

THEME OF THE QUARTER

a closer look at . . .



INTRODUCTION

Once again, it is our pleasure to highlight the mission and role of a key and pivotal command involved in the development and management of the U.S. Security Assistance Program. Accordingly, the principal feature of this section is an article submitted by the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate (J4), United States Pacific Command (PACOM). Following this, we have included some excerpts from a report submitted to the Congress regarding U.S. foreign policy objectives in this region of the world. Lastly, we will provide a brief rundown on the DISAM Asian Seminar.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (Submitted by PACOM)

PACIFIC COMMAND OVERVIEW

The Pacific Command (PACOM) is, geographically, the largest of the Unified Commands, encompassing a vast area of more than half of the earth's surface. PACOM extends from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of North America and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. The Pacific and Indian Oceans, roughly 70 percent of the world's ocean area, lie within its boundaries. To illustrate the great expanse of the Command, approximately 17 days are required for an aircraft carrier to sail at normal cruising speed from California, via The Philippines, to the Indian Ocean.

Recent trends and events have accentuated the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. (and Free World) interests. Trade between the U.S. and nations of the Asia-Pacific community has risen to about 100 billion dollars annually and has exceeded our trade with the European Economic Community (EEC) for the past 8 years. Japan ranks first as our largest overseas trading partner. Private U.S. investments in the PACOM region have grown to almost 20 billion dollars, with profit returns exceeding, percentage-wise, that experienced in Europe.

Large quantities of strategic raw materials are obtained by the U.S. from Asia and the Pacific. Australia possesses the world's largest reserves of uranium and is also an important source of manganese. More than 90 percent of our imported zirconium and titanium comes from "Down Under." Most of our tin, tungsten, and natural rubber come from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Developing nations of the region are assuming greater importance as world suppliers of raw resources needed by our industries and defense programs.

In his State of the Union Address of 23 January 1980, President Carter warned:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The unimpeded flow of Persian Gulf oil through the Indian Ocean is essential to the well being of Free World economies. About 95 percent of Persian Gulf oil, valued at \$175 billion per year, transits the Indian Ocean. This includes 16 percent of the oil required by the U.S. More significantly, the majority of the oil consumed by Western Europe, Japan, and The Philippines arrives via the Indian Ocean. These percentages are:

Western Europe	- 60%
Japan	- 75%
The Philippines	- 67%



Protection of these critical sea lines of communication is the responsibility of PACOM.

Mutual security treaties with Asia-Pacific countries serve as commitments in protecting U.S. and participating nation interests. These include treaties/agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, Korea, The Philippines, and Pakistan. Although our Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan was terminated at the end of 1979, the U.S. will continue to make defensive weapons and equipment available on a restrained basis.

It is important to understand the dynamic nature of the Asia-Pacific environment. The Sino-Soviet rift has widened while, concomitantly, relations between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China have improved. Although the U.S. is no longer engaged in active military operations in the Indochinese Peninsula, armed conflict and human suffering continue. Recognition of an increased military threat from North Korea resulted, last year, in the planned withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea being placed in abeyance. The buildup of Soviet military forces in

Afghanistan, Soviet Far East and the Pacific and Indian Oceans poses a growing threat to the stability of the PACOM region and to world peace.

The prognosis for the future is for continued change as global strategic and economic interests continue to shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Developing nations of the area, fired by growing nationalism, will continue to seek political, economic, and security arrangements to protect their viability as sovereign states. The U.S. must maintain an active role in assisting these countries in the attainment of national self-sufficiency, thereby countering influence from nations whose goals are inimical to our own.



LEFT: Flight of four F-5E aircraft purchased by the Royal Malaysian Air Force through the Foreign Military Sales program. RIGHT: A Royal Thai Air Force F-5E purchased from the United States. (Photographs courtesy of PACOM)

MISSION OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC)

The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) is Admiral Robert Long, who succeeded Admiral Maurice F. Weisner on 31 October 1979. He is the eleventh Naval officer to head the Pacific Command since it was established in 1947. As CINCPAC, Admiral Long is charged with the following mission:

To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean, to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, Southeast and South Asia and the Indian Ocean; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority.

ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC) IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Department of Defense Directive 5132.3, "Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance," charges the Unified Commander to directly participate in regional security assistance activities. In carrying out this mission, CINCPAC provides a regional overview of security assistance matters, administers the execution of approved programs through U.S. personnel assigned in recipient countries, and evaluates the effectiveness of the PACOM Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs). CINCPAC has consistently supported the direct involvement of the Unified Commander in security assistance, and, in the past, has strongly opposed efforts to limit or eliminate this involvement. The responsibilities of the Unified Commander in providing regional security assistance supervision exist simultaneously with the Chiefs of Mission. These efforts are not mutually exclusive but act in concert to meet U.S. goals and objectives in the region.

PACOM ORGANIZATION FOR EXECUTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES

Command and control for the Pacific Command is exercised from Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, which is located on a ridge overlooking the U.S. Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. The sprawling headquarters building is a converted World War II medical facility (Aiea Hospital). There is a definite Naval flavor to this landlocked headquarters, which has no floors, corridors or walls; only decks, passageways, and bulkheads -- and even a Bridge. To those with a bent toward history, the headquarters reflects the personal legacy of one of America's greatest military leaders and strategists -- Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who served as Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet-Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPAA) from 31 December 1941, until 24 November 1945. The present organization of Headquarters, Pacific Command, is the evolved product of the Joint Staff formed by Admiral Nimitz on 6 September 1943. His headquarters designator of "J00" still serves to identify the present-day CINCPAC.

The Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate (J4), headed by RADM Ralph G. Bird, USN, has staff responsibility for Security Assistance policy, planning, procedures and operations in the Pacific Command. This Directorate has eight divisions, four of which are directly involved in Security Assistance. This organization reflects the importance placed by CINCPAC and J4 on the effective and timely management of PACOM Security Assistance Programs. For reference, the Security Assistance Divisions are:

J45 - Security Assistance Policy Division
Chief: COL Robert L. German, USA

AUTOVON 477-6652

J46 - East Asia Country Programs Division
Chief: CAPT Warren W. Erikson, USN

AUTOVON 477-5183

J47 - South Asia Country Programs Division
Chief: COL James B. Gebhard, USAF

AUTOVON 477-6656

J48 - Performance Evaluation Division
Chief: COL Melvin E. Meister, USA

AUTOVON 477-6011

These four divisions are responsible for the supervision and administration of PACOM's Security Assistance Programs. The Policy Division (J45) provides the primary point of contact for security assistance policy, legislative matters, consolidated reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, excess property redistribution, automated reports and training of foreign students. The J46 and J47 divisions monitor the planning, programming and implementation of host country security assistance programs. These two divisions provide the desk officer expertise for the countries in their respective regional areas. Evaluation of U.S. and host country efficiency and effectiveness in managing Security Assistance programs is conducted by J48. The remaining four J4 divisions support, in varying degrees, the security assistance functions of the command. Other PACOM staff agencies assist J4 in meeting security assistance responsibilities in such areas as regional planning, personnel, law, communications, operations, budgeting, and public affairs.

PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS (SAOs)

PACOM SAOs cover the entire spectrum of organizations, ranging from Military Assistance Groups (MAGs) to Defense Attache Offices

(DAOs) that have been vested with security assistance responsibilities. Of the 17 major PACOM region nations with U.S. security assistance interfaces, four host MAG-type organizations, three are served by small three- to twelve-man offices, and the remainder, with the exception of Bangladesh, depend on DAOs for the administration of security assistance programs. To date, there has not been a Presidential determination to authorize the DAO in Dacca, Bangladesh, to handle security assistance business. Currently, the following personnel spaces are authorized throughout PACOM in support of security assistance:

	<u>Number of Personnel</u>
U.S. Military	231
U.S. Civilian	61
Foreign Nationals	<u>103</u>
TOTAL	395

These figures represent a personnel reduction of over 75 percent since FY 1975. Additionally, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for Taiwan are now handled by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Afghanistan's Security Assistance Program was terminated in early 1979.

FY 1980 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM VALUES

Table 1 is based on available information on the value of FY 1980 security assistance programs for PACOM region countries. Dollar amounts are estimates and subject to change. Since FY 1976, the trend has been away from grant aid programs and toward increased FMS and commercial sales. In fact, The Philippines is the only country in the region which still receives Military Assistance Program (MAP) materiel. This program is scheduled to terminate at the end of FY 1981.

Foreign Military Sales in the PACOM area, as shown in Table 1, are expected to exceed \$3 billion in FY 1980, or nearly one quarter of all such sales worldwide. The largest FY 1979 programs were with Taiwan, Korea, Japan and Thailand.

ESTIMATED FY 1980 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM VALUES
FOR PACOM COUNTRIES

TABLE 1

<u>Program</u>	<u>Estimated Value (Millions of Dollars)</u>	<u>Number of Participating Countries</u>
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)	\$3,000.00+	13
2. Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMSF)	386.00	6
3. International Military Education and Training (IMET)	5.86	11
4. Military Assistance Program (MAP)	25.00	1 (The Philippines)
5. Economic Support Fund	20.00	1 (The Philippines)
6. Commercial Sales, Licensed Under the Arms Export Control Act	577.00	Currently Unknown

CINCPAC policy is to ensure International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) monies are devoted to CONUS training of promising junior and middle grade foreign officers in professional managerial skills. Consequently, the value of the IMETP has been consistently stressed by this Command. Solid support for this program has also been given by the U.S. Ambassadors to participating PACOM region countries. Reductions in program ceilings, coupled with escalating course costs, have resulted in a marked decrease in the number of region IMETP students since FY 1975. The importance of IMETP in strengthening U.S. ties with the current and future leadership of PACOM region countries has been clearly demonstrated. Not only does the program promote a better understanding of the U.S. way of life and the U.S. military, it also provides the management expertise and technical training necessary for the effective operation of country defense forces. In the PACOM region, over 400 national level military and government leaders have been trained through IMETP. This Command feels that this program yields tremendous dividends, to dollars invested, in the establishment and maintenance of long-term, stable relationships

between the U.S. and countries of this vital region. To date, FMS training has not compensated for the student decline experienced in IMETP.

Commercial sales of military-related materiel to countries in the PACOM region are expected to exceed \$500 million during the current fiscal year. This projected amount is twice the value of such sales made directly to foreign governments by licensed U.S. commercial contractors.

MAJOR PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

Although the DISAM Newsletter has comprehensively covered significant Security Assistance events in PACOM, it may be of value to review what we consider are the highlights of our yearly activities in this field. They are:

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)

PASOLS is a CINCPAC-sponsored seminar for senior logisticians of friendly and allied nations within the PACOM region. It is a tri-service forum for the mutual exchange of logistics concepts, principles and procedures that have broad relevancy throughout the Asia-Pacific area. Presentations by representatives of participating nations and Department of Defense agencies cover topics germane to a central theme which, in turn, is oriented to the ultimate goal of regional logistics cooperation. Following a set of presentations, discussion groups address and analyze the initiatives proposed by the speakers. In addition to the obvious professional benefits derivative of the meetings, PASOLS provides an opportunity for the establishment of personal dialogues between high-level U.S. logisticians and key counterparts from Asia-Pacific countries. In addition to the U.S., participating nations include Australia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The Ninth PASOLS Seminar is scheduled for April 1980 in Seoul, Korea.

PACOM Security Assistance Conference

Like CINCEUR and CINCSOUTH, CINCPAC annually hosts a Security Assistance Conference, normally in mid-November. Attendees include senior representatives from Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments and PACOM SAOs. Presentations by members of the Washington community and Chiefs of PACOM SAOs provide timely and needed information on current security assistance policy and expected trends for the future, along with in-country perspectives on the actual implementation of security assistance programs. Informal seminars and question and answer sessions afford the opportunity for a candid exchange of views on significant security assistance issues such as funding, manning levels, arms transfer policy, and channels of

communications. A list of key action items and responsible agencies is maintained and updated throughout the conference to ensure timely follow-up. After completion of the conference, a summary of proceedings is published.

Phase IV Training

Phase IV training is conducted annually by teams from J45 to refresh and update the knowledge of PACOM SAO personnel. A unique aspect of the FY 1980 Phase IV training was that the teams visited all PACOM region countries which have significant MAP, FMS or IMET programs, rather than conducting the training at a central location. This approach has several advantages including lower overall costs, the opportunity to provide the training to a larger number of personnel, plus the chance for members of the CINCPAC staff to observe in-country security assistance operations. An added benefit of this approach to security assistance training was that host country nationals were able to participate in training sessions at no cost to the U.S. Government. Two Phase IV teams recently completed a five-week swing through the PACOM region, conducting training for over 200 U.S. and foreign personnel in 11 countries.

Tri-Service Training Workshop

Annually, in mid-March, J4 hosts a five-day Tri-Service Training Workshop. Experience has shown that the workshop concept is invaluable in the management and planning of IMET and FMS training programs for PACOM region countries. First on the agenda are updates on training-related matters by delegates from the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Military Departments. Then, for the remainder of the week representatives from PACOM SAOs present IMET and FMS training programs for the next two fiscal years to separate Military Department panels for review and coordination. If, due to the small size of a training program TDY expenditures for a SAO representative are not justified, the PACOM country desk officer presents the proposed program at the workshop. Officers from J45 chair each of the Military Department panels. As required, adjustments are made in the proposed programs to meet service school schedules, funding level changes, increased course costs, student prerequisites, etc.

The FY 1981-1982 Tri-Service Training Workshop was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, from 17-21 March 1980. Over 60 training managers from CONUS, Hawaii and PACOM region countries attended.

PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PUBLICATIONS


Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM

The FORUM is a professional military journal published quarterly by the Pacific Command specifically for Foreign Military Officers and other officials in PACOM region countries. Audience

orientation is primarily toward career officers of all military services. Emphasis is placed on informative topics, rather than on controversial subjects. One of the principal objectives of the FORUM is to support U.S. security assistance programs in the region.

Articles regularly include subjects of general interest to foreign officers, such as cooperative logistics, organizational maintenance, IMET/FMS training, and in-country projects funded by U.S. security assistance programs. The 1979-80 Winter Issue (Volume 4, Number 3), for example, featured an article on Indonesia Communications, known by the acronym, INDOCOM. This is a major electronic communications project provided to the Indonesian Armed Forces under MAP. Further, the FORUM provides a medium by which U.S.-trained foreign officers can maintain currency regarding professional military matters.

The magazine is distributed free of charge to 24 PACOM region countries. Total circulation is approximately 23,000 copies and is expected to increase as the FORUM becomes better known among Asia-Pacific nations. For further information on the FORUM project, the PACOM point of contact is Major Fred Walker, USAF, at AUTOVON 477-6128/6074. Written communications should be directed to the FORUM Editor, CINCPAC Staff, Box 13, Camp H. M. Smith, HI 96861.



LEFT: Admiral Robert L. J. Long, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, meeting foreign officers during the Third Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS III), held in Honolulu, Hawaii, from 14-18 January 1980. Seminar was hosted by U.S. Army Western Command, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii. Admiral Long was a featured speaker at the Seminar. RIGHT: Panel discussion during PAMS III. The objective of this continuing program is to provide foreign officers a broad understanding of the U.S. Army's mission in Hawaii and the roles of the U.S. Army in the Asia-Pacific region. Funding for attendees came either from participating countries or through the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP). (Photographs courtesy of PACOM)

PACOM Security Assistance Activities Bulletin

The PACOM Security Assistance Activities Bulletin (SAAB), published quarterly by CINCPAC J45, summarizes significant security assistance activities and items of interest within PACOM. This bulletin provides a vehicle to exchange information and increase the communications within the PACOM security assistance community. The SAAB reaches all of PACOM's overseas organizations as well as a broad spectrum of mainland organizations that support the U.S. Security Assistance Program. Past issues have included informative articles on PACOM activities such as PASOLS, Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) which is sponsored by the U.S. Army Western Command, current policy changes, and advisories on personnel policy /procedures.

CONCLUSION

Well-managed and adequately funded security assistance programs for PACOM countries can materially contribute to the realization of U.S. goals and objectives in the region. We at PACOM are actively involved in the planning and implementation of these programs in an earnest effort to assure their success.

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES: ASIA (Compiled by DISAM)

As indicated in the next article concerning the DISAM Asian Regional Studies Program, Asia can be divided into distinct, albeit not clear-cut, regions. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy varies from region to region. The following are extracts from a publication prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The title of this April 1979 publication is "United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations." Although, due to dynamic nature of international relations contain aspects of this report may be slightly dated, we feel it nevertheless offers some important insights with respect to this area of the world.

INDIAN OCEAN, ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

While the Indian Ocean region itself is somewhat peripheral to primary U.S. strategic military concerns, the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the United States and its allies makes the security of the sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean Persian Gulf region vitally important to the national interest of the United States. So long as the U.S. economy is dependent upon the oil of the region the United States requires close political ties with the area's oil producing

states, and the ability, in a crisis, to maintain or promptly regain access to the region's oil resources.

Due to the circumstances that led to the withdrawal of the European colonial powers from the Indian Ocean littoral states, military bases per se have only limited utility today as instruments of influence for the United States in the region, inasmuch as most local states are strongly opposed to the establishment of a permanent shore presence by an outside military power. Accordingly, the only permanent U.S. military installation in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area is at Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory. The United States recently lost previously held home-porting rights at Bahrain, but still retains the option of making periodic use of Bahraini facilities. Existing American military forces in the region serve primarily to maintain a nominal presence, patrol the vital sea lanes and maintain communications between U.S. military forces world-wide.

In light of the political sensitivities of local states it is unlikely that the United States could easily acquire rights to new bases in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region, and there are, additionally, practical limitations on the expansion of facilities in Diego Garcia. When one considers, further, that a primary threat to the oil resources of the region comes from potential internal political instability of the oil producing states it becomes clear that the basic instruments of influence available to the United States in the region are the maintenance and/or development of strong political and economic ties to key nations there. Controlled and measured military sales as well as technical and logistical training and support to friendly governments can also aid in the achievement of such American policy goals in the region. However, the recent experience of Iran indicates the serious potential pitfalls in using military sales and/or aid as an instrument of U.S. policy.

Given these circumstances in the area, and its importance to the U.S. and its allies, implementation of the "containment" strategy to its fullest extent might require, for example, increasing U.S. naval deployment and coverage of the area's vital sea lanes by whatever means available.

On the other hand, if the United States chose to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy, it would logically make a concerted effort to assist the local states in strengthening their own capacity to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner, and to enhance their

ability to guarantee that the vital oil trans-shipment routes in the area would be kept open, instead of emphasizing a major U.S. military buildup in this region.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Among the major objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific region are the maintenance of a balance of power in the region, the enhancement of the political and economic stability of the non-Communist countries there, ensuring American access to the resources and markets in the area, and keeping open the major sea passages between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The largest U.S. bases in the region are in the Philippines at Clark Air Force Base and at the Subic Bay Naval complex. Of the two, Subic Bay is the most important and vital support element for American military operations in the region. The Philippines bases, however, only serve United States political objectives in the area in an indirect manner.

In the wake of the Vietnam war, these Philippines bases have become politically symbolic to a degree that would have been unanticipated a decade ago. Today they stand as a tangible representation of continued American interest in the region to ASEAN countries, to Japan, and even to the People's Republic of China.

While the Philippines bases do not serve as a vehicle for deterring an immediate, identifiable military threat to United States interests and objectives in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific region -- inasmuch as no such threat currently exists -- the bases do provide an important contingent capability for supporting U.S. policy ends in areas beyond this immediate region, such as protecting the sea lines of communication between Japan and the Persian Gulf -- all goals that are consistent with the strategy of "containment." Although a strong rationale exists for retaining the Subic Bay complex, a strong rationale also exists for reducing the size and functions of Clark Air Base -- to emphasize, at most, logistics support for Subic Bay and operations of the United States -- Philippines air defense system.

If the United States chose to terminate its base rights in the Philippines it could support most of its military objectives in the region under the "containment" strategy through construction of military facilities in Japan and/or the U.S. Pacific Trust Territory, or through arrangements with Singapore or possibly Australia for access to their military facilities to support a continued, and substantial, U.S. naval presence in the area.

Should the United States choose to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy it would likely seek an enlarged military role for the allies in the region, increase United States-ASEAN diplomatic contacts and cooperation, and support trade policies designed to aid ASEAN states meet their development goals. This strategy implies placing greater emphasis in the future on encouraging and enhancing the capabilities of local institutions such as ASEAN to take the lead in developing intra-regional cooperation on a variety of fronts in an effort to advance the cause of region economic and political stability in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Establishing a long-range plan for transferring greater responsibility for the military security of at least portions of the sea lanes in the region to local states such as Australia and Japan might also be part of such a strategy in order to promote a greater sense of regional cohesion and help to reduce the current obligation (and expense) involved for the United States in attempting to maintain unilaterally the military stability of this vast expanse of ocean and land mass.

NORTHEAST ASIA

In the Northeast Asian region, United States foreign policy objectives are centered on preserving its close relationship with, and the independence of, Japan -- given the fundamental importance of that country to American political and economic interests in the area. An overriding concern of the United States is maintaining the general balance of power in Northeast Asia, a region which has become a locus of direct Soviet-American military confrontation only exceeded in its scope by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

Soviet military power near Japan is presently challenging the military superiority of the United States has held in the area since World War II. Only the United States is currently capable of balancing Soviet military strength in the region.

At present the complex of American bases in the Northeast Asian region consists of major air and naval installations in the Japanese home islands, and major air and ground installations in South Korea. These bases currently support most U.S. policy objectives in the area, although some modifications could take place in the status quo without destroying the ability of the United States to carry out its policy ends under the "containment" strategy. However, if the United States withdraws its ground troops from South Korea, additional reductions from area bases, under the prevailing circumstances,

would make it very difficult for the United States to support its objectives in the area as defined by the strategy of "containment."

Over time the United States will likely be faced with the fundamental issue of what the future role of Japan should be in maintaining the military balance of power in the region. In the past, the United States has assumed the role of guarantor of military stability in the region, with Japan spending no more than 1 percent of its GNP for defense purposes. Given the strength of the Japanese economy and its close ties with other regional states, it is possible to envision Japan, at some point, assuming a key role in maintaining the security of the vital sea lanes in the area, from the home islands to Indonesia. Such a development would be a major goal for the United States if it chose to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy.

It is also possible to envision a time when Japan and the People's Republic of China might come to a common understanding regarding the need to prevent conflict within the region and measures to ensure that outside powers do not threaten the peace and stability of the area. Greater emphasis on cooperation for the purpose of promoting the economic development of the region by Japan, the PRC and other area states also seems possible in the long term. These ends might also be pursued by the United States under the "regional partnership" strategy.

Fundamental changes in the American military role within Northeast Asia will likely be held in check until the Japanese willingness to assume a greater military burden is clarified, and the U.S. Korean troop withdrawal matter is settled. But the basis for a substantial evolution of U.S. strategy from "containment" to "regional partnership" in the northeast Asian region exists, and could be brought about if U.S. policymakers choose to promote this change in strategy.

One can see the non-too-subtle difference between being "somewhat peripheral" in the case of South Asia to the "perserving... the fundamental importance...to American political and economic interests." The most recent events in Afghanistan, Iran, and Indochina reflect the volatile nature of the regions and the difficulty in generalizing U.S. policies vis-a-vis "Asia."

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