

PERSPECTIVES IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

a focus on special topics of interest




This section of the Newsletter features two articles written by DISAM faculty members on topics dealing with some day-to-day management aspects of security assistance. The contents of each article represent the assessments of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the United States Government or any of its agencies.

TRANSITIONING FROM A MAAG TO AN ODC -- AN UNOFFICIAL GUIDE

By Major Donald A. Dubay, U.S. Army

As most readers may be aware, in recent years there has been a continuous, even dramatic, reduction in the number of military personnel with U.S. Missions overseas performing security assistance (SA) functions. At the same time, however, there have not been any significant changes in overseas mission responsibilities with regard to SA, nor in overall program activity. The personnel reductions (see chart on next page) have raised several questions on the role of Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs)* overseas, and how SAOs can best absorb personnel reductions while still functioning effectively.

*The designation of Security Assistance Office (SAO) is used in this article as reference to all USG elements permanently assigned to an overseas U.S. Mission tasked with performing SA functions.



DATA FROM FY 1980 AND FY 1981 CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION DOCUMENTS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

*TOTALS FOR FY81 INCLUDE SA AUGMENTEES TO DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICES (DAOs)



The focus of this article will be on MAAGs (Military Assistance Advisory Groups -- those SAOs which are authorized more than six permanently assigned U.S. Armed Forces personnel) and how these MAAGs can limit disruptions while paring down to an SAO of six or fewer military members. These thoughts, which strictly represent the unofficial and personal views of the author, are documented in response to the perceived growing interest in this subject as evidenced by student and field activity queries. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to stimulate further discussion and research, and not to serve as a "cookbook recipe" for coping with a rather complex management challenge. Any conflict or contradiction with official policy or guidance is totally unintended.


FUNCTIONS

Before undertaking any substantive discussion of SA organization structures and activities, it may be best to review the functional requirements placed on SAOs by the Legislative and Executive Branches. This exercise should be of assistance in defining what "must" be done by SAOs, as well as assisting in avoiding confusion as to SA versus non-SA related functions.

Primary Functions. The primary legal basis for the performance of SA activities by SAOs is Section 515(b), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA). The Act, as amended by Public Law 95-92, states that MAAGs "shall have as their primary functions logistics management, transportation management, fiscal management, and contract administration of country programs." The act also states that "advisory and training assistance...shall primarily be provided" by personnel assigned for limited periods. As the FAA does not further define the four primary functions, the understanding of Congress regarding them is in the March 1978 hearing transcripts of the House International Relations Committee, as follows:

1. Logistics management consists of insuring proper execution of delivery of materiel and services obtained through U.S. security assistance. It includes making the necessary arrangements for such items as

construction; receipt, movement, storage, distribution, operation and maintenance of materiel; for training; and for necessary technical services. Under this function, the MAAG also keeps the Department of Defense informed as to problems being encountered with the U.S. logistics system and takes or recommends appropriate action to resolve them.



2. Transportation activities consist of working with the U.S. contractors, services and the foreign armed forces concerning USG transportation policies and procedures, the freight forwarder delivery system, special procedures for delivery of munitions and other hazardous cargo; assisting the host country in developing transportation procedures, including pipeline management; due-in status reporting; assisting in locating missing cargo in the Defense Transportation System; inspecting and validating transit damage to security assistance materiel; assisting the host country in preparation of damage reports and claims; arranging for movement of MAP-origin materiel being returned to U.S. custody.

3. Fiscal management includes obtaining and providing financial information on Foreign Military Sales cases, FMS credit agreements, MAP and IMET programs, utilization of drawdown cases, supply support arrangements, progress payment requirements for "dependable undertaking" FMS cases; serving as technical interface among the country, Security Assistance Accounting and Finance Center, DSAA Comptroller, and service commands responsible for fiscal matters; keeping the Chief of Mission informed on progress payment delinquencies or other fiscal matters which may require political attention.

4. Activities in contract administration include oversight of FMS transactions and the monitoring of activities and operations of contracting officers or contracting officers' representatives (COR) and staff support to them in the administration of contracts between the government and commercial contractors. At this time we do not envision the MAAG assuming responsibility for actual contract administration as would normally be assigned to a contracting officer or COR. The MAAG must, however, oversee activities of attached CORs to insure that their missions are accomplished in an efficient and effective manner and are in accord with established security assistance objectives.

For SAOs with six or fewer U.S. Armed Forces personnel, the FAA states they will "perform accounting and other management functions" with respect to SA programs identified in the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (AECA). This does not mean the smaller SAOs have a reduced scope of responsibility; rather, it is an implication that the smaller SAOs have a lesser degree of involvement in SA management details.

Other SA Related Functions. There are other SA related functions which the SAO must perform either in conjunction with the four primary functions noted above, or in implementing the SA programs as provided for in the AECA. These include:

1. FMS Case Management: This includes assuring the FMS case is implemented in accordance with host nation desires and prior host nation/USG agreement; that the case, if necessary, is properly modified and/or amended; that such modifications and amendments are appropriately acknowledged or accepted by the host nation; that the concept of the total package approach is utilized, and that systems integrated logistics support plans are sufficiently reviewed and coordinated by the host country and the USG, as well as other FMS case management activities, including assisting the host nation in planning for the receipt and integration of FMS materiel and services into its defense organization.

2. Training Management: This includes both the programming of training requirements and the administration of foreign military trainees (FMT) to assure that properly qualified and prepared FMTs attend courses of instruction most suitable to host nation needs and, with regard to the International Military Education Training Program (IMETP), that training is programmed in accordance with Part II of the Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM -- DOD 5105.38-M) and other appropriate guidance.

3. Plans: This includes the preparation and Country Team coordination of scheduled and unscheduled SA related reports. The

three primary planning documents requiring significant SAO participation are the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA); its scheduled update, the Consolidated Data Report (CDR); and the Joint Strategic Planning Document/Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA).

4. Monitoring: This includes monitoring host nation utilization of MAP and IMET program materiel and training:

a. Section 505(a)(3) of the FAA states that no defense articles or related training or other defense service shall be furnished to any country on a grant basis unless it shall have been agreed that it will, as the President may require, permit continuous observation and review by, and furnish necessary information to, representatives of the USG with regard to the use of such articles or related training or other defense service.

b. The appropriate Unified Commands provide specific guidance to the SAOs on the performance of this function.

In addition, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), OASD(ISA), in the draft update of DOD Directive 5132.3, states that the SAOs (termed inclusively as MAAGs in the directive) will:

1. Assist U.S. Military Departments and their subordinate elements in arranging for the receipt, transfer, and acceptance of security assistance materiel, training, and other services for recipient countries.

2. Assist the host government in the identification, administration, and proper disposition of security assistance materiel that is in excess of current needs.

3. May perform secondary functions such as advisory and training services, and negotiation on non-security assistance military matters, so long as these activities do not detract in the judgement of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission from the primary functions.

4. Keep the ASD (ISA), DSAA, JCS, Unified Commands, and Military Departments informed through appropriate channels of security assistance activities in country.

In order to perform all of these SA functions identified above, the Director, DSAA provided the following guidance during the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1979:

In performing these functions [the four primary functions identified in the FAA], the organizations maintain liaison between DOD components, the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, and the Foreign Defense Organization in order to:

Enable the foreign government to acquire information needed to make decisions concerning the acquisition, use, and required training involved in obtaining defense articles and services from the U.S. through security assistance programs (keeping in mind that host countries are to be encouraged to establish and depend upon, to the extent possible, their own procurement missions in the U.S.);

Obtain information needed to evaluate host military capability to employ and maintain equipment being requested, and to process the foreign government's security assistance proposals;

Enable the U.S. to request the foreign government to take action in order to facilitate the timely, efficient and responsive implementation of approved programs; and

Enable the USG to acquire information concerning potential future defense acquisitions by the foreign governments and anticipate demands on U.S. resources.


The latest official discussion/synopsis of SA functions is in the recently published FY 1981 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), as follows:

Security assistance organizations in foreign countries are an essential part of the overall management of the security assistance program. These organizations perform the following functions:

- supervise logistics, transportation, and fiscal activities related to management of the program in the respective country;
- provide advice and assistance to the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission on security assistance matters;
- maintain liaison with the foreign defense organization on security assistance activities;
- oversee the administration of contracts in-country between the Department of Defense and commercial contractors furnishing articles and services under the aegis of the security assistance program; and



- help assure proper utilization and disposition of materiel, training, and technical assistance furnished to the foreign governments through the security assistance program.

Housekeeping and Non-SA Related Functions. In addition to purely SA functions, SAOs also must perform extensive housekeeping tasks, and may be required to undertake non-SA related activities, both of which can and do detract from the SAOs ability to properly perform their specified SA functions.



1. Housekeeping functions commonly performed by SAO's include maintaining the SAO budget and property books; performing U.S. military/civilian personnel actions; supervising local hire personnel; managing the SAO "motor pool;" assisting assigned U.S. personnel with housing matters, and other such activities. Housekeeping requirements become a particular burden to those SAOs which receive very limited assistance from the U.S. Mission, are located apart from the Chancery, and are in countries where required consumer goods either are not available or are difficult to obtain.

2. SAOs also frequently are tasked with performing non-SA functions, usually by virtue of being a military organization and by being the senior Unified Command representative in-country (in the case of the Chief, SAO) and, as such, the DOD representative. Some of these functions are ceremonial and diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic in nature, such as wreath laying ceremonies and hosting social functions on U.S. military holidays, reflecting the status of the SAO Chief as an active senior member of the U.S. Mission in country. Other non-SA functions are directly U.S. official community related, such as managing the DOD film service and operating an APO/FPO mail



system. Potentially the most demanding non-SA function for the SAO, however, is in assisting other DOD elements in the performance of their missions. For example, SAOs may be tasked to assist in coordinating combined military exercises, joint service/combined exercises, and U.S. joint or single service exercises conducted within the host country territorial boundaries. While some indirect SA related benefits can be ascribed to the performance of these activities (evaluation of host nation capabilities, rapport with military counterparts), they are nearly or wholly outside of SA activities as defined by USG legislation and for which personnel resources generally are authorized.

In performing SA functions, the SAOs have been provided with specific guidance and policy statements, in addition to those previously mentioned. The primary ones are identified at references 10 through 15 shown at the end of this article.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

It would be simplistic and inaccurate to assume that, given identical sets of tasks and functions, SAOs worldwide could perform those tasks and functions with similar resources and achieve similar results. There are too many variables confronting the SAOs for such assumptions. Following is a discussion of four of the major considerations in evaluating SAO capabilities in the performance of their functions.

1. Host Nation Capabilities: There are very few grant aid recipient and FMS purchaser countries which could not assume most SA roles over a reasonable period of time, given the availability of training, planning assistance, and adequate communications with the USG agencies and commercial sources. A key role of the SAO, assuming host nation self-sufficiency is a goal, is to "work itself out of a job," by continually and aggressively assisting the host nation in developing its managerial and technical capabilities with regard to SA programs. Given the myriad and complex functions of grant aid and FMS programs, however, SAOs can be expected to continue to play an active role in host nations/USG interactions.

2. SAO Capabilities: Two major variables in assessing SAO capabilities in performing its SA functions are its personnel, and the quality of communications with the host nation defense establishment and appropriate USG agencies. As concerns U.S. personnel permanently assigned to the SAO, an assessment must be made as to their general professional experience/competence, assignment specific training (language, SA schools), and physical location in-country (a SAO USAF pilot located with a host nation operational unit some distance from the SAO/U.S. Embassy has no flexibility in performing other than a very limited set of tasks). SAO capabilities can be increased many times over by the effective employment (with host nation concurrence and participation) of Technical

Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs), Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Teams (TATs), other DOD and commercial field teams, defense requirements surveys, site surveys, and technical surveys. Other than establishing effective communication with the host nation defense organization, perhaps the greatest challenge of a SAO is to effectively plan for and employ the above teams and surveys, as it requires a fine sense of its own goals and limitations, knowledge of SA program requirements, and of host nation capabilities.

3. Program Size and Diversity: A third major consideration of the performance of SA functions simply is the size and diversity of the programs. Each program, whether MAP, IMETP, FMS credit, FMS cash, co-production, etc., has its own set of requirements to be performed by the host nation, either entirely by itself or with the assistance of an SAO.

4. Local Operating Conditions: The fourth consideration concerns local operating conditions. This includes the need for foreign language fluency (If SAO personnel are lacking in this skill, for example, are host nation counterparts and points of contact highly qualified in English? Can it be assumed they always will be so?). Also, there may be several host nation preferences as to the size, composition, and location of the SAO. Another, and most important consideration, is the willingness of the host nation defense establishment to adjust to U.S. policies and procedures with regard to SA program requirements, and to accept SAO guidance in the execution of those requirements.

ACTIONS FOR TRANSITION

For those MAAGs facing personnel reductions, anticipating reductions, or simply wishing to avoid turbulence if and when the MAAG is reduced in size, the following actions are recommended as critical, but not all-inclusive, due to the individual characteristics of each country and purchaser/recipient, which will influence the shape and timing of the actions. It is emphasized that the recommendations below will require extensive planning and coordination for implementation and are not intended as "quick-fixes."

1. Definition of Functions: The first matter that should be addressed is the definition of functions performed by the MAAG, and the tasks necessary for each function. Additionally, there should be a distinction made between SA and non-SA related functions and tasks, excluding housekeeping activities.

2. Organizational Transition:

a. The next step is to develop a section within the MAAG, using present MAAG personnel, which will form the nucleus for the transition and which, ultimately, will become a six-man SAO. Once formed, the transition team will assume control of the MAAG SA

functions on a planned, phased basis. The team's method of operation will be to exercise centralized control of its ever-increasing functions, while relying on the existing MAAG service and special projects sections for execution of tasks. This will be especially relevant for FMS case management. One MAAG apparently is undertaking such an approach and, to its credit, has emphasized the need for a central file, under the transition team's control and as the MAAG's official files repository, while other MAAG elements rely on working files for the day-to-day case management activities.

b. Some SA functions lend themselves readily to centralized control and execution, and these should be the first to be inherited by the transition team. Some of these are:

(1) Plans: Perform as the MAAG focal point for the preparation and U.S. Mission coordination of SA reports, including the AIASA, CDR, and JSPDSA; the service sections are to provide input for appropriate portions of the reports.

(2) Financial Management: Monitor all payments made on FMS cases, whether cash payments or FMS credit agreement draw-downs; monitor and coordinate with the host nation FMS credit agreement paybacks; monitor the FMS trust fund and advise the host nation on its uses; maintain the official MAAG FMS case file, with all amendments and notices, in part to track host nation financial requirements; receive, coordinate with the service sections, and present to the host nation the quarterly DD Form 645 Billing Statement; respond to host nation queries on all matters concerning FMS financial matters, and assume MAAG primacy for all other FMS financial management actions.

(3) Training Management: As noted previously, training functions, whether FMS or IMET Program training, fall neatly into two subfunctions; these are training programming and foreign military trainee (FMT) administration activities. Initially, the transition team may elect to perform FMT administration actions, with the service sections temporarily continuing their training programming function, since most FMT administrative requirements have been standardized within DOD while training programming, especially for the IMET Program, requires some service unique expertise. Eventually, however, all training management functions should be assumed by the transition team. Principal FMT administrative matters include administering ECL tests; verifying FMT qualifications and medical requirements; maintaining FMT files for current students; preparing Invitational Travel Orders (ITOs); coordinating the issuance of U.S. visas and, where necessary, coordinating third country clearances; obtaining airline tickets for transoceanic and CONUS travel (IMET only); presenting pre-departure briefings, preparing and sending student arrival notices and performing all other student administration functions which may be required.

(4) FMS Case Management: Process all planning and review (P&R) and all price and availability (P&A) data requests initiated in country, to include those requiring State Department justification, as well as other requests for planning data. Initially, the preparation of Letters of Requests (LOR) for planning data and Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) should be coordinated fully with the service sections to assure their completeness and validity. Also, the team is to provide responses, when received, to P&R and P&A planning requests to the host nation; monitor the status of LOA processing in CONUS; receive and review, with the service sections, requested LOAs to assure accuracy and completeness and forward such LOAs to the host nation (the same process would apply to LOA modifications and amendments); manage all FMS cases for training and other services; process all Reports of Discrepancy (RODs), with the service sections providing technical assistance to the host nations in preparing the RODs. The service sections are to continue providing the day-to-day FMS case management and technical assistance for materiel FMS cases to the host nation, until final delivery of the materiel. The transition team will perform all case closeout actions. Additionally, the team is to establish complete FMS planning and LOA case files.

(5) Military Assistance Program: Assume responsibility for the preparation of required end item utilization reports required by the Unified Command, relying extensively on input by the service sections; maintain all MAP materiel status records; be responsible for the disposition of MAP materiel declared excess to the host nation's needs (an increasingly demanding function as MAP materiel ages and countries "buy new" to replace it).

(6) Process all life-of-type purchases and MIMEX offers.

(7) Maintain the official MAP, IMETP and FMS policies and procedures files for the MAAG.

(8) Maintain close liaison with all appropriate host nation defense elements in the execution of its functions.

(9) Assume all functions and responsibility for the planning, request, and overall supervision of TAFTs, MTTs, TATs, Survey Teams and other SA teams. (As noted previously, the proper management of these teams is considered especially critical for a small SAO.)

(10) Eventually, as the transition team becomes the new SAO, it will have assumed all security assistance related functions necessary for the proper implementation of its host nation's SA program.

c. In order to perform its various functions and tasks and to assure full staff cooperation when required, it is recommended that the chief of the transition team be the Deputy Chief, MAAG.

3. Host Country Participation: To assist in securing the cooperation of the host nation in the transition (reduction) from a MAAG to a six-man or smaller SAO, the transition should be viewed as a joint U.S./host nation venture, especially as the transition should require some planned actions on the part of the host nation defense organization. If possible, the MAAG Chief should keep the highest levels of the local defense establishment abreast of the plans and progress of the transition, while assisting the host nation in assuming more of the SA functions and tasks previously performed by the MAAG. Unfortunately, there is no blueprint to assist SA purchaser/recipient countries in becoming more self-sufficient, but there are some actions the MAAG may take or recommend, to include:

a. Development of a periodic logistics course, conducted by MAAG personnel, for host nation personnel engaged in processing FMS requisitions, maintaining requisition status files, interpreting periodic requisition status reports, and preparing RODs. As a guide, one SAO has conducted one such 2-3 day course on a quarterly basis. To assure the greatest degree of host nation participation, the course is fully coordinated with host nation defense elements prior to each session.

b. Establishment of an AUTODIN system for all materiel requisitions. (Approximately 24 purchaser countries have established such a system which, according to one user, is the single most valuable link to the U.S. logistics system for his country's armed forces.)

c. Planned attendance at such courses in CONUS as the DISAM "F" and "FE" courses; the International Defense Management Courses; various junior and mid-level officer supply, logistics and maintenance courses; and use of a security assistance management MTT for key personnel in-country. (English language training may be a planning factor for the above).

d. As noted by the General Accounting Office, the Congress, and the DOD, the USG should encourage host nations to establish their own procurement missions in CONUS, and several have done so. For example, there are approximately 12 countries represented at the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command and 10 at the U.S. Navy International Logistics Control Office. There is only one purchaser country representative at the U.S. Army Security Assistance Center, New Cumberland, but, as for all U.S. SA elements, the military representatives assigned to their country's diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C., are encouraged to establish liaison with all appropriate SA organizations. Additionally, purchaser country representatives are found at the U.S. Army Material Readiness Commands, Navy Aviation Supply Office and Ships Parts Control Center, Air Force System Program Offices and Air Logistics Centers, as well as with other offices and centers (training centers, for example).

4. MAAG Personnel Reductions: If possible, MAAG personnel reductions should be through normal attrition, which would create the least amount of turbulence and allow for the orderly transfer of functions and files from the service sections to the transition team. Development of the team, its consolidation of MAAG security assistance functions, and an increased level of participation in SA functions by the host nation will set the basis for reductions of those MAAG personnel involved specifically in SA management. Other measures which can result in further reductions include:

a. An assessment by the MAAG of efforts expended in non-SA functions, particularly those which involve assisting in the performance of the mission of other U.S. DOD elements. The Chief of the U.S. Mission may desire a transfer of those functions to the responsible DOD organization(s).

b. Elimination of translation services provided by the MAAG for the host nation. The host nation should be encouraged to provide its own translation section (one possibility is the English Language School). Most internal MAAG translation requirements eventually can be satisfied by requiring language training of all of its non-administrative personnel. Furthermore, language training should become an absolute necessity for U.S. personnel staffing a small SAO. In a large MAAG, non-language qualified personnel can be "hidden," or kept from having to interact with non-English speaking host nation defense personnel, without hampering the MAAG mission. In a six-man or smaller SAO, such a luxury does not exist. Personnel assigned should have the requisite skills and talents to perform virtually all SAO functions (at least on an emergency basis) and to be able to communicate effectively with the host nation's defense representatives on SA related matters.

c. The largest number of military personnel reductions may be possible from the administrative sections. Some reductions may develop as a result of overall MAAG personnel reductions. The most effective means of reductions, however, may be possible by obtaining more administrative support from the U.S. Mission, which will be made more likely as the MAAG is reduced in size. U.S. Mission support of the MAAG can include (services reimbursable through a support agreement):

(1) Vehicle maintenance.

(2) Housing support, to include locating housing, contracting for rents, providing maintenance and furnishings, and providing guard personnel, if necessary.


(3) Providing office space within the Chancery, which would eliminate requirements for separate security, maintenance and cleaning personnel and their management.

(4) MAAG access to the U.S. Mission language study program.

(5) The benefit to the U.S. Mission for providing this support is the reduction of official U.S. personnel in-country (if desirable). The SAO also benefits by ridding itself of some of its non-SA functions and responsibilities.

TRANSITION TEAM COMPOSITION

At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be noted that there is no SAO organizational model suitable for all U.S. Missions, nor is there an irrefutable position arguing for a functional vice a service oriented structure. There will be strengths and weaknesses evident in any model presented; however, certain SAO organizational characteristics are desirable. The following is a proposed six military member transition team, whose composition would be expected to remain fairly stable once it becomes the new SAO, except for one substantive position reverting to an Administrative Officer position. Most of the present five and six military member SAO structures and functions were reviewed, with the finding that the largest number required their personnel to be "dual-hatted." That is, the personnel in these organizations are assigned by specific SA function, while performing some service-related tasks, normally because of service unique expertise requirements, and for DOD representation activities. The rank structure of the model, below, is based on a composite of rank structures of present six military member ODCs.



Position and Qualifications

1. Team Chief: O-6, service immaterial. During the transition, should be the Deputy Chief, MAAG. Recommended qualifications:

a. Mandatory language training at S3/R3 level (if U.S. Army, Foreign Area Officer preferred).

b. Senior service school and/or advanced degree mandatory.

c. Phase II training mandatory (DISAM "0" course preferred; shorter "I" course acceptable).

d. Phase III training mandatory.

2. Plans Officer: O-5 from different service than the Team Chief; perform as Deputy Team Chief. Recommended qualifications:

a. Mandatory language training at S3/R3 level (if U.S. Army, Foreign Area Officer preferred).

b. Completion of intermediate service school desired.

c. Bachelor degree mandatory; graduate degree desired.

d. Fully qualified in military specialty (logistics background preferred but not essential).

e. Phase II training mandatory (DISAM "0" course).

f. Phase III training desirable.

3. Senior Programs Officer: O4, service immaterial (should be from service most active in FMS transactions with host nation). Recommended qualifications:

a. Mandatory language training at S3/R3 level.

b. Competitive for intermediate service school.

c. Bachelor degree mandatory; graduate degree desired.

d. Full qualifications in logistics mandatory.

e. Phase II training mandatory (DISAM "0" course).

4. Programs Officer: O4, service immaterial (should be different service from that of senior programs officer). Recommended qualifications identical to those of senior programs officer.

5. Training Officer: O-4, service immaterial. Recommended qualifications:

- a. Mandatory language training at S3/R3 level. If U.S. Army, Foreign Area Officer validated position mandatory.
- b. Competitive for intermediate service school.
- c. Bachelor Degree mandatory; Graduate Degree desired.
- d. Phase II Training mandatory (DISAM "O" course).

6. Training NCO: E-8, service immaterial (should be different service from that of training officer). Recommended qualifications:

- a. Mandatory language training at S3/R3 level.
- b. Phase II Training mandatory (DISAM "O" Course).
- c. Logistics background preferred, to assist program officers where necessary.

Dedicated administrative assistance to the team should be limited. Most personnel can rely on general MAAG administrative assets. The training officer and NCO will require assigned (dedicated) clerk/typists for the preparation of required reports, messages, correspondence, etc. Directly assigned administrative personnel also would be of assistance to the training element in standardizing its many tasks and functions.

CONCLUSION

There is no clear set of recommended actions for the transition of a MAAG to a smaller, primarily functionally oriented, SAO. There simply are too many variables. It is recognized that several matters were not addressed in detail, such as FMS case and training management documentation and aids, purchaser country comments as to the desired role of host nations personnel based in the U.S., and other information of a general nature. This is, however, only an initial attempt to define a transition process, one that can be planned for and adopted in a phased sequence while limiting SA program management disruptions.

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3. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
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6. Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
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10. President Carter's Statement on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, 19 May 1977.
11. Secretary of State message DTG 310241Z AUG 77, Subject "Implementation of Arms Transfer Policy Guidelines Against Promotion of Arms Sales."
12. Secretary of State message DTG 240237Z FEB 78, Subject "Roles and Activities of Military Personnel Assigned to Security Assistance Duties in Diplomatic Missions Abroad."
13. Deputy Secretary of Defense Letter, Subject "Contacts with Industry Regarding Foreign Arms Sales," dated 4 May 1978.
14. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Public Law 95-384, 26 September 1978.
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