reflecting both the U.S. tradition of civilian supremacy and the instrumental rather than policy role of the military. As already noted, the training ranges from basic technical skills to professional military education and is designed to advance the efficiency, professional performance, and readiness of the recipient armed forces, thereby leading to an effective, non-political, and professional military force. The grant nature of the program also provides the U.S. with influence in the selection of courses and often in the selection of students. Moreover, for many developing countries, IMET provides the only alternative to training provided by the Soviets and their allies. IMET is a people-to-people program. Its aims and purposes are long range in nature and scope.

When the U.S. offers training to foreign military personnel on an IMET basis, it demonstrates a real and active interest on the part of the U.S. in the national security of the foreign country. When a foreign country sends its military personnel to be trained by the U.S., it casts a vote of confidence in the United States and its military institutions, and acquires information and insight upon which to base decisions on the desirability of cooperating with the U.S. on political as well as military matters.

There are many ways to establish such relationships, but it is in the training environment that personal, military-to-military relationships of enduring value are forged. When U.S. and foreign military personnel sit down to plan and undergo training together, the mutual insight and rapport which result are of a different and higher order than relationships based on most other types of contact or forms of security assistance. Moreover, the planning and the training experiences provide the necessary practical basis for military cooperation in an emergency.

IMET has a positive effect on the trainees and the recipient countries beyond the actual training. The currents of pro-American attitude within recipient armed forces generally appear to be based on a successful training experience. The exposure to our society, the quality of instruction, and acknowledged leadership in certain fields play a big part in the formation of pro-American ideas and an orientation toward the U.S. Furthermore, although nation-building is not an objective of the IMET program per se, it is, nevertheless, an important byproduct. The associated technology, management, and technical skills and the increased trained manpower flowing from the IMET program has had a positive effect on the infrastructure of IMET recipient countries. The effect has been to stimulate "nation building" which, in turn, has encouraged economic development. Similarly, the English language instruction which is essential to much of the training contributes directly to increased rapport between American personnel and their foreign counterparts and, in the long run, to a greater understanding of the United States, its people, and values.

Finally, as is the case with the U.S. Armed Forces, there is a continuing need for IMET recipients to replenish their trained personnel. Especially critical are military training and education for specialties and disciplines which do not exist in their countries because of the excessive costs to acquire those capabilities or because of a limited requirement, both of which makes it uneconomical to develop an internal training capability. Long considered the "Arsenal of Democracy" with respect to military equipment and materiel, the U.S. is now also looked to as the "Arsenal for Training" because of its qualitative and strong military training base. At the same time, the U.S. certainly does not have a monopoly on the body of knowledge that makes up military training and education. In this regard, the one hundred or so countries which make up the IMET program and the thousands of students which they send to U.S. military training installations and educational institutions provide U.S. students with knowledge and experiences that would not be otherwise normally available to our own forces.

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## Appendix F

### The IMET Planning, Programming, and Implementation Process

The planning and programming of international military training requirements is a process which occurs over approximately an eighteen month period. The student levels and required funding levels for a country's IMET training program are forecast first in the training portion of the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance, or AIASA. This document, submitted to the U.S. Department of State by the in-country U.S. Embassy, includes a recommendation for the desired IMET program level for the country concerned. The Embassy office responsible for security assistance management [i.e., the U.S. military Security Assistance Organization (SAO), the Defense Attaché Office (DAO), or an Embassy official] plays a major role in the preparation of the IMET (and other assistance) recommendations contained in the AIASA. The AIASA is then used by State, assisted by DOD, in preparation of the annual Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) that furnishes Congress with an overall recommendation and justification for the proposed worldwide (as well as country-by-country) Security Assistance Program, including IMET. In reviewing the country AIASAs, both in the development of the CPD and in the subsequent funding allocation process, foreign policy and political-military considerations are carefully evaluated, from the desk officer level up through senior State and DOD channels.

The annual IMET planning process is initiated through a series of ongoing meetings between the SAO Training Officer and the host country training staff to identify all U.S. training that is needed and desired by the country concerned. The process of working with a country to identify those of its training requirements that may be fulfilled by available U.S. training is a very important one. The SAO neither dictates to the country what training it can have, nor does the SAO simply accept all country desires. The SAO and country training managers work together closely to fulfill a country's training needs while remaining within the policy guidelines for IMET-funded training as promulgated in the Foreign Assistance Act.

Following these very detailed and lengthy planning sessions, specific course and other training requirements are submitted to the U.S. military department Security Assistance training agencies at annual training planning and programming workshops. These workshops are conducted by the five regional U.S. unified commands and occur in the January to March timeframe, prior to the upcoming fiscal year (budget year). The basic purpose of these workshops is to bring the SAO training officer who has been working with a country's training staff throughout the year and most intimately knows and understands the country's training requirements, together with the U.S. military department security assistance training desk officers who will plan and secure the requisite training. Again, all of this is accomplished within the structured IMET policy guidelines as stated in the *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, DOD 5105.38-M. The DSAA representative attending the workshops has approval authority for all requested training and exceptions to policy. The various Military Department/Military Service representatives present at these workshops are the experts on what types of U.S. military training are available and which are the most appropriate to fill specific training requirements. The U.S. Unified Command representatives are responsible for the overall conduct of the workshop and the performance of each individual SAO.

After completion of all five regional training workshops, the Military Department (MILDEP) representatives enter all accepted and approved training requirements into their computer systems; then, training spaces are allocated, and a detailed computer listing of each country's approved IMET program is provided by the MILDEPs to the SAO. This document provides allocations, course scheduling, and the financial data required to manage the country IMET program. When

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the IMET funding is made available, the program is implemented, and students are sent to the U.S. for training. There are approximately fifteen detailed administrative actions involved in the processing of international military students (IMS) for their training experience. Again, great attention to detail is required of the in-country SAO in such student preparation.

A considerable management effort also takes place behind the scenes. DSAA, in coordination with State, plays a key role in all of this to ensure that the IMET program is properly constituted and carried out. Through its continual monitoring of actual funding of individual country IMET programs, DSAA ensures that these programs remain within policy guidelines and allocated IMET dollar levels. Through a biannual reallocation process, State and DSAA ensure that IMET funds are utilized to the fullest extent possible in fulfillment of additional training requirements.

Many others also play a significant role in the execution of the IMET program. For example, the MILDEP training agencies carry out the training concerned in accordance with the *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)* and the *Joint Security Assistance Training Regulation (JSAT)* and the associated implementing directives that are derived directly from legislation. Finally, the expenditure of IMET funds is also very closely controlled and executed by the financial management sections of the MILDEP training agencies.



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## Appendix G

# Contrasting Aims and Objectives of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military Sales Training (FMST) Programs

From a purely military standpoint, no more is gained by providing training under IMET than could be gained if the same training were purchased under FMST. While the courses selected under IMET are military in nature, the justification for IMET and the long-range benefits of the program are to bring about effective and mutual beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries and to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such IMET activities in the basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights. There is no question that the training also helps countries to improve their ability to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States.

Except for the more developed countries, most countries use FMS training cases to support defense materiel purchases or other technically-oriented training. The benefits of such training are immediately and demonstrably evident to the country in the utilization of the material.

Most of the training accomplished under IMET might not be accomplished under an FMS-only training program. From a U.S. perspective, IMET is designed to foster non-systems related training. This is particularly true in the case of training in leadership skills which may be of value in higher positions in countries. Even in countries where economic hardship is not a critical factor, the higher cost of FMS training often causes foreign governments to look elsewhere for less costly training regardless of the level or type of training.

The IMET program can effectively accomplish its objectives only if it satisfies two criteria. First, like training obtained under FMS, the training must be perceived by the recipient country to be of utility to its armed forces. Second, unlike training obtained under FMS, IMET emphasizes War College and Staff College training and other professional leadership training.

From time to time, these criteria may result in conflict between the desires of the U.S. and the aims of IMET recipients. However, close planning with the country may lead to the resolution of conflicting aims, resulting in a balanced program fulfilling both U.S. and country objectives.

Since its inception in FY 1976, IMET has emphasized professional development. In the pre-1976 period, grant training was primarily related to the hardware supplied under the former grant materiel program. While the training received by and the ultimate benefits accruing to today's grant training recipients are still military in nature, the program has broader benefits.

Improving and sustaining relations between the U.S. and the country remain the key considerations in determining a country's eligibility for IMET; and those relations remain a consideration in determining a country's IMET dollar level.

In the final analysis, however, both IMET and FMST enhance military professionalism and effectiveness and contribute to increased understanding and mutual beneficial relations between the United States and its friends and allies.

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## Appendix H

### Survey of Comparable U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Training Programs

In addition to the IMET program, the training of foreign military personnel in the U.S. is also carried out through cash or grant financed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Some of this training is similar to that provided under IMET. However, FMS training more frequently involves the technical training associated with specific defense equipment purchases. Table H-1 provides a summary by course content of FMS training for FY 1988 which is similar to that provided for IMET as described in the preceding Table D-1 in Section D. Comparison of these two tables provides valuable insight into the unique nature of the IMET program.

Measured in dollars far more training is conducted through FMS than through the IMET program. For example, in FY 1988, \$47.4 million was appropriated for IMET. In that same year, about \$238 million in military education and training was financed through Foreign Military Sales. This included FMS cases financed either with military assistance funds or national funds (i.e., a country's own cash). In dollar terms, the FMS training program is roughly five times larger than the IMET program.

Table H-1 summarizes FMS training for FY 1988. What is most apparent in comparing this data with Table D-1 is the greater share of technical and flight training financed under FMS. For example, Undergraduate Pilot and Other Flight Training accounts for just 2 percent of IMET training, but represents 11 percent of FMS training. Similarly, while Technical and Enlisted Training accounts for 48 percent of IMET training, it accounts for 70 percent of FMS training. On the other hand, Officer Professional Military Education accounts for less than 7 percent of FMS training, but represents about 24 percent of IMET training.

These comparisons make clear the distinctive nature of the IMET program. As a separate program, the U.S. can strongly encourage countries to partake of Professional Military Education which emphasizes professionalism and where foreign students learn the same professional military leadership qualities and values as our own military. In this regard, the above comparisons attest to the success of IMET.

**TABLE H-1**  
**1988 Foreign Military Sales Training**  
**Student Spaces by Course Content**

Description	Navy	Air Force	Army	Total	Percent
<b>A. CONUS Training</b>					
<b>(1) Officer Professional Military Education</b>					
PME-Senior Level	14	60	75	149	1.36%
PME-Mid Level	45	32	320	397	3.62%
PME-Basic	3		184	187	1.70%
Sub total	62	92		733	6.68%
<b>(2) Officer Management Related Training</b>					
Defense Management	66	88	30	184	1.68%
Intelligence/EW	9	92	20	121	1.10%
Military Police/Security		8	6	14	0.13%
Comm-Elect Mgt	1		5	6	0.05%
Logistics Management	36	34	76	146	1.33%
Engineering Mgt.	22	4	4	30	0.27%
Pers/Manpower/Analysis		13	1	14	0.13%
Administration		6	28	34	0.31%
Maintenance Mgt		31	18	9	0.45%
Computer/ADP Mgt		32	9	41	0.37%
Finance/Accounting	1	5	6	12	0.11%
Other Management	24	11	112	147	1.34%
Sub total	159	324	315	798	7.27%
<b>(3) Officer Postgraduate and Degree Related Training</b>					
Postgraduate/Degree	74	11	10	95	0.87%
<b>(4) Undergraduate Pilot and Other Flight Training</b>					
UPT/Flt High Cost	16	469	68	553	5.04%
Other Flight	6	369	283	658	5.99%
Sub total	22	838	351	1211	11.03%
<b>(5) Technical Operations, Maintenance, Medical, and Enlisted Training</b>					
Aviation, Non-Flt	229	352	32	613	5.58%
Aviation Maintenance	20	177	33	230	2.10%
Tech/Maintenance	248	262	178	688	6.27%
Operations	106	47	357	510	10.72%
Missile	12		2377	2389	21.77%
Comm-Elect	20	217	90	327	2.98%
Logistics/Supply-Enl.	1	35	12	48	0.44%
Computer/ADP-Enl.	3	47		50	0.46%
Military Police/Security-Enl.				0	0.00%
Administration-Enl.	1	7		8	0.07%
Mgt Related-Enl		23	4	27	0.25%
Instructor	5	76	60	141	1.28%
Medical	34	35	53	122	1.11%

TABLE H-1 (continued)

Description	Navy	Air Force	Army	Total	Percent
<b>(5) Technical Operations, Maintenance, Medical, and Enlisted Training (Cont)</b>					
Damage Control	11	0		11	0.10%
Contractor	2	606	112	720	6.56%
English Language Prerequisite	50	249	210	509	4.64%
English Language Admin		129	2	131	1.19%
Other Language Training			14	14	0.13%
Country Liaison/Exchange	1	9	7	17	0.15%
Other non-Mgt/Enl	238	189	12	439	4.00%
Unidentified CONUS Tng	5		714	719	6.55%
Subtotal	986	2460	4267	7713	70.27%
<b>(6) Orientation Tours</b>					
OT-DV				0	0.00%
OT-non-DV			2	2	0.02%
OT-Other				0	0.00%
Subtotal	0	0	2	2	0.02%
<b>SUBTOTAL CONUS TRAINING</b>	<b>1303</b>	<b>3725</b>	<b>5524</b>	<b>10552</b>	<b>96.14%</b>
<b>B. OCONUS TRAINING</b>					
PME				0	0.00%
Management		7	30	37	0.34%
Flight			12	12	0.11%
Tech/Maint	30	19		49	0.45%
Operations	24	27	198	249	2.27%
Medical		48		48	0.44%
Correspondence Course	29			29	0.26%
Subtotal	83	101	240	424	3.86%
<b>TOTAL CONUS + OCONUS TRAINING</b>	<b>1386</b>	<b>3826</b>	<b>5764</b>	<b>10976</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

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## Appendix I

### Other National Military Training Programs

#### Soviet Military Training

Security assistance is an important instrument of Moscow's overall policy toward developing countries in the Third World. Although Soviet security assistance in no way guarantees that Soviet political-military influence will be durable, security assistance does provide the Soviet Union with a potential means for exploiting opportunities for establishing, maintaining, or strengthening political influence among recipient countries.

The major reasons for Soviet security assistance programs are fourfold. These motivating factors are interrelated and include gaining political influence, improving Soviet security, obtaining strategic or economic benefits, and advancing the revolutionary process in the Third World. An important feature of the process has been the Soviet ability to quickly exploit political vacuums which arose during colonial independence movements after World War II, as well as to take advantage of opportunities presented by recurrent revolutions and internal conflicts, and also to exploit strains in U.S. relations with key regional clients.

A key element of Soviet security assistance has involved the military training of Third World personnel. This training has served as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. In the past, that instrument has been further enhanced by training provided to Third World militaries by Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and Cuba. Such training has provided access to military establishments, intelligence services, and other professional groups in the Third World. In sum, Soviet training efforts have been calculated to help promote Soviet and Communist Bloc penetration of the Third World, with the objectives of eroding Western influence and supporting radical regimes and groups. As such, the program provides the Soviets the opportunity to create a dependency among many Third World countries that send students to Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Cuban training facilities.

Military training of Third World personnel in the U.S.S.R. has been an integral element of Soviet foreign military assistance. Benefits derived by Moscow from this training program have included:

- Reinforcing dependence on the U.S.S.R. for military assistance. In this regard, military training has supplemented Soviet arms transfers and required the use of Soviet military advisers and technicians.
- Providing an opportunity to influence foreign military personnel and, through them, the governments of Third World states. To achieve that goal, the Soviets have often included political courses (i.e., ideological instruction) in their military training programs.
- Allowing Soviet intelligence services to recruit agents and evaluate foreign military personnel.

While precise information is lacking, an estimated 6,700 trainees from the Third World are currently in the U.S.S.R.

Implementation of training requirements contained in military assistance agreements is the responsibility of the Soviet General Staff. Training has been conducted at several schools within the U.S.S.R. Many are officer training schools (*Uchilishche*)—similar to U.S. service academies.

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Others are schools for noncommissioned officers or for technical training. Some high-ranking Third World officers have attended advanced courses at the most prestigious academies (*akademiya*), such as the Military Academy of the General Staff and the Frunze Military Academy.

**Third World Military Students  
In the U.S.S.R.\***

Latin America	300
Africa	3,000
Middle East and South Asia	2,100
East Asia	<u>1,300</u>
Total	6,700

\* The above figures do not include the large number of personnel from Cuba and Afghanistan, for which estimates are not available.

In some cases, training courses have been the same as those for Soviet personnel. Some institutions, primarily schools and academies for Soviet officer training, have one or more separate faculties or departments devoted to training foreigners, both from the Third World and the Eastern bloc nations. Foreign students normally have been organized by national groups for living and administrative convenience. While proficiency in Russian has not been mandatory for all trainees, officers and cadets attending courses of two or more years' duration usually have received language instruction during their first year.

Reactions of foreign students to Soviet military training have been mixed. Political indoctrination and harsh winters have been unpopular, and racial incidents have occurred. Foreign reaction to Soviet living conditions has varied, according to the trainee's background. Soviet intelligence and security training has been highly regarded because of the instructors' competence and the utility of the courses. In contrast, many foreign students have faulted Soviet flight and aircraft maintenance training, as well as combat vehicle and equipment training because of limited hands-on experience. The number of Third World trainees in the U.S.S.R. may decline over the next few years as Moscow reduces military assistance to some clients. Finally as a result of the recent upheavels and leadership changes in Eastern Europe, these states may curtail training assistance to leftist Third World states for philosophical reasons or because of the inability of such countries to pay for their training in a hard currency.

### Western European Training

Many Third World International Military Students from former West European colonies and territories generally attend European schools in countries with which their country previously shared a common language. Even so, it is rare to find an officer who would rather attend a European than an American military school. This preference has been identified through U.S. military experience and contacts with international military officers who have attended the American courses. The more convincing argument comes from those foreign officers who have been exposed to both U.S. and European military schools and who often found themselves not being treated as equals in the latter. Moreover, those who participate in the U.S. military schools feel they are treated on a basis equal to their fellow American students and that the American schools go out of their way to make them feel at home. They also know that U.S. instructors and their fellow American students will work with them until they have a firm grasp of the material presented. In this regard, they also feel that the personal concerns of the Americans which emerge during these military training programs are a strong, positive reflection of American society. This

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is perhaps the greatest experience acquired by the foreign officers and, more often than not, one of the most important lessons they take back to their respective countries.

In addition, many foreign military students indicate that American military schools teach more in a one-year Command and Staff College than the Europeans teach in a two-year program. Their observations address the fact that the U.S. military schools provide a significantly greater degree of academic freedom, shorter formal classroom sessions, and greater individual and cooperative student research efforts. They believe that the European system requires too much classroom attendance, while allowing little time for independent research and study. To the International Military Student, this approach accounts for the increased length of a similar European course, and a consequent decrease in the number of subjects taught. Similarly, they believe that the scope of subjects in European professional military education and training is further limited because of a lesser degree of academic freedom.

As a consequence, U.S. international military training and the IMET program are generally viewed as the most effective military assistance programs available to Third World military forces. The general exposure of international military students to the process to U.S. society is also an inexpensive and effective way to foster increased human rights awareness in Third World societies. U.S. trained military officers in these countries have repeatedly noted these facts.



**International military students observe the wreckage of a UH-1 Helicopter at the Norton Air Force Base, CA crash laboratory facility**

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## Appendix J

### Statistical Data

- TABLE 1 IMET Trainees Holding Positions of Prominence  
(FY 1984 - FY 1989)
- TABLE 2 IMET Annual Appropriations and Country  
Programs (FY 1976 - FY 1990)
- TABLE 3 IMET Students and Number of Countries  
(FY 1976 - FY 1989)
- TABLE 4 Number of IMET Students per Country  
(FY 1976 - FY 1989)
- FIGURE 1 Profiles of the 1988 IMET Student Population



**TABLE 1**

**IMET TRAINEES HOLDING POSITIONS OF PROMINENCE  
(PERIOD FY 1984 - 1989)**

<u>UNIFIED COMMAND</u>	<u>COUNTRIES REPORTING<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>PROMINENT POSITIONS<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>GEN/FLAG RANK<sup>3</sup></u>
Central Command	9	87	153
European Command	42	471	619
Atlantic Command	10	26	6
Pacific Command	13	417	580
Southern Command	<u>5</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>84</u>
TOTALS	79	1,067	1,442

<sup>1</sup> This does not include all countries which have received IMET in the past, or are receiving IMET at present. Numbers include only those countries whose SAOs responded to a query for information, including countries which received IMET in the past but are now FMS countries. In the case of former IMET funded countries, every attempt was made to include only personnel who received training either under IMET or the equivalent grant training program at that time.

<sup>2</sup> Includes general and flag officers who have achieved prominent positions: e.g., Chairman, JCS; Chief/Vice Chief of Staff of a service; Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander Army or Corps and comparable elements in the Navy and Air Force; major service or training commands; agency directors; commanders of war colleges and command and staff colleges; academy superintendents; attachés to major world capitals; and, NATO senior officials. Also included are heads of state, ministers of defense, and other government ministers, ambassadors, members of parliament, and chiefs of leading business enterprises. For the purpose of this survey, units below Army Corps level (comparable Navy and Air Force commands) were not considered "prominent" although commanded by a major general or brigadier general or Navy equivalents unless the units were elite or singular units with a special task, such as guarding the nation's capital. At the same time, many of the persons occupying prominent positions did not hold general officer or flag rank, since these grades are either extremely limited or non-existent in their countries. These include countries where lesser ranks serve as chief of a service, senior cabinet aids, senior positions on the joint or general staff, or commanders of training, all positions which would nominally be held by general or flag officers in other countries. Finally, in some cases, (1) the information provided indicated general or flag ranks but did not give positions, or (2) individuals occupying several prominent positions during the period were credited with the most senior position only. Therefore, the numbers of prominent positions may be considered to be higher than reflected in the above totals.

<sup>3</sup> As indicated in footnote 2 above, all general and flag officers did not rise to positions of prominence as defined above, and all prominent positions were not held by general officers or flag ranks.

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**TABLE 2**


**IMET Annual Appropriations and Country Programs  
FY 1976 - FY 1990  
(Dollars in Thousands)**

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Appropriated</u>	<u>Number of Countries*</u>
1976	\$28,750	42
1977	\$25,000	46
1978	\$30,000	41
1979	\$27,900	40
1980	\$25,000	52
1981	\$28,400	62
1982	\$42,000	72
1983	\$46,000	80
1984	\$51,532	86
1985	\$56,221	91
1986	\$54,490	96
1987	\$56,000	96
1988	\$47,400	98
1989	\$47,400	95
1990	\$47,196	107 (Planned)

\* This column identifies the number of countries which had funded IMET programs during a particular fiscal year. The 1990 figure represents those countries which are programmed to be funded, subject to legislative and policy considerations which might restrict planned programs from being funded.

**TABLE 3**

**IMET Students and Number of Countries**  
 FY 1976—FY 1989



Note: The lower numbers of students in 1988 and 1989 reflect decreased funding levels.

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
ALGERIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	7	7	10	11
ANTIGUA-BARBUDA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	11	10	7	10	0
ARGENTINA	139	140	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	13	18
AUSTRIA	3	4	6	10	2	5	15	6	6	7	6	7	4	6
BAHAMAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	26	17	18	19
BANGLADESH	0	12	23	21	14	17	32	31	37	48	34	37	33	35
BARBADOS	0	0	0	1	13	12	10	22	22	18	14	14	12	0
BELIZE	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	19	23	79	23	21	18	19
BENIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	2	3	4
BOLIVIA	241	183	227	211	36	0	0	0	29	70	21	43	66	97
BOTSWANA	0	0	0	0	11	4	12	21	22	34	29	35	28	32
BRAZIL	220	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	9	15
BURKINA FASO	0	0	0	9	6	7	6	0	2	0	2	5	3	3
BURMA	0	0	0	0	3	6	23	16	14	24	28	32	21	0
BURUNDI	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	6	6	13	7	4	6
CAMEROON	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	8	8	9	12	17	12	13
CAPE VERDE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	2	0	3	3
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	6	6	6	10	7	10
CHAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	11	9	11	15	14
COLOMBIA	688	350	257	408	444	539	642	910	665	720	813	855	890	811
COMOROS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	1	3
CONGO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
COSTA RICA	0	0	0	0	0	37	55	79	36	71	71	68	70	45
DJIBOUTI	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	6	8	6	10	7	7
DOMINICAN REP.	235	73	90	113	47	163	129	153	168	168	130	132	83	107
DOMINICA	0	0	0	0	0	7	1	6	16	8	10	11	7	9
ECUADOR	220	288	421	451	385	217	252	381	146	168	143	156	54	221
EGYPT	0	0	12	24	92	135	343	337	175	114	124	170	159	139
EL SALVADOR	233	47	0	0	125	256	736	452	102	263	371	311	353	190
EQUAT. GUINEA	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	1	3	2	2	3	4
ETHIOPIA	184	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Total Number of IMET Students per Country

TABLE 4

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
FIJI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	15	16	13	11	0	0
FINLAND	6	6	6	5	7	8	7	7	2	5	6	6	10	5
GABON	0	0	0	0	5	3	4	6	4	7	6	5	5	3
GAMBIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	3	4	7
GHANA	57	28	51	28	23	47	43	32	27	39	26	21	14	16
GREECE	49	136	115	0	162	179	148	147	156	166	151	159	138	203
GRENADA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	18	18	13	15
GUATEMALA	134	127	0	0	0	0	0	0	152	123	95	112	68	99
GUINEA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	7	12	8	8	6
GUINEA-BISSAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3	2	3
GUYANA	0	0	0	0	0	11	22	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAITI	13	12	14	17	10	27	25	29	64	45	20	11	0	9
HONDURAS	256	116	219	226	166	261	328	332	326	321	349	321	357	234
ICELAND	0	20	0	0	1	0	3	5	3	8	5	5	5	5
INDIA	17	13	21	31	26	0	9	14	10	19	26	10	12	16
INDONESIA	270	198	240	189	172	193	190	221	135	97	112	81	89	89
IRELAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
IVORY COAST	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	5	8	10	5	11	8	10
JAMAICA	0	0	0	0	0	8	20	73	60	72	57	63	60	54
JORDAN	140	291	277	245	207	282	200	381	370	399	381	480	488	312
KENYA	22	21	28	43	35	58	72	73	125	135	163	107	100	91
KOREA	442	172	207	236	113	175	240	260	253	233	216	235	191	204
LEBANON	27	3	59	56	45	83	125	67	32	83	64	51	36	28
LESOTHO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	4
LIBERIA	26	16	31	9	13	19	24	35	55	92	42	23	14	14
LUXEMBOURG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0
MADAGASCAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	2	6	4	4	4
MALAWI	0	0	0	0	1	2	7	21	23	22	18	11	18	16
MALAYSIA	75	45	86	56	21	51	93	57	97	109	114	112	86	88
MALDIVES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	3	3	4	2	3
MALI	0	0	0	3	4	3	12	10	9	11	11	9	9	10
MALTA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8

TABLE 4 (continued)  
Total Number of IMET Students per Country

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
MAURITANIA	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	4	3	1	2	4	6
MEXICO	98	37	39	54	43	107	63	28	33	76	19	98	71	31
MOROCCO	132	85	199	109	129	150	112	136	140	96	63	87	63	56
NEPAL	6	3	5	3	2	6	10	8	13	12	8	9	7	9
NICARAGUA	246	234	275	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NIGER	0	0	0	0	0	7	11	7	11	11	13	10	12	12
NIGERIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	23	19	20
OMAN	0	0	0	0	1	2	8	6	12	21	2	2	14	9
PAKISTAN	84	56	80	59	0	0	90	81	116	108	108	111	92	95
PANAMA	316	234	83	219	202	293	219	301	260	183	166	115	0	0
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0	0	0	0	2	2	6	5	5	10	8	12	4	5
PARAGUAY	196	99	145	0	0	0	8	14	16	19	19	23	17	5
PERU	411	677	56	72	195	178	369	284	88	160	53	2	43	2
PHILIPPINES	392	126	134	106	98	272	250	296	313	449	518	524	473	516
PORTUGAL	188	215	128	129	85	68	72	85	74	83	79	60	86	86
RWANDA	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	4	0	4	1	4	3	5
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	2	2
SENEGAL	0	2	7	11	12	12	18	18	17	31	19	31	23	26
SEYCHELLES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	1	0
SIERRA LEONE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	6	5	7	6	8
SINGAPORE	0	0	0	0	0	3	18	21	22	12	16	18	9	14
SOLOMON ISLANDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	2	2	2	4
SOMALIA	0	0	0	0	0	21	26	32	41	71	57	19	49	42
SPAIN	336	188	252	122	134	269	245	218	231	219	158	160	138	132
SRI LANKA	0	3	12	2	3	10	18	14	18	16	16	17	21	20
ST. KITTS & NEVIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	7	8	10	13	8
ST. LUCIA	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	6	15	12	13	8	4	9
ST. VINCENT	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	12	13	13	10	8	8
SUDAN	0	17	25	31	31	69	98	68	125	117	54	63	49	0
SURINAME	0	0	0	0	5	7	2	0	0	3	6	0	0	0
SWAZILAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	8	5	7	5	5
TAIWAN	122	120	122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE 4 (continued)  
Total Number of IMET Students per Country


TABLE 4 (continued)  
Total Number of IMET Students per Country

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
TANZANIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6
THAILAND	281	230	165	163	119	179	234	271	351	320	277	274	284	231
TOGO	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	4	2	2	3	4	3	6
TONGA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	10	7	7	4	4
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	10	16	13	6
TUNISIA	77	55	123	166	84	88	144	124	146	156	119	137	108	116
TURKEY	0	0	0	43	147	172	178	194	215	255	207	196	210	202
UGANDA	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	5	3	0	0	14	9	10
URUGUAY	192	0	0	0	0	0	1	15	45	18	19	19	34	17
VENEZUELA	150	13	30	0	0	18	22	52	46	49	61	80	75	34
YEMEN (SANA'A)	15	20	35	17	19	25	35	37	29	64	53	65	59	53
YUGOSLAVIA	0	0	0	0	2	3	5	7	7	4	5	4	4	4
ZAIRE	37	78	54	68	35	40	14	18	40	70	57	62	54	34
ZIMBABWE	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	18	33	17	12	18	20
COUNTRY TOTALS	7010	4858	4429	3772	3545	4836	6161	6671	5969	6682	6137	6206	5780	5277

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FIGURE 1

Profiles of the 1988 IMET Student Population



Data on the IMET program drawn from a representative program year—in this case 1988—show that the largest proportion of the students in the IMET program are military officers (61 percent). A smaller proportion (38 percent) are enlisted personnel. Only a handful (less than 1 percent) are either senior officers or civilians. See Figure 1 above.

Figure 1 also displays the proportion of students from the various military services of the recipient countries. Nearly half of the students were sent by the recipient country's Army. About 30 percent represent Air Force personnel, and about 16 percent are Navy personnel.

Most of the students who are to be trained under IMET, arrive in the United States with adequate English language training to begin their military training immediately. In 1988, about 20 percent of IMET students required some English language instruction prior to beginning their military courses of study in the the United States.

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## Appendix K

### Observations Regarding IMET Contributions to the Advancement of U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Objectives

The following excerpts are observations and reports from U.S. government officials and other sources which attest to the important role of IMET in advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

- *House Committee on International Relations, Report No. 94-848, 1976.* “The committee’s in-depth review of security assistance programs concluded that the record of the international military education and training program demonstrates that such programs are the most effective form of grant security assistance and should be retained.”

- *Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Statement to the House Committee on International Relations, 1976:* “Foreign military training . . . is highly cost-effective in improving the efficiency of allied and friendly military forces . . . . This modest grant program provides long-range benefits in terms of mutual defense and military cooperation.”

- *House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 96-70, 1979:* “In addition to transmitting professional military skills and instruction in U.S. military doctrine, the grant military training program assists in the pursuit of U.S. policy objectives by providing sufficient opportunities for communication with the military leadership of other countries.”

- *Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1979:* “The IMET program continues to provide a significant return on a modest investment. It not only develops the technical and management competence of foreign personnel to use effectively U.S.-supplied equipment, but also enables officers who have or are likely to attain positions of leadership in their countries to learn more about the United States and establish friendships here. We believe that dollar for dollar this is one of our most important programs.”

- *General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1983:* “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have particularly asked me to emphasize to the Committee the importance of the international military education and training funds to our security. It helps us establish military-to-military relationships that last through the years and give us important opportunities to work closely with the military forces of other countries.”

- *Senate Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 98-245, 1983:* “In addition to the obvious utility of IMET programs, training the military forces of friendly nations, other very important aspects of the program include the resulting ties between the United States and other countries, ties between U.S. military personnel and the military personnel of other countries, and the secondary transfer of American values—both human and political. Time after time this program has demonstrated its worth far beyond the basic training elements it provides. Another equally important, indeed vital, aspect of the program is that by training forces of friendly nations, the program enhances the United States’ own security interests.”

- *Frank C. Carlucci, Chairman, Commission of Security and Economic Assistance, Report to the Secretary of State, 1983:* “This [IMET] program raises professional military competence by training foreign military students in American methods as well as the operation and maintenance of U.S. equipment . . . . IMET also has an important political impact in that it establishes and promotes personal contacts and relationships.”

- *General Paul F. Gorman, USA (Ret), Chairman, Paper by the Regional Conflict Working Group submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, 1988:* “On the scale of U.S. expenditures for security, IMET entails very small investments with disproportionately high

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potential yields in international understanding and cooperation and the sort of personal relationships that can pay important dividends in unforeseeable future circumstances.”

- **Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Technology Transfer and Security Assistance from Commanding Officer, Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity, Serial No. 4292, 24 Jan 90:** “The recent attendance at the Naval War College by a senior British Royal Navy and a senior Argentine Naval Officer who had been foes in the Falkland-Malvinas Island War interfaced and developed a professional personal relationship. And while not directly benefiting the U.S. Government, such relationships are in support of US foreign policy and national security objectives. Similar instances involving other countries are repeated over and over again at other U.S. military professional institutions and training facilities.”

- **Letter to Dr. James S. Blandin, Professor and Executive Director, Defense Resources Management Education Center, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, from Malaysian Students, 10 September 1989:** The training offered an “opportunity for [accompanying] Allied wives to broaden their horizons and for meeting wives of other nationalities over and above their American counterparts, as well as civilian sponsors. This I find is of great value, especially for wives who come from restrictive religious and cultural backgrounds to be exposed to an open society. . . . We also learned a great deal from other Allied officers on various aspects of professional and non-professional matters, sharing thoughts and ideas, quarrels, and other disagreements and above all we learned to respect one another.”

- **USCINCLANT Report 30 Nov 89:** “The IMET program in Iceland is recognized for the facilities made available to U.S. military forces there. It also helps to counter . . . public sentiment over having those troops there by providing training to organizations that otherwise would not be able to get it, since Iceland has no defense force of its own. Two of the four organizations (the Lifesaving Association and the Search and Rescue Organization) receiving IMET training are composed of civilian volunteers and have no government budget.”

- **Memorandum (Classified) Subject: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) MTT, 14 Jan 83 [extracted text is unclassified]:** Another case in point involves a joint U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force EOD MTT deployed to a mid-East country to train approximately 100 personnel in ordnance disposal as a result of recent hostilities in the area. In the process, over two hundred different types of ordnance from approximately 20 countries and terrorist organizations were surfaced. Tons of such ordnance were also shipped back to the US; this included many types which were previously unknown to the EOD school, thereby filling a gap in US EOD information regarding mines, explosives, booby traps, etc. In addition, the sources of the explosives and ordnance, and the methods of shipping to the area were also determined.

- **Message, AmEmbassy (Classified), 041409Z Mar 86 [extracted text is unclassified]:** “U.S. . . . Military Contacts: A warming trend. . . . For the most part, the few . . . military with whom we are in contact appear well-disposed toward the U.S. (Those who don’t like us would have little incentive to make contact.) Senior officers who have been training in the U.S. . . . are generally the most accessible and open. One of the Pol-Mil section’s most important and valuable contacts . . . in a key . . . position is unabashedly pro-American and completely free and open in his contacts with us. Not surprisingly, he trained as a . . . in the U.S. . . . Fortunately, he has been . . . in many sensitive negotiations . . . on which significant progress has been realized. . . . Traditionally, the U.S. has had the best relations with . . . trained in the U.S. . . .”

- **Letter, AmEmbassy Vienna, Austria, 17 Dec 86:** “Austria presently provides training each year for approximately 24-48 U.S. military personnel. These soldiers receive two weeks of mountain training in Austria at no expense to the U.S. Army, with the exception of transportation to and from the training site. Additionally, the AMDO [Austrian Ministry of Defense] has provided mountain flying training for U.S. helicopter pilots, also at no expense to the U.S. government. The AMDO offers this training to the U.S. as a token of appreciation for training received by Austrian students under the IMETP.”

- **Message, USMILGP Buenos Aires, Argentina 042056Z Jun 87 (Statement by Argentine U.S. Coast Guard Trainee):** “Having observed ordinary people activities in the Greater New York and Miami areas, I am now totally aware of the real meaning of liberty and democracy. . . . A significant boost in strengthening ties with the Argentine Coast Guard and the interests of the two countries.”

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• Message, USDAO Dhaka, Bangladesh, 150827Z Nov 89: "IMET students contact with America, Americans, and the American ideals of freedom and democracy make a significant impact on students. They then return with a clear idea of these concepts which they compare against their own situations in Bangladesh. . . . These ideas may have contributed to the military staying out of the 1987 governmental crisis in Dhaka. . . . Contact with the American system of political control of the military may be remolding societal norms away from their previously dominant role in politics. IMET students return with concepts and ideas of how politics can execute projects which help the nations and its population."

• Message, AmEmbassy New Delhi, India, 071254Z Dec 89: ". . . IMET serves as a primary vehicle for contacts with the predominant military power of the Asian subcontinent. In the case of the Navy, where the potential for contact between services is greatest, attendance at Naval Command College by several officers has been pivotal in developing more open views concerning the U.S. . . . Sending personnel to technical schools . . . reduces reliance on the Soviet Union for weapons and design assistance . . . ."

"Contributing to Nation Building: the military remains one of the few Pan-India institutions. Access to the U.S. exposes a select group of officers to a functioning democracy and reinforces the Indian Services recognition of the primary goals, responsibilities, etc., of civil authority."

• Message, USDAO Colombo, Sri Lanka, 061129Z Dec 89: "The IMET program for Sri Lanka fulfills several very important goals of U.S. foreign policy which cannot be duplicated by any other program . . . valuable access to an increasingly important leadership segment of this democratic nation—the military . . . . In view of potential human rights challenges, the military needs exposure to U.S. values . . . . As Sri Lanka is challenged by its simmering insurgency, no other program can duplicate the strong influence that training in the U.S. gives to this rapidly expanding army. Thirdly, the IMET program provides important access for U.S. Navy ships and U.S. military aircraft to Sri Lanka ports and airfields. . . . All officers who return after U.S. training under the IMET program have positive comments on the U.S. system and the American Armed Forces."

• Message, SAO Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 080257Z Nov 89: "It is difficult to quantify the benefits of the IMET program . . . . There is probably not an alternative means of achieving the same effect as the IMET program achieves. . . . The program seems quite valuable in continuously reaching large numbers of Malaysian officers of all ranks. This builds goodwill generally and facilitates military-to-military cooperation. It also enhances specific capabilities (ASW, anti-mine warfare) being developed by the Royal Malaysian Navy which operates in waters (Straits of Malacca, South China Sea) of strategic importance to the U.S. Finally, it promotes a degree of reciprocity. One U.S. Army major attends the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College each year and a total of approximately 35 U.S. Army officers and NCOs attend the Malaysian Army Combat Survival and Combat Tracking courses each year, gaining invaluable experience operating in a tropical jungle environment."

• Message, Republic of Maldives, (USDAO Colombo, Sri Lanka), 061129Z Dec 89: "The Maldives IMET program has been extremely successful in winning the complete confidence of the leaders of this island nation. The students who return after U.S. training . . . have a positive attitude toward the U.S. and have done very well. . . ."

"It is important to note that the one Maldives student trained at the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Basic Course in 1987 was one of two officers to receive an award for exceptional bravery during the November 88 attack on Male. This officer, and other U.S. trained personnel, were singled out by the President and given double promotions and the nation's highest military award for their actions in putting down the attack. Their U.S. training made the difference and allowed recognition at the highest levels of professional U.S. military training. This small investment [average \$30-50K] pays dividends in several folds. The IMET program has helped enhance the U.S. image in a tiny Islamic nation, played a vital role in preserving its democracy, promoted regional stability in the Indian Ocean, and has allowed ready access for U.S. ships and aircraft on short notice."

• CHJUSMAG-K Seoul, 130225Z Nov 89: "During the past 10 years Korea has moved progressively towards a constitutional democracy under the leadership of IMET program graduates. The exposure to the U.S. and the role of the military in a democratic system that these leaders experienced during their training in the U.S. undoubtedly, has had substantial impact on their subsequent political beliefs, understanding of the military's role in nation building, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms for all citizens and political institutions, to include the press. This is not a quantifiable contribution . . . but, in the context of all the benefits accrued to the U.S. through the IMET program in Korea, is no small contribution."

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“Contribution to Nation Building. This is nowhere more evident than the growing number of Korean military trained under the IMET program who have assumed positions of prominence and influence within the Korean military while on active duty and/or upon retirement in Korean government, business, and industry. These are the pillars of society that have thrust Korea to the level of political and economic progress seen today. The experiences of the Korean military gained through IMET program-sponsored training in the U.S. are not forgotten. The IMET program is to a large measure responsible for the sustained pro-U.S. attitude prevalent among the higher levels of Korean society.”

- **USOMC Niamey, Niger, 131410Z Nov 89:** “This is the first time officers above the grade of First Lieutenant have been selected for PME [Professional Military Education]. All officers selected for IMET attendance are chosen personally by the President. The DVOT [Distinguished Visitors Orientation Tour] was invaluable to the program here in Niger. Since the return of the DVOT, the tenor and tone of overall military relations with Niger has improved markedly, even though relations were very good to begin with.

“Most importantly, the visitors felt that they were treated as professional equals by the U.S. Army and Air Force officers (regardless of grade) they met on the trip; and it is this aspect of the visit that is most talked about in the FAN officer corps. Since our return, numerous officers assigned throughout the country have commented that American rhetoric about equality is indeed factual, as confirmed by the DVOT experience and the appointment of the new CJCS [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, USA].”

- **Message, USDAO, Suva, Fiji, 2800034Z Nov 89:** “Nation Building: both Fiji and Tonga have used and Tonga continues to make use of courses related to nation building activities. For example, courses such as propulsion systems engineering, engine repair, hydrographic survey, and oceanic search and rescue planning have become routine. These are very important courses for these small nations and contribute much more than simply military preparedness.”

- **Message, CHJUSMMAT, Ankara, Turkey, 160919Z Nov 89:** “The value of the PME courses lies not in the classroom instruction as much as it does in the exposure to American lifestyles, institutions, and values.”

- **Message, (Classified) [extracted text is unclassified]: 290714Z Nov 89:** “In one very important situation, IMET training paid off for the U.S. in a big way. That situation was the evacuation of dependents and non-essential Embassy personnel at the height of the pro-democracy demonstration and the nation-wide strike. We were making a last ditch effort to evacuate personnel by commercial aircraft. The operations at the airport were completely shut down . . . We had access to and in effect took command of the control tower and air traffic control facilities and were allowed free access to the aircraft parking ramp. . . We attributed this and the successful evacuation to a large degree to the IMET training and experience that . . . had received in the U.S.”

- **Message, (Classified) 071052Z Dec 89 [extracted text is unclassified]:** “The IMET program is a key contribution to what has long been the core element of . . . politics and policies [toward the U.S.] of this nation. IMET has played an important part in enabling us to develop strong relationships with . . . leaders and a virtually unique degree of influence on . . . policies effecting a broad range of U.S. interests . . . to include narcotics suppression . . . intelligence cooperation . . . military exercises . . . U.S. ship visits . . . [a] key bridge [for] flights [and] overflights . . . [and] medical research. . .”

- **Message USDAO, Antananarivo, Seychelles, 151159Z Dec 89:** “Specific benefits to USG in providing [IMET] training: US DAO and U.S. Embassy feel that . . . AmEmbassy personnel, NASA tracking station, and U.S. tourists [are] . . . better protected . . . [and] access to the Seychelles Peoples Army and the Police Commission . . . [is] greatly enhanced.”

- The U.S. Navy assisted Egypt in revamping the Egyptian Naval Academy from Russian to U.S. methods, thereby extending U.S. training methods and doctrinal concepts to other African and Mid-East nations.

- Tunisian Naval Academy graduates have been trained at the U.S. Navy Basic Surface Warfare Officer School for the past four years which will facilitate USN/Tunisian naval operations in the Mediterranean.

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- The IMET program has also provided similar education and training assistance to numerous other countries: Korea, Venezuela, Zaire, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Egypt, Pakistan, Colombia, and El Salvador. Management training has emphasized U.S. basic skill training and self sufficiency. Pakistan, Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey, are also making major changes to reflect the U.S. system. These efforts will enhance joint cooperation and mutual security efforts to ensure continued good relations and cooperation with and among many nations.

- In October 1988, the Chief of Staff of the Guinea Bissauan Navy and President of the Guinea Bissau Constitution and Judicial Commission visited the U.S. on an OT. Guinea Bissau has aggressively pursued a coastal fisheries protection mission with the assistance of the USCG under the ACS program. Recognizing these positive U.S. activities on behalf of his country, this westward looking officer participated in a variety of meetings that concluded with extensive discussions of future mutual cooperation with the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and resulted in the Bissauan's becoming a recipient of ACS monies. Through these joint efforts, Guinea Bissau was able to install radios in their patrol boats to aid in the protection of their fishing rights and natural resources.

- The Mauritanian CNO visited the U.S. under the auspices of an OT. This individual is one of the seventeen members of the Provisional Ruling Council of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. The USN, USCG, and the USMC have all participated in mobile training teams (MTTs) in Mauritania. As a result, the Mauritanian military operates a very successful coastal security program in protection of its natural resources.

- An excellent example of how the IMET program has benefitted the U.S. Army is in the field of medical research. Approximately two years ago, the IMET program sponsored several foreign military scientists and senior laboratory technicians as observer trainees at the U.S. Army Medical and Research Command. The exchange of information that took place between these individuals and their U.S. Army counterparts during their IMET-funded training was instrumental in the development of chemical/biological detoxification and microbiology information heretofore unknown to the U.S. Army.

- United States Coast Guard personnel deploy to foreign nations to provide assistance in anti-drug initiatives which are outside the U.S. military purview. In some cases, the assistance of these deployments is ensured because their foreign counterparts are former IMET students who are anxious to again work with the U.S.

- Many developing countries have become increasingly interested in the duties and responsibilities of the Coast Guard. Because few nations have large "blue water" navies, many have patterned their navies after the multi-missioned U.S. Coast Guard, enabling them to fulfill their peacetime humanitarian responsibilities and their nation's defense requirements. This USCG training provided under the IMET program has always served to strengthen their military mission.

- Through the IMET program, the United States Coast Guard has built the maritime forces of seven Caribbean Island nations. The training provided compliments the equipment sales of the military assistance program. As a result of this effort, these nations are now capable of executing their own anti-narcotics effort. This effort plays a key role in the U.S. war on drugs.

- During routine operations in the Caribbean, a USCG vessel pursued a suspect vessel, initially in international waters. The suspect vessel then entered foreign waters. Rapid communications resulted in a foreign vessel joining the pursuit. Direct communications between the USCG and foreign vessel resulted in a speedy capture of the suspect vessel. The success of such an operation is in large part due to the fact that the commanding officer of the assisting foreign vessel had undergone training on a USCG vessel, was familiar with U.S. procedures, knew exactly what to do, and was friendly to the U.S. as a result of his U.S. training.

- USCG cutters are routinely required to make foreign port calls during transit. Speedy approval for these port calls and the assistance provided to the crews during port visits also can be attributed to the good relationships developed through the IMET program.

- USDAO (Classified) Statement, 5 Feb 90 [extracted text is unclassified]: "The only access to the . . . Army, outside the general officer only contact permitted, is through the IMET educated officers. These men, because of their U.S. association and understanding are eager to talk to the USDAO personnel. This is done unofficially . . . since contact is prohibited. This is the only 'real' information that is available to U.S. personnel

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since the high ranking officers will not provide anything but the party line. [Also] as the former U.S. Defense Attaché in the . . . I saw the real benefits of U.S. trained personnel in my contacts [there] because the U.S. trained officers would provide . . . information not available elsewhere.”

- Message, (Classified) 271138Z Mar 90, to HQ USAF [extracted text is unclassified]: “We have received the following letter on Office of the President letterhead from . . . Chief of Staff, Department of Defense.

“For a long time now since we started sending our officers to your Air War College . . . we have experienced a significant shift towards serious professionalism from our graduates . . . . As a matter of fact, our Air Force top leadership is in the hands of Maxwell, [i.e., Air War College] students and we are extremely proud of their achievements. It is with this factor in mind that we continue to associate our armed forces with the American military institutions.

“Previous graduates of the Air War College have and are now filling important posts within the . . . defense establishment . . . .

“ . . . receives senior service school invitations from other countries . . . but turns them down because the distinctions between the role of the military and political institutions are too blurred in those nations. Instead, . . . lobbies hard for ever U.S. senior service school possible [and] attendance at the Air War College is particularly critical . . . [and] is becoming a prerequisite for assignment to the most senior positions within the Air Force . . . .”

- Message, AMEMB REYKJAVIK 301822Z Mar 90. The small but effective [IMET] program has secured enormous goodwill and very tangible results. GOI officials and the public at large consistently point to SAR [Sea and Air Rescue] cooperation as the most visible and welcome advantage of the bilateral defense relationship . . . in an area that reaps major advantages for the U.S. and Iceland, not to mention the hundreds of individuals, including American citizens, whose lives are saved each year as a result of skills acquired by Icelanders through the IMET program.

“ . . . . The IMET program has been recognized as one of those few, precious linkages that underlie the foundation of our relationship.

“ . . . . Iceland’s IMET program is used to train personnel from those civil and voluntary organizations whose function is to defend the well-being of Iceland. . . . But even as Icelandic needs are fulfilled and tangible foreign policy interests accomplished, more discernible IMET objectives are also being met with the direct linkage between activities of IMET beneficiaries and those of their U.S. military counterparts at the NATO base.

“ . . . . In the final analysis, it was U.S. interest that guided the Congressional decision to provide an IMET program for Iceland years ago, and those interests are even greater today.

“I do not believe that Congress was made aware that in Iceland, 50 percent of our IMET trainees are dedicated volunteers who must strive to come up with the resources on their own and who must use vacation time from their full-time jobs to attend training.”

- *Washington Post*, Oct 8, 1989, p. A56, “Escaped Officer urges U.S. to Shun Mengitsu; Leader of Failed Ethiopian Coup warns Against Accommodation, Cites Weakened Military”: “This is not the time for an accommodation with Mengitsu,” said Maj Gen Kumlachew DeJune . . . Chief Operations Officer for the Coup . . . who attended a 13-month artillery course at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, in 1969 [and] was Deputy Commander of the 2nd Army based in Asmara.”

- *Washington Post*, Oct 17, 1989, p. C1, “The Last Casualty of the Bay of Pigs Decades After the Invasion, the Sad Death of Pepe San Roman”:

“The 29 year-old commander of the 1500-strong 2506 Brigade of Cuban soldiers . . . training in the States at Ft. Benning, GA (where he graduated fourth among 81 men in 1956).”

- *Daily Globe*, Manila, p. 6, Wed., Nov. 29, 1989: “A UP [University of the Philippines] professor who is an anti-bases advocate said Monday that the increasing number of Armed Forces personnel being

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trained in the United States is linked to the pro-bases position paper submitted earlier this year to President Aquino by defense and AFP officials.

Their "position was understandable considering that the 'cream' of the AFP's Officers Corps were products of the Pentagon's International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP)."

The above examples, although diverse, have one thing in common: IMET proved to be beneficial to U.S. interests in one way or another at a given time and location. In some instances, the benefits were quite substantial and directly supportive of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives; in other instances, the benefits are more modest but nonetheless meaningful, especially in situations where IMET promotes a military-to-military relationship and channels of communication which otherwise might not exist.

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# Appendix L

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