Fact Sheet: Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)

[The following material has been compiled from information provided on the DTSA internet home page (http://www.dtsa.osd.mil/index.html).]

"Guarding Technology For America's Security"

The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) provides the direction and stewardship for the technology security policies and programs of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DTSA's mission is to develop and implement DoD policies on international transfers of defense-related goods, services, and technologies to ensure such transfers are consistent with national security interests.

In performing this mission, DTSA seeks to:

- Promote efforts to prevent and counter the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and their means of delivery
- Preserve critical U.S. military technological advantages
- Control and limit the acquisition of defense-related goods, services, and technologies by any country or entity that could be detrimental to U.S. security interests
- Support legitimate defense cooperation with U.S. allies and friends

The Director of DTSA is Mr. Dave Tarbell. DTSA is part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy.

DTSA performs a myriad of functions as part of its technology security and export control mission. One of DTSA's principal functions is to coordinate DoD's review of export licenses referred by the Departments of State and Commerce. DTSA does not issue export licenses, and is not a regulatory agency. DTSA makes recommendations to the Department of State on license applications for the export of defense articles and services under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and to the Department of Commerce on license applications for the export of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies under the Export Administration Regulations. In determining a DoD recommendation on export license applications, DTSA obtains information and advice from numerous DoD organizations, including the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Agency, and organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

DTSA serves as a single point of contact for license applicants for matters affecting DoD's technology transfer policies and the review of export licenses. For export license reviews, DTSA has established a so-called "day-in-court" procedure whereby applicants may submit a paper addressing DoD concerns with their license application and then request a meeting to discuss them prior to DTSA forwarding a final DoD recommendation to State or Commerce. If requested, this process can include a review by the Director, DTSA. For all cases, DTSA makes every effort to communicate directly with exporters to discuss issues and concerns, and welcomes exporter initiated contacts.

In this regard, exporters are encouraged to contact DTSA early in their process of developing business opportunities that might eventually require an export license that would be reviewed by DoD. These early discussions can serve to identify for exporters potential difficulties for U.S. security interests early in the business development process to avoid possible problems with customers. At the same time, this serves to expose DoD reviewers to the overallbusiness development picture contemplated by the exporter which can facilitate reviews of licenses later in the export license application process.

In addition to reviewing export license applications, DTSA performs a number of other functions, including:

- Developing technology security policies on the releasability of defense-related systems and technologies to allies and friends;
- Performing technical analyses and determining DoD positions on export control lists and associated regulations;
- Participating in international export control negotiations covering arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies (including those involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities);
- Providing technical support to U.S. Government diplomatic, intelligence, and enforcement efforts directed at the prevention of unauthorized technology transfers;
- Determining DoD positions on the review of foreign investments in defense-related companies through the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S.; and,
- Providing technical support for U.S. Government programs to assist other nations in the development of effective export control systems.

DTSA is divided into the following five functional components:

The **Policy Directorate (PL)** is responsible for export control regime negotiations (including all of the non-proliferation regimes covering weapons of mass destruction and the Wassenaar Arrangement on arms and dual-use technologies), regulations, proposed foreign investments in U.S. defense-related companies, and technology releasability guidelines for specific technology areas, science and technology exchanges, and other government-to-government programs (e.g., foreign military sales). Telephone: (703) 604-8032; Fax: (703) 604-4779.

The **License Directorate (LD)** is responsible for coordinating the reviews of export license applications referred to LD by the Departments of Commerce and State. Telephone: (703) 604-4859; Fax: 604-5382.

The **Technology Directorate (TD)** provides comprehensive technical and analytical support on export control regimes, dual-use and munitions export license reviews, and export control lists and regulations. Telephone: (703) 604-5217; Fax: (703) 602-5841.

The **Technology Security Operations Directorate (TSO)** works with diplomatic, intelligence, and enforcement agencies to halt diversions of defense-related goods and technologies, and to identify policy initiatives, particularly in the area of improved compliance with export controls. Telephone: (703) 604-5926; Fax (703) 602-4774.

The **Resource Management Directorate (RM)** is responsible for administrative functions including information management systems like ELISA, d a wide variety of other services. Telephone: (703)604-4836; Fax: (703) 604-5381.

DTSA History

Mr. Tarbell was appointed as the fourth Director of DTSA in August of 1994. He came to DTSA after 15 years with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Policy. Under his leadership, DTSA's over 120 military and civilian employees safeguard America's defense related technology. This section provides a little history on this dynamic organization and its ever evolving mission.

1970-1979

By the late 1970's, efforts to protect and safeguard sensitive military-related Western technology from Communist Bloc nations had become unfocused. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the non-treaty organization incorporating most of the modern industrialized West and Japan, had become a backwash and was increasingly ineffective. Exceptions to the COCOM rules had become commonplace and international rules were not strictly enforced. U.S. domestic export control efforts also languished. Within DoD there was no central focal point for coordinating DoD review of sensitive exports and for advancing key DoD interests on technical security policy issues. As a result, DoD technology security interests suffered both nationally and internationally. Little was done to counter what came to be recognized as a massive technology acquisition effort by the Soviet Union. This lack of direction and effective oversight in the U.S. system often caused long licensing delays that drew attention from business and Congress, much in the form of criticism directed at DoD. Business was frustrated by the lengthy license review time by DoD and by the lack of a single point of contact to explain export Policy issues.

In the 1970's and the early part of the 1980's, technology security policy and implementation were the responsibility of numerous, disconnected DoD organizations, often with conflicting objectives. At this point in time DTSA did not exist.

The Department of Defense suffered the consequences. The agency's influence over interagency and international export control policy was significantly impaired. In addition, exporters and Congress became frustrated by the lengthy license review time within the DoD and by the lack of a single point of contact to explain export control policy issues.

1980-1995

By 1980, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave renewed clarity to the stark nature and seriousness of the threat to the mutual security interests of the West. It also became apparent that the Soviet Bloc had initiated a massive effort to improve its military capabilities through acquisition of military relevant Western dual use technology. This was illustrated by military utility of a number of dual use exports that came to light at this time. It was revealed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had improved the accuracy of its Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles using U.S. machine tools and was producing better armor-penetrating missiles at a drill bit factory obtained from the West for the petroleum industry. As a result, renewed interest arose in Congress and the Executive Branch, particularly at Defense, in taking steps to stem the flow of military critical technology by embracing a more vigorous and responsible approach to export controls. Under the leadership of the then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, DoD

undertook a greater role in the export control process to ensure U.S. technology security concerns were fully addressed. DoD took the lead in a major U.S. initiative to strengthen and update COCOM controls, to modernize the operation of the COCOM Secretariat and, at the same time, to sensitize business, the public, and other governments to the acute nature of the threat. At the same time, efforts were undertaken to centralize and streamline the export control process within DoD in order to ensure the timely processing of export licenses to protect legitimate U.S. interests. This was done, in part, by increasing the level of Defense technical and policy resources dedicated to technical security and export licensing. This process culminated with the establishment of DTSA in 1985 as a field activity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the appointment of Deputy Under Secretary Steve Bryen as DTSA's first Director.

With the formation of DTSA, DoD centralized and consolidated the DoD role in export controls under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. DTSA's role included management of the DoD license review process for both dual use and munitions licenses and representing DoD in interagency and international export control policy fora, most importantly COCOM deliberations on select exports to high risk Western destinations for potential diversion to the Soviet Bloc.

The newly established DTSA faced many challenges. During the mid to late 1980's, new revelations made it apparent that Soviet acquisition efforts continued unabated. Most striking was information made available by France from a KGB defector that showed the breadth and depth of Soviet efforts to acquire military sensitive technology. DTSA was also the spearpoint of DoD's reinvigorated technology security program to address growing concerns regarding emerging new threats that were not addressed by COCOM, including efforts by countries such as Iraq and Iran to speed their programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons with Western technology.

In 1985, DTSA was instrumental in uncovering one of the USSR's most successful and potentially damaging acquisition efforts. Through its intelligence liaison function, DTSA learned that the Soviets had obtained, in violation of COCOM agreements, an advanced and highly accurate Japanese machine tool and an advanced Norwegian computer controller for the tool. This machine tool was employed by the USSR to mill noiseless propellers for nuclear submarines that made them much more difficult to detect. This diversion became one of the most celebrated technology security issues of the decade. It also led to far greater public awareness of the national security threat presented by exports of seemingly civilian technology and of the continuing efforts to obtain controlled technology illegally. It led, ultimately, to a thorough review and strengthening of export control and compliance programs in several countries.

In 1990, DTSA reorganized to meet the new challenges presented by the rapidly changing politico-security environment. The major sea change was the breakup of the Soviet Bloc. DTSA focused on the need to continue to account for the residual security threat from Russia and China, and to also address a growing need to adjust COCOM controls to account for the diminished level of the threat as well as the continuing advance of technology. DTSA was instrumental in this process which was realized through the adoption by COCOM of a greatly reduced control list and increased emphasis on cooperation and assistance in export controls with the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. At the same time DTSA began to take on new responsibilities for the review of sensitive exports to rogue countries such as Iraq and Iran which formed the basis of a new and emerging threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies. In this regard, DTSA was instrumental in halting assistance to Iraq that would have provided critical support to Sadam Hussein's nuclear weapons program shortly before Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991.

1996

DTSA has made a tremendous impact in ensuring that American and Allied security interests are fully safeguarded in the area of strategic trade. DTSA has been instrumental in making sure that the U.S. will not face an enemy armed with advanced weapons built on the latest of U.S. technology while also ensuring that U.S. business interests are fully considered. It is the combined efforts of the DTSA directorates, and the Departments of Commerce and State that make technology security policy a success. Since his arrival in August of 1994, Mr. Tarbell has overseen the wrap-up of the COCOM operation and the establishment of a successor organization, The Wassenaar Arrangement in Vienna, Austria. He has also worked closely with his interagency colleagues to further stabilize the export control process and to steer the export controls through regulatory and policy changes, including a major Presidential policy reviewing computer controls in 1995. He also reorganized DTSA to streamline internal functions which have improved the quality of the export license process, technical support, and policy reviews.

Need More Information?

DTSA's normal business hours are 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time), Monday through Friday. After hours, exporters are encouraged to send fax messages outlining the nature of the inquiry and the license case number (if applicable). A DTSA staff member will follow-up promptly the next day.

For the status of DoD's review of specific license applications, DTSA has instituted an electronic bulletin board system called the Export License Status Advisor (ELISA). ELISA can be accessed from a computer with a modem by dialing 703-602-4740, 24 hours a day (except 8:00 to 8:30 am Monday-Friday Eastern Time). The export license application number assigned by the Department of Commerce or State is required to access information from this system. As well, DTSA has an internet home page at http://www.dtsa.osd.mil/index.html

If you would like to know more about DTSA or would like a speaker or participant for a specific event, please contact the DTSA Outreach Coordinator, Mr. Bill Bann, at 703-604-8046, fax 703-604-4779. Visit requests or invitations may also be fowarded to Mr. Frank Bray, fax 703-604-4779, Policy Director, Defense Technology Security Administration, 400 Army-Navy Drive, Suite 300, Arlington, VA 22202-2885.