
PLANNING FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

By

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
Department of Defense Directive 5132.3 dated 10 March 1981, provides nine specific security assistance responsibilities to be assumed by each of the five U.S. area or geographic Unified Commanders. The first stated responsibility is to "make recommendations to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense on any aspect of security assistance programs, projections, or activities." This tasking coupled with the introductory directive statement, "shall provide to the JCS a military assessment and impact upon security assistance within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR)," provides the Unified Commander a great weapon or tool in performing his duties. Whether it's a weapon or tool depends on how it is used. Both can be constructive or destructive in use, or possibly even worse, ignored and left in the magazine or storage box to rust. The latter is quite often a case of not knowing it's there or lacking the skill or confidence in its use. This article is a discussion of the Unified Commander making recommendations to the JCS and Secretary of Defense specifically in the planning and execution phases of security assistance.

Two preliminary points must be first made. One is that the Unified Commander's position in the generally accepted scheme for security assistance lines of communication is right in the center and, in the positive sense, at or near the beginning of the process. Chart 1 illustrates this position by showing the Unified Commander linked up with the security assistance organization/office (SAO), the Secretary of Defense (through the JCS), each of the military departments, and each country Chief of Mission or Ambassador. The second point is the implied versatility or flexibility given to the Unified Commander by allowing recommendations ". . . on any aspect of security assistance. . ." which can be interpreted by the Unified Commander and his staff as providing a green light for complete participation in the security assistance process for the affected AOR.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING

Before execution or implementation, a coordinated plan must be developed. A plan will not be perfect in every respect and should be flexible enough to adapt to even the most unforeseen circumstance. Security assistance planning must be done to complement the deliberate planning process. The basic question is, "What does a country (or region) need to obviate or enhance U.S. military action in a crisis?" This can range from the ideal of foreign self-sufficiency (political, economic, and military), to partial or temporary U.S. augmentation, to complete, sustained U.S. military action or presence. The deliberate planning process starts with threat assessments and ends up as an operations plan (OPLAN) or a concept plan (CONPLAN) with periodic reassessments. The planner, however, may argue that this plan is insufficient because of resource restrictions or questionable regional access, and this is where security assistance planning is involved. Some available methods for security assistance to augment U.S. plans include: self-sufficiency so U.S. force projection is not needed, U.S. equipped and trained host nation forces to operate alongside deployed U.S. forces, prepositioned equipment and supplies for both host nation and U.S. forces, and assurance of host nation transiting or basing access. Security assistance is used by the Unified Command planner as a force or resource multiplier, and a method to acquire or guarantee access both for routine operations and in a crisis.

CHART 1



The unified commander will assess the proposed, or newly effective, OPLAN/ CONPLAN for points that need reinforcement and determine if regional support is the answer. Usually the answer is long term to final resolution since issues of force incompatibility and politics enter the process. The unified commander must share the plans and points of needed reinforcement with his SAO chiefs with the goal of developing a strategy to include AOR host nations using the concepts of combined operations and coalition warfare.

Security assistance is the tool for building and modernizing host nation forces, and building and sustaining a political relationship for future geographic and resource access. This strategy is the direction the SAO and ultimately the Ambassador needs to guide host nations into developing defense goals compatible to U.S. national interests. Security assistance is the ideal method to achieve these goals. How a country intends to achieve its goals are reflected by the Ambassador (and the SAO) in the joint DOD/State Department required Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA) report. Early detailed liaison between the Unified Commander and the Ambassador (and SAO) for a common country/region specific strategy in support of U.S. national interests is crucial. Liaison is absolutely essential for a useful AIASA submission.

The AIASA process has been criticized for being too structured and not far looking enough. Nothing precludes providing additional information subsequent to and independent of the AIASA submission, since the AIASA is submitted eighteen months before the subject fiscal year and requires an additional three year projection which amounts to over five years into the future. This is going to be especially critical starting with the FY 1992 budget submission because the FY 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act requires all future annual assistance requests to Congress be done on a four-year projection basis.

Using the "make recommendations" and "provide a military assessment" functions, the Unified Commander is required to comment on each country team AIASA submission addressing the following three areas:

- Recommend equipment and capabilities required to enhance *cooperative* defense and regional security and meet other legitimate national defense needs.
- Assess how each country might *complement* U.S. forces and *cooperative* defense objectives.
- Provide specific explanations of U.S. *objectives to be supported* by U.S. assistance.

Each country's assistance plan should be compatible with the Unified Commander's U.S. national security plan. It is implied that the U.S. defense plan drives the security assistance plan.

Also of significance is that a Unified Commander should also consider being involved with the security assistance plans for countries in adjacent AORs as "overall U.S. defense *coordination*" among Unified Commanders. Examples include Pakistan and India, Egypt and Israel, or any Caribbean country and any Caribbean littoral country. Because of nonspecific wording, recent years' AIASA submission guidance could be interpreted as allowing inter-AOR Unified Commander comments to be made. Two traditional enemies in different AORs do not preclude the need for coordinated OPLAN/CONPLAN with complementary security assistance plans which are initially brought forth in coordinated AIASA submissions. These AIASA submissions would then be commented upon by both "appropriate" Unified Commanders.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE IMPLEMENTATION

The Unified Commander's recommendation and military assessment responsibilities do not stop with the AIASA submission. A well thought-out plan can go out the window in a very dynamic world, i.e., the crumbling Iron Curtain, a sudden military coup, an unexpected invasion and takeover, or loss of assumed basing access. Assistance is needed immediately, but the once thought perfect OPLAN and complementary assistance plan did not account for and include the unforeseen situation. The Unified Commander may be in a crisis management mode, and may quickly put together a new OPLAN or flesh out a once generic CONPLAN into an OPLAN. The generic assistance plan must take into consideration the newly developing U.S. national strategy and supporting OPLAN. Some questions to be asked are, "What is needed in the crumbling country?" and "What can the U.S. provide in a timely fashion?" At this point, the Unified Commander does not have the time to go through the deliberate planning, security assistance strategy development, and AIASA submission processes. Again, the Unified Commander must quickly identify resource weaknesses in the new plan with the idea that foreign military forces, facilities, or bases be used either by or alongside U.S. forces. Security assistance would be the mechanism to repair the potential weak points in the U.S. plan.

A second question involving timeliness must also be considered in the form of plan reality or practicality. The identification of OPLAN weaknesses or uncertainties to be filled by foreign resources, which in turn require security assistance, is the same as the peacetime or long term planning process but is significantly time compressed. However, realism enters the picture when practical questions need real answers. A sample scenario sequence may be as follows:

- Country Alpha needs an armored presence to counter a threatened invasion. The U.S. cannot provide U.S. M1 tanks for thirty days because of distance.

- In the long term, Country Alpha needs its own M1 tanks so that continued U.S. presence is not required. Further complicating the situation is that Country Alpha is a net importing country with a low per capita income and education, and no immediate prospect of economic growth. Specifically, both U.S. financial and hardware assistance is needed now.

- The Unified Commander quickly identifies the security assistance need in addition to the immediate U.S. military force assistance. The latter will not be further addressed in this scenario.

- The Unified Commander recommends to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense that M1 tanks be made available to Country Alpha as soon as possible. He uses the leverage of his responsibility, authority, senior rank, and urgency of the situation to strengthen the recommendation. But M1 tanks nor any other type of tank are not in the General Dynamics warehouse for immediate transfer, especially for free (grant basis). Alternatives are needed.

- Being briefed by his staff of DISAM graduates, the Unified Commander suggests using the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) M1 tank stocks for the immediate availability and using the FAA Section 506 (special Presidential drawdown authority), AECA Section 21 (b) or 22 (d) (delayed payment), or FAA Section 614 (special authorities) for immediate funding resolution. The unified command staff promptly remembers their formal recommendation of three years ago which was approved for the SDAF purchase and stocking of M1 tanks. [Ed. note: See also "An Analysis of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund," elsewhere in this issue.]

- The Unified Commander's recommendation is approved and M1 tanks are released from SDAF stocks for immediate shipment, using security assistance crisis action funding options. The Commander did not waste one of his proverbial silver bullets to get the tanks but wisely used the "system" as intended.

However, suppose the SDAF stocks did not have M1 tanks but only had M60 tanks or not even the M60s. Or suppose Country Alpha had no expertise (quite likely the case) in M1 tanks but had M60 tanks in their inventory. The Unified Commander then can recommend immediate delivery of M60 tanks in the interim until M1 tanks with appropriate support and training are available. If the SDAF has no M60 tanks, then the options of Excess Defense Articles using FAA Section 644 (general availability for sale), FAA Section 514 (stockpiling for certain countries: NATO, Korea, Thailand, and now Israel), FAA Section 516 (Southern Region Amendment countries: Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, and now Morocco, Pakistan, and Senegal) or FAA Section 517 (certain major illicit drug producing countries) should be considered. Other than transportation and follow-on support, the last two options (Sections 516 and 517) are grant transfers.

Other M60 (or even M1) options include third country transfers or leasing from U.S. stocks. The former is authorized by AECA Section 3(d) and requires U.S. permission for the transfer. The financial arrangement is a matter between Country Alpha and the third country. The latter (leasing) is authorized by AECA Sections 61 through 64 and involves appropriate costs to Country Alpha for a maximum of five years (renewable). This amounts to a temporary rental of a military capability. A point to remember is that nothing is free and political factors are ever present. The end item transfer may be free but subsequent repair parts, consumables, training, and host country support infrastructure installation must be financed, acquired and sustained. The political factors for the acquisition, transfer, and host nation use accountability, are extremely complex and always dynamic.

The Unified Commander must assume a primary role for responsible security assistance implementation in his AOR. The tools are there for his use and many times he has to leverage the priorities for planning and implementation if his strategy and OPLAN/CONPLANS are to work

effectively. Knowledge of the relationships among deliberate planning, security assistance planning, and AIASA submission processes is critical. Knowledge of security assistance options for crisis management is just as important, if not more so. Education, advance planning, and constant review are the answers for readiness to execute.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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