
Roles and Missions Review: Steps Toward Jointness

By

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For the first century and a half of our nation's history, the armed forces' role and missions were not subject to much debate. The Army's role was fighting on land. The Navy's and Marines' role was fighting on and from the sea. This simple division of labor started to get complicated after World War I, when the services began to adapt the increasing combat potential of the airplane to their respective war-fighting roles.

Roles and missions grew even more confused during World War II, when the globe was divided into theaters, each encompassing land and sea areas. A commander in chief was appointed for each theater and given a mission, so that admirals began to command soldiers and generals began to command sailors.

After the war, to implement lessons learned, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. This act made the Joint Chiefs of Staff a permanent, formal body, created the United States Air Force as a separate service; and, after amendment in 1949, led to establishment of the Department of Defense. This act also attempted to clarify and codify service roles and missions to provide a framework for program and budget decisions.

After the act became law, service leaders met at Key West, FL, and produced a broad outline for service functions. That outline guides the division of labor to this day.

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. It requires the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to periodically recommend such changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) as the chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces."

The 1993 *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*, the second prepared in accordance with the act, comprehensively summarizes a process of internal review and self-appraisal that goes on in the armed forces every day. It represents the culmination of months of effort by the chairman and the Joint Staff. The recommendations in this report are the chairman's alone, though the service chiefs, combatant commanders and their staffs were directly involved in the review process.

RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD

Three years ago, when the first report was prepared, the Berlin Wall still stood. American strategic forces were on constant alert, and more than 500,000 U.S. troops were in Europe, ready to repel any attack by the Warsaw Pact. Today, the Cold War is over. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Our strategic bomber force is no longer on alert. Nuclear and conventional arms control agreements have been concluded, eliminating entire classes

of nuclear weapons and thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces. Over 100,000 troops have come home from Europe.

But the disappearance of the Soviet threat has not eliminated the need for trained and ready armed forces. In the past three years, American troops have been committed in over two dozen crises ranging from armed conflict in Panama and the Persian Gulf, to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions in several parts of the world and to disaster relief operations at home and abroad. In short, our armed forces have been busier than ever in this rapidly changing world.

Four key factors—the end of the Cold War, budgetary constraints, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the press of new regional crises—converged to provide the opportunity, the necessity and the authority to address the ways in which all four services are structured, trained, and employed in combat. As a result, more changes have occurred in the U.S. military in the past three years than in any similar period since the National Security Act of 1947.

First, a new National Military Strategy was developed. Next, the base force was established to provide the means for implementing the strategy. Smaller than the Cold War force but flexible, well-trained, and highly capable, the base force is dynamic and could be tailored in response to further changes in the strategic environment.

OBJECTIVE SET

Finally, a detailed review of the roles, missions and functions of the armed forces was undertaken to ensure the new strategy and force structure were aligned as effectively as possible. In developing recommendations, the objective was to maintain and enhance the combat readiness of the armed forces even as their size and budgets were reduced.

Many steps have been taken since the first report—some with little public notice—to respond to the rapidly changing world and to improve effectiveness and efficiency. Even as walls fell and empires toppled, we made the adjustments our nation's security required.

The organization of our nuclear forces has been changed fundamentally. For the first time, all of America's strategic bombers, missiles and submarines are under one commander, either an Air Force general or a Navy admiral. This arrangement, hard to imagine only a few years ago, represents perhaps the most dramatic change in the assignment of roles and missions among the services since 1947.

As a result of presidential nuclear initiatives developed under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense, the Army and Marine Corps—both of which have had a nuclear function since the mid-1950s—no longer have nuclear weapons. Now they rely on the Navy and the Air Force for nuclear support. Moreover, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from ships, submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Finally, for the first time since the 1950s, all U.S. strategic bombers and all 450 Minuteman II missiles have been taken off alert.

CHEMICALS RENOUNCED

With the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris on January 13, 1993, the United States renounced the use of chemical weapons. The services no longer need to maintain a capability to retaliate with lethal chemical weapons. This will reduce training, maintenance, and procurement costs, and permit chemical weapons stockpiles to be destroyed in the safest, most efficient manner.

Our new regional focus, combined with major reductions in overseas troop levels, puts enormous emphasis on strategic mobility. The formation of the Transportation Command had already set our management house in order; what remained was to match our lift capabilities with the new strategy and base force. The Mobility Requirements Study does just that. The study's recommended mobility improvements will enable deployment of an Army light division and a heavy brigade to any crisis area in approximately two weeks and two heavy divisions in about a month.

In 1989, the Department of Defense began to expand significantly its participation in America's fight to stem the flow of illegal drugs. This expanded mission requires the sustained use of active duty and reserve component forces that are properly trained and equipped for a nontraditional role. They are involved with interagency organizations and host-nation police and military forces in planning and carrying out these counterdrug operations. This campaign involves several commanders in chief, who are working together closely so they can share joint lessons learned and continue to improve our capability to perform this unprecedented mission.

A change of strategic focus from global to regional conflict allowed us to make major changes in the way we calculate and provide for our logistics support needs. For global war, we need enough stocks so that each combatant commander could fight his theater's forces alone and for some considerable time without resupply from the continental United States.

With our new strategy, we need only enough "starter" stocks to last until theater forces are resupplied from the continental United States or from pre-positioned "swing" stocks that can be moved quickly from one region to another. To do this, some stocks are being repositioned from land to "afloat." The Army, for example, estimates it can achieve a 50 percent reduction in war reserve requirements under this new concept. Combat logistics have entered a new era with our new strategy.

The intelligence support available to U.S. forces in the gulf war was probably the best in history. This was partly because of innovations that preceded the war and partly because of innovations made during the war. Notwithstanding this success, additional needs were identified.

Combining the success and the needs, we have greatly improved what was already a good intelligence system. For example, we set up a standing board comprised of senior intelligence officials from all intelligence organizations to determine program priorities and coordinate support for military operations. We established a Joint Intelligence Center—just as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf had during Desert Storm—for all our combatant commanders. We established the National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon. This center serves as a focal point for support to the commands and to joint task forces by acting as a national clearing house for intelligence requests and by coordinating support from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency.

We established a Central Imagery Office to coordinate the timely provision of imagery products—maps, target photos, intelligence photos—to the warfighters. We also established an Office of Military Affairs within CIA to correct a deficiency in national intelligence availability identified by our commanders during the gulf war. Finally, we eliminated a shortfall by giving DIA tasking authority for all human intelligence—information gathered by people.

DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

We have made great strides in developing and training under joint doctrine. Foremost among our new publications is *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces: Joint Warfare is Team Warfare*. It serves as the focal point for further refinement. Ocean Venture 92, conducted off the Carolina

coast, and Tandem Thrust 92 in California and the mid-Pacific saw thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines training together on joint wartime tasks.

Clearly indicative of our new joint doctrine and training emphasis was the use of a joint force air component commander in the gulf war. This commander oversaw and synchronized all air component operations for Gen. Schwarzkopf. This was a historic first, and its overwhelming success was dramatically apparent in the results obtained.

The drawdown to the base force requires a commensurate reduction in our infrastructure. The services have identified more than 170 activities for elimination, consolidation, or realignment. For example, the commissary functions of all services have been combined into a single Defense Commissary Agency. We have assigned executive agents to oversee common functions such as cleanup of former DOD-owned hazardous waste sites, operation of common-user ocean terminals, and support for medical materiel, military postal service, and domestic disaster relief. We have reduced and reorganized service staffs.

WHAT WE'RE DOING NOW

The Key West Agreement, foundation for the current assignment of service roles and functions, was the product of a meeting convened by the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, to work out disagreements among the services sparked by the National Security Act of 1947. Many argue that the agreement failed to resolve redundancy and duplication among the services. In fact, what was recognized in 1947 and has been supported by Congress ever since is that there are advantages in having complementary capabilities among the services. At the national command level, such flexibility provides additional options to senior decision-makers in a crisis. At the theater level, commanders in chief can more effectively tailor a military response to any contingency, regardless of location.

Despite the enduring wisdom of the Key West Agreement, we recognized the need to review the underlying division of responsibilities. Beginning in the summer of 1992, a comprehensive "top-to-bottom" review of roles and missions was undertaken. This review, led by the Joint Staff, involved the services and the commanders in chief at every step.

Selected for examination were areas in which two or more services perform similar tasks, where restructuring might generate significant cost savings or where changes in strategy and force structure made a comprehensive review appropriate. One primary goal was eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort, recognizing that redundancy can be a good thing—especially in an emergency—and that emergencies are less predictable today than at the height of the Cold War.

The 1993 report thus examines the U.S. armed forces from a perspective entirely different from that of the 1989 report. It addresses many questions being asked by Congress and the American people about their armed forces. In a number of areas, significant changes are recommended. In others, the current division of labor makes the most sense. In still others, further study is needed before final recommendations can be made.

A detailed review of roles, missions and functions necessarily involves a review of the Unified Command Plan, because missions are assigned to combatant commanders, not to services, and the Unified Command Plan defines those commanders' responsibilities. As mentioned, U.S. Strategic Command already represents a major change to the Unified Command Plan; nonetheless, we recommend one more major change and further review of another.

During World War II, forces from all services were assigned to theater commanders who waged the war. We learned it was the best way to fight. The National Security Act of 1947 and

subsequent congressional action in 1958 made this successful organization permanent. The Goldwater-Nichols Act put the finishing touches to this arrangement except for one major contingent of troops, those assigned to units in the continental United States. By 1992, this exception had become all the more glaring because of the changes in our strategy, forward deployments, and force structure.

With troop strength overseas reduced, our regionally oriented strategy depends more on CONUS-based forces—forces that must be trained to operate jointly as a way of life. Yet there is no CONUS-based commander in chief charged with this mission. The lack of an appropriate joint headquarters to oversee these forces has always been considered a problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tried twice to fix it.

FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

U.S. Strike Command was activated in 1961 to provide unified control over CONUS-based Army and Air Force units. Initially, Strike Command had no regional responsibilities, but was assigned functional responsibilities to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands, to train assigned forces, to develop joint doctrine, and to plan for and execute contingency operations as ordered. In attempting to fulfill its responsibilities as a trainer and provider of forces, Strike Command frequently collided with the services' authority under Title 10 to organize, train and equip forces.

In 1971 came the U.S. Readiness Command. It was given functional responsibility for training and providing forces, with no geographic area of responsibility. Readiness Command experienced some of the same service resistance in fulfilling its assigned training responsibilities.

Over time, Readiness Command was given additional functional responsibilities, including a requirement to plan for and provide joint task force headquarters and forces for contingency operations in areas not assigned to overseas commanders in chief. One such headquarters, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, eventually became the U.S. Central Command. Readiness Command was subsequently disestablished as a result of a combination of factors, not least of which was the fact that our strategy depended more on forward deployment and basing to contain Soviet expansion than on CONUS-based forces.

NEW STRATEGY

Today our strategy has changed, and we have reached a level of joint maturity that makes it possible to address once more the need for unified command over CONUS-based forces. Unified command would facilitate the training, preparation and rapid response of CONUS-based forces currently under the Army's Forces Command, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, the Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic.

The time has come to merge these forces under a single commander in chief to ensure their joint training and joint readiness. Units that are already accustomed to operating jointly will be easier to deploy. Overseas combatant commanders will be able to focus more on in-theater operations and less on deployment and readiness concerns.

This commander in chief could also be assigned certain other functional responsibilities, including supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations and training units for that purpose, responding to natural disasters in the United States and other requirements when requested by state governors and as directed by the president; improving joint tactics, techniques and procedures; and recommending and testing joint doctrine.

ORIENTATION SHIFT

After examining several approaches to setting up the joint headquarters, we found U.S. Atlantic Command particularly well suited to assume this new mission. It is an existing CONUS-based joint headquarters and already has a working relationship with the four commands that would become its permanent components. The command's Cold War mission, to defend the Atlantic sea lanes and undertake offensive naval operations against the Soviet Union, has fundamentally changed. While continuing to perform this vital NATO mission, it has the capacity to undertake this additional responsibility in keeping with the revised military strategy. Its geographic area of responsibility, although large, presents only a modest warfighting challenge, given the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Under this arrangement, the present command in Norfolk, VA, would shift from its predominately maritime orientation to a more balanced combatant command headquarters. We would probably rename the command so as to reflect more accurately its new focus. Its commander would become a nominative position, which could be filled by any service.

The Army's Forces Command would no longer require "specified" status as a single-service command reporting directly to the president and secretary of defense. With this change, the term "specified" would be retired, and all forces would belong to a joint team. While the services would retain their Title 10 responsibilities, training and deploying of CONUS-based forces as a joint team would be a new mission for this expanded command. Unification of the armed forces, which began in 1947, would at last be complete.

The United States has developed a robust, highly capable and complex framework for the launch and control of space vehicles and systems. Most space functions today reside within the Air Force, but all the services, U.S. Space Command, and several defense agencies and organizations are involved in space activities.

The commander in chief of U.S. Space Command, in Colorado Springs, CO, is assigned combatant command of U.S. forces providing warning and assessment of a bomber or missile attack on the United States. The command also supports other combatant commanders by ensuring that space operations and warning requirements are supported.

U.S. Space Command also commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command, which provides air defense of the North American continent. It carries out its mission through the Air Force Space Command at Petersen Air Force Base, in Colorado Springs, Naval Space Command at Dahlgren, VA, and Army Space Command at Colorado Springs.

Even with the end of the Cold War, our national security depends on a robust space capability. But we can no longer afford to allow multiple organizations to be involved in similar, independent, or duplicative space roles and functions.

A number of improvements are under way to streamline our space organization and systems and eliminate unnecessary overlap. Organizationally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed in 1991 to "dual hat" the commander of U.S. Space Command as commander, Air Force Space Command, which reduced personnel and support costs. But these changes don't go far enough.

AIR FORCE RESPONSIBILITY

The proposal we are evaluating would assign the space mission to the commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Command and eliminate U.S. Space Command. Under this proposal, after appropriate consultation with the Canadians, Air Force Space Command would assume command

of NORAD in Colorado Springs. It would also operate all Strategic Command space systems. Small Army and Navy components would be assigned to Strategic Command to ensure space systems support for all services' needs. All services would also be represented in appropriate planning and requirements offices.

The Air Force would be responsible for development of future military space systems. These actions would ensure service-unique requirements for and uses of space are properly represented and that services and commanders in chief have trained personnel to exploit space systems.

Other changes envisioned would include designating the Air Force as the lead service to coordinate with NASA regarding LANDSAT remote earth-sensing operations, and consolidating DoD's functions at NASA into a single organization under Air Force Space Command. To streamline military satellite communications operations, all operational responsibilities for the Defense Satellite Communications System would transfer from the Defense Information Systems Agency to the Air Force. Responsibilities for the Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications system would also transfer to the Air Force. Both systems would remain under the combatant command of Strategic Command.

Under this proposed arrangement, commanders in chief, services or agencies continue to submit space-systems requirements to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for validation. Day-to-day requirements for operational space system support would be submitted to Strategic Command.

Such a consolidation would conserve scarce resources and eliminate a substantial number of positions. It is envisioned that this would improve warfighting support from space, allowing an increase in operational effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability, while maintaining joint service expertise and joint operational focus.

More analysis is needed before we assign the space mission to Strategic Command.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Another significant change that does not involve the Unified Command Plan is the proposal to consolidate all depot-level maintenance under a new joint command.

Over the years, all four services established their own depot maintenance systems to perform overhauls, rebuilds and other complex operations beyond the technical ability of maintenance units in the field. The four networks, each independent of other services' capabilities and sized to support a global war, can be reduced and restructured.

A study group chartered by the chairman recommended closure of seven or eight depots to reduce excess capacity. Savings of \$400 million to \$600 million per year are achievable when all these depots are closed. The group also recommended establishment of a Joint Depot Maintenance Command to oversee and administer all depot-level maintenance.

This recommendation is still under review in the Department of Defense. Meanwhile, the services have been directed to identify and recommend depot closures and consolidations prior to the next deliberations of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

DISTORTED FACTS

The claim that America has "four air forces," implying it has three more than it needs, makes a wonderful sound bite but distorts the facts. In fact, America has only one air force, the United

States Air Force, whose role is prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The other services have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and functions but which also work jointly to project America's air power.

It would make no more sense to assign all aircraft to the Air Force, as some would suggest, than it would to assign all items of any other militarily useful technology—radios or trucks, for example—to a single service. The airplane and helicopter capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are unique, complementary and necessary. Together they constitute America's air power, an indispensable ingredient in any situation where American lives are at risk.

That said, it was recognized that the acquisition plan for major aviation programs would require more resources than might be available. Many issues associated with air power roles, missions and functions were therefore examined, and a number of opportunities were identified to make the structure and systems that support and sustain America's air power more efficient. For example:

- **Continental Air Defense.** Significant savings in manpower and operating costs can be achieved by eliminating or sharply reducing the 12 Air National Guard interceptor squadrons dedicated solely to this mission. General purpose and training forces from the active and reserve components of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can absorb this post-Cold War mission, perhaps in its entirety.
- **Theater Air Interdiction.** Operations deep behind enemy lines are essential to any military campaign. The contributions of both bombers and attack aircraft should be considered when the total number of aircraft required for theater air interdiction is determined.
- **Close Air Support.** The Key West Agreement has always been interpreted as limiting this support to fixed-wing aircraft. But this essential battlefield task can and should be performed routinely by attack helicopters as well. Service functions are being realigned to reflect this expanded definition. To ensure uniformity of execution by all services that request and provide fixed- and rotary-wing close air support, standardized joint procedures are being developed.
- **Marine Corps Tactical Unit.** U.S. Marines train and fight as a combined arms air-ground team, supported by organic aircraft that can operate from carrier decks and austere expeditionary sites ashore. Despite calls by some for its elimination, Marine Corps tactical air is a unique capability, essential to our military strategy. The number of aircraft types in the Marine Corps inventory will be reduced from nine to four, and Marine Corps squadrons will deploy more frequently aboard aircraft carriers.
- **Flight Training.** To take advantage of the services' common purpose and training programs for the primary flight training phase, all Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard flight students will begin training using a common fixed-wing training aircraft under joint development. Following primary flight training, student pilots will advance in one of four specific follow-on specialties: Navy fighter/attack, Air Force fighter/bomber, Navy and Air Force tanker/transport/maritime patrol, or helicopter.

Tanker/transport/maritime patrol training consolidation is expected to begin in 1994, when the Navy plans to introduce advanced maritime training at Reese Air Force Base, Texas. A study will determine if it is cost effective to move Navy, Marine Corps and, Coast Guard helicopter training from Pensacola, FL, to Fort Rucker, AL, where Army and Air Force training is conducted.

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- **Aircraft Requirements and Inventory Management.** Each service uses a different formula to determine how many aircraft it needs to buy and different rules to account for aircraft once they're in the inventory. To ensure procurement and maintenance funds are not spent on unnecessary aircraft, standard terms and procedures will be developed to govern aircraft requirements and inventory management.
 - **Common Aircraft.** The 1993 review of roles, missions and functions included a careful examination of aircraft common to more than one service, looking for ways to do business more effectively or efficiently while preserving each service's ability to perform required functions. The resulting recommendations are summarized:
 - Consolidate the airplanes used for airborne command and control of strategic forces. Eliminate the Air Force EC-135 program and use its funds to pay for transition to the Navy's E-6A and assign the function to the Navy.
 - Continue to give each service responsibility for its own combat search and rescue. Use standard equipment to support interoperability while implementing joint doctrine to enhance training and operational effectiveness.
 - Improve management of operational support aircraft and reduce their numbers to only those required.
 - Retain attack helicopters in the Army and the Marine Corps. Consolidate aircrew and maintenance training where practicable. The Army and Marine Corps pursue developing and procuring common airframes to fulfill future requirements.
 - Consolidate maintenance training, simulator training and maintenance infrastructure for general-support helicopters. Study the feasibility of consolidating overlapping service support functions within certain geographic regions.
 - Retain C-130 tactical airlift aircraft and KC-130 tanker support aircraft structures as currently configured. Review showed that consolidating these heavily tasked aircraft under one service would not be cost-effective, would degrade efficiency and would greatly complicate their management and support.
 - Retain and modernize the Navy/Marine EA-6B and the Air Force EF-111 aircraft currently used to jam enemy radar systems. The airframes, optimized for their services' "from the sea" and "global reach" roles, derive significant economies of scale from the fact they share parts, support, and training procedures with the large fleets of A-6s and F-111s managed by the Navy and Air Force. Consolidating jammer aircraft into one airframe would degrade effectiveness and require purchase of additional aircraft.
 - Retain current types of electronic surveillance aircraft in the Navy and the Air Force. Existing quantities of Navy EP-3Es and Air Force RC-135s are barely sufficient to handle peacetime requirements for gathering electronic intelligence. Eliminating either type or replacing one with the other would be costly and would contribute nothing to effectiveness. Support structures already in place for the large fleets of Navy P-3s and Air Force KC-135s make the operation and maintenance of 12 EP-3Es and 14 RC-135s a small fraction of overall costs.

Forward presence is the totality of U.S. instruments of power and influence employed overseas. Forward stationing is one element of forward presence and is a key underpinning of U.S. diplomacy. It contributes to conflict prevention and lends credibility to alliances. As the global security environment changes, more cuts in forward-stationed forces may be appropriate,

but then other forward-presence operations will increase in importance. A new concept being developed would use geographically and mission-tailored adaptive joint force packages to conduct forward-presence operations, potentially at a lower cost than today's deployments.

With its emphasis on rapid response to regional crises, the National Military Strategy places a premium on the expeditionary capabilities of the Marine Corps and the contingency capabilities of Army airborne and light infantry forces. Both types of forces should be retained, but the review of requirements is continuous and may in the future include the possibility of further reductions in the Army's light infantry forces.

The Marine Corps integrates armor and artillery units into its maneuver elements. Severing armor would markedly reduce unit cohesion and warfighting capability and produce negligible cost savings. The Marine Corps must retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious operations and outfit three maritime pre-positioning squadrons. Any requirement for additional tank support will be provided by Army armored units.

There appear to be advantages in making the Army responsible for all multiple launch rocket system support, but taking away the Marine Corps' organic general support artillery and having the Army take on that function is a major step that requires an in-depth cost and effectiveness analysis before any final decision.

THEATER AIR DEFENSE

All four services currently operate theater air defense systems. Study showed there would be substantial near-term costs and personnel disruption associated with transferring these systems and associated functions between services. No long-term saving was identified.

A comprehensive review of theater air defense is needed to ensure the planned mix and quantities of air and missile defense systems are appropriate. The Joint Staff will head a mission area analysis to review theater air defense requirements, capabilities, and deficiencies and determine if further refinements to service roles and functions are appropriate.

TRAINING AND TEST AND EVALUATION STRUCTURES

The training and test and evaluation (T&E) facilities built for World War II and maintained throughout the Cold War can be restructured. An integrated test and evaluation range structure will be developed under the management of an executive agent as part of the effort to lower costs and increase effectiveness. As an example, integration and electronic linking of the many service training and testing ranges in six western states and off the California coast would provide a land, air, sea and offshore supersonic operating domain to accommodate a large portion of our joint training, test, and evaluation needs well into the next century.

CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS

Each service has its own construction engineers to support combat forces and to maintain a worldwide array of bases and facilities. The services are reducing their engineer structures—the Army by 34 percent, the Air Force by 39, the Marine Corps by 20 and the Navy by 11 percent. The possibility of having one service provide all wartime construction units was evaluated, but consolidation was rejected because of the uniquely tailored support each service's construction engineers provide to operational units.

OPERATING TEMPO

“Optempo” describes the pace of operations and training. Optempo determines the rate at which funds are spent from the operations and maintenance accounts to buy the fuel, repair parts, and supplies consumed during normal operations. When we examined whether additional O&M savings could be achieved through prudent reductions in optempo, we came to several conclusions.

First, increased use of simulation helps train commanders and leaders in operational art and tactics, and weapons crews in engagement techniques. The requirement to be ready to go on an instant's notice, however, still demands that people be trained in the field, at sea, and in the air on their weapons and support systems.

Second, new forward-presence concepts will reduce some optempo rates during routine peacetime operations. However, reduced overseas basing and increased emphasis on resource-intensive operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance may mean an actual increase in optempo.

Finally, for a smaller, increasingly U.S. based force, keeping units fully trained is the only certain way to ensure they are ready to respond when called.

INITIAL SKILLS TRAINING

Current training establishments reflect Cold War training requirements—they are big, expensive, and overlapping. While some training has already been consolidated, more training installations and facilities can probably be closed or consolidated to reduce costs. Toward that end, and as part of the continuous process of internal review and self appraisal, the services, with Joint Staff support, are conducting a comprehensive scrub of all military skills.

CHAPLAIN AND LEGAL CORPS

Chaplains and judge advocates are military officers subject to the performance standards, regulations, policies, and particular customs of their parent services. Consolidating chaplains and lawyers under a single service would result in insignificant savings and have a negative effect on the quality of pastoral care and legal support provided to service members and their families. Consolidation is therefore not recommended.

INTELLIGENCE

Despite steps taken to implement lessons learned in Desert Storm and centralize management functions, the existing intelligence structure still largely reflects its Cold War origins. The Defense Intelligence Agency is assessing resources with a view toward providing joint task force commanders with fully operational intelligence support organizations. The agency is also examining the consolidation of some service-level intelligence production responsibilities.

FORCE STRUCTURE

As part of a continuing review, the Department of Defense will continue to work with Congress to determine the proper active and reserve force mix. As additional ways are sought to consolidate functions and reduce defense spending, a study of National Guard and Reserve headquarters and staffs should be conducted to identify duplication that may be unnecessary.

THE MAIN POINT

As U.S. national security needs have changed, so has the U.S. Military. The recommendations in the roles and missions report advocate the need to continue to reshape our military to address the challenges of the future, while recognizing that it must be done intelligently, prudently, and responsibly.

The 1993 roles and missions report outlines new approaches to how the services intend to do business. The report represents a clear expression of our commitment to change, but above all, it documents the armed forces' firm recognition that the main purpose of assigning roles, missions, and functions is to protect America.

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A First Step

By

**Les Aspin,
Secretary of Defense**

[The following is a reprint of an item which appears in *Defense 93*, Issue 2. The item, which accompanies the previous report of the Chairman, JCS, is based on a letter from Secretary Aspin to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ron Dellums, dated March 29, 1993.]

I believe the proper assignment of roles, missions, and functions to the military services is vital to ensuring that our forces are the most effective possible at any given level of resources. The report of General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, provides a constructive first step in assessing the roles, missions, and functions of the military services for the post-Cold War era. Several findings hold real promise for achieving greater efficiencies, affording significant savings, and most importantly, contributing positively to the combat effectiveness of our armed forces.

My decisions on General Powell's recommendations fall into three categories: on several important matters, I will move quickly to implement the recommendation and have directed that implementing plans be provided to me as soon as possible. On other matters, I have assigned the appropriate components to explore some additional alternatives and to develop detailed proposals for implementation. I will direct implementation in these areas once this additional work is completed. Finally, on remaining matters, I accept General Powell's recommendation that no immediate changes are necessary for now.

The following are representative of the recommendations to be implemented quickly:

- Designate the commander in chief, Atlantic Command, as responsible for readiness and training of U.S.-based forces;
- Consolidate fixed-wing aircraft training, attack helicopter maintenance and aircrew training and general-support helicopter maintenance training, simulator training, and maintenance infrastructure;

- Consolidate airborne command and control operations for strategic nuclear forces in the Navy's E-6A aircraft;

- Assign close air support as a primary function to all services and account for the contributions of attack helicopters in close air support operations.

Recommendations requiring additional study include:

- Merge U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command, and designate the Air Force the primary agent for design, launch, and operation of satellites;

- Reduce excess depot capacity and consolidate management functions.

Finally, in some areas, such as tactical airlift and tankers, electronic jammer aircraft, and electronic surveillance aircraft, I accept General Powell's recommendations. We plan to sustain the current distribution of responsibilities among the services

The issue of multiservice duplication merits a further note. I agree with General Powell that fielding similar capabilities in more than one military service is not necessarily a bad thing. It may be necessary to ensure critical capabilities are available when and where they are needed. Moreover, diversity can foster innovation, seriously complicate enemy planing, and hedge against possible break-through countermeasures.

We will look to eliminate duplication, but will not automatically assume it is wasteful or counterproductive. Where we elect to maintain multiservice capabilities and they involve similar weapon systems or platforms, I will direct the services to adopt common approaches to the extent possible in such areas as tactics, techniques, doctrine, training, support infrastructure, and weapon platforms.

Our focus will be on preserving the benefits that derive from competition, while eliminating the more wasteful associated practices. I will ensure that clear-cut responsibilities are levied on the appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services to develop and implement these standardization, consolidation, and commonality practices.

Legislators Seek a Re-evaluation of U.S. Arms Transfer Policy

[The following is a copy of a Congressional letter sent to President William J. Clinton on 30 July 1993. The letter carries the signatures of 111 members of the House of Representatives, and asks the President to develop a new multilateral arms transfer policy which will increase restraints on the transfer abroad of U.S. conventional weapons. The last formal Presidential policy statement on this subject was issued on 8 July 1981 by former President Ronald Reagan, as the "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy" of the United States.]

Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington DC 20515

July 30, 1993

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The President
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge you as part of your review of foreign policy goals, to undertake a fundamental re-evaluation of U.S. arms transfer policy.

During the Cold War, the two superpowers transferred billions of dollars of weapons to the developing world every year as part of their strategic competition. With the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., and the attendant excess of conventional military equipment flooding global markets, we believe that it is urgently in the national interest to find a way to stop this spiral of militarization.

An overarmed developing world not only has a terrible human cost, it is also contrary to American interest in democracy, political stability, and a growing global economy. It is essential that we act now: our arms agreements with developing countries have more than doubled to an average of nearly \$17 billion per year since the end of the Cold War, and this trend could worsen.

Obviously, the solution to the problem of militarization and arms transfers must be a multilateral one. It will do neither us nor the developing world any good if we reduce exports only to find the gap filled by other suppliers. However, as the recent strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines shows, multilateral solutions often require U.S. leadership.

Congress has already begun to address the need for arms restraint, enacting several initiatives:

- encouraging establishment of a multilateral arms restraint regime;

- imposing a one-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines and a call on the administration to negotiate a world-wide ban on their deployment; and
- calling on the administration to oppose multilateral lending to countries who refuse to reduce military spending in concert with their neighbors.

As you formulate your policy to tackle the crisis in arms transfers, we urge you to consider other concrete steps with which the United States can challenge other suppliers to join in a process of restraint. Such steps might include a short-term moratorium on arms transfers to unelected or repressive governments, or a ban on arms transfers to governments not complying with the new U.N. arms trade registry.

Whatever strategy you finally adopt, however, we believe that it will be far more likely to succeed if you personally present a vision to the American people and the world community of the human and economic benefits of a real and effective system of arms transfer restraint that could lead to a dramatically demilitarized world.

The public, both here and in other supplier nations such as in Europe and the former Soviet states, must understand that arms sales to developing countries are not a cost-free way to extend military production lines. That understanding would be greatly enhanced, at least in this country, if you explained that the last three times U.S. forces went into action—Panama, Iraq, and Somalia—they faced weapons or weapons technology either exported or financed by our own government.

We appreciate your attention to this important issue, which has such deep implications for your policy goals of promoting democracy abroad and economic growth at home. We look forward to working with you to achieve a new, responsible multilateral arms transfer policy that will reduce the huge and unnecessary global spending on armaments.

Sincerely

Neil Abercrombie	George E. Brown Jr.	Eliot L. Engel
Gary L. Ackerman	John Bryant	Anna Eshoo
Lucille Roybal Allard	Leslie L. Byrne	Lane Evans
Thomas A. Andrews	Maria Cantwell	Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
Jim Bacchus	Benjamin L. Cardin	Sam Farr
Peter Barca	John Conyers, Jr.	Vic Fazio
Thomas M. Barrett	Peter A. DeFazio	Harris W. Fawell
Xavier Becerra	Ronald V. Dellums	Bob Filner
Tonly Beilenson	Peter Deutsch	Eric Fingerhut
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Lucien E. Blackwell	Richard J. Durbin	Thomas M. Foglietta
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Elizabeth Furse	Robert T. Matsui	Philip R. Sharp
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Benjamin Gilman	Jim McDermott	Louise McIntosh Slaughter
Dan Glickman	Cynthia A. McKinney	Fortney Pete Stark
Tony P. Hall	Carrie P. Meek	Louis Stokes
Dan Hamburg	Robrt Mendez	Gerry E. Studds
Alcee L. Hastings	Kweisi Mfume	Esteban Torres
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Tim Johnson	David R. Obey	Bruce F. Vento
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Joseph Kennedy	Major R. Owens	Maxine Waters
Gerald Kleczka	Frank Pallone, Jr	Henry A. Waxman
Michael Kopetski	Donald M. Payne	Alan Wheat
Tom Lantos	Nancy Pelosi	Lynn C. Woolsey
James A. Leach	Tim Penny	Ron Wyden
Richard H. Lehman	Collin C. Peterson	
Sander M. Levin	Charles B. Rangel	
John Lewis	Martin Olav Sabo	
William O. Lipinski	Bernard Sanders	
Nita Lowey	Thomas C. Sawyer	
Carolyn B. Maloney	Charles E. Schumer	
Marjorie Margolis- Mezvinsky	Patricia Schroeder	
Edward J. Markey	Jose E. Serrano	
Matthew G. Martinez	Christopher Shays	
