Internal Development In Costa Mesa: An Airpower Case Study In Nation Assistance

By

Colonel August G. Jannarone, USAF
United States Special Operations Command
MacDill AFB, Florida
and
Mr. Ray E. Stratton
Lockheed Corporation
Tampa, Florida

[The view and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and in no way represent official policies or positions of the United States Special Operations Command, the Lockheed Corporation, or the United States Department of Defense. Further, any resemblance of the notional nations of Costa Mesa and El Sol to any actual country is purely coincidental.]

This is the fifth in a series of articles by the authors examining the role of airpower in Low Intensity conflict [LIC] and peacetime engagement.[1] In our last article, "Trouble in Costa Mesa: An Airpower Case Study in Peacetime Engagement," we outlined how a USAF Foreign Internal Defense Aviation Group (FIDAG) might come to the aid of a notional Latin American country facing a revived insurgency intertwined with narco-trafficking.

As the readers of that article will recall, an in-country survey by FIDAG personnel of aviation needs was followed by the development of a tailored plan to enhance Costa Mesa Air Force (CMAF) capabilities to combat the growing insurgency and narcotics trafficking. Some 45 days were required to analyze FID aviation missions and develop appropriate assistance teams and plans. Unfortunately, the military situation deteriorated alarmingly during that period. When intelligence indicated that the guerrillas were planning an attack on the capital city of Buena Vista and on major military installations, the FIDAG quickly adjusted their assistance schedule to cope with this development and supported Costa Mesa Army and Air Force preparations for pre-emptive attacks on the guerrillas in their jungle staging areas. This joint operation was launched just 12 weeks after the arrival of FIDAG training, logistics, and technical support teams in Costa Mesa. As a result of the attacks, the surviving guerrillas were forced to withdraw to the neighboring country of El Sol, temporarily lowering the immediate military threat to the Costa Mesa government.

Despite the stunning victory over the guerrilla forces of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Costa Mesa (FPLCM), the root social, economic and political problems leading to the insurgent opposition remain. Widespread poverty, substandard or non-existent medical care in rural communities, maldistribution of income and land, poor governmental infrastructure for public services, and a general apathy of the population toward national development are still present in varying degrees. The limited aviation resources of the CMAF must now shoulder an additional burden, that of supporting nation building efforts of the Costa Mesa government. Since the basic aviation capabilities necessary to contain the insurgency and fight the narcotics trafficking must be maintained, expansion into the nation building support role poses a formidable challenge. The FIDAG is again officially requested to assist, through the usual diplomatic channels.

NATION BUILDING ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE: ADDRESSING DEFICIENCIES AND IMBALANCES

When the FIDAG receives the formal request for additional training and other assistance to support nation building activities (internal development) with aviation, it is immediately apparent that a different approach will be required from the one used to develop the tailored plan for boosting counterinsurgency and counternarcotics (internal defense) capabilities of the CMAF. Thus, before any in-country surveys and inter-agency coordination meetings can take place, a comprehensive assessment of the Costa Mesa economic, political, and social conditions must be completed. This first, analytical step is the crucial focusing mechanism that will underpin development of plans to provide advice, training or other assistance.

The FIDAG calls upon the skills of the U.S. Army civil affairs and psychological operations forces. Four regional specialists are promptly attached to the FIDAG Costa Mesa team in Florida. Other technical experts from the State Department, Department of Commerce, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) are also made available for an inter-agency analysis effort. The Joint Staff and OSD officers who monitor Costa Mesa coordinate with the other non-DOD agencies and facilitate the analysis.

All relevant functions and current nation building programs of the indigenous government, the U.S. government, and commercial entities are identified and analyzed. Strengths, weaknesses and omissions in the various skills and programs required to move Costa Mesa forward to greater autonomy, security, and economic growth are highlighted. The examination includes public health, education, transportation, communications, economics, agriculture, commerce, refugee programs, labor, public safety, and others. Possible areas for improvement are identified with suggested program objectives, cost level, and relative priority to the host government. (Figure 1).

Before conducting the in-country survey to refine the analysis and develop a supporting aviation plan for nation building assistance, the FIDAG team must coordinate the assessment. It does so through those U.S. organizations with the responsibilities and resources for providing integrated assistance to Costa Mesa, consistent with current U.S. policy for the region and for the uses of U.S. military assets in nation assistance.[2] These organizations include FIDAG's parent unified command—U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA); Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation, and Justice; several regional and functional bureaus of the Department of State; and JCS and DoD regional/country policy and program offices.

THE PRINCIPAL NEED: A COSTA MESA INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD) CAMPAIGN PLAN

The informal and formal coordination of the Costa Mesa requests for assistance served to underscore that government's need for a long overdue, "home-grown" IDAD campaign plan. Significant U.S. and multilateral support would be appropriate—even essential. However, the management, direction, and implementation would have to be indigenous, and acceptable to the politically aware segments of Costa Mesa society. Additionally, the commitments of national resources (money, materials, natural resources, time, skilled planners, managers and operators, the Armed Forces, etc.) would have to be formal, publicly declared, and sustained over a decade or more. A lot to expect, but the alternatives appeared bleak.

FIGURE 1

TYPICAL IDAD AVIATION SUPPORT PROGRAMS

PROGRAM	OBJECTIVE	PRIORITY /RISK	EST COST	AVIATION RESOURCES
RURAL HAMLET SECURITY	PROTECT THE POPULATION PREVENT INSURGENT CONTACT	H/H	H	TRANSPORT, SURVEILLANCE, LIGHT STRIKE
PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS	PREVENT ISOLATION OF RURAL TOWNS, INSURE COMMUNICATIONS,. FACILITATE COMMERCE	H/H	M	SURVEILLANCE, LIGHT STRIKE, HELO
RURAL PUBLIC HEAL PROGRAMS	INSURE PUBLIC ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE, PRENATAL COUNSELING, DENTISTRY, IMMUNIZATIONS	M/L	M	TRANSPORT, HELO
MOTION PICTURE/ TV/RADIO SERVICE	BUILD PUBLIC AWARENESS/INCREASE SENSE OF INVOLVEMENT	M/L	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS	BUILD PUBLIC AWARENESS/SENSE OF COMMUNITY, IMPROVE GOVERNMENT IMAGE	L/M	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
RURAL PUBLIC EDUCATION	IMPROVE LITERACY, RAISE INDIVIDUAL EXPECTATIONS FOR PROGRESS	M/L	L	TRANSPORT
PSYOPS-BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT	INCREASE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT, SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY	H/M	L	TRANSPORT
PSYOPS-GUERRILLA DISAFFECTION	ENCOURAGE DEFECTIONS/SURRENDER TO HOST GOVERNMENT FORCES	H/L	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
GOVERNMENT-RURAL POPULATION INTERFACE	EDUCATE PUBLIC ON MANY ROLES OF GOVERNMENT, ENHANCE RESPECT AND SUPPORT FOR LAW/ORDER	M/L	L	TRANSPORT, HELO
RURAL VETERINARY MEDICINE	ELIMINATE DISEASES FROM FARM LIVESTOCK/PREVENT INFECTIONS	M/H	M	TRANSPORT
RURAL WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT	INSURE EVERY VILLAGE HAS ADEQUATE PURE DRINKING WATER	H/M	L	TRANSPORT

The guerrillas had been defeated in the major battles of the previous year, but they were not totally destroyed. The difficult economic circumstances remained, as did unsatisfactory levels of public services to a population facing a turbulent transition to a modem economy. The illicit narcotics trafficking remained a fact, and a menace to society, inhibiting balanced economic development and tainting the international political reputation of this small, vulnerable democracy.

If only as an organizing vehicle, an integrated IDAD campaign plan seemed central to the efforts of the Costa Mesa National Government, a conclusion which was both suggested and enthusiastically supported by the U.S. Country Team in the capital city of Buena Vista. The two-year old USSOUTHCOM cross-staff working group on assistance to Costa Mesa, in conjunction

with the Security Assistance Office (SAO) in Buena Vista and other elements of the Country Team, drafted a suggested IDAD campaign plan (Figure 2) for consideration or further development by the Costa Mesa Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defense. These ministries would be key players in structured nation building programs and would have to provide critical resources, developmental experience, field leadership and rural security (with the national police under Interior, and the military under Defense). The two ministries received the draft campaign plan with interest. Their review generated numerous questions on organization, external resources support, responsibility, authority for planning, and direction of programs and discrete projects. Working together as a Presidentially tasked interagency group, the two ministries agreed upon a campaign management organization applicable to the entire Costa Mesa government.

The U.S. Country Team, in collaboration with USSOUTHCOM, reviewed recent "lessons learned" in the region and provided a "start up kit" of checklists for selected IDAD missions to Costa Mesa officials. A review of the successes and failures of the Vietnam war CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) program was also carried out to check for any "pearls" lost to corporate memory. In addition to the draft campaign plan, written in Spanish, a diagram of a "Task Flow Chart" for FID aviation missions was included. Based upon management tools such as PERT and Critical Path, this "campaign in action" model reduced the initiation and monitoring of projects, programs and organizational functions to simple, unambiguous terms. It was flexible and could be realigned by the Costa Mesa government to suit their view of what was possible and desirable.

COMPETING REQUIREMENTS, LIMITED RESOURCES: AVIATION APPLICATIONS BY IDAD MISSION PRIORITY

The Costa Mesa five-year IDAD plan initially established overall mission priorities as follows:

1. Medical and dental services expansion and extension, with emphasis on remote area delivery.

2. Protection of population from guerrillas.

3. Protection of essential resources, especially key elements of the transportation, communications and electric power infrastructure.

4. Sanitation and health education.

5. Engineering and construction for potable water systems, roads, schools, and electrical power distribution grids.

6. Psychological operations to counter and isolate the insurgency; aggressive public affairs to inform and encourage the population.

7. Counternarcotics program to reduce production, demand, trafficking, and money laundering.

FIGURE 2

GOVERNMENT OF COSTA MESA

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD)

Campaign Structure (suggested)



The FIDAG team concentrated on development or sustainment of discrete aviation applications that supported the IDAD campaign. These seven major tasks, or applications, correspond to the similarly numbered IDAD mission priorities:

1. Transportation to remote short or grass landing strips of medical personnel (civilian and military teams), their equipment and supplies, and public health administrators/educators.

2. Airlift and insertion (landing, rappelling or parachuting) of patrols, reaction forces, and rotational personnel in rural/remote areas under attack or at significant risk.

3. Airborne surveillance of key power production and water treatment/control sites by fixed wing and helicopters, during periods of heightened vigilance, especially at night (requiring flares, goggles, infra-red or other night vision equipment).

4. Transport and resupply of teams of health inspectors, educators, and sanitation specialists.

5. Aerial photography, topographic surveying, and terrain/resource assessment; engineering equipment delivery.

6. Transporting government, civic, and military leaders to population segments previously ignored; leaflet, loudspeaker, and deception/diversion missions.

7. Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance to detect illegal narcotics processing, storage, distribution/ transportation nodes; rapid movement of law enforcement teams and security forces to seize evidence and suspects.

The mix of aircraft in the CMAF presented both advantages and liabilities for a wide range of day-to-day operations. The available helicopters, Skyvans, and C-47's could all provide cross-support to some degree in lift activities. Differences in payload capacity, unrefueled flying distance, required flight altitude, and night flight capabilities of aircraft and aircrews made certain aircraft natural candidates for specific missions. Similarly, the Tucano trainer and the A-37 could each support portions of light attack, armed reconnaissance, and escort missions. The principal liabilities centered on the need for parts, technical manuals, specialized tools, and servicing supplies or equipment peculiar to each aircraft, which varied by country of origin, manufacturer, age, and condition. The maintenance and supply challenges were significant, but not insurmountable.

The FIDAG maintenance instructors worked over a period of months to reach agreement with several agencies on periodic and emergency support arrangements. The national airline of Costa Mesa, Solana, agreed to provide interim hangar, washrack, and radio test equipment access for four new U.S.-leased Skyvans. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (through efforts of the Embassy's Agricultural Attaché) agreed to send an aerial fertilizing and pesticide expert for three months to advise on crop protection and yield estimation methods. With the help of two U.S. defense contractors, a limited task-specific consortium (one year, parts and tools support only, and basic maintenance instruction) was assembled to address the ground support and phase maintenance restructuring requirements for all the fixed wing military aircraft that had a history of low in-commission/availability rates. This was paid for by Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) credits provided by the U.S.

Aviation support priorities on a daily or weekly basis seemed straightforward, yet proved troublesome. It became evident that some aviation support had to be allocated to each of the seven

priority mission groupings over the course of every week. Except when tactical military or police emergencies demanded redirection, the sustainment of each field program (and the morale of their dedicated staffs) required a proportional distribution of available airframes that accounted for time sensitivity within relative priorities. This systematic apportionment and allocation of aviation was a very new way of approaching night mission assignments for the CMAF operations managers and maintenance supervisors. After a few months, they gradually gained confidence in it, principally due to the positive effects of joint civil-military interaction within the four functional program management groups of the national IDAD campaign structure.

TWO YEARS INTO THE PLAN: A TYPICAL IDAD AVIATION DAY

It is 4:50 a.m. at the major airfield serving Buena Vista. The four recently delivered AVRO Skyvans are undergoing preflight inspection by their CMAF flight crews. These aircraft were purchased by the U.S. government and leased to the Costa Mesa government for four years. At the end of the lease period they could be purchased outright, or redistributed by the U.S. to meet higher priority needs in the region. Maintenance and logistics support is provided by a U.S. civilian contractor who guarantees a 90 percent operational readiness (OR) rate for the aircraft. Selected CMAF maintenance and logistics personnel are integrated into the contractor's team to receive hands-on experience with streamlined maintenance and logistics procedures. They will take this knowledge back to their own maintenance crews operating five older Skyvan aircraft, purchased by Costa Mesa some years before. The costs of this support are paid for by a combination of FMFP credits and direct commercial contracting by the CMAF.

A joint U.S.-Costa Mesa medical team arrives by bus at the airfield in the pre-dawn darkness and begins loading medical supplies and equipment on the first aircraft in line. Their destination is the outlying village of Pisco which has no medical care facilities and only a single licensed midwife. The medical team will stay for three days before flying back to Buena Vista. Their visitation schedule is well-publicized at Pisco and all other villages receiving this flying medical service. Seriously ill people who cannot be treated on site will be flown back to Buena Vista for treatment at the national hospital. A relative will be permitted to accompany any air-evacuated patient to cook, feed, and care for their loved one, in the custom of the society.

The second Skyvan in line is loaded with a portable movie theater and a large tent, for 100 people. It will travel to a district town (county seat equivalent) beyond the range of the single television station in the capital. The movie crew will show a variety of films each evening for a week. Sufficient first-run footage is inter-leaved with patriotic and informational films to insure a full tent every night. In addition to the district town, the movie crew will visit two outlying villages before returning to Buena Vista. After delivering the movie theater and crew at each location, this aircraft will conduct a sub-regional hub and spoke passenger shuttle service until sundown each day. This will demonstrate the value of development programs and the utility of aviation in commerce.

Also boarding the second Skyvan are six security trainers: four Costa Mesans and two U.S. Special Forces sergeants. They will evaluate hamlet security at the same locations as the movie crew, as well as provide security refresher and upgrade training. The team will remain for two weeks with the village defense force. It is important that the trainers live and work with their counterparts, accompanying them on patrols and reconnaissance drills around the hamlet to share the risks and build confidence. Building the morale of the village defenders is essential for an energetic, effective force. Some new light weapons and night vision devices are put on board. The security team will start familiarization training on the equipment during their visit.

The third Skyvan on the line is fitted with leaflet dispensers and loud speakers. Enroute to its first stop in the far northeast corner of the country, it will conduct leaflet and speaker operations

along the Costa Mesa side of the border with El Sol, targeting insurgent infiltration routes. Leaflets will offer to buy any guerrilla weapon at a handsome price ($400 per automatic rifle or machine gun, $200 per pistol). Other leaflets dropped along these suspected infiltration trails advise the guerrillas of the Costa Mesa government's "open arms" policy and provide instructions for rallying to the government. After two hours on station, the airplane lands at the agricultural community of Agua, a farming town cut off from its markets by the destruction of two river bridges. The psychological operations (PSYOP) platform now converts to a flying produce truck and grosses out with vegetables, fruit, poultry, and small livestock. It will make three such farm-to-market shuttles before nightfall. Five other towns are being serviced in this way to foster a sense of national unity and facilitate the interim economic viability of isolated rural populations.

It is now 6:30 a.m., and full daylight at the capital. The fourth Skyvan is passenger configured, with the rearmost seats convertible to litters for medical evacuees. Passengers arrive by taxicab, bus, and on foot, and the aircraft taxis for takeoff at 7:15 a.m. It will fly eight hub and spoke shuttle legs to outlying towns before dark, carrying government officials, police and law enforcement officers, rural townspeople, and patients not treatable in remote villages.

What about the rest of the Costa Mesa Air Force? Many of its assets are employed on similar nation building missions. But it also must conduct round-the-clock intelligence and surveillance missions, provide flare ship support to threatened towns, shuttle ground forces, and conduct gunship and strike missions when required. All available air assets are centrally managed, and combat configured assets are frequently reallocated to nation building missions when priorities warrant. When one of the C-47s assigned to fly a flareship mission becomes non-operational, the Skyvan which flew PSYOPS and agricultural shuttle missions is pressed into flare service. A trained flareship crew arrives and flare dispensers are quickly installed. The aircraft departs for the hamlet of Vita Dulce just after sunset and orbits the town for three hours, until the broken C-47 is repaired and replaces its younger counterpart on station. The Skyvan returns to Buena Vista and is reconfigured for tomorrow's mission, a medical flight to Pisco to evacuate a critically ill expectant mother and a wounded militiaman.

It has been an average IDAD aviation day. The four Skyvans in our example flew a total of 41.4 hours, carried 120 passengers, and positioned medical and security teams. They transported 40,000 pounds of farm products to market, airlifted a movie theater, and conducted a PSYOP loudspeaker mission and leaflet drop. Aggregated direct operating expenses, including fuel, oil, and maintenance, were just under $12,000 for the 24-hour period. Adding aircraft lease costs brings the total daily cost of the four ship IDAD operation to just over $16,000. This $33 million annual fleet cost is shared by the Costa Mesa government, U.S. FMFP, USAID, U.S. Economic Support Funds (ESF), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In terms of the survival of Costa Mesa as a democratic nation, the impact of this inexpensive, limited air operation is great. Further, there is synergism with other air operations, both military and civilian, in part due to military pilots assisting with the extension of Solana (the national airline) services to remote areas.

ADJUSTING THE IDAD CAMPAIGN PLAN PRIORITIES: BAROMETER OF PROGRESS

Shortly after the typical IDAD aviation day just described, the architects of the original IDAD campaign plan met at Buena Vista to hear the semi-annual progress report for the seven aviation mission areas, and to validate or adjust plans for the next two years.

The adoption of a centralized IDAD planning and implementation management process was a relatively novel decision. There had been growing pains: the vertically structured ministries, armed forces, police, and civil government establishments achieved horizontal program integration by trial and error, and with advice and support of the U.S. Country Team and several other

embassies (Canada and Germany, in particular). Several commissions of the United Nations and instrumentalities of the World Bank also offered insights from their extensive Third World experiences.

Evaluations of the first two years of the IDAD aviation campaign missions ranged from fair to excellent. One of the surprising consequences noted by evaluators working in the psychological operations area was the enhanced citizen morale and level of support for the central government in those areas receiving timely medical and dental services. In fact, documented levels of support for the central government derived from psychological campaign effectiveness profiles varied almost directly with the number of medical/dental/evacuation missions flown into a specific region. Because of this poignant cause and effect relationship, the Costa Mesa government requested permission to purchase the four leased AVRO Skyvans immediately rather than wait two more years under the lease agreement. They then asked to lease four additional Skyvan aircraft to be dedicated almost totally to flying medical services. U.S. representatives at the meeting agreed to assist in forwarding the Costa Mesa request expeditiously through channels. A minor squabble between the Defense and Interior representatives broke out over whose agency title would appear on these "flying hospitals." A compromise was quickly reached. "Government of Costa Mesa" and the national flag would be painted on the aircraft as well as a large red cross on the tail and wings.

Attempts to shore up the economic infrastructure of the country by flying produce and livestock to marketplaces were judged as marginally effective by Ministry of the Interior personnel supervising the farm-to-market shuttle flights. The main factor contributing to this mission area's low utility was a simple lift tonnage deficiency. With two years experience and a relatively simple computer assessment identifying villages unable to move sufficient levels of farm products to market, three 1500-foot grass airstrips were identified for lengthening to 5000 feet, to permit C-130A/B operations in good weather. Plans for utilizing Costa Mesa Army engineering units for the projects were drawn up while U.S. Country Team officials agreed among themselves at a side meeting to investigate the possibility of U.S. Reserve/Guard engineer training missions to assist in this task. The nature of the tasks, conditions, and locations seemed to suggest the availability of a useful training deployment for U.S. personnel.

Prior to the planning review, the FIDAG gained approval of the U.S. Ambassador to offer expertise from U.S. Department of Transportation, the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration), and the Airline Transport Association where it might be beneficial. Their experience in air movement of cargo and passengers in a systematic, safe, and efficient way could be used for avoidance of major scheduling and safety problems, and for program planning. The IDAD council quickly accepted the offer and the Air Attaché and Commercial Attaché of the embassy responded by contacting the appropriate agencies in Washington, D.C. In order to analyze and improve field aviation support, FIDAG personnel would fly as observers on several types of aircraft during development and security surge operations in rural areas.

As each of the seven IDAD aviation mission areas was reviewed and assessed, it became obvious to all present that a major force for national survival was being exercised through the cooperation of numerous U.S. and Costa Mesa government agencies. With initial successes to bolster the level of enthusiasm, plans for expanding and refining IDAD aviation missions in Costa Mesa were hammered out and agreed to by general consensus. A revised two-year plan was printed with a logo symbolizing national unity prominently displayed on its cover along with the flags of Costa Mesa and the United States. Copies were widely distributed and shortly thereafter appeared on a large number of government desks throughout Costa Mesa.

EPILOG

Following the bi-annual planning meeting, FIDAG and planning group delegates were invited to a banquet at a large Buena Vista hotel. The Minister of the Interior approached the U.S. Defense Attaché and asked why the FIDAG team members were not yet in attendance, since he wished to publicly express the gratitude of his government for their assistance. After being informed that they had left the country earlier that evening, he appeared crestfallen until the Attaché advised him that the FIDAG team and augmentees from CONUS were enroute to an Andean Ridge country facing a narcotics trafficking crisis, and the team had sent their regrets. With that news the minister smiled, raised his glass in a toast, and remarked, "Perhaps Sandino was wrong. Perhaps the 'Colossus of the North' can change its spots." The Defense Attaché, somewhat taken aback by the surprisingly frank statement, responded, "Your Excellency, I would say that our spots are definitely fading, and please bear with us for a few more years."

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Colonel August G. Jannarone (B.A., Ohio Weslyan; M.A., San Diego State University) is the Chief of the Plans and Regional Activities Division at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) headquarters. He has extensive experience in worldwide planning for and implementation of unconventional warfare, FID, deception, psychological operations, military civic action, and security assistance programs. His service includes the Special Operations Command Europe, (SOCEUR), Senior USAF Research Fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Peru. Colonel Jannarone is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, a Distinguished Graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, and a graduate of the Department of State's ten month executive "Senior Seminar" at the Foreign Service Institute. He is a senior navigator and senior parachutist.

Mr. Ray E. Stratton (B.S., Texas A&M University, M.S., Troy State University) is the former Commandant of the USAF Special Operations School. His military experience includes more than 500 combat missions in SEA in 9 types of aircraft as a Forward Air Controller, Air Liaison Officer, and Operations Advisor to the Vietnamese Air Force. He also served on the Air Staff as Chief of Security Assistance Policy and Management for military sales training programs for 31 foreign air forces. Mr. Stratton is currently the Lockheed Corporation representative to the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida.

NOTES

[1]**Article One:** Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Airpower in Foreign Internal Defense," a paper presented at the 58th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 12-13 June 1990.
Article Two: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Toward An Integrated U.S. Strategy for Counternarcotics and Counter Insurgency," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1990-91, pp. 51-58. Also presented at the 2nd Annual SO/LIC Symposium sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, D.C., 9-11 December 1990
Article Three: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Building A Practical United States Air Force Capability for Foreign Internal Defense," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 4, Summer 1991, pp. 80-91. Also presented at the 59th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 11-13 June 1991;
Article Four: Colonel August G. Jannarone and Mr. Ray E. Stratton, "Trouble in Costa Mesa: An AirPower Case Study in Peacetime Engagement," *The DISAM Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Winter 1991-92, pp. 99-108. Also

presented at the 3rd Annual SO/LIC Symposium sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, D.C., 8-10 December 1991.

[2]"Nation Assistance" is defined in Joint Test Pub S-57 (CIVIL AFFAIRS), September, 1991, as "civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, other DoD Title 10 programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations."