
International Narcotics Control: Andean Strategy Update

By

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I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Task Force today to discuss the progress that we have made on the Administration's Andean Strategy, with particular focus on Colombia. The Task Force has been very supportive of the Andean Strategy, and we appreciate your interest and your support of our efforts to implement a sound and effective program.

I particularly welcome this opportunity to discuss these issues because I believe that we are reaching a crossroads in our narcotics control efforts.

In a major initiative in 1989, the President outlined a bold plan to address the challenge of narcotics trafficking to our well being and to the institutions and survival of key friends and allies. We all recognized at the time the challenges and difficulties inherent in embarking upon this new effort. We knew it would not be easy to uproot the entrenched trafficking organizations, to reduce our own national demand for drugs, to assist other countries in programs to eliminate production and trafficking, and to develop a spirit of international commitment and cooperation. We began with a full awareness of the obstacles to building and sustaining domestic and international consensus on action, especially at a time when there are pressing demands on limited resources. Yet, the urgency of the situation and the reality of the perils of drug trafficking to our own and others' interests brought us together to conceive, and then approve, a strategy to address a common threat to our nation.

That strategy could not have gone forward without the partnership between Congress and the Administration and the support of the public. It could not have flourished but for the support and cooperation of our friends and allies. We have come a long way in a short time. International cooperation and a shared sense of the importance of the issue is further advanced than I thought reasonable just a short while ago. We have made considerable progress in every area of endeavor, and we can reasonably expect even greater progress.

But I also see the potential for the effort to unravel because of a steady erosion of funding, of consensus, and of the support it needs to allow the program sufficient flexibility and time. I have watched with regret, for example, recent media attention focusing on [Colombian drug lord Pablo] Escobar's prison environment rather than on the fact that he is in prison.

Concentrating on Escobar's terms of surrender and his prison amenities does not ensure his conviction but tends to trivialize the fact of his surrender and the sacrifice that Colombia has made in bringing him and others to the bar. President Gaviria has stated that Escobar will receive "the harshest sentence possible" We must be prepared to move ahead collectively and help Colombia strengthen its judicial system so that it can deal with the Pablo Escobars.

We want to see justice done. We want to see the Colombian legal system work, to demonstrate to the world and to Colombia that years of violence and intimidation must now yield to law and due process. That will take time and patience.

Our plan calls for a 5-year undertaking. It is based on a program to reinvigorate domestic and international efforts to deal comprehensively with the trafficking of cocaine. It encompasses building close cooperation with the key Andean states as well as creating more effective means within our own system to respond to the challenge. It is a multi-year effort because we recognize that the scope and scale of the problem will not yield to short-lived or simplistic solutions. Sustaining a long-term effort, however, is not easy. If, as we believe, we are beginning to see real signs of progress in this multi-year effort, we must enhance our support; otherwise, we will progressively undermine our ability to carry the program forward.

I would like to turn to a brief review of the essential features of our effort and to cover some of the signs that I believe indicate that we are on the right track.

THE ANDES

Our program in the Andes demonstrates what can be done in a relatively brief period, despite continuing problems with political will, corruption, and human rights. We have developed an integrated effort, in conjunction with the three Andean countries, that combines economic, law enforcement, and military assistance in a phased plan that takes into consideration the range of complexities inherent in dealing with the drug issue. These programs are now in varying stages of implementation.

The central components of our program seek the commitment of the host governments and the enhancement of their legal structures and enforcement capabilities in order to disrupt and dismantle trafficking organizations. We are also working with these governments to improve their economic performance to offset the adverse effects of eliminating coca or cocaine production. Creating the necessary political will to deal with narcotics corruption and other impediments is a vital component of the strategy. Additionally, we are seeking to ensure greater respect for human rights by these governments.

Although we are only in the second year of a multi-year effort, there have been some notable achievements. Our programs and the cooperation and commitment of these governments—often in the face of brutally violent trafficking reactions—have resulted in increased seizures, arrests, surrenders, confiscation of assets, and signs of disarray within some of the trafficking organizations. Their costs of doing business have definitely risen, and their operations have been harassed and hampered.

With only the first year's funding and training actually on the ground and FY 1991 funds in the pipeline, already we are starting to see an increased drumbeat of major operations going off one after another in Colombia and Bolivia.

Vigorous local law enforcement efforts, crop eradication projects, and U.S. support for host country interdiction operations helped to disrupt the cartels' activities, which in turn lowered leaf prices and undermined the purchasing networks in Bolivia, where voluntary eradication eliminated 8,000 hectares of coca plants in 1990 alone. New cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the principal coca growing area in Peru, has stabilized. Marijuana cultivation in Colombia has been virtually eliminated.

Our major focus is law enforcement. We have helped to improve counter-narcotics cooperation with the police in all three countries. INM funding is a major support for the anti-drug

police in all three countries, with additional technical assistance provided by DEA (U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency), and training and equipment provided also through military assistance. A majority of our military assistance goes to support local enforcement efforts in the three countries, either through direct supplies, equipment, and training to police units, or through indirect support to military units that aid the police in their operations.

In Colombia the military has supported the police through air transport, as well as through their own direct anti-narcotics operations. Bolivian air force and navy units provide dedicated transport to police units on missions. In Peru, the military will be responsible for security for police units on operations and for alternative development efforts in the conflictive Upper Huallaga Valley. In addition, in remote regions or dangerous conditions, some military units are assigned counter-narcotics missions in Bolivia.

We recently concluded an umbrella agreement with Peru to shape our cooperative effort there, and we see a constructive, if limited, role for the military in that program. The Peruvian air force has intercepted and forced down several trafficker aircraft in the Upper Huallaga Valley and along the borders, leading to the arrests of the passengers and modest seizures of cash and coca paste. The number of daylight trafficker flights has diminished sharply, and we understand the narco-pilots are asking for higher payments.

We know that the impact of these efforts in all three countries has a ripple effect which disrupts trafficking operations and raises the costs of their business. Moreover, our efforts have not been limited to interdiction.

We have also worked to develop economic assistance programs linked to counter-narcotics efforts. These programs include macro-economic measures and more focused efforts to give those people involved in coca production a viable economic alternative. We are convinced that in certain situations, such as the one currently faced by Peru, a comprehensive economic assistance program linked to narcotics cooperation is the only way to stabilize the country and permanently displace narcotics in the Peruvian underground economy.

Politically, the Andean governments have fulfilled many of the expectations of the Cartagena Declaration. In addition to agreements signed at Cartagena, the Andean states have undertaken a number of activities:

- All three have adopted OAS model legislation on precursor chemicals.
- Bolivia has ratified the 1988 UN convention, signed agreements on tax information exchange, essential chemicals, public awareness, and weapons control.
- Peru has signed agreements on tax information exchange, essential chemicals, public awareness, and has exchanged notes with the U.S. on extradition.
- Colombia has signed agreements on asset sharing and essential chemicals with the U.S.

Several areas, however, pose problems to implementing an effective narcotics control program in the Andean region.

Although we believe that President Fujimori of Peru has the necessary political will to implement an effective counter-narcotics program, his efforts are hampered by a collapsed economy, anarchy, wanton terrorism, and widespread corruption.

In Bolivia, government corruption continues to compromise counter-narcotics operations and slow down narcotics-related redevelopment efforts.

While Colombia has implemented the most effective counter-narcotics effort over the last two years, we are entering a new phase where Colombia's judicial and democratic institutions will be severely tested by surrendering drug lords such as Pablo Escobar. The [Colombian] constituent assembly has also banned extradition, and there may be some indications that major trafficking figures, like the Ochoas, have kept trafficking organizations intact despite their surrender. I will be addressing the Escobar issue later in my testimony.

We are continuing our efforts to have a positive influence in these areas, keeping in mind that we are working on an issue that ultimately affects fragile social, economic, and political institutions of sovereign countries. Nevertheless, we are conscious of the necessity to press the narcotics issue in order to succeed over the long term:

1. We are working with law enforcement agencies and the Andean militaries to increase substantially the pace of laboratory destruction and to dismantle trafficking organizations. Our goal in this area is to improve performance of host country operations to a point that significantly disrupts cocaine traffic and networks. We continue to work toward training and equipping law enforcement personnel so that they are prepared to take on sophisticated trafficker operations. Our model for what we wish to accomplish has been amply demonstrated by the Colombia program.

2. We are developing new international mechanisms to address money laundering and the flow of precursor and essential chemicals. We have solidified our ties in this area with the Europeans through the Dublin Group [which includes the EC member states, the European Commission, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and the United States], which addresses the Andean narcotics problem and is aimed at denying the traffickers essential chemicals and any further inroads into the relatively small European narcotics market. The Andean states also participate actively in the constructive work of the multilateral Chemical Action Task Force, along with delegations from Europe, North America, and Asia.

3. We are developing cooperative programs to deal with violations of human rights and corruption. All three countries require a presidential determination under the 1990 INCA (international narcotics control act). Colombia and Bolivia received these determinations earlier in the year. We withheld judgment on Peru at the time. Peru is our greatest concern in all three of the areas above, and we are closely engaged with the Fujimori Administration in supporting its efforts to turn around a situation which has existed for several Peruvian administrations.

4. Currently, we are working closely with our missions in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to develop approaches to address specific problem areas such as judicial reform, public diplomacy, eradication efforts, control of precursor chemicals, money laundering, and economic support.

The goal, based on a continuing assessment of the performance of the Andean states, is to carry forward the progress we have made and address the shortcomings we have noted. Knowing that we must sustain a vigorous program, we are determined to pursue those efforts that have produced results, reassess those that have not, and seek new approaches that will enhance our chances of success.

The Administration's policy is to provide legitimate governments with resources needed to establish control over areas currently controlled or heavily influenced by drug trafficking and narco-financed insurgent groups. Our goal is to help create a favorable environment for effective government sponsored alternative development and interdiction programs.

THE U.S. MILITARY ROLE

Before moving on to country-specific summaries, let me clarify a point that comes up repeatedly in the press here and in the Andes. There has been considerable comment recently about the possibility or even the intention of militarizing the drug war, of indiscriminately employing U.S. forces in Latin America, or of supporting local militaries at the expense of civilian institutions. Let me be clear: it is not our policy to fight someone else's drug fight. We never have—nor will we ever—force military assistance on any of the drug producing countries. Nor do we have any intention of sending U.S. military forces into the Andean countries to fight the drug war.

The assistance we do provide, at the request of host governments, is not designed to create large new forces. Rather, we aim to create the specialized skills and units (both law enforcement and military) required to conduct or support meaningful counter-narcotics operations. We do not do this to engage in counterinsurgency or to introduce U.S. forces into the region by the back door. Our objective is to assist local governments and narcotics law enforcement units to cope with their problems, to emphasize the need to respect human rights, and to equip and train them to address the increasingly complex nature of the drug problem. This is a necessity forced upon us and our allies by the resources available to the traffickers and their insurgent auxiliaries as a result of their willingness to use whatever force is needed to achieve their goals.

COLOMBIA

The Government of Colombia continues its efforts against traffickers and has seriously disrupted the cocaine processing industry. Colombian Government interdiction operations resulted in seizures of over 53 metric tons of cocaine, the arrest of 7,000 suspected traffickers, and the destruction of over 200 cocaine processing labs in 1990.

While most counter-narcotics operations were spearheaded by the national police, the Colombian military also became involved in the war on drugs in 1990, accounting for a 19-ton seizure during *Operation Petrolera*. Since September 1989, the Colombian Government has captured or killed more than 50 major traffickers, extraditing 24 of them to the United States. So far in 1991, the Colombian Government has seized over 53 metric tons (mt) of cocaine and dismantled several major narco-terrorist cells in the employ of the Medellin Cartel. The national police has also destroyed 40 major cocaine producing laboratories and 58 clandestine airstrips while making 1,500 drug-related arrests. It is estimated that these targets were equally divided between the two major trafficking cartels.

Despite the surrounding controversy, the entire leadership of the Medellin Cartel is behind bars. Many of the complex, multi-service, heliborne operations against trafficking and air resources were facilitated by U.S. assistance which helped sustain Colombian Government operational efforts and kept the focus on key targets.

Colombia's progress in attacking these organizations exceeds what we anticipated 2 years ago. In the course of these anti-narcotics operations, the Colombians have endured unrelenting pressure from drug traffickers and insurgent groups that has produced thousands of casualties as the result of indiscriminate bombings and assassinations, as well as targeted attacks on public officials, the police, and the military. In 1990, the Colombian national police suffered 420 casualties at the hands of traffickers, and, thus far in 1991, just the anti-narcotics unit of the National Police has lost more than 30 men. Nevertheless, as noted above, the government continues its vigorous efforts.

Moreover, the government, despite the narco-generated violence and provocation, also continues to take effective action to curb official human rights abuses, including the creation of an aggressive watchdog agency and the dismissal of human rights abusers in the armed forces and police. Special courts to handle terrorism have been set up which can dispense justice more effectively and thereby deter any retaliatory abuses by government forces. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the traffickers resort to extreme violence to achieve their goals, ignoring all human rights standards.

They also resort to vigorous disinformation campaigns against the government which are designed to discredit legitimate governmental institutions. False claims of abuse, which must be investigated, tie up resources, confuse the issue, and help to demoralize the police.

While Colombian forces have inflicted significant damage on the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel as well as an emerging new cartel on the North Coast have not yet been targeted as aggressively. We continue to press the Colombians on this issue and are convinced that the cartels cannot be broken unless enforcement pressure is exerted on all of them at once.

At this time, I would like to address the issue of the surrender of Pablo Escobar and other major traffickers under President Gaviria's plea bargaining decree. The Government of President Cesar Gaviria used a risky two-track policy to deal with the power of the trafficking cartels and trafficker manipulation of the emotional extradition issue. By applying strong police pressure against traffickers, Gaviria induced Escobar and other major traffickers to surrender under this plea bargaining decree which guarantees reduced sentences and no extradition to the United States. The media coverage surrounding Escobar's surrender has focused on the cosmetic rather than on the essential.

The reality of Escobar's physical surroundings in jail, which has been exaggerated, is not the central issue. What is of fundamental importance is the fact that Escobar is in jail. President Gaviria's plea bargaining process, not foreign to our own system, is not a program to let Escobar and other traffickers off. We should now give the Colombian Government the opportunity to let Gaviria's plan to strengthen the Colombian judiciary and prosecute Escobar and others in Colombia a chance to work. We should remember that it has been Colombia that has borne the principal burden of drug-related violence. We must also keep in mind that 18 months ago Escobar and his cartel were directly attacking government institutions and were a direct threat to Colombian democracy itself. Today, most of those traffickers are dead or behind bars.

At the same time, we must do everything possible to ensure that justice is done. President Gaviria has pledged that his government will do everything possible to convict Escobar of his crimes and issue the harshest punishment possible. He has also promised that trafficking from jail cells by Escobar, the Ochoas or anyone else will not be tolerated. Trafficking from jail will result in traffickers losing all benefits obtained by surrendering under plea bargaining decrees.

For President Gaviria's plan to succeed and for justice to be served, we must assist the Colombian Government [to] strengthen the judiciary so that traffickers can be successfully prosecuted and incarcerated in Colombia. For that reason, the U.S. Agency for International Development plans to authorize \$36 million of NSD [National Security Directive]-18 economic support funds to support a multi-year comprehensive justice sector support project designed to strengthen the Colombian judicial system. The goal of the project is to improve the administration, operation, and effectiveness of the Colombian judicial system. Achievement of this goal will improve the capability of the Government of Colombia to bring narco-traffickers and narco-terrorists to justice and strengthen fundamental democratic institutions in Colombia.

A key portion of the administration of justice program will be the judicial protection program designed to protect judges involved in narcotics cases from intimidation. This program is already underway and has distributed armored cars and bulletproof vests to special order court judges involved in narcotics cases. Planning is currently underway to provide training and, although some major traffickers have surrendered, it is too early to determine whether the judicial system will be strong enough to withstand trafficker intimidation and corruption. However, through our assistance to strengthen the judicial system and an agreement on evidence sharing that is already in force, the Colombian Government will stand a far better chance of succeeding.

Concerning human rights, President Gaviria has made frequent public statements that his administration will not tolerate human rights abuses by government officials, and, in 1990, Colombia's *Procuraduria* (an independent government watchdog agency) stepped up enforcement through a series of aggressive investigations into human rights violations committed by security forces personnel. The investigations have resulted in the dismissals of a number of civilian officials and military officers and enlisted men. On their own initiative, the military and police are also dismissing some human rights violators.

President Gaviria has made it clear he is committed to making his new system work and remains committed to the war on drugs. We remain concerned, however, that the trafficker cartels arrayed against the Colombian Government continue to wield considerable influence in blunting the rule of law in Colombia. It is in our interest to support the Colombian Government's efforts to strengthen its judicial system while increasing the tempo of enforcement activities.

BOLIVIA

We have made considerable progress in our relationship with Bolivia. The overall operational tempo is up, cooperation is extensive, and we have had a number of significant successes. The Government of Bolivia has accepted the principle of performance based U.S. assistance and continues to cooperate on counter-narcotics efforts. The cooperation we receive, however, is considerably below the potential of the Bolivian Government and is an indication that corruption continues to be a critical factor in holding back the counter-narcotics program. Nevertheless, we have made significant progress in Bolivia in a very short time.

Major law enforcement achievements in 1990 included:

- Dismantling of the notorious "Meco" Dominguez trafficking network, resulting in the arrest of Dominguez and his closest associates;
- Destruction of processing laboratories; and
- Seizure of important records, assets, real estate, and commercial enterprises.

More recently, we have assisted the Bolivian authorities in a number of operations aimed at disrupting trafficker activity in the region. These have resulted in numerous arrests and seizures of aircraft and of drugs. These types of major endeavors, which are ongoing, underscore the progress we have made in improving local capabilities and in working with police, military, and civilian authorities.

The Government of Bolivia, in a recent counter-narcotics law enforcement operation against the largest syndicate of trafficker organizations in country, regained control over the trafficker town of Santa Ana De Yacuma, a frontier town in the cocaine processing and transshipment region of the Beni Department. The operation included an impressive coordinated raid by some 600 Bolivian rural narcotics police, air force, navy, army, and national police. Results of the operation include

the seizure of 39 aircraft and the arrest of Renato Roca Suarez, the subject of outstanding indictments in the United States. He is the brother of Jorge Roca Suarez, a major Bolivian trafficker arrested in California [in] September 1990. There were no casualties.

Recognition at the highest levels of the Bolivian Government that corruption poses a serious impediment to all U.S. assistance programs was precipitated by the surprise appointment of an individual (Rico Toro) with known narcotics connections (and other dubious activities) to head the Special Force for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking—the principal Bolivian Government counter-narcotics organization. President Paz Zamora accepted the resignation of Rico Toro, as well as [of] the minister of interior and the chief of the national police. Additionally, the Bolivian Government is cooperating in removing other corrupt law enforcement officials.

Although still only a fledging effort, the Bolivian navy's Riverine Task Force has improved operational effectiveness by stepping up patrols to deny uncontested use of the rivers for movement of precursor chemicals and cocaine products. The Government of Bolivia agreed to include its army in support of the counter-narcotics effort. Counter-narcotics rural mobile patrol units of the national police demonstrated increasing willingness to initiate raids and operations.

Bolivian forces, assisted by U.S. Government agencies, have improved short-term operations against drug trafficking and production. Sustained enforcement efforts and overproduction depressed coca leaf prices, encouraging voluntary eradication. As a result, the Government of Bolivia achieved in 1990 a net reduction in coca cultivation by eradicating 8,087 hectares of the crop.

The Government of Bolivia continues to face major challenges in its counter-narcotics campaign. While the government has increased law enforcement efforts, trafficking organizations have kept pace by diversifying their marketing of refined cocaine and by demonstrating a greater willingness to use violence to resist law enforcement. Widespread corruption, compounded by the Bolivian Government's weakness in implementing policy, further combined to hamper the effectiveness of counter-narcotics programs in 1990.

PERU

Peru presents the most difficult situation because of the complexity of its problems. The performance is not always what we would like to see. Even so, the Fujimori Administration has publicly committed itself to fight narcotics traffickers and their insurgent allies, and to adhere to international human rights standards. But, as a new government with a wide range of serious internal problems, it has moved slowly and sometimes uncertainly toward developing a comprehensive strategy. There is, however, significant support within the government and in the public for developing a workable counter-narcotics program in cooperation with the United States.

In late 1990 and early 1991, these developments produced some results. The Peruvian air force, for example, has based interceptors at the police counter-narcotics base at Santa Lucia and forced down several trafficker aircraft. In two of these aircraft, authorities arrested five suspected traffickers and seized 220 kg of cocaine. Further, the military zone commander in the Upper Huallaga Valley [UHV] agreed to cooperate with police counter-narcotics activities and rescinded the "prior notice" requirement which had previously resulted in leaks of information from Peruvian officials to traffickers. The Peruvian army has also assigned security squads to the counter-narcotics police base at Santa Lucia, further demonstrating a strengthened commitment.

There has been a noticeable movement of trafficking activities away from these counter-narcotics efforts to the northern part of the UHV, as well as a shift to night-time, dusk, and dawn flights to evade enforcement efforts. Efforts which raise the costs of doing business and disrupt

trafficking networks are the initial steps in dismantling the narcotics business. Even in Peru, where we have yet to deliver any of the major new elements of the enhanced effort, we have seen increased activity and commitment.

President Fujimori has been closely engaged in bilateral discussions regarding a comprehensive strategy which addresses all aspects of the Peruvian counter-narcotics effort. The plans would not only include enforcement operations, but also the restructuring of land titling regulations and provision of credit to coca farmers to help them develop licit crops. The strategy and plans for Peru are based not only on the Cartagena Declaration, but also upon the recently concluded umbrella agreement, which clearly discusses the issues and understandings upon which the United States and the Government of Peru will implement the comprehensive counter-narcotics program. The program will be detailed in three annexes covering law enforcement, military, and economic assistance. Thus far, we have concluded only the law enforcement annex with the Peruvian Government.

Despite productive discussions, the Fujimori Administration is up against endemic corruption, a legacy of human rights abuses, and formidable economic, social, and political problems. Military forces in the Andean emergency zones frequently resort to extrajudicial violence while trying to defend the Peruvian Government from two of the world's most violent terrorist groups as well as narco-terrorists. The government has publicly stated its determination to respect human rights and is developing initiatives—such as a human rights commission—to that end. We are aware that Peru must receive a presidential determination under the 1990 INCA in order to receive U.S. assistance in FY 1991. To date, we have not made this determination.

TRADE

The United States supports efforts by drug producer and transit countries to export products that provide a secure base for employment and foreign exchange earnings as an alternative to drug production and trafficking. The long-term aim is to develop sustainable economic growth based on legitimate trade. The United States is pursuing a range of hemispheric trade programs, including the proposed Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative [EAI].

The recently introduced ATPA will provide duty-free access to the U.S. market for a broad range of imports from the Andean region for 10 years. Duty-free treatment should help to provide the Andean countries the opportunity to develop a basis for expanded trade and reduce their dependence on the illegal drug economy. In addition, the Administration is pursuing implementation of the EAI to improve economic growth, increase trade, and promote investment in Latin America. Bilateral framework agreements have already been signed with 11 Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Besides the ATPA, the two "rounds" of Andean trade initiatives have also offered the Andean countries technical assistance to help improve trade performance, accelerated negotiations within the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT], improved access under our Generalized System of Preferences, and expanded agricultural development assistance and technical cooperation. After consultations with our major trading partners, they, too, have taken steps to help the Andean countries improve their trade performance.

CONCLUSION

The Andean Strategy is having an effect. For the first time in a decade, there was a halt in the rise of coca cultivation. Total coca cultivation, which had been increasing annually by as much as 10 to 20 percent, levelled off; in Bolivia and Colombia, it declined. The level of police enforcement activities and operations has grown; seizures are up significantly, and, while I do not

want to stress a "body count" mentality, what these reflect is better intelligence, greater coordination, and enhanced cooperation, a coming together of local effort and US support in more effective ways.

To a considerable degree, this increased tempo and the supportive environment that has made it possible are a direct result of U.S. willingness to increase its levels of support as a sign of its engagement and commitment. To retreat from that now, to signal to our friends and allies, who have undertaken significant actions, that we will not carry through on our commitments is likely to have a detrimental, long-term effect on our counter-narcotics program. What we are all interested in is performance and results. I believe that we are getting those, but they are only interim signs. It is too soon to draw the conclusion either that we have won or that we have lost. Genius is one part inspiration and nine parts perseverance. We have had the inspiration. It is now time to persevere.

There is no question that serious problems with corruption, ineffectiveness of law enforcement efforts, human rights abuses, and lack of political will to attack the drug trade remain as obstacles to success in the immediate future. The traffickers continue to be strong and rich and able to adapt to changing circumstances. To achieve further success, we must continue to work cooperatively at home and with our friends overseas. We must continue our commitment and sustain our resolve.