
Curbing Destabilizing Arms Transfers

By

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This Administration has assigned a very high priority to preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles that can deliver them.

We have been at work over the past three years developing and implementing new initiatives in all these areas. We have strengthened and expanded the international control regimes. We have increased the equipment and technology subject to export controls, both in the United States and multilaterally.

We have undertaken regional initiatives to stop proliferation in volatile areas of the world. And we have inaugurated a process for dealing with conventional arms transfers.

Let me first discuss some of these achievements and then recount the problem areas which are our current focus.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The international institutions dealing with nuclear proliferation have been greatly strengthened under American leadership. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has expanded. Long-time powerful holdouts such as China and South Africa have joined, and France is about to join.

In addition, many countries have adopted stricter conditions on their nuclear-related exports. Twenty-seven countries—the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group—have agreed to the long-standing U.S. position on "full-scope safeguards"—that a country receiving any significant new nuclear-related supplies must have safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.

The international lists of items controlled for nuclear proliferation reasons have been updated and expanded. At U.S. initiative, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed on April 3 to control a substantial list of dual-use, nuclear-related equipment and technology.

In sum, these advances mean a substantially stronger institutional framework for nuclear non-proliferation. They heighten the barriers to obtaining nuclear technology by countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

REGIONAL GAINS

We have also made gains on some pressing regional nuclear problems. Argentina and Brazil have both renounced nuclear weapons ambitions. If things continue to go well, they may soon be taken entirely off the map of nuclear proliferation concerns.

Our long-time concerns about South African nuclear weapons ambitions have been alleviated. That country has now acceded to the NPT and promptly completed its NPT safeguards agreement. We have set back Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs were heavily damaged during the Gulf War, and those that remain are subject to destruction under international supervision. Long-term international monitoring will be conducted to assure these programs are not rebuilt.

We have made an important start on the North Korean nuclear problem by strongly encouraging the North-South dialogue and nuclear inspection agreement and pressing North Korea fully to implement its nuclear obligations under the NPT.

MULTILATERAL CONTROLS

There have been major positive developments to strengthen multilateral controls of missile technology. Key supplier countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, have toughened their national export controls.

Institutional membership has expanded dramatically. The Missile Technology Control Regime—MTCR—responsible for combating missile proliferation has grown from 7 to 18 member nations, and at least two more will join this year.

The list of controlled items has been revised and updated. The MTCR has extended the scope of its efforts to include missiles capable of delivering all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons.

The United States has persuaded key supplier countries to apply strict MTCR missile export control standards. These include Russia and China. Argentina now observes MTCR-equivalent controls, as does Israel. Several East European countries are in the process of doing likewise.

Beyond this, the MTCR is conducting an active outreach program to non-member countries to help them assure effective missile export controls. On March 30, [1992], the United States—with contributions by other MTCR partners—hosted a seminar for nations of Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the former Soviet Union.

U.S. CONTROLS

The United States has tightened its own controls on missile technology. Under our Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative, licenses will soon be required for any exports to missile projects in the Middle East and in certain other countries of proliferation concern.

Under a U.S. law enacted in 1990, we have imposed missile trade sanctions on foreign entities in several nations, including China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, and Iran.

This means that almost all sources of missile technology have now been closed off to proliferant countries. Only North Korea is still exporting complete MTCR-class missile systems.

We have gotten a number of countries out of the missile business. Argentina, last year, announced the termination of its Condor Ballistic Missile Program. Iraqi missile programs are subject to UN efforts to dismantle them.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (CBW) CONTROLS

Important steps have also been taken against the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The international institution dealing with CBW proliferation—the "Australia Group"—has become stronger and larger. Membership has expanded from 20 to 22 members, including newest members Finland and Sweden.

The list of internationally controlled CBW-related goods has jumped dramatically under U.S. prodding. In 1990-91, the United States greatly expanded its own list of controlled chemical weapons precursors—from 11 to 50 worldwide—and introduced controls on chemical and biological weapons-related, dual-use equipment and whole chemical plants. Now, all Australia Group members are adopting these same strict controls.

There have been regional achievements as well. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile last year agreed to a chemical and biological weapons-free zone.

East European CBW export controls have multiplied. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are meeting the high Australia Group export control standards. Other countries are joining the trend to better controls. Israel, China, and, to some extent, India have adopted export controls in this field as well.

The net result of these persistent efforts has been to choke off most of the traditional sources of supply for chemical and biological weapons programs.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

The five major conventional arms suppliers have begun moving toward responsibility, transparency, and consultation on conventional arms transfers. Concerning responsibility, the five have acknowledged their special obligation for insuring that their arms transfers do not undermine stability.

Regarding transparency, they have also agreed that we must exchange information about arms sales in order to identify and avert destabilizing arms transfers.

In the way of consultation, the five have agreed, for the first time, to make their arms transfers subject to debate and criticism and to abide by common guidelines concerning arms transfers.

In short, the five have agreed to apply the collective reason of the five to decisions they—except for the United States—do not share with their own parliaments. This is not business as usual. It is both new and important.

PRESENT FOCUS

Institutionally, our top priority is to get a chemical weapons convention completed this year as a basic framework for dealing with chemical weapons. There are several regional problems that warrant our continuing attention.

- On North Korea, we need to assure that the North carries out fully its nuclear commitments. These include nuclear inspections under the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and its bilateral agreement with the South. We need to continue pressure on North Korea to stop its uncontrolled missile technology transfers.

- We are making a start on South Asian non-proliferation. Our proposal for a five-power conference is an important step in the right direction, and our bilateral discussions are continuing. Four of five participants have agreed to the conference, and we continue to engage India with a view toward obtaining its participation as well.

- In the Middle East, we will continue to insist on Iraqi compliance with its obligations to destroy and not rebuild its weapons of mass destruction. Iran has increased its efforts to obtain missiles and weapons of mass destruction and expanded its conventional weapons capability. We will keep Iran under very close scrutiny.

- We will need to assure that Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union do not become new sources of supply or brain power for countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. Initiatives are underway to help strengthen export controls, improve nuclear material accountancy and control and physical protection, and to redirect scientists in meaningful non-military endeavors. Our contacts with the newly independent states have been encouraging.

On conventional weapons transfers, we intend to move the process forward by holding a plenary meeting this spring.

REVIEW OF PROLIFERATION DEVELOPMENTS

Nuclear Controls: Cooperating Countries Increase, Controls Are Tightened. Several important steps to further nuclear non-proliferation have been taken in the last 3 years.

Important new members have been added to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China has acceded to the NPT, and France is expected to do so soon. South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also adhered to the NPT since the beginning of 1991. Russia has assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the NPT, and prospects are favorable for the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.

Other important nuclear-related agreements have been completed. Argentina and Brazil are removing themselves from the area of nuclear proliferation concerns. They entered into an agreement with the IAEA accepting full-scope nuclear [safeguards] at all their facilities.

Other countries have taken important steps. South Africa promptly completed its NPT safeguards agreement. Algeria has placed its Chinese-origin research reactor under safeguards, and Syria has recently completed an NPT full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

While North Korea has signed its IAEA safeguards agreement, it has still failed to ratify and fully implement it as required by the NPT, and we are greatly concerned about its continued stalling. Prompt and full implementation remains crucial. North and South Korea have agreed to a joint declaration to establish a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, with a mutual inspection regime. Here, again, the key will be effective implementation.

There has been significant progress over the past couple of years on a key nuclear export policy long supported by the United States, i.e. requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment. All 27 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Agreement issued a statement calling for full-scope safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear supply.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is upgrading its trigger list and has agreed upon a list of dual-use nuclear related equipment and technology for common controls at its meeting in Warsaw last

week. This is a major step forward in impeding access by proliferant countries to technology potentially relevant to nuclear weapons.

The NPT Exporters or Zangger Committee recently clarified its controls on heavy water production plants by itemizing equipment and components of such a facility which should not be exported in the absence of a commitment to apply IAEA safeguards.

The IAEA Board of Governors, spurred by the example of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, confirmed the agency's authority to carry out "special inspections," whereby it can inspect nuclear activities at any place in a country, not just at declared nuclear facilities.

Chemical and Biological Weapons: U.S. Controls Strengthened. The United States has taken the lead in strengthening its own controls and creating a stronger international institution to deal with chemical and biological weapons.

In 1991, the Administration introduced regulations under the Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI), which expanded U.S. export controls related to chemical and biological weapons. These controls include chemical weapons precursors, chemical and biological equipment, and certain whole chemical plants. Under EPCI, we also now have authority to require a license and, where necessary, to stop the export of any item or any U.S. citizen assistance where this may materially contribute to the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons or missile programs.

Multilateral Chemical and Biological Efforts: International Regime Enlarged, Controls Expanded. The international chemical and biological weapons control regime—the Australia Group—has been enlarged and strengthened.

- Sweden and Finland have now joined the Australia Group, bringing membership to 22 countries, and all Australia Group members now control all 50 chemical weapons precursors. Just over half did so before EPCI.
- We are now nailing down agreement on chemical equipment controls.
- For the first time, we now have a multilateral list of organisms, toxins, and equipment for adoption by the Australia Group at its June 1992 plenary.

Regional Successes: Eastern Europe and Others Adopt Export Controls. The extension of CBW export controls outside the Australia Group in the past 12 months has been encouraging. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria are in the process of applying controls comparable to those of the Australia Group. Israel has adopted controls on all 50 chemical weapons precursors. China has also adopted some precursor controls, as, to a lesser extent, has India.

In September 1991, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil took the major step of establishing a chemical and biological weapons-free zone among themselves.

Chemical Weapons Convention: Seeking a Treaty This Year. The long-term solution to the problem of chemical weapons [CW] is a global, verifiable CW ban. We are seeking a treaty this year. Last May [1991], President Bush called for accelerating the pace of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, the United States made substantial concessions on major issues which had been sticking points in the talks. Subsequently, the Conference on Disarmament set a 1992 target date for completion of the convention and has redoubled work on the convention. The United States is

working vigorously to solve the relatively few major outstanding issues, notably on verification, with the aim of getting a treaty finished as soon as possible this year.

In March [1992], Australia tabled a new draft treaty text at the Geneva Chemical Weapons negotiation. We welcome this initiative. With some changes that are important to us, we believe this text can serve as the basis for concluding a convention. We are strongly urging the countries participating in the convention negotiations, and the chairman of the negotiations, to use the Australian text as a basis to finish a broadly acceptable treaty we can sign this year.

Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference: Measures Adopted at U.S. Behest. The Third Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference (RevCon), which met September 9-27 [1991] in Geneva, produced positive results. It largely adopted U.S. proposals for strengthening the implementation of the convention. The RevCon adopted eight new or revised confidence-building measures designed to enhance openness about biological research activities. Perhaps the most interesting confidence-building measures are those requiring the declaration of past offensive biological weapons programs and of past and present biological defense research programs.

The RevCon also agreed on measures designed to improve adherence and compliance and endorsed the principle of biological export controls to help prevent proliferation. It also urged all parties to adopt penal legislation against illegal biological weapons activities, to apply to a country's citizens wherever they might be. The RevCon elaborated the procedures for raising compliance concerns and obligated a party to provide a specific and timely response to concerns raised.

As agreed by the RevCon, a governmental experts meeting began on March 30 with a mandate to identify and examine potential Biological Weapons Convention verification measures from a technical and scientific standpoint. Although the United States has not been able to identify any verification measures we believe would be effective, we think the verification issue deserves a fair and open-minded technical review. So far, this experts meeting has gone well, with a frank and fruitful discussion of the problems associated with verification.

MISSILES

In the last year, the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] has added two more members—Finland and Sweden, bringing membership to 18. This is a dramatic increase from the original seven partners in 1987. Two other countries will soon become members, and others have expressed interest in joining.

Various non-member countries have recently taken steps to bring their practices into conformity with the (MTCR) guidelines and the annex, which lists sensitive missile-related equipment and technology. In 1991, Argentina announced the termination of its ballistic missile program and an intention to adopt the guidelines, and Israel announced and took steps to implement its adherence to the guidelines. In keeping with an agreement reached during Secretary Baker's November visit to Beijing, China, on February 22 (1992), announced that it would observe the MTCR guidelines and parameters in return for the lifting of U.S. missile sanctions imposed on China in June 1991.

At the MTCR's Fifth Plenary Meeting, held in Washington last November, the partners approved a revised Equipment and Technology Annex of controlled items and agreed on the desirability of extending the scope of the MTCR guidelines to missiles capable of delivering any weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological as well as nuclear warheads. Technical experts from the partner nations are meeting this week to work out how to implement

this extension of the guidelines. Several other partner countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland, have tightened their controls on exports of sensitive missile technology.

Regulations pursuant to the EPCI, published in August 1991, require licenses for all exports that a U.S. exporter "knows or is informed" are destined for MTCR-covered missile projects in the Middle East and certain other countries. A list to implement this part of the regulation will be published soon.

Sanctions can be unwieldy and difficult, even painful, to apply. Still, used judiciously, they have proved a useful way of securing cooperation on non-proliferation. After the Congress passed missile and chemical/biological sanctions legislation, the United States provided detailed information on the new laws to all foreign countries. This in itself caused some countries to review their export control systems. The actual application of sanctions spurred other countries to get their exports under effective control. Among the countries where missile trade sanctions have been imposed are China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, and Iran.

Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been the subject of intensified non-proliferation efforts because of the collapse of central controls and the temptations inherent in difficult economic circumstances. A major objective has been to sensitize these countries to the importance of non-proliferation and to get them to adopt appropriate export control and enforcement mechanisms.

We and partner countries have been engaged in a long series of contacts. In July 1990, the United States conducted a special visit to Eastern Europe focused on the need to establish responsible and effective non-proliferation and defense trade controls. A follow-up visit to the region was made in October 1991. In December 1990 and again in December 1991, the Australia Group held seminars on CBW for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A multilateral group of MTCR partners visited Moscow in October 1991 to discuss missile proliferation. In February of this year, an inter-agency team visited Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to discuss the need for effective export controls and to stress the importance of participating in the non-proliferation regimes. The MTCR hosted a seminar for East European, Baltic, and former Soviet Union states on March 20, and a third Australia Group seminar will be conducted in Budapest in December.

The results in Eastern Europe have been highly encouraging. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria have already adopted, or are in the process of adopting, controls comparable to those of the Australia Group and MTCR.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we launched a fresh series of initiatives to meet the changed situation there. In January 1992, I visited four states—Russia, Byelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—and brought along a special team to brief on non-proliferation and defense trade controls and to encourage the new states to impose effective control systems. Although these states' degree of organization varies greatly, all have been receptive to the U.S. approach. Russia, which benefits from the expertise and resources of the former Soviet Union, is the farthest along in having an effective control system.

We will be following up in various ways. In the near future, teams will be visiting the former Soviet Union to help the newly independent states to establish effective non-proliferation regimes. We expect several of our allies to participate in these teams.

The President has named a senior coordinator with responsibility for coordinating cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union on brain drain matters.

The United States, Russia, Japan, and the European Community have agreed to create science and technology centers in Russia and Ukraine to provide peaceful civilian work for weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union. The center will function as a clearinghouse for developing, selecting, funding, and monitoring projects that would be carried out mainly at institutions and facilities located in Russia and other CIS (Commonwealth) States. The intention is to help weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to non-military endeavors and thus minimize the temptation to use these skills in proliferation projects. In addition, we will provide concrete assistance to Russia to help disable and dismantle nuclear weapons. We have also offered assistance to Russia to help it begin the process of destroying its chemical weapons.

Other Problem Areas. Proliferation concerns have decreased markedly in some areas, such as Argentina and Brazil and Eastern Europe. In other areas, a difficult situation remains. North Korea is a top concern for nuclear and missile proliferation. We are using all available channels to exert pressure on North Korea to halt its proliferation efforts. We have held direct discussions with North Korea. Other countries have engaged the North Koreans as well.

In the context of international pressures, we hope that the North-South dialogue, and, in particular, the declaration on establishing a non-nuclear Korea, will yield results. It will be essential to have a credible and effective mutual nuclear inspection regime. North Korea must also ratify and fully and promptly implement its IAEA safeguards agreement. Ultimately, however, the question remains North Korean intentions. We need to keep the pressure up.

Aside from our nuclear concerns, North Korea's irresponsible proliferation behavior is most egregious in the case of missiles. In fact, North Korea is now the only country selling complete missile systems that exceed MTCR parameters to the Third World—a dubious distinction that threatens international security.

North Korea has learned to produce Scud missiles indigenously, and to extend the range of its Scuds. It is prone to selling these missiles to countries in volatile regions such as the Middle East.

North Korea may even be going beyond this. First, the North appears willing to sell not only complete missile systems but also the equipment and technology to permit other countries to build their own missiles. Providing a production capability makes it more difficult for the world community to stop missile programs in the recipient countries, and can, in effect, "clone" still more irresponsible suppliers hungry for hard currency to keep their indigenous missile efforts going.

Second, North Korea is working on a still longer range system in the 1,000 kilometer class. This system will let North Korea target all of South Korea and most of Japan. There is a more ominous possibility. Given North Korea's past record, it is highly likely that this system—and the technology to produce it—will become available on the international market. Such a system is inherently so inaccurate that its only use will be as a terror weapon against cities. It will be most effective when tipped with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction.

These North Korean actions regarding missiles and missile technology represent a threat to the security of Northeast Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and anywhere else such missiles are procured. We are working intensively with other countries to deal with this serious problem.

Various Middle East countries remain worrisome. Although Iraq's capabilities have been substantially reduced by the Gulf war and ensuing embargo and inspection regime, it remains poised to resume these activities when and if current strictures are removed. Meanwhile, Iran is energetically seeking to develop its conventional and non-conventional weapons capabilities.

South Asia is a concern primarily for nuclear proliferation reasons, but our concerns extend to the danger that India and Pakistan will also compete in missile, chemical, and biological weapons. We have proposed a five-nation conference as a way to reduce tensions and deal with regional proliferation problems, among other subjects. All states but India have accepted the idea. India continues to have the idea under consideration. We are pleased with the ongoing foreign secretary level talks between India and Pakistan. These have already resulted in useful confidence-building measures and, we expect, will result in more.

Meanwhile, our bilateral efforts with India and Pakistan continue. We held intensive discussions with Indian Foreign Secretary Dixit on his recent visit to Washington.

Strengthening Non-Proliferation Efforts. While we can be proud of our non-proliferation achievements, the problem is a big one, and our efforts are never-ending. I wish there were a single, easy way to deal with the problem, but there isn't. Rather, we need a full array of techniques and must be ready to shift our strategy and tactics constantly to meet constantly changing situations.

ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Administration has been pursuing a formal program of arms restraint among suppliers and recipients since the President announced his post-Gulf war Middle East arms control initiative in May. The Administration has sent the Congress a report on the progress we have made in this initiative, but let me review for a moment before I discuss where we are headed.

President's Initiative. The President launched the Middle East Arms Control Initiative on May 29, 1991. The initiative included proposals:

- To establish supplier guidelines for restraint on destabilizing transfers of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction and associated technology;
- To freeze and eventually eliminate holdings of surface-to-surface missiles in the region;
- To implement a verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons usable material in the region and call on the states of the region to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
- Calling for states in the region to become original parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and implement CWC confidence-building measures; and
- Calling for strengthening of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and urging regional states to adopt biological weapons confidence-building measures.

The President's initiative called for the five major suppliers of conventional arms to the Middle East to meet to discuss guidelines for restraining destabilizing transfers of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction and WMD-related [weapons of mass destruction] equipment and technology.

Five-Power Meetings. Following the President's announcement, senior representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and United Kingdom met in Paris on July 8-9 (1991). At this Paris plenary, the five countries issued a communique supporting the President's proposal and agreed to meet again to develop their work further.

On September 26-27, the five governments sent experts to London to draft guidelines on the responsible transfer of conventional arms, a mechanism for exchanging information on arms transfers, and harmonization of WMD export controls—including the development of common guidelines governing transfers of WMD-related equipment and technology. The work of these experts paved the way for a second plenary meeting in London, on October 16-17.

At the October meeting, the five governments adopted common guidelines for the export of conventional arms. These guidelines are a matter of public record. The five countries agreed to inform each other about transfers to the region of the Middle East for seven types of weapons, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels, and certain missile systems. They agreed to make arrangements to permit meaningful consultation about such transfers.

Getting this far has not been easy, but we are moving ahead and making steady progress. One encouraging sign of our efforts was the resounding adoption, on December 9, of a UN Transparency in Armaments Resolution in the UN General Assembly. The United States co-sponsored this resolution and has worked through the Middle East arms control process and at the United Nations to build support for its adoption.

Another good example is the progress made at the last meeting of the five, with Russia sitting in the place of the (former) Soviet Union. On February 20-21 (1992), the United States chaired the fourth meeting of the five on arms transfer restraint. The meeting prepared the way for a plenary meeting in Washington at the Under Secretary level. The timing for this meeting has not been finalized.

As a result of the efforts made at the February meeting, the plenary will address concrete proposals for exchanging information on arms transfers and guidelines for transfers of weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and technology.

Discussion of specific proposals for sharing information on arms transfers is a first for this process and for these five countries. The arrangements for consultation we envision will give us the opportunity to influence arms transfers which we find destabilizing before they occur—to act instead of react. I hope to chair this next meeting in May.

Middle East Arms Control Regional Security and Arms Control Group. In Moscow last January, the United States and the Russian Federation hosted the organizational meeting for the multilateral phase of the Middle East peace process, which included establishment of an arms control and regional security working group. The process will not be easy; from our own history, we know that arms control is always hardest when the threat of armed conflict looms large. But we have made an important start.

The regional participants in the Moscow arms control working group meeting demonstrated an earnest interest in getting down to business. The first substantive meeting of the groups is scheduled for Washington in mid-May, and we look forward to continued support from the regional players.

CONCLUSION

It is true we have made substantial progress in all areas. We and our non-proliferation partners have done a lot. The last year or so have been models of cooperative effort.

But it is also true that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons represents a continuing threat.

This is a time for stronger efforts, not for complacency. We need to do more nationally and internationally. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given us a chance to redirect some of our energies. The proliferation problem needs to be among the highest priorities.

There is no single magic bullet that will stop proliferation. Rather, there are actions we need to take along a broad front.

Only with concentrated effort will we be able to reduce and eventually eliminate the dangers of conventional and non-conventional weapons proliferation. We want to work closely with Congress in this important task.