
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PERSPECTIVES

U.S. Navy Perspectives on Military Assistance

By

Rear Admiral George A. Huchting
Deputy Director, U.S. Navy International Programs Office

[The following is a reprint of a paper presented at the annual DSAA-DISAM Symposium, "The Dynamics of Military Assistance," on 19 July 1990 in Dayton, Ohio.]

It is a distinct pleasure to join you here today in the heartland of our great nation. As I look around the room I see a cross section of the diverse communities that must all pull together—strongly—as we enter the decade of the 90s. This is, as you all know, a dynamic time, and today I would like to share with you some perspectives from the services—specifically the Navy—on things that must be in our focus as we proceed forward in the execution of our global activities.

The task that I have been assigned today—that of discussing military department perspectives on U.S. military assistance—is a welcome one. What encompassed the military assistance efforts of the past may no longer be an adequate definition for today. According to my dictionary, assistance is defined rather straight forwardly as help or aid. But the question now revolves more around what constitutes that help or aid and through what channels the help or aid can be funneled. What dynamics—political, economic, or social—drive the formulation of our assistance packages?

We are all aware of the changes that are taking place in the governments of Eastern Europe; the unification of Germany now monetarily accomplished, at least in the initial stages, is moving ever forward; Greece has a new government which has resolved some tough issues forthrightly; the Arabian Gulf has for a moment become a bit more settled; Yemen is once again united; portions of Africa are looking for ways of settling differences peacefully. Our neighbors to the South are making progress on a number of fronts; Pacific Rim and Asian countries are economically moving forward; Europe is working toward the EC-92 target; the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] regime is under intense review; new markets are opening for some technologies; and defense budgets in general are tight.

As we thread our way through this ever shifting maze, let us perhaps focus on two or three different issues that seem to overarch military assistance or aid. I will provide these thoughts from the perspective of the Navy Office of International Programs [Navy IPO]. The printed programs you received before the conference indicate that I am the Deputy Director of the Navy Office of Technology Transfer and Security Assistance [NAVOTTSA]. Things change, as in the change from NAVOTTSA to Navy IPO.

One of the results of the Defense Management Review (DMR) was the formation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN-RDA). As that office strives to ensure continuity of the acquisition process—from cradle to grave—likewise all Navy *international* acquisition programs are now on one ship, under the command of the ASN-RDA. Specifically we will focus on international acquisition issues from scientist, data, and information exchanges, to codevelopment and coproduction MOUs, foreign

military sales, export licenses, foreign weapons testing, foreign investment in our business, and foreign availability of technology. The charter of our office provides a unique perspective; we must facilitate the formulation of Navy positions on a wide range of subjects, and we must execute functions that will affect the fortunes of our allies, the fortunes of our business, and also directly impact on USN capabilities. The linkages are there—the trick is keeping the balance amongst competing forces.

From that perspective let me zero in on some issues. As budgets get tight, business competition will get even more tough. At the same time, the effort and cost of producing the next generation systems will become more difficult and the R&D monies must be carefully husbanded. This leaves a situation where countries will be able to make major investments in a warfare area on a more a limited basis and they will want the leading technology to tide them through the years. International and national business competition will be fierce; production lines will suffer economies of scale cycles that will, like billiard balls on a table, impact other budgets worldwide as adjustments take place. This most certainly impacts us at home as well. Overarching the foregoing is the fact that high tech weapons are continuing to spread throughout the world and the world—despite the changes in the Warsaw Pact—is not a really peaceful place.

How far can we let certain technologies go lest we have to fight against that very capability. Wrap around that rather bumpy package the very strong desire, by most nations who are developing a wider, more substantial industrial base, the requirement to coproduce parts of what they buy—at a minimum—and to codevelop the next generation if possible. National economics encourage that—as cost and risks are reduced. The number of partners in codevelopment can affect the ability of the endeavor to meet each national operational requirement, and affect the execution of the program due to technology sharing limitations—limitations which are on the technology of the weapon system as well as on the *production* side of the house.

Another key factor that will affect us all is the transition of the European Community under the aegis of EC-92. What standards will EC-92 use in future product development; how will we have access to these standards; how will national content be calculated; and what national security items will be protected? Don't forget the ongoing effort in COCOM, which may be one of the most significant drivers in how we do business.

Having tried to at least highlight several areas in which the dynamics of the international world will affect us directly, let us go back and look at the question of military assistance. To be sure, the traditional avenues of foreign military and direct commercial sales will be there—we are tough competitors, both from a technological and price basis. Perhaps we will see more emphasis on keeping older systems on line longer; thus, training and logistics will be the strong glue that keeps us all together. Training—both PME and technical as well as logistics—is something we don't take a back seat to any one on. In these traditional areas, we will be supporting a wide range of countries. On one end of the spectrum will be the countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia with highly developed defense acquisition offices here in the U.S., and there will be a balance between their direct commercial and government-to-government programs. On the other end of the spectrum will be the countries in Africa in which, while the dollar value is low, the impact of the effort is significant and the execution—from the technical to logistics, from expectation to actual delivery—is perhaps the hardest to accomplish. There will be the challenge of dealing with the Andean countries as they struggle against the drug lords. The various sources of funds will keep us all busy making sure we get it right the first time. The urgency of the Andean situation demands *flawless execution* of the acquisition laws. We must do it right and quickly.

Our actions must never give anyone an opportunity for a legitimate protest. Protests are a fact of life, but protests increase our work load and, worst of all, delay the equipment acquisition and fielding of an operational capability.

Regardless of the sweat expended in D.C., blood is being shed by the people in the Andes and elsewhere. As direct commercial sales are executed, the challenge to industry and the Services will be not to let the allies get into a position where they are not compatible with main line U.S. systems engineering, training, logistics and interoperability. But let me now suggest that there may be other areas on which—on a military-to-military basis—we may provide assistance to *each other*; for example:

- Looking for really good scientific exchange programs on a reciprocal basis with partners that have a sound potential to contribute toward mutual growth in a specific area.
- Information and data exchanges that are focused toward areas of mutual or complementary benefits and that will fill in gaps on technologies we *really need* to meet an operational *requirement*.
- Going to work with the *right* partners in the *right* manner on a program that is on the front burner, not on the margin. There may be some key to success. Get a limited number of partners so that the product will fulfill all partners requirements. Structure the development so that we avoid bumping into technology transfer concerns as we move forward. Pick a requirement we really need—not one on the margin. The international involvement will—if the program is technically sound and meets a valid requirement—keep the support there, develop an interoperable capability and perhaps free up assets with which to do something else, either within or without the service.
- Coproduction is with us. It supports our allies—militarily by the product, and economically through work shares. We have to do it smart to protect our technological and production base. When discussing coproduction, military assistance means that we must work the issues up front with the Department of Commerce as well as with State and the Agencies within the DOD.
- Technology transfer decisions may be the key to all military assistance and it is one of the most difficult to deal with, but it is the one we had best focus on. It will impact on interoperability, what we will fight against as well as what we will fight with; it will affect our industrial base and production costs which directly can translate into bullets in the Armory—for both ourselves and our allies. We must fully understand the technology that is developing, and we must assist in the formulation of sound release policies. A case in point is the discussion of source codes for computer programs on combat or engineering systems. This has been a long, on-going effort. Making policy by each situation that comes across the desk is not healthy, breeds crisis management, and leaves open the door to the cry of not being evenhanded. Along these lines, in May of this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood promulgated the requirement for a technology assessment/control plan. Let me quote you the first paragraph.

The Department of Defense needs to accelerate the process for reaching decisions on the transfer of classified information and controlled unclassified technical data to foreign governments in support of cooperative programs and the sale of military equipment. Foreign disclosure and security planning should start at the beginning of the weapon system acquisition process and decisions should be systematically applied throughout a weapon system's life cycle.

The services are working to make that happen.

Let me close now with the thought that military assistance will change—is changing—as we assemble here. We must be politically alert, economically engaged, and operationally tuned if we are to seize the initiative to strengthen old alliances and build new bridges into the 90s. Having more than one or two credits in philosophy, along with my business background—let me close with a quotation from the Nicomachaen ethic of Aristotle: “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.” We must take careful aim—together—as we fashion and execute military assistance in the 90s.