
Pursuing U.S. Objectives In Asia and the Pacific

By

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Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss my recent trip to several East Asian countries and the range of issues which I pursued related to advancing American interests in the region.

During my trip earlier this month [March], I visited Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong. As this committee will be holding a separate hearing on Hong Kong later this week, I will not address issues related to that portion of my travels here today.

Let me say a few words about the broader context of those travels. My trip took place in the aftermath of the President's visit to the Asia-Pacific region earlier this year. My consultations reflected many of the challenges and objectives President Bush emphasized on his trip: realizing a just peace in Cambodia and attaining the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIAs [prisoners of war/missing in action] from the Vietnam war era so that we can begin a new era in our relations with the nations of Indochina; meeting the challenge of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; and forging a global partnership with Japan by enhancing our foreign policy cooperation and attaining more balanced and equitable economic relations.

INDOCHINA

Indochina was a central focus of my mission. My visit to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia marked the first time that an Assistant Secretary of State has visited all three countries in the same trip since the end of the Vietnam war; and it was the first to Cambodia since Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge. As President Bush said in Singapore last January, the United States seeks to improve its relations with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and help integrate all three countries into the dynamic East Asian region and the larger international economic and political system. I went to Indochina to advance this process of reconciliation between the United States and these three states; to help create conditions in which we could begin to build as the President said in his Singapore lecture, "lasting ties of interest and affection."

Vietnam

As I have testified here previously, in April 1991, we presented to the Vietnamese a normalization plan sometimes referred to as the "road map." This policy was designed to allow the United States to pursue—in parallel—the two primary policy objectives for Indochina that we have maintained over the past 12 years: attaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIAs; and a negotiated peace settlement in Cambodia which will result in the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces, prevention of a return to power of the genocidal Khmer Rouge, and free elections for the formulation of a new Cambodian government.

Our policy framework is a step-by-step process whereby the United States and Vietnam would take a series of reciprocal measures designed to build trust and confidence. It would lead to normalization of our economic and political relations as the Cambodia peace accords are implemented and as POW/MIA accounting advances. It left Hanoi with no doubt as to where we stand and under what circumstances we would be prepared to move ahead.

I would note that in the months since the Paris accords were signed last October, Vietnam has, to varying degrees, addressed many of the concerns embodied in our policy, including POW/MIA accounting and other humanitarian issues.

At the signing of the Cambodia peace agreement in Paris last October, Secretary Baker announced that, in view of the cooperation from Vietnam and Cambodia on the UN settlement effort as well as certain progress on the POW/MIA issue, the United States was taking steps to launch this normalization process. The initial actions in this process included:

- Changing the embargo rules to permit U.S.-organized group travel to Vietnam;
- Lifting the 25-mile travel limit for Vietnamese diplomats assigned to the United Nations;
- Beginning talks with Vietnamese officials in New York about the issues and modalities surrounding the normalization process;
- Establishing a U.S. mission in Cambodia;
- Stating publicly our concerns about genocide in Cambodia and our determination to prevent its recurrence; and
- Lifting the trade embargo against Cambodia as soon as implementation of the peace agreement began.

At the same time, the United States has sustained our efforts to address Vietnam's humanitarian needs, especially in the health and public services sectors. Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai and I held the first round of normalization talks in New York last November, and Vietnam's Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Trinh Xuan Lang, met with my deputy Ken Quinn in January to review various technical issues that we agreed would be addressed in a U.S.-SRV [Soviet Republic of Vietnam] working group.

Last September, and again in late January, General John Vessey, the President's special emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA affairs, traveled to Hanoi and met with Vietnamese leaders. During these visits, he obtained important new Vietnamese commitments on our POW/MIA accounting, as well as some specific Asia and the Pacific Vietnamese actions to implement those understandings. General Vessey's important work—in conjunction with the signing of the UN settlement agreement for Cambodia—helped set the stage for us to begin the normalization process. However, on his most recent visit at the end of January, the General was told that there was some reluctance in Hanoi to move ahead as rapidly as we proposed to achieve our POW/MIA objectives.

General Vessey underscored to Vietnamese leaders our intent to adhere to our policy objectives, emphasizing that we were prepared to move either rapidly or slowly toward normalization with Vietnam: the pace and scope of the process—as we have consistently maintained for years—will depend on the speed of our progress in POW/MIA accounting. At the same time, Hanoi indicated a strong desire to discuss the full range of our cooperation on

humanitarian issues, including U.S. efforts to meet Vietnam's humanitarian needs. In sum, there appeared to be a real danger in late January that the process was gridlocked.

Fortunately, subsequent developments have been more favorable to progress. On March 4-5, I led a delegation to Hanoi to discuss humanitarian issues of concern to the United States and Vietnam. Traveling with me were Mr. Alan Ptak, the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, Mr. George Laudato, the Deputy Assistant Administrator of USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] for Asia, and Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths, the Executive Director of the National League of Families. Brig. Gen. Thomas Needham, Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, joined us in the region after having presented our plans for an accelerated POW/MIA effort to his Vietnamese counterparts the previous week. In my discussions with the Vietnamese, we reached an important new level of understanding on how both sides can improve our humanitarian cooperation, particularly on POW/ MIA accounting.

The Vietnamese agreed to a five-point program to accelerate their cooperation with us on POW/MIA investigations, undertaking to do the following:

- Allow us greater access to their central records, archives, and museums and to individuals with information on POW/MIA issues;
- Implement a mechanism for short-notice “live sighting” investigations;
- Begin a 2-year plan for accelerated joint investigations in Vietnam, to include five such investigation cycles over the next 10 months, focusing on the 135 remaining high-priority discrepancy cases;
- Continue to work on trilateral cooperation with Lao and Cambodian authorities; and
- Reaffirm Vietnam's intention to search for and rapidly repatriate remains of Americans still unaccounted for and to hold technical exchanges in order that we understand clearly why remains we believe they might have access to are not available—if that is indeed the case.

If all five agreements are sincerely implemented, they should significantly advance us to our goal of attaining the “fullest possible accounting” within a reasonable period of time.

Vietnam signaled its intent to deliver on this program in several ways. First, it agreed to the first short-notice investigation of a live sighting report on March 5, the day I completed my talks in Hanoi. With only 1 hour's notice to Vietnam of the destination, a helicopter lifted off from Hanoi that day with Vietnamese and U.S. experts on board and flew to a remote part of Thanh Hoa Province, where they were able to conduct a thorough investigation. U.S. personnel were permitted to conduct spontaneous interviews with local villagers of their own choosing and were permitted to move about the area freely. After thorough investigation, our experts concluded that the report that live Americans were seen in this particular area in 1986 was not credible.

Also on the day I departed Hanoi, a Vietnamese delegation traveled to Phnom Penh to participate in the first trilateral talks with U.S. and Cambodian officials; this followed the U.S.-SRV-Lao trilateral talks held in Vientiane [Laos] last December. We thus have established a mechanism for pursuing the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in the border areas between these countries. As I left Vietnam, the 16th in a series of joint investigations was taking place in Vietnam. Results from this activity, as well as the day-to-day cooperation our POW/MIA office receives in Vietnam, will help confirm whether Vietnam continues to implement the steps we reached understandings on in Hanoi. The initial assessments of the 16th iteration are encouraging.

General Needham is in Hanoi today to arrange the 17th joint investigation, which begins next month.

Finally, a few days after I left Hanoi, Vietnam informed us that they had recovered three sets of remains believed to be of American servicemen. We have repatriated them and are examining the remains to determine whether they are indeed American.

In Hanoi, we also discussed U.S. efforts to address Vietnam's humanitarian needs. As you know, Mr. Chairman, since 1987, the United States has urged American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to donate humanitarian assistance to Vietnam under an initiative headed by General Vessey. In 1990, we announced that Treasury Department licensing regulations for humanitarian donations would be streamlined; in 1991, we made the first direct donation of U.S. aid, providing \$1.3 million for prosthetics assistance in Vietnam. This past January, we provided our first donation of disaster relief for Vietnam, giving \$25,000 for typhoon relief.

In Hanoi, I told our hosts the United States is prepared to take additional steps to address Vietnam's humanitarian needs. I outlined a humanitarian assistance package for 1992 that will include additional funds for prosthetics assistance, aid for displaced children, excess medical equipment made available by the Department of Veterans Affairs, Fulbright scholarships, possible additional disaster relief, and use of the Denton amendment program to transport humanitarian assistance donated by NGOs. In addition, Department of Defense medics accompanying our teams doing POW/MIA investigations in Vietnam will now offer medical services to local residents.

Laos

In Laos, my delegation was received at an unprecedentedly high level, meeting for the first time with Prime Minister Khamtai and Minister of Defense Choummali, as well as Foreign Minister Phoun and Vice Minister Soubanh. The Lao Government agreed to expand its already considerable cooperation with us on POW/MIA investigations, including provision of Lao personnel to work with Department of Defense officials assigned to Vientiane for this purpose. They informed us they would soon be turning over two sets of remains, apparently of American servicemen, discovered by local people in Xieng Khoang Province. They also agreed to accept U.S. training of helicopter pilots so that they will eventually be qualified to fly U.S. helicopters for our joint investigative work. Finally, the Lao Government pledged to continue their cooperation with us to counter the narcotics trade, particularly in the enforcement area.

I told the Lao the United States is gratified by their cooperation on these important issues and urged continuing efforts. Our relationship has improved significantly over the past several years, and the President announced in November that we will raise the level of our representation to the ambassadorial level for the first time since 1975. The United States has recently established a POW/MIA office in our Embassy in Vientiane, and we look forward to increasingly productive efforts to account for U.S. servicemen missing in Laos. During this visit, I announced our decision to provide 4,000 metric tons (mt) of rice and a \$400,000 famine mitigation program in response to recent disasters caused by floods and drought. I also told the Lao that we would be building more schools in remote areas and would send a USAID team this spring to survey prosthetics needs with a view to increasing our assistance in this field.

Cambodia

Achievement of the comprehensive political settlement agreement for Cambodia last October laid the groundwork for regional peace and national reconciliation following decades of war. I traveled to Cambodia to underscore continuing U.S. support for the settlement agreement signed in Paris last year and to assess progress so far in implementing it. Joining my delegation was Deputy

Assistant to the President Sihan Siv, himself a survivor of the Khmer Rouge killing fields. We were received by Prince Sihanouk and met with officials of the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and a number of Cambodian leaders representing the state of Cambodia and the non-communist resistance parties on the Supreme National Council (SNC). All the Cambodians we met expressed their strong support for the settlement process and looked forward to the impending arrival the following week of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

I found that UNAMIC has done a good job in carrying out its limited mandate to prepare the country for the arrival of UNTAC, but that implementation of the settlement will depend importantly on a credible, sizable UN presence—especially during the difficult transitional period—as demobilization and cantonment of forces is carried out. UNTAC will also have an important role to play in eliciting the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge. To date, we have been disappointed and concerned about credible reports of Khmer Rouge military actions in Kompong Thom and other instances of non-cooperation in contravention of the requirements of settlement implementation. We also urged restraint on the part of the state of Cambodia during our meetings with Hun Sen last week.

Everything I witnessed in Cambodia—from the atrocities of the Tuol Sleng genocide museum to the newly built refugee repatriation center at Siem Reap—convinces me it is essential that the United States and other donor countries act quickly to provide funding for this vitally important UN mission. The horrors inflicted on the Cambodian people over the last 2 decades must never be allowed to recur. The UN settlement is Cambodia's last, best—perhaps its only—hope. The visit of SNC (Supreme National Council) member Hun Sen to Washington last week testified to the hopes of all Cambodians that the United States will do its share to make the UN settlement process succeed.

The Phnom Penh authorities continue to cooperate with us fully on POW/MIA work. The first full-scale joint recovery and excavation operation was in progress while I was in Cambodia, and U.S. military helicopters were allowed to operate within the country for this purpose. That investigation has uncovered at least four sets of remains of individuals missing since 1970. Mr. Hun Sen and Mr. Chea Sim of the state of Cambodia reaffirmed the willingness of their administration to continue cooperating with us on this important endeavor.

In conclusion, I came away from this portion of my trip with the conviction that we have finally laid in place policies, processes, and personnel which will help put the past behind us and move toward a new relationship with all three countries of Indochina. Good faith implementation of these plans by the leaders of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will be key to achieving this goal. The Administration and the American people will now be looking for results.

In particular, we will be seeking to account for as many of our missing servicemen from the war as possible. Achievement of that important goal, in the context of continuing progress in Cambodia, will allow us to move toward the objective announced by President Bush and Secretary Baker of reconciliation with all three countries of Indochina. With resolution of these problems, we look forward to the day when progress in all three countries will enable them to join their Southeast Asian neighbors as productive partners in a more prosperous and peaceful international community.

THAILAND/BURMA

I met with Thai leaders both before and after my trip to Indochina. The Thai were in the midst of an important election campaign, the recent results of which we hope will herald a return to democracy to Thailand.

While our support for constitutional rule and democracy as well as bilateral economic issues were matters I pursued with various Thai leaders, we also focused on regional issues of mutual concern: Cambodia, Vietnam, and Burma. Our close cooperation with the Thai Government as a treaty ally and prominent member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has facilitated our efforts to bring peace to Cambodia. The Thai share our interest in adhering to the schedule for elections in Cambodia next year and recognize that our contribution to UNTAC will be crucial to meeting this goal. For their part, the Thai are working closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to assure an orderly and safe repatriation of Cambodian displaced persons and have contributed personnel and funds to road-building and mine-clearing projects in support of the repatriation effort.

The Thai are also very interested in the progress of our relations with Hanoi and are working to improve their own relations with Vietnam. I explained to the Thai that I had had a series of constructive meetings with the Vietnamese and that we hoped that implementation of the five-point program discussed in Hanoi would enable us to take correspondingly positive steps. The Thai welcomed this news and shared their impression that the Vietnamese are eager to improve their relations with the outside world.

I also discussed our continuing concerns about the deteriorating situation in Burma, which has begun to spill over into Thailand and Bangladesh. Let me add here that we will work with others [to] ameliorate the situation of the Rohingya refugees fleeing Burma for Bangladesh, and that, in this connection, we welcome the forthcoming visit by a representative of the UN Secretary General to Burma and Bangladesh.

During my discussions, I noted that the refugee outflux is growing and that narcotics obviously remain a severe problem. I explained that there was considerable interest in the United States in the safety of Burmese refugees in Thailand and suggested that if the Thai do set up a safe area for Burmese students, we believe that appropriate international organizations should have regular access.

On bilateral matters, I stated that the U.S. Government views Thailand as a staunch and long-term friend and that we particularly appreciated Thailand's cooperation during the Gulf war. I noted, as well, that we welcomed the Asia and the Pacific passage of the narcotics-related asset forfeiture and conspiracy legislation and that we had made strides in protection of copyrights and patents and hoped to make further progress on our remaining concerns. And I stressed our support for Thai efforts to move ASEAN to become a free trade area.

KOREAN PENINSULA

I also held discussions in Seoul, which, like Bangkok, was consumed by election fever. As was demonstrated by the March 24 National Assembly elections, democracy is sinking ever deeper roots in South Korea. Most of my discussions, however, centered on the problem of getting Pyongyang [North Korea] to abandon its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, to take meaningful steps to ease tensions on the peninsula, and to become a responsible international actor on issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. These discussions were part of a deepening pattern of consultations with our Republic of Korea allies with whom we are working closely to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Our main concern, and that of the Republic of Korea as well, is related to the international community's suspicion that, despite its agreements with the South and with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] agreements that remain to be implemented—the North Koreans have not abandoned their quest for a nuclear weapons capability. Only credible inspection regimes and their full implementation under both the bilateral agreement and the IAEA safeguards

agreement will begin to give the international community confidence that the North Koreans are genuinely honoring their commitments and are prepared to move beyond the military confrontation that has polarized the peninsula for more than four decades.

There are some hopeful signs. In February, the North and South brought into force two bilateral agreements: one is a broad-ranging agreement on reconciliation and non-aggression, and the other a non-nuclear agreement. Subcommittees on military matters, political matters, and economics and exchange have already begun meeting under the reconciliation agreement, and the two sides have formed a joint nuclear control commission, or JNCC, under the non-nuclear agreement.

The two sides have publicly committed themselves to work to produce an inspection regime within about 2 months after the first meeting of the JNCC on March 19. They agreed further that inspections would begin within 20 days of agreement on the inspection regime. When completed, that agreement will form the basis for bilateral inspections to verify the non-nuclear agreement. The North has also said it would ratify its IAEA agreement in April, notify the IAEA of its list of relevant facilities in May, and then have IAEA inspections in June.

Thus, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now has before it a golden opportunity to allay suspicions, demonstrate its credibility, and accelerate an opening to the outside world, thereby joining the mainstream of global trends toward reconciliation, reform, and economic development. If Pyongyang acts in good faith, we could see IAEA and bilateral inspections under both regimes by the end of June.

Such a development would be a historic step forward in moving toward the stated goal of both Koreas of a secure, de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula. Further, it would give added impetus to the ongoing North-South dialogue, which remains the primary means for resolving Korea's problems and achieving national reconciliation and eventual reunification. Resolving the nuclear issue would also make possible movement toward a significant improvement in U.S. relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We hope the North will see its interests served by taking advantage of this opportunity. The alternative can only be heightened suspicions, rising tensions, and sustained isolation for the North Koreans.

Another area of concern, of course, is North Korea's weapons proliferation activities, especially its trade in missiles with various countries in the Middle East. We have urged North Korea's leaders to refrain from this practice, which is clearly destabilizing to a highly volatile region. We have told them that these unacceptable activities can only worsen their international reputation and further retard any prospects for improved diplomatic and economic relations with the international community. We are working together with other concerned countries to find ways to limit the introduction of destabilizing weapons into areas of concern, especially the Middle East.

For the moment, however, we are in a period of what might be called "watchful waiting" to see if Pyongyang will take a new direction in its security policies—especially on the nuclear issue. The North has now made several important commitments on paper, and we expect them to be fulfilled completely in the timeframe Pyongyang has publicly committed itself to. Nothing less can adequately remove the suspicions we share with the rest of the world. Further delays in what is already an unreasonably protracted process would be cause for grave international concern.

JAPAN

My stop in Tokyo involved consultations on the East Asian aspects of our global partnership and follow-up from the President's trip on a number of trade and financial issues essential to keeping that partnership on a solid economic footing. Our relations with Japan must rest on

equitable and mutually advantageous political, security, and economic foundations. That partnership offers unprecedented opportunities for shaping the post-Cold War international system through close coordination of U.S. and Japanese policies to encourage stability, respect for human rights and political pluralism, economic development, and halting the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Since the President's visit, there has been significant progress on a number of Asian fronts which my consultations sought to reinforce:

Vietnam: Japan has been very helpful in urging Hanoi to be responsive to our POW/MIA concerns. A recent letter from Japan's Foreign Minister, Michio Watanabe, to his Vietnamese counterpart seems to have facilitated Hanoi's decision to agree to the five-point program I mentioned earlier. And Japan's Vice-Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Koji Kakizawa, stressed the need for Hanoi's full cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issue during a visit to Hanoi just last week. We are very appreciative of Japan's efforts.

On Cambodia, I debriefed my Japanese counterparts on my assessment of the situation there and discussed the challenges ahead for the UNTAC in successfully implementing the Paris accords. There are indications that Japan will provide generous support for UNTAC. Mrs. Ogata's activities in the UNHCR and Mr. Akashi's as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Cambodia underscore Japan's increasingly important leadership role in the UN settlement process.

Korea: Close cooperation with Japan has been key to our diplomatic efforts to end the North Korean nuclear threat, and I debriefed my Japanese colleagues on my discussions in Seoul and our assessment of the current situation on the peninsula. In Japan's normalization talks with North Korea and in our limited dialogue with Pyongyang, we both have made clear to North Korea it must meet the concerns of the international community about its nuclear program if it is to develop normal and constructive international dealings.

More generally, there have also been close consultations between our two governments on regional issues with global implications, including the Middle East peace process and assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union.

- Japan has been very supportive on both Middle East and CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] initiatives. Tokyo is taking an active role in these diplomatic efforts. Of course, much remains to be done on a number of issues of mutual concern.
- Having seen recent progress on People's Republic of China (PRC) participation in the global non-proliferation regime, we must continue to encourage constructive Chinese involvement in such international security activities and to encourage improvements in Chinese human rights practices.
- We must press the Burmese regime to ameliorate the situation of the Rohingya refugees fleeing Burma for Bangladesh and to improve its record on human rights and political activities generally.
- We need to continue our joint efforts in support of democratization and development in Mongolia. A second Mongolia donors' conference is scheduled this spring as a follow-on to the Tokyo conference held last September.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

I also followed up on a range of economic issues raised during the President's trip. Press reports notwithstanding, I would like to provide an update on significant progress in trade-related issues over the past 3 months:

- The President's visit to Japan produced market access gains in sectors important to our exporters such as computers, glass, paper, and auto parts. Business leaders who accompanied the President report positive results for their companies and for U.S. business in general.

- Japanese auto-makers agreed to more than double their procurement of U.S.-made parts by 1994. This is consistent with MITI's [Ministry of International Trade and Industry] business global partnership program, which encourages Japanese firms to import more, source more locally in their overseas operations, and to assist foreign firms entering Japan's market. We want Japanese car-makers to work with U.S. parts suppliers on product development, the same way they work with their Japanese suppliers. U.S. auto-parts-makers tell us they now see changed attitudes and more interest in U.S. products among Japanese car makers.

- On autos, we are giving full support to the efforts of U.S. car-makers to sell in Japan.

- As *The Washington Post* reported after the President's visit, the U.S. computer industry was "stunned" by how rapidly we negotiated the public sector procurement agreement [with Japan] and the fact that we addressed every major issue raised by the industry to its satisfaction. Our companies are now gearing up to take advantage of new opportunities.

- On paper market access issues, negotiations are continuing to get measures in place which would expand access for U.S. firms to Japan's domestic paper market. We are firmly committed to supporting the efforts of U.S. paper companies to succeed in Japan's market.

- We are addressing the imbalances in trade and investment through the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT], the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), and market access talks. While our bilateral trade deficit with Japan has fallen from \$57 billion in 1987 to \$42.3 billion in 1991—and our exports to Japan doubled during that period—the deficit remains unsustainably high and could increase as the U.S. economy strengthens. I must add that Japan's current global account surplus for 1991 of \$78 billion—almost double the previous year—indicates that its imbalances are of growing concern to Europe and others in Asia as well. If Japan cannot get these surpluses under control, it will weaken the country's welcome in many parts of the world.

- SII is aimed at addressing the structural features in the U.S. and Japanese economies that block the free flow of goods, services, investments, and balance-of-payments adjustment. Last year we made good progress on reform of Japan's distribution system. This will make U.S. products more widely available to Japanese consumers. In 1992, we are focusing on how the Japanese business environment affects the entry of newcomers.

- In the Uruguay Round, agricultural reform is key, which means tariffication for all commodities from all countries. For Japan, that means rice. I sought to encourage Japan to demonstrate leadership in increasing market access for goods and services as well.

Finally, the President and the Prime Minister Miyazawa in Tokyo in January pledged to work together to promote growth in the U.S. and Japanese economies, which together account for 40 percent of world GNP. We look for policies from Japan that will stimulate economic growth through expansion of domestic demand, not through an ever-growing export sector.