

# PERSPECTIVES IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

a focus on special topics of interest



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TO THE USEUCOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONFERENCE

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Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am pleased to have this opportunity to meet with those of you who are directly involved with our security efforts in European Command. At the outset, let me extend my congratulations to you -- my commendation to you -- for the manner in which you perform your functions. We get nothing but good feedback, and that is always pleasing to hear; so I congratulate you on it.

I know from previous visits that I have made to various areas in the world that you and your military associates -- if you have any with you in your station -- in fact are often the sole representatives by which the people of the nation in which you serve judge the United States Armed Forces. That is a pretty big responsibility you bear, which is why I am so pleased to get the good comments about how you do represent our country. You are at the cutting edge of the attempts of the United States to try to foster our political objectives by providing allies with technology, with materiel, with resources, with training and with service. That to me is one of the most important security efforts of our country. Thus, to have the opportunity to get together at a single location with all of you in this manner is very fortunate for me. As you know, I wear two hats, SACEUR and CINCEUR, and no matter where I go ostensibly as the CINCEUR I am also still the SACEUR. There are overtones from being associated with NATO that sometimes preclude the opportunities to travel to some of your duty stations -- places where I envy the DCINC in his having the privilege to go. I do think it is very important from time to time that we eyeball one another and see what is on each other's mind.

The basic thrust of what I want to talk about today is that we in EUCOM face a large and a growing threat, but we do not face it alone. As a consequence, I want to talk in terms of a little larger context than just European Command. Because our command is tied so closely to NATO, I wish to outline the general menace to the Alliance as I see

it, to highlight what we face in the current military situation. I also want to discuss some of the things we have to do, if, in fact, we are serious in the West that we intend to defend ourselves, and, more importantly, that we are to be perceived by those who menace us that we have that intention and the requisite capability.

At the outset of the '80s, NATO -- but particularly the European allies because the United States functions on a global security basis already -- must face up to the fact that there is a changed global strategic situation which impacts very heavily upon us. In addition to the Alliance having to continue to face within its boundaries the threat from the East, we now must also confront additional challenges located outside the boundaries of the Alliance -- many in areas where you serve. The West faces the danger of vital supply lines being choked or severed or Third World strife and political instability engulfing areas which are crucial to our economies and to our way of life. These challenges, needless to say, are nourished by Soviet military power, which to an unprecedented degree now menaces the worldwide interests of the Western Alliance.

There are four major aspects of that Soviet menace which I wish to address. The first one is that the primary danger comes from the fact that there is a continuing adverse force imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. I need not elaborate for this group about the relentless Soviet accumulation of military power over the past 15 years. They have always outnumbered us in men and equipment. They continued along the lines of numerical preponderance until the early part of the '70s when they turned their attention to overcoming the qualitative advantage that we have traditionally enjoyed, and upon which we have depended. And they have succeeded in all areas -- weapons of mass destruction at the highest level; theater nuclear forces within Europe; general purpose forces; land, sea and air -- across the board. The Soviet Union entered the '70s as a conventional land power with defensive air and sea forces. She enters the '80s as an offensively oriented global power with all types of forces and all types of capabilities. And in my view, the Warsaw Pact has surpassed the West -- or soon will -- in all areas of warfighting capability that we need in order to carry out our strategy.

The second aspect of this Soviet threat is that this military strength is even more dangerous when one considers the internal problems that the Soviet Union has within both her own country and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s. These include leadership changes, chronic economic and agricultural problems, oil supplies which are diminishing and may well make her an importer before the end of the decade, and concern about the fidelity of her Warsaw Pact allies: witness Poland. Yet despite the increased political and economic problems which she faces, there is no evidence available to us today to lead us to believe that she will do anything other than continue the massive investment in military power throughout the rest of this decade. As the Soviet brand of communism continues to experience failures, she may well resort to her one area of success as a superpower -- the exercise of military might.

As a third aspect of the Soviet menace, the broader strategic environment contains evidence of demonstrated Soviet willingness and capability to project her military power for political purposes. For thirty years, she has insisted on the right to use force to hold East European governments within the fold, and even now, while keeping forces prepared to intimidate Poland, she continues in Afghanistan a policy of extending the Brezhnev Doctrine into the Third World. The great danger for NATO in this latest Soviet aggression is that she now has acquired a better position from which to threaten our collective vital interests in Southwest Asia.

The fourth aspect, closely related to this increasing propensity to use military power for political purposes, is the growing Soviet capability to project that power worldwide. I believe, and I would say it is the consensus of the senior military body of the Alliance, that the menace to the West has never been more serious since 1949 when NATO was founded. A comprehensive modernization effort and a growing power projection capability bolster an already large offensive-oriented Warsaw Pact military establishment. And what have we done in NATO in response? We cannot be very proud of what we did in the United States in the 1970's. We decreased our defense effort through most of that decade at a time when our NATO allies were in fact increasing theirs. I might also say they continue to remind the US of that fact when Americans, not so gently, urge them to do more today. In response to what we face, the NATO allies have been trying to do more in the past several years. But I must tell you it has not been enough, and we are not projected to do enough in the future. Our capabilities for defense across the board have not kept pace with the growth of the threat, and over the past decade the balance has tipped too far in favor of our potential adversaries.

Now the rhetoric is good. In fact, the rhetoric in NATO ministerial meetings could not be better. Last December we heard absolutely the kind of talk and the kinds of communiques that must come from that organization. The same is true in all the fora within NATO; but good rhetoric is not enough. The performance of countries on both sides of the Atlantic in meeting their commitments is generally not good. The commitments that have been made by countries in the Long-Term Defense Program, the NATO Force Goals and the Phase II post-Afghanistan measures are becoming more and more overdue promissory notes as we see slippages, cancellations and reductions. Every year Allied Command Europe gets stronger because we continue to whittle away at our deficiencies, but every year the gap between the force capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact gets wider. In addition the changed strategic environment with its increased threat to vital interests outside the boundaries of NATO places further demands on our resources.

So what we face in NATO today -- and I think it is now a common recognition among our West European allies -- is a dual menace inside and outside the boundaries of NATO which requires a dual response. We cannot choose between outside and internal responses, both are essential. Within the European theater the overall task remains unchanged -- to deter. If unsuccessful, to defend. We will continue to be

prepared to implement a deterrent strategy of Flexible Response, which gives us the volition to escalate the level of violence if necessary. This strategy is still applicable today providing that the nations of the Alliance give us that necessary continuum of forces from the conventional through the theater nuclear to the strategic.

We are moving on several levels to meet the challenges that arise outside NATO. We are trying to concert our efforts through consultation and, with other Western nations -- some not within NATO -- deploying forces to the Indian Ocean to demonstrate our resolve. The U.S. Rapid Deployment Force continues to attract public attention on both sides of the Atlantic, most recently with respect to who is going to command it. Incidentally my position on that is that it does not matter. We are going to make it work no matter what the decision is. The creation of the RDF signals to the other Allies the need for what they themselves have called a better division of labor. We really have not defined specifically enough what that means in terms of what our NATO allies must provide. Some would say that so far it's business as usual. We hope to change that. The Allies at least must be prepared to compensate in some manner for those forces that might be committed in the Rapid Deployment Force and therefore would not be coming to the SACEUR as reinforcements.

Despite the Allied efforts of the past several years, it is my assessment that the threat continues to grow. That threat now is a dual threat; our ability within the Alliance to counter it is declining, and therefore the credibility of our deterrent is diminishing. What I have just told you is exactly what I tell the public, what I tell groups that I address, what I tell the NATO ministers themselves. My aim is to draw the attention, particularly of the peoples within the countries of our Alliance, to the fact that these are critical times, that security arrangements must have first priority and that they must be prepared to sacrifice. It is only when the people believe that, that you will have happen in the Western Europe countries what I hope has happened in our country -- namely the mandate that was given to President Reagan last November to get on with enhancing the security arrangements of the United States. I hope the people who gave him that mandate recognize that implicit therein was the agreement to sacrifice in other areas; because if they now send a message to their duly constituted representatives that they really did not mean that that mandate included their making sacrifices, the Congress will not follow through in the budget revisions that the Administration has sent to the Congress. The United States must set the example. There is no way that we can expect to have any additional resources made available to the Alliance unless the United States takes the lead. In Western Europe, Germany must be prepared to set the example as well.

What I try to point out to political leaders is that the limitations they place on resources for security must correspond to the degree of risk to the freedom of their people that they are prepared to assume. Today that risk is high, and it is growing. We must show

within the Alliance the resolve that we are prepared to back up our rhetoric with action and with material resources. Yes, this effort will impact on social services; but showing that resolve is the message that needs to be sent to the other side, because they closely monitor the condition of our deterrent.

I hope that you discern from what I have said that we do not have enough, that we are not doing enough and that we are spread very thinly with what we have. There just are not sufficient forces, US and allied, to devote to all our security concerns worldwide. Nor would it be politically possible in my opinion, to engage in massive new overseas peacetime deployments. Likewise, I do not believe, as some would advocate, that it is politically feasible to extend the boundaries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

But this is where you in the security assistance field enter the picture. Some of your efforts directly assist NATO and our allies in their modernization programs. In many cases, on the southern flank and beyond, you represent the principal or perhaps even the sole link between security efforts of the United States and those of the countries in which you serve. Several of those countries, let's admit it, not long ago were considered in the backwater of American concerns. Now they have gained sharply increased prominence for our long-term strategic planning and our long-term strategic needs. As the Soviet global military capabilities evolve, the menace to our interests in such areas as the Gulf and the Horn of Africa has become more salient. We depend on raw materials which come from or transit past countries to which many of you are assigned. Here again, it has to take a concerted effort of allies in order to protect those interests because they are collective and common. Likewise we all know that future deployments of US forces beyond the European theater will depend so much on overflight rights and refueling bases and forward support facilities arranged with countries where you serve.

I believe that the new Administration in Washington is determined to meet the challenges posed by the Soviet menace. I believe that a fundamental part of the approach of this Administration is to improve the global security posture by renewed emphasis on security assistance programs. I say that knowing full well that the Congress has not yet taken final action on those security assistance programs. Having worked for two years as the Army's Chief of Legislative Liaison, the one thing I took away from my experience with the Congress is that the only thing that's predictable about the Congress is their unpredictability. Nonetheless, the Administration has made its position clear by the security assistance budgets that they have submitted to the Congress and, equally important, by the very positive tone expressed by the Reagan Administration towards the concept of US security assistance programs. I think it is a welcome and long overdue change of perspective in which it is the security interests of the United States which rank foremost in our considerations of the security assistance program. I think we have gotten the message from this Administration.

I would like to think that these developments -- the budget that has been submitted and the positive tone of the statements from the Administration with respect to security arrangements and assistance -- would raise your credibility and your effectiveness with the nations and the counterparts with whom you deal. They will continue to look to you for an indication and interpretation of US policy. Despite the past legislation which may have circumscribed and may continue to circumscribe your official representational functions, nevertheless the reality is that your presence and performance are considered a demonstration of concern by our country for the security of the nations where you serve. I know that this demands of you a level of knowledge and a level of enthusiasm which is often difficult to maintain, particularly in view of the constraints of time and the factors beyond your control. Irrespective of these handicaps, you still play a major role where you are in serving as additional ambassadors for our country.

Now I do not mean that every moment and in every action you have to advertise for the Western democracies, their way of life and so on. The accomplishments and advantages we have speak for themselves pretty much. By comparison, the Soviet system, in economic and social terms, is a failure by any standard of measure, except for the accumulated military might that I mentioned at the outset. And this bankruptcy is becoming increasingly evident over time. What I am saying to you is that your challenge in performing the special security assistance tasks in EUCOM is to hold the door open for the West. What you do may not always get adequate recognition, but you and I both know that the return that such successes bring in terms of gaining, maintaining and strengthening our allies, and thereby contributing to our own strength, are of such a nature that it is difficult at times to measure.

To those of you here who deal at the senior management level of our security assistance programs, I ask that you keep your ear open to the word from the field. Neither end of the chain has a monopoly on good ideas, innovations and initiatives. All the brainpower is not accumulated at EUCOM or in Washington. Nor is it all out in the field. I would hope there is an equitable distribution. The message for those of us who are in a supervisory or senior managerial position of responsibility is: listen to those out there at the cutting edge and do the best that we possibly can to provide the tools they need to do their job.

I have devoted considerable time to outlining the global threat which we and our allies face today. In EUCOM, our deployed forces along with our allies have their hands full, I can guarantee you, coping with the ever-mounting challenge of deterring Warsaw Pact aggression. The fact that our strategy of Flexible Response is losing its credibility points out the urgency and complexity of the NATO-related tasks for this decade. And the very need for facing new challenges in EUCOM in cooperation with our Allies highlights the increased scope of our security concerns. The main point I want this group to understand is that in the current strategic environment there

should be no question in your minds or anybody else's that security assistance functions are absolutely essential to the future of the United States. That is particularly true at this time when we are organizing, equipping and planning for that rapid deployment capability which will be adequate to meet the threat with which we and our friends in this part of the world must contend.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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