

DSCA Welcomes
New Deputy Director

The DISAM Journal

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Welcome
to the
United States

AFRICA Command

The DISAM Journal
of International Security Assistance Management

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THE DISAM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

Happy holidays and welcome to this quarter's DISAM Journal!

This month we feature our newest geographic Combatant Command, U.S. Africa Command. Highlights include a primer and remarks from General Ward, Commander of U.S. Africa Command; foreign affairs perspective from Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte; a look at contingency operations in the region as noted by the Command's Public Affairs Office; and a cross-cultural look by DISAM's own LTC Jim Toomey.

This month we also welcome DSCA's new Deputy Director, Ms. Beth McCormick. Ms. McCormick brings a wealth of experience to DSCA, and you can read more about her on page 1.

As always, this edition has something of interest for everyone. We have included articles of regional interest including Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas and those specifically related to Security Cooperation such as the "DSCA SAMM Tips" article.

As we wrap up the final issue of 2008, let me use this opportunity to highlight DISAM's activities over the year. It has truly been a banner year. Between all programs, we served 4,198 students — our highest ever and the fourth year of the last five where we exceeded 4,000 students.

Here are some more facts and statistics regarding this year's activities:

- *Our resident student numbers have never been higher. We hosted over 1,500 students and operated at over 102% capacity for the year.*
- *Our online students soared to 1,100. These students now make up 25% of our total students. This is hard to believe after our beginning of only 202 students in 2002.*
- *Although our mix of international students was down for the year (420 versus 678 in FY 07), we visited 14 key partners. This was in addition to the total of just under 200 international students that attended newly revamped and focused resident courses.*
- *In terms of quality, our student critiques have never been better. This feedback evidences our on-going commitment to continuous improvement. With a record number of students, we are pleased that our courses have continued to meet and exceed what our stakeholders expect and hope that we will continue to surpass these expectations.*

These and other successes this previous year have been bolstered by many people. We have had a lot of help from our headquarters at Defense Security Cooperation Agency; Combatant Commands; Security Assistance Organizations; the Military Departments; the offices within Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff; other departments within the USG; other schoolhouses; contractor support from companies like Anteon, Avanco, General Dynamics, and Wedgewood Consulting Group; our hosts here at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base; and others I am bound to forget to mention. I thank you for your input into DISAM curriculum, feedback on our performance, and the trust you place in us to train your personnel.

I also need to publicly thank my staff at DISAM. Kudos to our faculty for instructing 40-50 resident class offerings per year, as well as taking the most up-to-date curriculum to our customers around the world. They also found time to dialogue with you to answer your questions and better our curriculum. Our staff is second to none — from our registrar who manages all student activity; to our budget personnel who ensure our students are treated well and paid properly; to our librarian who services our resident students and graduates; to our IT/Automation group who make it all connect in terms of classroom presentation and online activities; and to our graphics, supply, and administrative support personnel who do a variety of tasks that go on behind the scenes that make the school effective.

Again best wishes and have a great holiday season!



RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant



THE DISAM JOURNAL

of International Security Assistance Management

Volume 30 No. 4

“DSCA Welcomes New Deputy Director” 1

Feature Articles

- General William “Kip” Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa Command
 “Welcome to U.S. Africa Command” 3
- U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs
 “Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)” 5
- General William Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa Command
 “Remarks at Ceremony for U.S. Air Forces Africa” 7
- Lieutenant Colonel James Toomey, USA, Deputy Director, DISAM
 “Do I Hold the General’s Hand or Just Drink his Palm Wine?
 Cultural Advice for Africa” 9
- John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State
 “Remarks at the Foreign Affairs Brain Trust on Africa” 13

Legislation and Policy

- “Department of Defense Directive: DoD Policy and Responsibilities
 Relating to Security Cooperation” 17
- Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State
 “U.S.-Russia Relations” 29
- Donald Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia
 “Defeating Al-Qaeda’s Air Force: Pakistan’s F-16 Program
 in the Fight Against Terrorism” 36
- Alexander A. Arvizu, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
 for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
 “U.S. - Japan Relations: Partnership and Progress” 39
- Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
 “Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty” 42
- Robert M. Perito, Senior Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace
 “Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program” 49
- Senator (Vice President-Elect) Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
 “Biden Addresses Military’s Expanding Role in U.S. Foreign Policy” 60
- Senator Dick Lugar, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Leader
 “Opening Statement for Hearing on Military Role in Foreign Policy” 62
- John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State
 “Military’s Role Toward Foreign Policy” 64
- Matt Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
 “Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership” 69
- John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State
 “Remarks at the 38th General Assembly of the Organization of American States” 75

Judy Garber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State “U.S. Perspectives on the Black Sea Region”	77
John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State “A U.S. Asian Partnership”	80
John C. Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security “Improvements to the Defense Trade Export Control System”	83
Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the United States”	90
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, DC “MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems”	92
David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs “Remarks on Release of the Annual Report on the Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008”	100
Security Assistance Community	
John Harlow “Army Unveils New Stability Operations Manual”	105
Chris Wendell, S/CRS, and Amon Killeen, OSD/STB, Lessons Learned Task Force Facilitators, The Best Practices Working Group (BPWG), formed under National Security Presidential Directive-44 “Developing an Interagency Stabilization and Reconstruction Lessons Learned Process”	108
Kristen Noel, American Forces Press Service “Civil Affairs Sailors Work to Improve Humanitarian Effort Outcomes”	110
Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service “U.S., Serbian Leaders Discuss New Ways To Cooperate”	111
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs “The Merida Initiative”	113
Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Ernest Scott, U.S. Southern Command “French Military Docs, Nurses Contribute to Continuing Promise”	115
Perspectives	
Congressional Research Service “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”	117
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs “Colombia: An Opportunity for Lasting Success”	139
Government Accountability Office “Peacekeeping: A Report on the Global Peace Operations Initiative”	141
Lieutenant Lonnie Prater, SC, USN, Instructor, DISAM “Field Studies Program: Mining the Unintended Consequences”	145

Education and Training

Elisa Moskowitz

“The Creation of Expanded International Military Education
and Training (E-IMET)” 147

John M. Smilek, Assistant Professor, DISAM

“Controlled Unclassified Information ‘A Review and Revision’” 153

Lieutenant Colonel James Toomey, USA, Deputy Director, DISAM

“Training and Educating for Complex Operations:
What DISAM Can Do for You” 158

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

“Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) Tips” 161



DSCA Welcomes New Deputy Director

[The following is from a news release from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Washington, DC.]

The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency recently welcomed a new Deputy Director to its Headquarters in Arlington, VA.

Beth M. McCormick, a member of the Senior Executive Service and formerly the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Technology Security Policy and National Disclosure Policy and the Acting Director, Defense Technology Security Administration, will fill the position left vacant by Richard Millies, who retired after more than 30 years of Federal service.

In her current position, she is the Director's principal assistant in managing a professional security cooperation work force of military and civilian personnel located around the world. She provides leadership, management, and oversight for the implementation of a diverse portfolio of security cooperation and partner capacity building programs including: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), End Use Monitoring (EUM) and Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action.



New DSCA Deputy Director

McCormick began her career in government service in 1983 as a Presidential Management Intern with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She became an Assistant for Strategic Defense and Space Arms Control Policy in 1985, where her primary responsibility was support to the Defense and Space Negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. From July 1994 to October 2001, she served in several executive positions with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, including Director of International Relations and Deputy Associate Administrator for Life and Microgravity Sciences. In November 2001 she returned to the Defense Department as the Director of Policy, U.S. Air Force International Affairs, a position she held until January 2005. Following her tour with the U.S. Air Force, she reported as Deputy Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. She assumed the position of Director in August 2005 and that October was appointed as the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and National Disclosure Policy.

Mrs. McCormick received her B.A. from Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania in Political Science, Russian and Soviet Area Studies in 1981. She received her M.A. in Security Policy Studies from George Washington University in 1983. She has received several awards for her exemplary Federal service including the Meritorious Presidential Rank Award, Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the Air Force Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, and the Department of State Superior Honor Award.



FEATURE ARTICLES

Welcome to U.S. Africa Command

By

**General William “Kip” Ward
Commander, U.S. Africa Command**

[DISAM wishes to acknowledge the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) website as the source of the below listed information. For complete and updated information on current as well as historical beginnings, the reader is referred to <http://www.africom.mil>.]

As we build U.S. Africa Command, we want to talk to people about what the U.S. military is doing in Africa. Just as importantly, I want everyone on the staff to also listen and learn. So we have launched a new forum called “AFRICOM Dialogue” as a way for members of the Africa Command staff to describe what we’re doing.

In the weeks and months ahead, I have told the staff to focus on a few important points:

1. We are building the team. We have the opportunity, vision, and determination to redefine how the U.S. military cooperates with and complements the efforts of its U.S., international, and non-governmental partners in Africa.
2. U.S. Africa Command will add value and do no harm to the collective and substantial on-going efforts on the continent.
3. U.S. Africa Command seeks to build partnerships to enable the work of Africans in providing for their own security. Our intent is to build mutual trust, respect, and confidence with our partners on the continent and our international friends.

For me, commanding Africa Command is an honor and privilege. I realize the U.S. military plays only a very small role in the international, inter-generational work taking place on the continent and its island nations. But we want our work to matter, and we want to do our work well. Years from now we want Africans and Americans to be able to say U.S. Africa Command made a difference—a positive difference.

U.S. Africa Command

On February 6, 2007, President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the creation of U.S. Africa Command. The decision was the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the DoD acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well. Yet, the department’s regional command structure did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of U.S. Africa Command enables DoD to better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DoD coordination point to help address security and related needs.

A Different Kind of Command

The designers of Africa Command clearly understood the relationships between security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity in Africa. As a result, the Command reflects a much more integrated staff structure, one that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa. The Command also seeks to incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the U.S. staff on common approaches to shared interests.

Mission

Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.

Building Partner Capacity

The creation of Africa Command does not mean the U.S. military will take a leading role in African security matters, nor will it establish large U.S. troop bases. Rather, Africa Command is a headquarters staff whose mission entails coordinating the kind of support that will enable African governments and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force, to have greater capacity to provide security and respond in times of need. Africa Command builds on the many African-U.S. security cooperation activities already underway, yet will be able to better coordinate DoD support with other U.S. government departments and agencies to make those activities even more effective.

Presence

Africa Command will be headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future. The command inherits a small but meaningful U.S. military presence already existing in several African nations, to include Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, as well as liaison and administrative offices co-located with U.S. Embassies and diplomatic missions to coordinate Defense Department programs supporting U.S. diplomacy. Any additional presence on the continent will take place only in full diplomatic consultation and agreement with potential host nations.

The Way Ahead

The Africa Command began initial operations in October 2007 and became an independent unified command on October 1, 2008. The focus during its first year was to build a unique organization dedicated to long-term partnerships. Now the Africa Command will focus on synchronizing hundreds of activities inherited from three regional commands that previously coordinated U.S. military relations in Africa.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)

By

U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs,
Stuttgart, Germany

The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, managed and funded by the Department of State (DoS), is an initiative designed to improve African ability to respond quickly to crises by providing selected militaries with the training and equipment required to execute humanitarian or peace support operations.

Once trained, forces can be deployed into multinational units to conduct operations under auspices of the Africa Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), or regional security organizations. On-the-ground training is supervised under the Department of State, while U.S. Africa Command provides mentors and advisors as requested.

Background

ACOTA is the successor to the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which, in 1997, began the U.S. peacekeeping training program in four countries of Africa. Since then, ACOTA's membership has grown to include 21 African partners.

Though ACOTA's immediate goal is to support the establishment of the AU's African Standby Force/ Brigades by June 2010, its long-term objective is to assist the AU and individual troop contributing countries in its peacekeeping operations for as long as it is needed.



An Initial Entry Training Class prepares to give honors during a pass and review ceremony at the activation of a new infantry battalion with the Armed Forces of Liberia at the Barclay Training Center in Monrovia, Liberia, August 29, 2008. The battalion trained with the assistance of the United States and the international community. The Liberian Armed Forces have been activated under the approved 2008 National Defense Act. (Photo by Petty Officer First Class Daniel P. Lapiere, U.S. Africa Command)

Training roughly 20 battalions per year, ACOTA tailors its programs to match the individual needs and capabilities of each country. ACOTA supports peacekeeping operations in Africa by:

- Training African soldiers on topics including convoy escort procedures, refugee management, and small-unit command skills
- Overseeing exercises for battalion, brigade, and multinational force headquarters personnel
- Providing equipment to partner nations, such as mine detectors, field medical equipment, uniforms, and water purification devices
- Conducting refresher training periodically to ensure that trained units maintain their capabilities
- Training African trainers who in turn train their own nation's soldiers in peacekeeping skills

Facts and Figures

Since 2004 ACOTA has trained approximately 45,000 African soldiers and 3,200 African trainers who have supported deployments to peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Darfur, Somalia, and Lebanon.

Rwanda is a prime illustration of ACOTA's success. Its forces in Darfur are recognized as a capable and highly affective military unit, due in large part to ACOTA training. Additionally, nearly all new Rwandan peacekeeping forces are indigenously trained by ACOTA-trained instructors.

In the near-term, the number of ACOTA partners can be expected to rise as the demand for African peacekeeping missions increases. Thus, ACOTA remains a unique and critical tool that has the ability to provide a long-term security solution.

Conclusion

U.S. Africa Command recognizes its participation and support to ACOTA as the primary tool for building African partnership capacity for peacekeeping operations.

As such, the Command and its components will continue to support ACOTA by:

- Providing military mentors/advisors to participate in these missions (to date, roughly 300 mentors have been provided)
- Coordinating ACOTA missions into U.S. Africa Command's overall theater security cooperation efforts
- Cooperating with European nations interested in partnering with peacekeeping training

Remarks at Ceremony for U.S. Air Forces Africa

By

General William Ward
Commander, U.S. Africa Command

[The following is an excerpt from remarks delivered in a ceremony at Ramstein Air Base, Germany to honor the activation of U.S. Air Forces Africa, which will be designated 17th Air Force. The date of the ceremony, September 18, coincided with the official birthday of the U.S. Air Force. Ramstein Air Base in Germany is also home to U.S. Air Forces Europe.]

I welcome you to this very important and historic occasion, and it is my greatest pleasure to be able to do that. One of the best parts of my job is that I get to take part in history-making endeavors. And today is historic in more ways than one.

I'm happy to pass along my congratulations and "Happy Birthday" to my United States Air Force teammates. Sixty-one years ago today, Mr. W. Stuart Symington was sworn in as the first Secretary of the Air Force tasked to establish a Service that would become the "first line of defense" in the post-World War II world. Throughout America's history, we have been fortunate that great leaders and committed citizens have shouldered momentous responsibilities and have led us forward through an ever-changing global landscape toward a stronger, safer and more secure future. Today, we mark another such occasion.

Not only is it an honor, but it is my privilege to welcome the United States Air Forces Africa to the United States Africa Command team. This is a major undertaking by the 17th Air Force. This transformation involved a lot of hard work to establish a new Air Force Service Component Command from the ground up. Doing this is exciting work! It's hard and sometimes frustrating, but it is not often you get to create something new that will make a real difference, that will add value for our nation. To Major General Ron Ladnier and the professionals of the 17th Air Force, I commend you all for a truly remarkable job.

Let me talk now about the unified Command that you are now a part of. The United States Africa Command's mission is: "In concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conduct **sustained security engagement** through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and more secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."

That is a big mission, but what does it mean? We have committed ourselves to the **delivery and sustainment of effective security cooperation programs**. We recognize the importance of following through on a program. And we will be a reliable partner, building trust and confidence with all those we work with on the continent—whether they are African partners, fellow U.S. Government agencies, or international partners. You, as our Air Component Command, will do the same.

Our primary focus is building partner security capacity on the continent. We are doing this through a variety of programs including various operations, military-to-military events, exercises, and humanitarian assistance missions. Many of you may already have been involved with our partners in Africa in various military-to-military activities, such as "Safe Skies for Africa"—and you know about the need for assistance in the development of professional militaries.

I recently visited Liberia to participate in their commemoration of the activation of the first battalion of the new Armed Forces of Liberia. Since halting the hostilities in Liberia in 2003, U.S. Security Sector Reform efforts in Liberia have made a world of difference. I cannot begin to explain to you the amount of pride resonating from these new soldiers, their civilian leadership, and the Liberian citizens themselves.

This accomplishment will ultimately enable the Armed Forces of Liberia to defend the freedoms of its people and secure a better future for all Liberians. This is the kind of thing that U.S. Africa Command was meant to do.

This is what you were formed to do as well. Our partners in Africa want to build professional militaries that respect the rule of law and serve their people. U.S. Air Forces Africa will be a major enabler of this effort. As the air component to U.S. Africa Command, you will be responsible for the effort in helping bring about ever-increasing levels of air domain safety and security in Africa. You will be responsible for satisfying the mobility requirements within the Command and for our partners who we will support in reaching our mutual objectives.

As ever, your role in coming to the aid of our teammates in distressing situations is paramount, along with the control of all air operations associated with that effort as well as other standard air component command steady state and contingency operations. You will participate in current and future operations on the continent, broaden involvement in multinational exercises, and take on contingency operations as necessary. You will be ambassadors for the United States in everything you do.

I am confident that you will do remarkable things as you go forward to help the Africans build and maintain their own security, which in turn, maintains greater security for the American homeland. I am confident that you are up to the challenge. Happy Birthday to the United States Air Force. Congratulations, and 17th Air Force, welcome to the United States Africa Command.

Do I Hold the General's Hand or Just Drink his Palm Wine? Cultural Advice for Africa

By

Lieutenant Colonel James Toomey
USA, Deputy Director, DISAM

The U.S. Armed Forces, backed by the long policy and logistical tail of the DoD, are deploying at a dizzying operational tempo and operating in more countries than ever before in the history of our, or anyone else's, military. In the midst of this, one particular geographic area that will likely be a growth area for DoD for years to come is Africa: you need only look to the U.S. Africa Command to find proof of this. If you're still not convinced of Africa's importance, think for a moment about just three current, significant trends:

1. Oil—our increasing reliance on African oil, as a portion of our oil imports; rising oil investment and production in Africa; and U.S. public clamor for ending reliance on Middle Eastern oil
2. Foreign Aid—record levels of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa under the Bush Administration and planned, continuing increases (as derived from Congressional Budget projections through FY09) in all forms of U.S. security assistance to this continent
3. Instability—7 of the 16 current United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions throughout the world are taking place in Africa, 24 of the 63 peacekeeping operations undertaken throughout its history were there¹, 2 of 6 of the world's major ongoing armed conflicts are happening in Africa, and 10 of the 33 continuing conflicts (of any size) around the globe are occurring in Africa²

In Africa, this gradually increasing DoD engagement is likely to continue to focus on security cooperation, particularly on activities related to cementing new military-to-military (M2M) contacts, creating stability in post-conflict areas, building modern defense capacities in our African partner states and African regional and sub-regional organizations, and supporting international peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations (PKO). All of these activities, if done the right way, will require very close and often long-term working relationships with Africans; and this is where the importance of cultural competency comes into play.

Culture can be defined in a number of ways; but commonly, it can be thought of as the shared sets of traditions, values, symbols, beliefs, and institutions created or held important by a group of people which give them identity and shape their patterns of activity and response. "Cultural competency," a term developed by Ben Connable and Art Speyer in 2005³ and cited by LTC William D. Wunderle in his

1. "Background Note: 31 July 2008," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations website, August 2008

2. "List of Ongoing Conflicts," Wikipedia website, 29 August 2008: this article sites several other supporting references, including GlobalSecurity.org, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, etc.

3. Ben Connable and Art Speyer, "Cultural Awareness for Military Operations," Concepts and Proposals: USMC Cultural Awareness Working Group, HWCA and Marine Corps Intelligence Agency, February 2005

recent book on Arab and Middle Eastern culture⁴, is “the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that allows focused insight into military planning and decision making.” For my purposes, I will amend this definition to include not only foreign “military” planning and decision making but rather all “national security” planning and decision making by influential entities outside the military, to include foreign defense contractors, political parties, Ministries of defense, etc. All these people have an impact on DoD’s foreign partnerships; and we should be concerned with cracking their cultural codes in order to successfully communicate with them, to understand how to predict their reactions, and how to best influence them.

Unfortunately, for Africa and elsewhere, DoD has tended until very recently to ignore or misunderstand culture and its importance in the success of security cooperation. A good example of this exists in a definition of culture taken from Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which describes culture as “a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man” and also lumps culture into the general category of things like “roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.” Numerous articles and books have discussed, at length, the negative impact of our failure to understand local culture during our previous operations in Vietnam, the Balkans, and Somalia, as well as in the initial stage our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Closer to the topic of Africa, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently indicated that the U.S. Government had poorly communicated its intentions and objectives concerning Africa Command with African leaders, arguably a problem linked, at least in part, to cultural differences. On 14 May 2008, Secretary Gates said in his speech to the American Academy of Diplomacy that “in some respects, we probably didn’t do as good a job as we should have when we rolled out Africa Command...I think we need to take it a step at a time. I don’t think we should push African governments to a place that they don’t really want to go in terms of these relationships.”

It appears now, however, that we are learning from our mistakes. In July 2006, the Navy established its Maritime Civil Affairs Group to create its first generation civil affairs experts, who will receive training in foreign languages and culture. In 2007, the Pentagon initiated the Human Terrain System (HTS) to embed anthropologists and other social scientists in combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, in 2008, the Army is conducting a command selection board to consider—for the first time ever—the placement of single-tracked or career Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) into combat unit leadership positions in Afghanistan. While all of these efforts are still in their infancy, they clearly indicate that our senior leaders have recognized that a good, solid cultural understanding of both our foreign partners (and foes) is an important factor in the success of our security cooperation activities.

In the interest of helping along these efforts in a very small way, what follows are some general, albeit scattered, pieces of guidance or advice for approaching our partners in Africa. This information is by no means comprehensive or exclusive but, hopefully, will encourage those in DoD dealing with or working in Africa to think more about African culture and its importance and to seek further information on the specific regions, countries, or groups relevant to their endeavors.

When we talk about culture in Africa, one of the first things that must be understood is that Africa, as a very large continent historically divided by powerful geographic, climatic, economic, and political forces, is not a single culture. Because of their artificial territorial boundaries constructed during the European trading and colonization periods, there can be many different ethnic groups within a small area even within the modern nation-states of Africa. For example, in Liberia, a nation about the size of Tennessee, there are at least 16 major ethnic groups; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are

4. William D. Wunderle, *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for U.S. Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006

over 200⁵. There are literally hundreds of unique combinations in the manifestations of culture such as time orientations, languages, traditions, religious beliefs, ways of reasoning, views of authority, methods of negotiation, etc.

At the same time, however, there are some commonalities in culture, especially among people within the four major sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa (West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa) that support the use of general guidelines for relationships with people from these areas.

Beliefs

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, while there's a wide range of different indigenous beliefs, there are generally common or shared elements in these beliefs. In many countries, for instance, there is faith in pre-destination or fatalism, where individuals believe that what they can achieve or become in life is largely determined at birth by where they are born or even by what day of the week they are born on. In most countries, there are even stronger beliefs that supernatural forces control one's fate, such as witchcraft-induced curses or ancestral blessings. The use of talismans or amulets is also widespread as protection against evil forces or sources of spiritual energy or power; and divination, the interpretation of astrological signs and cosmic omens, is also common often through the use of a human intermediary in the form of a local priest or priestess. And, even though more formal and conventional "modern" religions are also common, like Christianity or Islam, there is a nearly universal tendency to integrate traditional indigenous beliefs with these world religions even among very highly educated, urbanized persons and even when beliefs and practices appear to conflict with the given conventional faith. What this means for us is even when a particular course of action or decision appears absolutely rational, it may not be chosen by our African allies because of religious or spiritual reasons beyond our comprehension.

Views on Time

In most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, time, as an organizational scheduling tool, is treated much differently than in American or even European culture. Most meetings, though clearly scheduled to begin at a certain time, will start at least 30 minutes late; and if you are senior to others attending this meeting, it may be acceptable to display your status by showing up as much as an hour or so after the scheduled starting time. Time, as a resource, is also treated differently. Many cultures believe that time is one of their few abundant resources; and as such, it is more prudent to proceed very carefully and slowly so as not to waste other resources. Time horizons also are commonly different. A bit of an oxymoron, but here's what I mean: most Africans will not do specific planning beyond the short-term because they believe there are simply too many risks and variables that will overcome this planning.

Values of Consensus and Collectivism

While media attention on African coups d'état and authoritarian national leaders seems to emphasize opposing cultural norms, behind the scenes at the national level and, in particular, at the local level, there is a lot of discussion and bargaining going on aimed at fulfilling the needs of not just strong or powerful national leaders but also the needs of the extended families, ethnic groups, and even hometowns or home sub-regions where those individuals maintain important, lasting cultural ties. These demands may require excessive corruption to be fulfilled; and while theft from the state treasury may not be considered particularly good, a much greater crime would be to fail to use one's position or status to provide for one's family and community. Similarly, the failure to consider all the appropriate voices within one's family or community, to include family and village elders, religious leaders, etc., to make a key decision, may also be a cardinal sin. The significance of this for security cooperation planners is it may take a long time to reach decisions on seemingly trivial issues and may be very difficult to achieve decisions aimed at achieving a greater good for the partner nation over the parochial needs of families or home villages.

5. "The World Factbook," U.S. Central Intelligence Agency website, 21 August 2008

I could go on and on about differences in broad values, cultural elements, and the like; but since this is an article versus a book, and designed for operators versus academia, let me just throw out a few quick practical tips regarding customs or norms that are generally valid and useful throughout Africa:

- Get some business cards and freely hand these out. Business cards are exchanged much more often in Africa than in the U.S. and ascribe status to the individual giving them as well as the person receiving them.
- When in a group setting, greet as many people as possible, particularly at the beginning and end of an event. This is simply good manners.
- Don't be afraid of people standing very close to you or people of the same sex attempting to hold hands with you. Standing close during conversations is the norm; holding hands is often a sign of acceptance and friendship (not romance).
- Eat the local food and drink the local beverage. It may make you sick but probably won't kill you. But be wary of using your left hand to grab things, especially when eating from a shared or communal pot or serving tray. Seriously, if you want to avoid health problems while showing cultural sensitivity, if possible, stick to bottled beers or soft drinks (the production process will kill most germs, and the sealed bottle normally protects these drinks); order your meat well done; and try to eat or drink in small, sample quantities until you get the local microbes into your digestive system.
- When in doubt, dress up and clean up. Even the poorest of government servants in Africa will strive to own a good, second-hand suit and will spend time each day shining shoes, pressing garments, and/or arranging their hair.
- Taboos to avoid: spitting in public, cursing, taking pictures of individuals without their permission, and excessive alcohol consumption at a public reception or party.

Naturally, there are differences from culture to culture on all of these elements and rules even among different sub-regions or ethnic groups within the same country. My final point of emphasis is that you should go out and get more specific, detailed information on your country to answer important questions such as: Should I chew gum in public?; Can I cross my legs or show the bottoms of my shoes while seated?; Should I make eye contact?; When do I give gifts and what should I give?; and, last but not least, What do certain gestures (thumbs up, palms down, lateral head nods, etc.) mean in this culture?

Regardless of where you go in Africa or with whom you work, don't be afraid to reach beyond your comfort zone or experience new ways of doing things. The pay-off may be lasting, happy memories for you and more importantly, lasting, positive relationships between Africa and the United States.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel James Toomey is currently the Deputy Director of International Studies at the DISAM. He has worked as a Sub-Saharan African (48J) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for the U.S. Army for 10 years with tours of duty at three U.S. embassies abroad including service as a Defense Attaché in Haiti and Liberia and an assignment as the Chief, Central Africa Branch at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). He possesses four degrees related to international business/political affairs, including master's degrees from Columbus State University and the University of Florida, where he also obtained a certificate in African studies.

Remarks at the Foreign Affairs Brain Trust on Africa

By

John D. Negroponte
Deputy Secretary of State

[The following are excerpts from remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus Annual Legislative Conference Washington, DC, September 26, 2008.]

I'm delighted to have this opportunity to discuss what I believe will be one of this Administration's enduring legacies. When President Bush took office in 2001, Nelson Mandela's dream of an Africa "in peace with itself" seemed, at best, a distant vision. Millions across the continent were falling victim to civil wars and infectious diseases. Millions more seemed trapped in desperate poverty by corruption, tyranny, and economic misrule.

Today, that's beginning to change. A new generation of African leaders is stepping forward and re-claiming responsibility for their continent's future. They are meeting their own challenges, creating opportunity for their people, and leading their nations into the global economy.

And so we too have changed our approach to Africa.

We have recognized that Africa's leaders deserve our support, not our pity; so we have discarded the paternalistic notion of development that treats African countries as charity cases.

We have recognized that Africa's nations will succeed only when Africa's leaders are using their natural resources to invest in their greatest resources: the talent and creativity of Africa's people.

We are treating African leaders as equal partners in building peace, combating disease, expanding prosperity, and improving governance. We are supporting them in setting clear goals and producing measurable results. And we are reinforcing success by supporting the most promising developing nations—nations whose governments invest in health and education, fight corruption, embrace markets and trade, and govern justly.

We have matched this new approach with a renewed commitment to Africa's development. Since 2001, this Administration has worked with our G-8 [forum of top economic world powers] partners to relieve some \$34 billion in African debt; and, with strong bipartisan support in Congress, we have nearly quadrupled assistance to Africa as part of the largest expansion of foreign aid since the Marshall Plan.

Like the Marshall Plan, our commitment to Africa stems from both our ideals and our interests. It reflects what's best about the American people: our compassion, our generosity, and our fundamental belief in the dignity of every human being. And it reflects a more sobering truth as well—that our success and security increasingly depend on conditions in distant lands and that we are at greater risk if Africa is a place where states are failing, where extremist ideologies are fostered, and where violence and instability spread across borders.

In short, it is in America's interest that Africa succeed—not just in the narrow sense of resolving specific crises, but in the broad sense of building institutions and adopting policies that sustain growth, freedom, and justice. No outside actor can do this for Africa. Africans must lead their continent to success. And increasingly, they are.

Our role is to support their leadership. We have launched initiatives, such as the Millennium Challenge Account [MCC], that support development plans devised by responsible African governments. The MCC not only expands assistance; it changes the way it's delivered, supporting leaders who deliver results by

governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. The 10 MCC compacts we have with African nations, which together are worth nearly \$4.3 billion, are supporting projects tailored to individual countries' specific needs—from expanding educational opportunities for girls in Burkina Faso to improving transportation and energy and water supplies in Tanzania to strengthening legal institutions in Benin. What these projects all have in common is that they are laying the foundation for sustainable growth. They are also encouraging other nations, who see the benefits of MCC compacts, to move ahead with the tough economic, political, and social reforms necessary to compete for compacts of their own.

The United States is also partnering with Africa's leaders and people to fight modern scourges like HIV/AIDS and malaria—some of the greatest threats to Africa's success. In 2003, when President Bush announced the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, fewer than 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving anti-retroviral treatment. Today, thanks to PEPFAR's \$18.8 billion commitment, that figure is nearly 1.7 million. PEPFAR has allowed nearly 200,000 children in Africa to be born free of HIV and is on track to meet its ambitious five year goals of treating two million people, preventing seven million new infections, and caring for 10 million people affected by HIV/AIDS. We are grateful that in July Congress reauthorized PEPFAR for up to \$48 billion over the next five years. That additional commitment will save millions more lives and build critical health-care capacity in partner nations.

Partnerships are also at the heart of the President's Malaria Initiative [PMI].

Launched in 2005, the initiative commits \$1.2 billion over five years to cutting malaria-related deaths in half in 15 African countries. It is estimated the initiative has already reached more than 25 million people, and data shows malaria rates are dropping in many parts of Africa. In Zanzibar, the percentage of infants infected with malaria has fallen from about 20 percent to below 1 percent.

Of course, for all the success of PEPFAR and PMI, there are still millions more lives to save. We urge our G-8 partners to fulfill their pledge to match our commitments to fighting HIV/AIDS and malaria.

We also must continue to address the ongoing crisis of hunger in Africa—a crisis that is growing worse in places due to rising commodity prices. Feeding the hungry is a moral calling for a nation as blessed as ours, and the United States is leading the world by providing over \$5.5 billion in 2008 and 2009 to fight global hunger. Our ultimate goal, however, must be to support African countries in feeding their own people. So we urge Congress to support President Bush's proposal to use a portion of our assistance money to purchase crops directly from farmers in Africa, rather than just shipping all food assistance from the developed world.

Our partnership with Africa is still broader than this picture suggests. More than assistance, Africans want our trade and investment because they increasingly recognize that those are the engines of long-term growth. One of the most powerful incentives for trade with Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA], which we thank Congress for extending. Since AGOA came into effect in 2001, exports from AGOA-nations to the United States increased more than six-fold to \$50 billion; and U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa have doubled. Even when the energy trade is set aside, the results are still magnificent. In creating new trading opportunities for African businesses, AGOA has created tens of thousands of jobs and brought millions of dollars of much-needed investment to Africa. After a long period of economic stagnation, sub-Saharan Africa is growing—by nearly 7 percent in only the past year. Congress and the next administration should look for opportunities to reduce barriers to trade and investment in support of Africa's growth. One good step would be to approve the U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty that President Bush signed during his recent trip to Africa.

Rwanda today is a symbol of Africa's potential—an example of what's possible when nations embrace

peace, strengthen democracy, and pursue trade. But we also remember the Rwanda of 1994. Our vision of free, prosperous and democratic African nations is not possible without peace; and so since 2001, this Administration has been active in facilitating an end to violent conflicts in Africa. Through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, we have built regional peacekeeping capacity by training over 45,000 peacekeepers since 2005, many of whom are now deployed around Africa. Over the past ten years, their presence has contributed to the calming of seven conflicts that had plagued the continent. Now, we must remain vigilant to consolidate peace.

We must remain vigilant in supporting peace in Sudan through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended horrific decades of civil war. The North-South Civil War and now the violence and atrocities in Darfur have inflicted untold suffering on the Sudanese. This Administration brokered an end to the North-South war in 2005, and we keep pressure on both parties to move ahead with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, especially in the oil-rich region of Abyei. In Darfur, we continue to press for the full deployment of the UN-AU [United Nations-African Union] peacekeeping force, UNAMID [United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur]. The President’s Special Envoy, Ambassador Rich Williamson, is working to accelerate the deployment of UNAMID and encourage donor contributions, like airlift provisions for peacekeepers into Darfur.

We must remain vigilant in supporting reconciliation in Kenya. The explosion of ethnic violence following Kenya’s closely-contested election last December shocked the world. Kenya calmed only after intense engagement by President Bush, Secretary Rice, and Assistant Secretary Frazer to support Kofi Annan’s facilitation efforts with Kenyan leaders and civil society to find common ground for compromise and to create conditions for a coalition government. We continue to support Kenya’s efforts to achieve lasting reconciliation.

We must remain vigilant in the Horn of Africa—where long-standing conflicts still simmer between Ethiopia and Eritrea and violence continues in Somalia. There, we are working to ensure that all parties fulfill their pledge in the Djibouti Agreement to end violence. And in New York, we are working to secure approval and deployment of a UN-mandated peacekeeping force to bring peace and stability to the Horn of Africa.

And of course, we must remain vigilant in supporting a future of peace and progress for the long-suffering people of Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans have lived too long under Robert Mugabe’s tyranny; we hope the agreement signed on September 15 at long last will give Zimbabweans the opportunity to live in a well-governed state, free from fear, violence, and intimidation. It remains to be seen when and how the agreement will be honored; but the United States will continue to work with regional leaders, the Southern African Development Community, and African Union to foster democratic transition, empower civil society, and meet urgent humanitarian needs in Zimbabwe. We will be watching Zimbabwe closely in coming months. If Mugabe demonstrates a clear commitment to reform, we are prepared to lift existing sanctions against him and his regime. However, in the absence of any concrete reforms, we are also prepared to impose additional sanctions.

The challenging situations in countries like Sudan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe tragically remind us Africa is still very much a continent in transition—a continent at once striving towards a better future but still haunted by ghosts from a troubled past. For too long, the developed world accepted violence, poverty, and tyranny as facts of life in Africa. We tolerated “there” things we would never accept “here.” But in the past decade, Africans have rejected this soft bigotry of low expectations. They have elected responsible leaders and pursued tough reforms to steer their nations towards freedom and justice, prosperity and peace.

When this Administration leaves office in January, Africa will be much better-off than it was only eight years ago. This is thanks to Africa’s leaders and people but also to our unprecedented new levels and kinds of support for them. The partnerships and programs we put in place are a foundation to support

Africa's continuing journey for peace, prosperity, and freedom. And it is a foundation on which the next administration can, and should, build.

Legislation and Policy

Department of Defense Directive: DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation

[The following DoDD, published and effective 24 October 2008, provides policy for all DoD Security Cooperation activities, as well as articulating the broad general responsibilities at the most senior levels within DoD. One significant change to note is that the in-country/OCONUS offices previously referred to as Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) have been changed to Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs). The Directive appears in its entirety minus document page numbers.]



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5132.03
October 24, 2008

USD(P)

SUBJECT: DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This Directive:

a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.3 (Reference (a)) and is in accordance with DoDD 2055.3 (Reference (b)).

b. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Guidance for the Development of the Force, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) (References (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively), and statutory authorities, Executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of security cooperation, including security assistance.

2. APPLICABILITY. This Directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. Security cooperation, which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs, is an important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an integral element of the DoD mission. Security cooperation activities shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DoD activities. Security cooperation requirements shall be combined with other DoD requirements and implemented through standard DoD systems, facilities, and procedures.


- b. Security cooperation planners shall take into account the economic capabilities of the foreign country concerned. Except in cases of overriding military considerations, an improvement of military capabilities that the partner country cannot or will not support, safeguard, or sustain shall be discouraged.
- c. Security cooperation planners shall consider complementary U.S. Government activities and shall coordinate as appropriate.
- d. No DoD civilian or military personnel shall make any commitment involving future U.S. programs, performance, or the availability of U.S. resources without appropriate Governmental clearances and satisfactory assurances that such commitments can be met and are in the best interest of the United States, per Reference (b) and the Presidential Memorandum (Reference (g)).
- e. The selection and training of U.S. DoD personnel engaged in security cooperation activities, particularly those assigned to security cooperation organizations (SCOs) and Defense attaché (DATT) offices, shall be in accordance with DoD 5105.38-M (Reference (h)).
- f. The security classification of security cooperation information and the disclosure and safeguarding thereof shall be consistent with DoD 5200.1-R, DoDD 5230.11, and the National Disclosure Policy (References (i), (j), and (k), respectively).

5. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

6. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. The reporting requirements in this Directive are exempt from licensing according to paragraphs C4.4.2 and C4.4.8 of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (l)).

7. RELEASABILITY. UNLIMITED. This Directive is approved for public release. Copies may be obtained through the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Directive is effective immediately.


Gordon England
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures

1. References
 2. Responsibilities
- Glossary

ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

- (a) DoD Directive 5132.3, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance," March 10, 1981 (hereby canceled)
- (b) DoD Directive 2055.3, "Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection and USDP Training of Security Assistance Personnel," March 11, 1985
- (c) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Guidance for Employment of the Force," April 21, 2008
- (d) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Guidance for Development of the Force," May 12, 2008
- (e) Title 10, United States Code
- (f) Title 22, United States Code
- (g) Presidential Memorandum, "Policy Regarding Future Commitments for Foreign Assistance," May 8, 1956
- (h) DoD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," October 3, 2003
- (i) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program," January 14, 1997
- (j) DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," June 16, 1992
- (k) National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1), October 1, 1988¹
- (l) DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," June 30, 1998
- (m) DoD Directive 5105.65, "Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)," October 31, 2000
- (n) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4110.01C, "Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System – Force/Activity Designators," April 12, 2004²
- (o) DoD Directive 5015.2, "DoD Records Management Program," March 6, 2000
- (p) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 7401.01C, "Combatant Commander Initiatives Fund (CCIF)" August 15, 2007³
- (q) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," as amended

¹ http://www.dmo.defence.gov.au/id/di/US_National_Disclosure_Policy.doc

² https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm#4000

³ http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/index.htm

ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The USD(P) shall serve as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on security cooperation matters and, in that capacity, shall:
 - a. Develop and coordinate DoD guidance, to include the issuance of Reference (c), which disseminates Secretary of Defense security cooperation goals and priorities.
 - b. Develop and coordinate DoD campaign plan policy and assessment guidance.
 - c. Provide oversight and review of regional and functional campaign plans and assessments.
 - d. Oversee and advise the DoD Components on the development of campaign plans and campaign support plans and resource allocation priorities.
 - e. Evaluate completed campaign plan assessments, campaign support plan assessments, and security cooperation program assessments and advise the Secretary of Defense on the effectiveness of DoD security cooperation efforts.
 - f. Articulate Secretary of Defense security cooperation goals, policies, and priorities to other U.S. Government agencies to help shape national security objectives and enable greater unity of effort.
 - g. Determine priorities for diversion of materiel and equipment in consultation with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
 - h. Develop, coordinate, and disseminate Reference (c), including the assessment guidance, which outlines Secretary of Defense security cooperation goals.
 - i. Oversee the direction and administration of DoD-wide policy guidance for the execution of security assistance and additional DoD security cooperation programs according to References (e), (f), (h), and DoDD 5105.65 (Reference (m)).
 - j. Represent Secretary of Defense interests in security cooperation matters and serve as the DoD point of contact and representative for security cooperation.
 - k. In coordination with the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, oversee and conduct programmatic level assessments and conduct all security cooperation program assessments.
 - l. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Director, DSCA, as appropriate, lead the development of

ENCLOSURE 2

foreign disclosure and sales policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems via the Director, Defense Technology Security Agency.

2. DIRECTOR, DSCA. The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of USD(P), shall direct, administer, and provide DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD security cooperation programs. The Director, DSCA shall only direct, administer, and provide DoD-wide guidance over those programs for which DSCA has responsibility, according to References (f), (h), and (m); and shall:

a. Ensure that Secretary of Defense and USD(P) interests in security assistance matters are represented.

b. Identify requirements, criteria, and procedures for the selection and training of personnel engaged in security assistance activities in DoD security cooperation programs over which DSCA has responsibility.

c. Communicate directly with the Heads of the DoD Components on security cooperation matters over which DSCA has responsibility, according to Reference (m).

d. In coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L), as appropriate, support the development of foreign disclosure and sales policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems.

e. Jointly establish appropriate agreements and procedures with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and with the combatant commands for senior defense officials (SDOs) and DATTs to provide guidance and oversight to security cooperation programs for which DSCA is responsible, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

f. Approve, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SCO joint manpower programs involving the establishment of new security cooperation organizations or changes in manpower authorizations or organizational structure. Jointly, with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, approve changes to the grade or Military Department affiliation of the SDO or DATT.

g. Report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) readiness of personnel for security assistance activities in DoD security cooperation programs over which DSCA has responsibility, in accordance with section 117 (c)(3) of Reference (e), and other relevant instructions or guidance.

h. Act as the Executive Agent for DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies.

3. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L) shall:

- a. Coordinate on security cooperation policy guidance and campaign plans.
- b. Ensure conformance with international armaments cooperation, industrial collaboration, and technology release policies.
- c. Ensure that DoD logistics policy and procedures are effectively integrated with security cooperation campaign plans and program implementation.
- d. Provide advice and technical assistance to the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA, to accomplish the objectives of security cooperation programs.
- e. In coordination with the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA, as appropriate, support the development of foreign disclosure and sales policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems (including proposed international armaments cooperation, foreign military sales, and direct commercial sales in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4110.01C (Reference (n))).
- f. Establish policies, in coordination with the USD(P), for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs that support the objectives and end states outlined in Reference (c) and that support current security cooperation goals.

4. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (USD(C)). The USD(C) shall establish policies and procedures for security cooperation activities involving financial management, fiscal matters, accounting, pricing, budgeting for reimbursements to DoD appropriation accounts and revolving funds, international payments, and matters affecting the DoD budget.

5. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I) shall:

- a. Develop and oversee implementation of defense intelligence security cooperation campaign plans.
- b. Establish policies, procedures, and priorities in coordination with the USD(P) for allocating and managing defense intelligence security cooperation activities that support the objectives and end states outlined in Reference (c).
- c. Provide oversight for intelligence security cooperation agreements conducted by the DoD intelligence agencies.

6. USD(P&R). The USD(P&R) shall:

- a. Assist the Director, DSCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by developing and coordinating relevant input on SCO joint manpower programs involving the establishment of

new security cooperation organizations or changes in SCO manpower authorizations, organizational structure, or the grade, rank, or Military Department affiliation of the Chief of the SCO.

b. Coordinate efforts to build regional, cultural, and language expertise among U.S. forces, including DoD international military and civilian personnel exchange programs, with USD(P).

c. Identify, track, and assess readiness of personnel with regional, cultural, and language expertise.

7. DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES. The Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities shall:

a. Coordinate on security cooperation policy guidance and campaign plans, and allocate appropriate resources to achieve objectives.

b. Develop campaign support plans, as appropriate, to conduct security cooperation programs and activities in accordance with Reference (c).

c. Complete campaign support plan assessments, as appropriate, in accordance with Reference (c).

d. Provide appropriate assistance as requested by the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA.

8. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

a. Coordinate on security cooperation policy guidance and campaign plans; allocate resources to achieve objectives.

b. In coordination with USD(P), develop campaign support plans, as appropriate, to conduct security cooperation programs and activities in accordance with Reference (c).

c. Complete campaign support plan assessments and contribute combatant command campaign plans, as appropriate, in accordance with Reference (f).

d. In coordination with USD(P), serve as advisors to the Secretary of Defense on all matters of security cooperation affecting or related to their respective Departments' support to the combatant commanders.

e. Provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to ensure the successful conduct of security cooperation programs.

f. Conduct international armaments cooperation with eligible friendly foreign countries and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(AT&L).

g. Conduct military education and training and sales of defense articles and defense services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA.

h. Provide technical information and data, upon the request of the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA, on weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, training, capabilities, logistic support, price, source, availability, and lead-time for developing and reviewing security cooperation programs.

i. Maintain appropriate records and furnish prescribed reports as requested according to DoDD 5015.2 (Reference (o)).

j. Provide qualified military and civilian personnel to carry out security cooperation assignments according to approved tables of distribution and other authorizations, directives, and requests.

k. Ensure conformance with technology transfer, classified military information release, and disclosure policies for their respective areas of responsibility while conducting security cooperation activities.

l. Assist USD(AT&L) and the Director, DSCA, as requested, in government-to-government or interdepartmental discussions or negotiations involving security cooperation.

9. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

a. Provide implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provide the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning security cooperation.

b. Review, in conjunction with USD(P), combatant command campaign plans (including security cooperation aspects) and oversee deconfliction of the campaign plans as necessary.

c. Produce the annual DoD campaign plan assessment template in consultation with USD(P), to be completed by the DoD Components. Review Service campaign support plans and enable deconfliction, coordination, and/or integration of Service support of combatant command campaign plans, as necessary.

d. Collect and review the campaign plan assessments completed by the Combatant Commanders through the comprehensive joint assessment and advise USD(P) on the effectiveness of DoD security cooperation efforts.

ENCLOSURE 2

- e. Modify Global Force Management Board processes and procedures to account for force requirements for security cooperation.
- f. Assign force and activity designators for priorities in the allocation of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training between partner countries and organizations and among partner countries and organizations and the U.S. Armed Forces, according to Reference (n).
- g. Recommend priorities for allocation of materiel and equipment for partner countries when competing needs cannot be resolved by Director, DSCA, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 7401.01C (Reference (p)).

10. COMBATANT COMMANDERS. The Combatant Commanders shall:

- a. Develop campaign plans, as appropriate, to conduct security cooperation programs and activities in accordance with Reference (c).
- b. Coordinate on seam issues (for combatant commands with geographic responsibility) or coordinate on their individual functional responsibilities (for combatant commands with a global focus).
- c. Complete campaign plan and campaign support plan assessments, as appropriate, in accordance with Reference (c).
- d. Provide appropriate assistance as requested by the USD(P) or the Director, DSCA.
- e. Supervise the SCOs in matters related to execution of the Reference (c), including the provision of necessary technical assistance and administrative support to the SCOs.

GLOSSARY

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are for the purpose of this Directive only.

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space in accordance with Reference (c). The campaign plan is the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities.

campaign support plans. Plans developed by the DoD Components that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of global and theater campaign plans, and on their own security cooperation activities that directly contribute to the campaign end states and/or DoD Component programs in support of broader title 10 responsibilities.

functional campaign plans. Plans developed by functional combatant commands that focus on translating global strategies into operational activities through the development of an operation plan for a campaign.

regional campaign plans. Support and implement the objectives of the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies and the Unified Command Plan through execution and assessment of regional, functional, contingency, and DoD Component plans. Regional campaign plans – along with DoD Component and directorate supporting plans – focus on activities, which include ongoing operations and security cooperation programs to achieve the theater objectives.

theater campaign plans. Plans developed by geographic combatant commands that focus on the command's steady-state activities, which include operations, security cooperation, and other activities designed to achieve theater strategic end states. It is incumbent upon geographic Combatant Commanders to ensure any supporting campaign plans address objectives in the GEF global planning effort and their respective theater campaign plans. Contingency plans for responding to crisis scenarios are treated as branch plans to the campaign plan.

campaign plan assessments. Assessments will address the Combatant Commanders' execution of the guidance contained in Reference (c) and any changes in the strategic environment that necessitate changes in DoD strategy or guidance. Assessments may be qualitative in nature.

security cooperation organizations (SCOs). Those DoD organizations permanently located in a foreign country and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions under section 515 of Reference (e) and under Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (q)), regardless of the actual name given to such DoD Component. SCOs include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and DATT personnel designated to perform security cooperation functions. The term "SCO" does not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct

GLOSSARY

security cooperation activities such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, or operational units conducting security cooperation activities.

senior defense official (SDO) or defense attaché (DATT). Principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the Chief of Mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.

security assistance. A group of programs authorized by Reference (f), as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation.

security cooperation. Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

security cooperation policy guidance. Goals and objectives for DoD security cooperation efforts and the corresponding priorities and direction for resource allocation.

security cooperation program guidance. Management procedures for planning, programming, budgeting, executing, and assessing security cooperation programs.

U.S.-Russia Relations

By

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

[The following is an excerpt from a speech delivered by the Secretary of State to the German Marshall Fund, Renaissance Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC on September 18, 2008.]

The German Marshall Fund is an indispensable organization, especially for our transatlantic alliance, but increasingly for our partnerships beyond Europe as well. So thank you for the great work that you do in fostering unity of thought, unity of purpose, and unity of action. These are the elements that the United States and Europe need more than ever today. You have made an immeasurable impact in helping us to reaffirm and strengthen our nation's ties with Europe these past few years. And so, again, thank you very, very much. I'm honored to be here.

Now, this is actually the first time that I have spoken at the German Marshall Fund as Secretary of State. And I venture to say, given our short time in office, that it is likely the last. I have come here today to speak with you about a subject that's been on everyone's mind recently: Russia and U.S.-Russian relations.

Most of us are familiar with the events of the recent past. The causes of the conflict—particularly the dispute between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—are complex. They go back to the fall of the Soviet Union. And the United States and our allies have tried many times to help the parties resolve the dispute diplomatically. Indeed, it was, in part, for just that reason that I traveled to Georgia just a month before the conflict, as did German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, among others.

The conflict in Georgia, thus, has deep roots. And clearly, all sides made mistakes and miscalculations. But several key facts are clear:

On August 7th, following repeated violations of the ceasefire in South Ossetia, including the shelling of Georgian villages, the Georgian government launched a major military operation into Tskhinvali and other areas of the separatist region. Regrettably, several Russian peacekeepers were killed in the fighting.

These events were troubling. But the situation deteriorated further when Russia's leaders violated Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and launched a full scale invasion across an internationally-recognized border. Thousands of innocent civilians were displaced from their homes. Russia's leaders established a military occupation that stretched deep into Georgian territory. And they violated the ceasefire agreement that had been negotiated by French and EU [European Union] President Sarkozy.

Other actions of Russia during this crisis have also been deeply disconcerting: its alarmist allegations of "genocide" by Georgian forces; its baseless statements about U.S. actions during the conflict; its attempt to dismember a sovereign country by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia; its talk of having "privileged interests" in how it treats its independent neighbors; and its refusal to allow international monitors and NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite ongoing militia violence and retribution against innocent Georgians.

What is more disturbing about Russia's actions is that they fit into a worsening pattern of behavior over several years now. I'm referring, among other things, to Russia's intimidation of its sovereign neighbors, its use of oil and gas as a political weapon, its unilateral suspension of the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Treaty, its threat to target peaceful nations with nuclear weapons, its arms sales to states and

groups that threaten international security, and its persecution and worse of Russian journalists dissidents and others.

The picture emerging from this pattern of behavior is that of a Russia increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad.

Now, this behavior did not go unnoticed or unchallenged over the last several years. We have tried to address it in the context of efforts to forge a constructive relationship with Russia. But the attack on Georgia has crystallized the course that Russia's leaders are now taking; and it has brought us to a critical moment for Russia and the world—a critical moment, but not a deterministic one.

Russia's leaders are making some unfortunate choices. But they can still make different ones. Russia's future is in Russia's hands. But its choices will be shaped, in part, by the actions of the United States, our friends, and our allies—both in the incentives that we provide and the pressure that we apply.

Now, much has been said recently about how we have come to this point. And some have attempted to shift the responsibility for Russia's recent pattern of behavior onto others. Russia's actions cannot be blamed, for example, on its neighbors like Georgia.

To be sure, Georgia's leaders could have responded better to the events last month in South Ossetia; and it benefits no one to pretend otherwise. We warned our Georgian friends that Russia was baiting them and that taking this bait would only play into Moscow's hands.

But Russia's leaders used this as a pretext to launch what, by all appearances, was a premeditated invasion of its independent neighbor. Indeed, Russia's leaders had laid the groundwork for this scenario months ago—distributing Russian passports to Georgian separatists, training and arming their militias, and then justifying the campaign across Georgia's border as an act of self-defense.

Russia's behavior cannot be blamed either on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] enlargement. With the end of the Cold War, we and our allies have worked to transform NATO, to bring it from an alliance that manned the ramparts of a divided Europe to a means for nurturing the growth of a Europe whole, free, and at peace and an alliance that confronts the dangers, like terrorism, that also threaten Russia.

We have opened NATO to any sovereign, democratic state in Europe that can meet its standards of membership. We've supported the right of countries emerging from Communism to choose what path of development they pursue and what institutions they wish to join.

And this historic effort has succeeded beyond imagination. Twelve of our 28 neighbor NATO allies are former captive nations. And the promise of membership has been a positive incentive for these states: to build democratic institutions; to reform their economies; and to resolve old disputes, as nations like Poland and Hungary and Romania and Slovakia and Lithuania have done.

Just as importantly, NATO has consistently sought to enlist Russia as a partner in building a peaceful and prosperous Europe. Russia has had a seat at nearly every NATO summit since 2002. So to claim that this alliance is somehow directed against Russia is simply to ignore recent history. In fact, our assumption has always been—and it still is—that Russia's legitimate need for security is best served not by having weak, fractious, and poor states on its borders—but rather peaceful, prosperous, and democratic ones.

It is simply not valid, either, to blame Russia's behavior on the United States—either for being too tough with Russia, or not tough enough, too unaccommodating to Russia's interests, or too naïve about its leaders.

Since the end of the Cold War—spanning three administrations, both Democratic and Republican—the United States has sought to encourage the emergence of a strong, prosperous, and responsible Russia. We have treated Russia not as a vanquished enemy, but as an emerging partner. We have supported—politically and financially—Russia’s transition to a modern, market-based economy and a free, peaceful society. And we have respected Russia as a great power with which to work to solve common problems.

When our interests have diverged, the United States has consulted Russia’s leaders. We’ve searched for common ground. And we have sought, as best we could, to take Russia’s interests and ideas into account. This is how we have approached contentious issues—from Iran, to Kosovo, to missile defense. And I have traveled repeatedly to Russia, the last two times with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, to try to foster cooperation.

Increasingly, Russia’s leaders have simply not reciprocated. And their recent actions are leading some to ask whether we are now engaged in a new Cold War. No, we are not. But it does beg the question: Where did this Russia come from? How did the Russia of the 1990s become the Russia of today?

After all, the 1990s were, in many ways, a period of real hope and promise for Russia. The totalitarian state was dismantled. The scope of liberty for most Russians expanded significantly—in what they could read, in what they could say, in what they could buy and sell, and what associations they could form. New leaders emerged who sought to steer Russia toward political and economic reform at home, toward integration into the global economy, and toward a responsible international role.

All of this is true. But many Russians remember things differently about the 1990s. They remember that decade as a time of license and lawlessness, economic uncertainty, and social chaos—a time when criminals and gangsters and robber barons plundered the Russian state and preyed on the weakest in Russian society—a time when many Russians, not just elites and former apparatchiks, but ordinary men and women, experienced a sense of dishonor and dislocation that we in the West did not fully appreciate.

I remember that Russia because I saw it firsthand. I remember old women selling their life’s belongings along the old Arbat—plates and broken teacups, anything to get by. I remember that Russian soldiers returned home from Eastern Europe and lived in tents because the Russian state was just too weak and too poor to house them properly. I remember talking to my Russian friends—tolerant, open, progressive people—who felt an acute sense of shame during that decade—not at the loss of the Soviet Union, but at the feeling of not recognizing their own country anymore: the Bolshoi theater falling apart, pensioners unable to pay their bills, the Russian Olympic team in 1992 parading into the games under a flag that no one had ever seen, and receiving gold medals to an anthem that no one had ever heard. There was a humiliating sense that nothing Russian was good enough anymore.

This does not excuse Russia’s behavior, but it helps to set a context for it. It helps to explain why many ordinary Russians felt relieved and proud when new leaders emerged at the end of the last decade who sought to reconstitute the Russian state and reassert its power abroad. An imperfect authority was seen as better than no authority at all.

What has become clear is that the legitimate goal of rebuilding the Russian state has taken a dark turn—with the rollback of personal freedoms; the arbitrary enforcement of the law; the pervasive corruption at various levels of Russian society; and the paranoid, aggressive impulse, which has manifested itself before in Russian history, to view the emergence of free and independent democratic neighbors—most recently, during the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan—not as a source of security, but as a source of threat to Russia’s interests.

Whatever its course, though, Russia today is not the Soviet Union—not in the size of its territory, the reach of its power, the scope of its aims, or the nature of the regime. Russia’s leaders today have no

pretensions to ideological universality, no alternative vision to democratic capitalism, and no ability to construct a parallel system of client states and rival institutions. The bases of Soviet power are gone.

And despite their leaders' authoritarianism, Russians today enjoy more prosperity; more opportunity; and in some sense, more liberty than in either Tsarist or Soviet times. Russians increasingly demand the benefits of global engagement—the jobs and the technology, the travel abroad, the luxury goods, and the long-term mortgages.

With such growing prosperity and opportunity, I cannot imagine that most Russians would ever want to go back to the days, as in Soviet times, when their country and its citizens stood isolated from Western markets and institutions.

This, then, is the deeper tragedy of the choices that Russia's leaders are making. It is not just the pain they inflict on others; but the debilitating costs they impose on Russia itself—the way they are jeopardizing the international credibility that Russian businesses have worked so hard to build, and the way that they are risking the real, and future, progress of the Russian people, who have come so far since Communism.

And for what, Russia's attack on Georgia merely proved what we had already known —that Russia could use its overwhelming military advantage to punish a small neighbor. But Georgia has survived. Its democracy will endure. Its economy will be rebuilt. Its independence will be reinforced. Its military will, in time, be reconstituted. And we look forward to the day when Georgia's territorial integrity will be peacefully restored.

Russia's invasion of Georgia has achieved—and will achieve—no enduring strategic objective. And our strategic goal now is to make clear to Russia's leaders that their choices could put Russia on a one-way path to self-imposed isolation and international irrelevance.

Accomplishing this goal will require the resolve and the unity of responsible countries—most importantly, the United States and our European allies. We cannot afford to validate the prejudices that some Russian leaders seem to have: that if you press free nations hard enough—if you bully them and you threaten them and you lash out—they will cave in, and they'll forget, and eventually they will concede.

The United States and Europe must stand up to this kind of behavior and to all who champion it. For our sake—and for the sake of Russia's people, who deserve a better relationship with the rest of the world—the United States and Europe must not allow Russia's aggression to achieve any benefit, not in Georgia, not anywhere.

We and our European allies are, therefore, acting as one in supporting Georgia. President Sarkozy, with whom we have worked very closely, is especially to be commended for his leadership on this front. The transatlantic alliance is united. Just this week, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer led all 26 of our alliance's ambassadors on a mission to Tbilisi to demonstrate our unwavering support for the Georgian people. The door to a Euro-Atlantic future remains wide open to Georgia, and our alliance will continue to work through the new NATO-Georgia Commission to make that future a reality.

We and our European allies will also continue to lead the international effort to help Georgia rebuild—an effort that has already made remarkable headway. The United States has put forward a \$1 billion economic support package for Georgia. The EU has pledged 500 million Euros, and it is preparing to deploy a large mission of civilian observers and monitors to Georgia.

In addition, with U.S. and European support, G-7 [Group of Seven, finance ministers from seven industrialized nations] foreign ministers have condemned Russia's actions and pledged to support Georgia's reconstruction. The Asian Development Bank has committed \$40 million in loans to Georgia. The IMF

[International Monetary Fund] has approved a \$750 million stand-by credit facility. And the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] is making plans for expanded observers, though Moscow is still blocking this.

Conversely, Russia has found little support for its actions. A pat on the back from Daniel Ortega and Hamas is not a diplomatic triumph.

At the same time, the United States and Europe are continuing to support—unequivocally—the independence and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors. We will resist any Russian attempt to consign sovereign nations and free peoples to some archaic “sphere of influence.”

The United States and Europe are solidifying our ties with those neighbors. We are working as a wider group, including with our friends in Finland and Sweden, who have been indispensable partners throughout this recent crisis. We are backing worthy initiatives, like Norway’s High North policy. We are working to resolve other regional disputes, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, and to build with friends and allies like Turkey a foundation for cooperation in the Caucasus. And we will not allow Russia to wield a veto over the future of the Euro-Atlantic community—neither what states are offered membership, nor the choice of states that accept it. We have made this particularly clear to our friends in Ukraine.

The United States and Europe are deepening our cooperation in pursuit of greater energy [independence]—working with Azerbaijan and Georgia and Turkey and the Caspian countries. We will expand and defend open global energy in the economy from abusive practices. There cannot be one set of rules for Russia, Inc.—and another for everyone else.

Finally, the United States and Europe, as well as our many friends and allies worldwide, will not allow Russia’s leaders to have it both ways—drawing benefits from international norms and markets and institutions, while challenging their very foundation. There is no third way. A 19th century Russia and a 21st century Russia cannot operate in the world side by side.

To reach its full potential, though, Russia needs to be fully integrated into the international political and economic order. But Russia is in the precarious position today of being half in and half out. If Russia ever wants to be more than just an energy supplier, its leaders have to recognize a hard truth: Russia depends on the world for its success; and it cannot change that.

Already, Russia’s leaders are seeing a glimpse of what the future might look like if they persist with their aggressive behavior. In contrast to Georgia’s position, Russia’s international standing is worse than at any time since 1991. And the cost of this self-inflicted isolation has been steep.

Russia’s civil nuclear cooperation with the United States is not going anywhere now. Russia’s leaders are imposing pain on their nation’s economy. Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organization is now in jeopardy, and so too is its attempt to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

But perhaps the worst fallout for Moscow is that its behavior has fundamentally called into question whose vision of Russia is really guiding that country. There was a time recently when the new President of Russia laid out a positive and forward-looking vision of his nation’s future.

This was a vision that took into account Russia’s vulnerabilities: its declining population and heartbreaking health problems; its failure thus far to achieve a high-tech, diversified economy like those to Russia’s west and increasingly to Russia’s east; and the disparity between people’s quality of life in Moscow and St. Petersburg and in a few other cities, and those in Russia’s countryside.

This was a vision that called for strengthening the rule of law and rooting out corruption and investing

in Russia's people and creating opportunities not just for an elite few, but for all Russian citizens to share in prosperity.

This was a vision that rested on what President Medvedev referred to as the "Four I's": Investment, Innovation, Institutional Reform, and Infrastructure Improvements to expand Russia's economy. And this was a vision that recognized that Russia cannot afford a relationship with the world that is based on antagonism and alienation.

This is especially true in today's world, which increasingly is not organized around polarity—"multi-", "uni-", and certainly not "bi-". In this world, there is an imperative for nations to build a network of strong and unique ties to many influential states.

And that is a far different context than much of the last century, when U.S. foreign policy was, frankly, hostage to our relationship with the Soviet Union. We viewed everything through that lens, including our relations with other countries. We were locked in a zero-sum, ideological conflict. Every state was to choose sides, and that reduced our options.

Well, thankfully, that world is also gone forever; and it's not coming back. As a result, the United States is liberated to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy. And that is what we are doing.

We are charting a forward-looking agenda with fellow multiethnic democracies like Brazil and India and with emerging powers like China and Vietnam—relationships that were once colored by Cold War rivalry.

We are transforming our alliances with Asia—in Asia with Japan and South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, [and] with other countries of the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]—and expanding them for platforms for our common defense as catalysts for fostering regional security, advancing trade, promoting freedom, and building a dynamic Asia-Pacific region.

We are rebuilding relations with countries like Libya, whose leaders are making responsible choices to rejoin the international order.

We are deepening partnerships, rooted in shared principles, with nations across Africa to support the new African agenda for success in the 21st century. We've quadrupled foreign assistance to promote just governance, investment in people, fighting disease and corruption, and driving development through economic freedom.

We are moving beyond 60 years of policy in the broader Middle East which, during the Cold War, led successive administrations to support stability at the price of liberty, ultimately achieving neither.

And we are charting a hopeful future with our friends and allies in the Americas—from whom we were, at times, deeply estranged during the Cold War. Here, we have doubled foreign assistance. And now, we are pursuing a common hemispheric vision of democratic development, personal security, and social justice.

Anachronistic Russian displays of military power will not turn back this tide of history. Russia is free to determine its relations with sovereign countries. And they are free to determine their relationships with Russia—including in the Western hemisphere.

But we are confident that our ties with our neighbors—who long for better education and better health care and better jobs and better housing—will in no way be diminished by a few, aging Blackjack bombers visiting one of Latin America's few autocracies, which is itself being left behind by an increasingly peaceful and prosperous and democratic hemisphere.

Our world today is full of historic opportunities for progress, as well as challenges to it—from terrorism and proliferation to climate change and rising commodity prices. The United States has an interest in building partnerships to resolve these and other challenges. And so does Russia.

The United States and Russia share an interest in fighting terrorism and violent extremism. We and Russia share an interest in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and stopping Iran's rulers from acquiring the world's deadliest weapons. We and Russia share an interest in a secure Middle East where there is peace between Israelis and Palestinians. And we and Russia share an interest in preventing the Security Council from reverting to the gridlocked institution that it was during the Cold War.

The United States and Russia shared all of these interests on August 7th. And we share them still today on September 18. The Sochi Declaration, signed earlier this year, provided a strategic framework for the United States and Russia to advance our many shared interests.

We will continue, by necessity, to pursue our areas of common concern with Russia. But it would be a real shame if our relationship were never anything more than that—for the best and deepest relationships among states are those that share not only interest, but goals and aspirations and values and dreams.

Whatever the differences between our governments, we will not let them obstruct a deepening relationship between the American and Russian people.

So we will continue to sponsor Russian students and teachers and judges and journalists, labor leaders and democratic reformers who want to visit America. We will continue to support Russia's fight against HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. And we will continue to support all Russians who want a future of liberty for their great nation.

I sincerely hope that the next President and the next Secretary of State will visit Russia and will take time to speak with Russian civil society and will give interviews to Russia's diminished but still enduring independent media, just as President Bush and I have done.

The United States and our friends and allies, in Europe but also in the Americas and Asia and Africa and the Middle East, are confident in our vision for the world in this young century; and we are moving forward. It is a world in which great power is defined not by spheres of influence or zero-sum competition or the strong imposing their will on the weak—but by open competition in global markets, trade and development, the independence of nations, respect for human rights, governance by the rule of law, and the defense of freedom.

This vision of the world is not without its problems, or its setbacks, or even its significant crises—as we have seen in recent days. But it is this open, interdependent world, more than any other in history, that offers all human beings a greater opportunity for lives of peace, prosperity, and dignity.

Whether Russia's leaders overcome their nostalgia for another time and reconcile themselves to the sources of power and the exercise of power in the 21st century still remains to be seen. The decision is clearly Russia's—and Russia's alone. And we must all hope, for the good of the Russian people and for the sake of us all, that Russia's leaders make better and right choices.

Defeating Al-Qaeda's Air Force: Pakistan's F-16 Program in the Fight Against Terrorism

By

Donald Camp

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia

[The following are excerpts from a statement by Donald Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia, Washington, DC, September 16, 2008.]

On February 18th of this year, the Pakistani people went to the polls and elected moderate leaders who are working to set a stable, prosperous, democratic path for Pakistan into the future. The journey along this path is going to be a difficult one as Pakistan faces increasing economic challenges and the serious threat of growing instability in the border regions. The United States wants to see this new government succeed, not only because it represents the desires of the Pakistani people but because we believe that a moderate government with a democratic mandate is the most effective partner in the fight against terrorists and violent extremism.

During Prime Minister Gillani's visit to Washington in late July, you saw the United States and Pakistan committed to maintaining and strengthening our broad-based partnership; and the United States committed to steps that can help Pakistan deal with economic problems and increase its effectiveness in countering the extremist threat. The Administration's request to re-direct Foreign Military Financing [FMF] in 2008 and beyond to support F-16 Mid-Life Updates [MLU] speaks directly to these two commitments. Updates to Pakistan's F-16s will make these aircraft far more effective against terrorist targets, while helping with these payments will provide the newly-elected Pakistani government valuable fiscal flexibility as they deal with rising food and fuel prices.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I represent the Administration's commitment to the F-16 program; and we ask for your support to approve the Administration's request to re-direct the remaining \$110 million in 2008 Foreign Military Financing for the Mid-Life Update and an additional \$142 million in the future. The new Government of Pakistan stands behind these requests and has committed to assume subsequent payments with national funds beginning in December 2009.

F-16s Defined U.S.-Pakistan Engagement

The sale of F-16s to Pakistan became a transformative element of the U.S.- Pakistan bilateral relationship over 20 years ago, and this historical context is important to understand and remember as we determine how to handle the questions of F-16 financing today. Not only a component of Pakistan's national defense, the F-16 has become an iconic symbol of our bilateral relationship and our commitment to each other.

In the early 1980s, the U.S. Government initially agreed to sell Pakistan 111 F-16 aircraft. This decision was influenced by our close partnership with Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By October 1990, however, Pressler sanctions were imposed when President [George Herbert Walker] Bush was unable to certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear weapon. The Pressler sanctions led to a decade-long suspension of security assistance to Pakistan and a deficit of trust between our two countries that we are still working to overcome. The suspension of our security assistance programs required under Pressler meant the suspension and eventual cancellation of an additional sale of F-16 aircraft that would have augmented the 40 F-16s Pakistan purchased in 1982. That cancellation has been viewed as a symbol of the collapse of our relationship during the 1990s, a period which remains highly emotional for

many Pakistanis. The suspension of our security assistance also precluded Pakistani military officers from attending U.S. military schools, which has produced nearly a generation of Pakistani military officers who have not traveled to the United States to learn side-by-side with American officers.

September 11 Re-Defined Our Relationship

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the September 11, 2001 attacks resulted in a profound shift in U.S. policy towards South and Central Asia. The terrorist attacks on our homeland led to a strategic choice by the Government of Pakistan to support U.S. efforts to remove the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan. Pakistan's decision gave us the support of a critical neighbor; enabled us to undertake Operation Enduring Freedom; and has helped to sustain coalition operations over the last seven years, with Pakistan's road networks and port facilities serving as the critical supply line for our military forces in Afghanistan.

In return, after September 11th, the Administration committed to reinvigorating the security relationship between our two countries. This led to Pakistan's designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2004 and the President's commitment to provide Pakistan a \$3 billion assistance package over five years, evenly divided between security and development. Soon after, the Administration sought to overturn decades of bitterness by agreeing to sell Pakistan a new generation of F-16s and [provide] it with the ability to upgrade its existing fleet. This agreement was formally codified in September 2006 when Pakistan signed three separate Letters of Offer and Acceptance [LOA] that constitute the core of Pakistan's F-16 program. Prior to signing the Letters of Offer and Acceptance, the Administration notified Congress that the sale would serve to stabilize the conventional military balance in South Asia, provide Pakistan the ability to conduct Close Air Support in ongoing operations in the Global War on Terror, and restore Pakistan's confidence in the enduring nature of our relationship with them.

The Purchase

Pakistan had originally planned a total purchase valued at \$5.1 billion, almost all of it in national funds. The 2005 Kashmir earthquake and subsequent financial constraints caused Pakistan to reduce the number of new planes it wanted to purchase from 36 to 18, which lowered the overall value of the deal to approximately \$3.1 billion. The 18 new planes are valued at \$1.4 billion, with the remainder of the \$3.1 billion dedicated to associated munitions (valued at approximately \$641 million) and 46 Mid-Life Update kits for Pakistan's existing F-16 fleet (estimated to cost \$891 million). Additionally, the United States has provided Pakistan with 14 F-16s designated as Excess Defense Articles [EDA].

Pakistan will use reprogrammed funds to purchase the Mid-Life Update kits to upgrade the Excess Defense Article F-16s delivered over the last two and a half years. The Mid-Life Update case was written and agreed upon by the U.S. and Pakistan as a "mixed funding" case, allowing Pakistan to use \$108.395 million in FY 2006 FMF credits on the overall \$891 million case. Pakistan's subsequent request to use additional Foreign Military Financing has led us to the current request to re-direct funds in FY 2008 and beyond. The Pakistanis have requested that the Administration allow it to use a portion of its FY 2008 and FY 2009 Foreign Military Financing Presidential commitment, totaling \$368M, for the Mid-Life Update program. They have also committed to making all additional payments beyond this request with national funds. Even with this Pakistani request, over 83% of the F-16 program will have been funded through Pakistani national funds. It is important to note that Pakistan has a consistent payment record on the three other Foreign Military Sales cases associated with this sale and historically on all other Foreign Military Sales cases.

F-16s and the War on Terror

F-16s provide a critical counterterrorism capability to Pakistan, and the Pakistan Air Force [PAF] has recently made extensive use of its aging F-16 fleet to support Pakistan Army operations in the Swat Valley

and in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]. According to information furnished to us by the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, the PAF flew 93 sorties in August 2008 in operations against the Taliban. However, their current model F-16 can be used for Close Air Support missions only in daylight and good visibility. They cannot be employed at night, a fact not lost on the Taliban and other extremist groups being targeted.

U.S. F-16s use day-night, all weather, air-dropped precision-guided munitions to great effect in Iraq; and we believe Pakistan should be able to use this capability to achieve our shared goals in countering militants along its western border. The new and enhanced F-16s will provide Pakistan the ability to attack fleeing targets with precision during all weather conditions. The Mid-Life Update will enable the Pakistan Air Force to use an advanced targeting pod that provides the ability to generate ground position data that can then be used to direct guided munitions to a target. In addition, the Mid-Life Update comes with an advanced communications system that enables real time communication with ground forces — a critical capability for Close Air Support missions. Combined, these systems provide Pakistan's Air Force with the technological capability to conduct precision close air strikes against Al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated terrorist targets in the FATA, as well as provide Non-Traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NTISR), a critical enabler in a counterinsurgency campaign. The Pakistan Air Force will receive considerable training associated with the F-16 cases including specific F-16 pilot and maintenance training for their F-16 technicians. We are currently finalizing a comprehensive training plan that will include Close Air Support, Combat Search and Rescue, aerial refueling, and night flying operations. This will also mean an improved ability to limit civilian casualties, which will in turn lead to greater willingness on the part of the Pakistani military to employ the F-16s in a counter-terrorism role.

It is also important to note that Pakistan's request to use Foreign Military Financing for the Mid-Life Update program will not detract from investments in other equipment that is being employed in direct support of ongoing military operations in the Tribal Areas. Our original congressional notification for the use of \$247 million of Pakistan's Foreign Military Financing allocation stated that Pakistan would use this assistance to finance the refurbishment of Pakistan Navy P-3C aircraft, to purchase Pakistan Air Force Command and Control articles and services, [for] tactical radios for Pakistan's Army, [for] TOW missiles, and to modernize and maintain Pakistan's Cobra helicopters. Twenty million dollars of the \$247 million will still be used to purchase TOW missiles and tactical radios. In addition, the Cobra helicopters, for which there are signed Letters of Offer and Acceptance, will be financed through Pakistan's remaining FY 2008 Foreign Military Financing allocation of \$50.57 million, which will be released pending expiration of the congressional notification period.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize the strategic importance of Pakistan to U.S. interests, not just regionally, but globally. While the F-16 plays an important role in Pakistan's efforts to defeat extremism, it also has achieved strategic importance as a symbolic barometer of the overall state of our relationship and trust between our militaries. Given the tangible and symbolic importance of Pakistan's F-16 program, we request Congressional support to redirect the remaining \$110 million in Foreign Military Financing in FY 2008 and up to \$142 million in the future.

U.S. - Japan Relations: Partnership and Progress

By

Alexander A. Arvizu

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

[The following are excerpts from Arvizu's statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, June 12, 2008.]

It is a privilege to appear before you today. The U.S. and Japan will celebrate the 50th anniversary of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 2010. This historic milestone is not just an occasion to reflect on the successes of the past six decades, but an opportunity to look forward toward future challenges and possibilities. Our Alliance with Japan has not only enhanced our own security and that of the region; it has blossomed into a political and economic partnership based on shared values and shared vision that provides substantial benefits to both countries and to people throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan is one of our most important trading partners and a staunch and reliable ally in fora ranging from the United Nations to the Six-Party Talks. Men and women from Japan's Self-Defense Forces support U.S. and coalition partners in Iraqi reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations and Operation Enduring Freedom. We work together on important issues throughout Asia such as increasing regional economic integration, promoting democracy and human rights, and coordinating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Japan is also becoming a more active partner in global affairs; and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region to include African development, promoting peace in the Middle East, and combating climate change.

Whatever challenges the next 50 years beyond 2010 may bring, I am confident our relationship with Japan will deepen and evolve so that it will contribute to peace, prosperity, and security for the region and beyond.

Japanese Domestic Politics

A brief look at the current domestic political situation in Japan may help provide context for a broader discussion of U.S.-Japan security alliance issues and political and economic issues.

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda assumed office in September of 2007, after the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] lost its majority in the Upper House in the July 2007 elections. Due to the electoral cycle, Japan may face a few years of legislative uncertainty, which will certainly affect the speed of government decision making. This is the first time since before the Second World War that Japan has been governed by a divided Diet; and the Fukuda Cabinet, the LDP, and the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan [DPJ], are navigating uncharted waters. As the largest party in the Upper House of the Diet, the DPJ now has the power to greatly hinder legislation. While the LDP can technically override the Upper House and enact legislation due to their supra-majority in the Lower House, as a practical matter, there are severe constraints on the Fukuda cabinet's ability to employ this tactic. This is especially true on issues with a high public profile, deemed to require substantial debate and compromise before passage into law.

However, the DPJ would like to demonstrate to the Japanese people that it can govern effectively. Thus, there is room for compromise and incentive to do so. Progress on a range of issues of both domestic and international importance is possible, but the rationale for action is occasionally less clear than it has been in the past.

U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed between the United States and Japan in 1960 during a very different era—at the height of the Cold War—and was marked by uncertainty in the United States over the treaty's real strategic value and by protests and demonstrations in Japan over the very concept of entering into a formal alliance with a former adversary. The strategic relationship has evolved over the years into the linchpin of American security policy in the Pacific and a core element of Japan's national security policy. Japan's provision of bases allows the United States to project military power into this critical region and contribute to the defense of Japan. It also provides a platform for the forward deployment of U.S. forces that enhances our ability to meet other regional responsibilities and objectives that the U.S. and Japan share such as the stability of the Korean peninsula and maritime security in the region's critical sea lanes. Opinion polls in Japan consistently show strong support for our continued presence, and the Government of Japan makes significant contributions to the basing of our forces. A Special Measures Agreement concluded this past December will provide approximately \$4 billion through 2010 for the basing of U.S. Forces in Japan [USFJ].

There are more than 48,000 American military personnel deployed in Japan, including our only forward deployed carrier strike group, the 5th Air Force, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force. This August, the USS George Washington is scheduled to deploy to Japan, the first American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be forward deployed outside of the United States. The George Washington's deployment is just one element of a broader effort to transform and realign American forces in Japan. Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative [DPRI], the United States and Japan made a landmark alliance commitment under the 2006 U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will have far-reaching benefits for the Alliance. These changes will help strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for a more sustainable U.S. military presence in the region. The transformation includes the relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa, and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan (e.g., increased interoperability, as well as collaboration on ballistic missile defense). This realignment will strengthen both countries' ability to meet current responsibilities and create an Alliance that is more flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security concerns, whether in the region or globally.

The U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship

The United States and Japan are the world's largest economies, together generating over a third of global output. We owe much of our prosperity to our bilateral economic relationship. Japan and the United States exchange the equivalent of \$760 million in goods and services every day. Japanese companies in the United States employed 613,500 American workers in 2005, and U.S. firms provided jobs for over 242,000 Japanese workers. Our economic relationship is more cooperative and less confrontational than in the past. We recognize that to sustain productive, growing domestic economies and maintain a strong international system based on free markets, opportunity, and effective and responsible economic governance, we need to work together. We are global leaders. And we are finding more and more that our engagement is global in scope as we tackle issues like energy security and climate change; protect intellectual property rights; deepen and strengthen the Asia-Pacific economic community; and address critical development needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere. To alleviate the burden of sharply higher food prices on the world's poor, in May the United States announced substantial new food aid. We also agreed that Japan could release to countries in need a portion of the rice imported under WTO [World Trade Organization] Uruguay Round commitments on an exceptional basis this year. We believe this will help calm the international rice market, and we continue to discuss the causes of these high food prices.

As important as our global economic relationship has become, we also need to continue our efforts to expand trade and investment between us. Our trade with Japan is not growing at the same rate as our trade with other countries in the region, and we continue to urge Japan to make meaningful market access commitments in the Doha Development Round negotiations. We are working hard to reopen the Japanese market to U.S. beef, consistent with the standards of the World Organization for Animal Health. In its policies and public statements, Japan should create and maintain a climate that welcomes foreign investment. We are also in close touch with the Japanese Government as the ten-year process to privatize Japan Post proceeds. The first steps began last October, opening up new opportunities for highly competitive American firms to serve Japanese consumers in the banking, insurance, and express delivery sectors. We are also pleased with our growing efforts with Japan to establish strong trade security protections, which will be essential to the movement of goods.

Global Partnership Issues

The influence of the U.S.-Japan partnership is increasingly felt around the world. We appreciate Japan's strong support for the war on terror, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are both committed to helping build a democratic, pluralistic, and unified Iraq. The successful deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces to southern Iraq was a historic milestone for U.S.-Japan cooperation, and the Coalition in Iraq appreciates Japan's continuing contribution of transport aircraft. We deeply value Japan's leading role as a provider of financial and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi Government and people. Japan also plays an important role in rebuilding Afghanistan through its generous reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, including a commitment to rebuild the southern portion of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road. The United States is grateful for Japan's ongoing refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. These contributions have demonstrated that Japan has much to offer the world in the security arena, and the world has shown that it welcomes continued increases in Japan's international security roles.

Our cooperation extends beyond security. We stand together at the forefront of efforts to help countries in the wake of devastating natural disasters, including the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004; the Pakistan earthquake in October 2005; the Central Java earthquake in 2006; and mostly recently, the cyclone in Burma and earthquake in western China. In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, Japan joined the United States in offering assistance and in advocating for greater access for international aid experts to conduct independent assessments and to help assistance reach those in need as quickly and effectively as possible. Japan has provided \$10 million in humanitarian assistance and joined the international community in calling for the Burmese authorities to be fully transparent and accountable in their management of relief efforts. Japan's material assistance to China in the wake of the Sichuan earthquake has so far totaled \$12 million. In addition, close to 100 Japanese rescue workers and medical specialists have been dispatched.

We are also working together with Japan and others to develop a new regional initiative to promote good governance, democratic values, and human rights in the Asia Pacific region. Japan has been a key partner in these regional efforts to date, and we expect their leadership to grow in this area.

Japan's G8 Priorities

Japan's G8 [Group of Eight, forum of top economic world powers] Presidency presents an opportunity to work together to achieve our common goals. Japan is focusing on four key themes: environment and climate change, development and Africa, the world economy, and political issues including nonproliferation. We are working with the Government of Japan to enhance G8 accountability for follow-through on past commitments on Africa, health, anticorruption, and other areas.

Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty

By

Daniel Fried

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

[The following are excerpts from testimony as delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC, September 10, 2008.]

I will discuss NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] purposes in the Cold War and today; the role that NATO enlargement has played in advancing security and stability in Europe since 1989; the current proposed round of enlargement to include Albania and Croatia; and NATO's future relations with Georgia and Ukraine, whom NATO's leaders at the Bucharest Summit declared will become members of the Alliance. In addition, Russia's recent attack on Georgia and ongoing military activity in that country forms a backdrop to our discussion today.

NATO's Purpose

NATO, the world's most successful military alliance, has been and remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community of democracies. It is both a defensive alliance and an alliance of values. While it was created in the context of Soviet threats to European security, it is in fact not an alliance directed against any nation. Article 5 — NATO's collective defense commitment — mentions neither the Soviet Union nor any adversary. One of NATO's purposes was and remains to defend its members from attack. But another purpose was to provide a security umbrella under which rivalries among West European nations — France and Germany in particular — could be reconciled and general peace in Europe could prevail after the 20th century's two world wars. A third purpose was to institutionalize the transatlantic link. NATO's first Secretary General Lord Ismay described NATO's role in an acerbic but telling aphorism, saying that the Alliance's purposes were "to keep the Soviets out, the Germans down, and the Americans in." In the Cold War, NATO succeeded: under its umbrella, Western Europe remained free and united peacefully in the European Union.

Article 5 remains the core of the Alliance. Throughout most of the Alliance's history, we had expected that if Article 5 were ever invoked, it would have been in response to a Soviet armored assault on Germany. We never expected that Article 5 would be invoked in response to an attack on the United States originating in Afghanistan. But that is what occurred. NATO's response was swift and decisive. The United States was attacked on September 11, 2001; and on September 12, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. In fact, while NATO's purpose of collective defense has remained constant, new threats have arisen. NATO thus has been required to carry out its core mandate in new ways, developing an expeditionary capability and comprehensive, civil-military skills. NATO is now "out of area" but very much in business — fielding major missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo and a training mission on the ground in Iraq. NATO is doing more now than at any time during the Cold War. While this is not the subject of our discussion today, NATO is still digesting the implications of these new requirements even as it continues fielding forces in Afghanistan.

NATO Enlargement

NATO enlargement was foreseen in principle from the beginning of NATO's existence with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO brought in new members even during the Cold War: Turkey and Greece in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain and end of the Soviet Union, the purpose of defense against attack by Moscow seemed to recede. But NATO enlargement took on a more profound strategic aspect: for the

then-raw and apprehensive new democracies that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Bloc after the fall of Communism, NATO, ahead of the EU [European Union], became the institutional expression of their desire to join with Europe and the transatlantic world. For the United States and other NATO members, NATO enlargement, along with EU enlargement, became the means by which the vision of a “Europe whole, free, and at peace” started becoming reality.

American leadership in NATO enlargement was patient, deliberate, and the result of careful planning that began during the Administration of former President George H.W. Bush, crystallized under President Clinton, and evolved under President George W. Bush. The countries that had liberated themselves from Communism found themselves on uncertain ground, looking for direction. They were nervous about Russia. They were not yet confident in their own democratic institutions. And they were mindful of the problems of their last period of true sovereignty in [the] 1930s, when Europe, and especially Central and Eastern Europe, suffered from competing nationalisms and growing authoritarianism. Many worried that Eastern Europe after 1989 might fall back into the dangerous old habits of state-ism and nationalism and border and ethnic rivalries.

It was in this environment that NATO enlargement — occurring faster and initially with more determination than EU enlargement — became the instrument through which the Central and Eastern European countries reconciled with each other, and under which they advanced and completed reforms, setting aside nationalist rivalry much as their West European counterparts did after 1945. NATO made its first decisions about post-Cold War enlargement in 1997; and security, stability, and democracy deepened in Central Europe. With the terrible exception of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which I will discuss later, the success that these countries achieved was so complete and so astonishing that few today even recall that Eastern Europe was widely expected to turn out otherwise. The policy of NATO enlargement, which many here today helped shape, was one of America’s and Europe’s greatest successes after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

NATO Enlargement & Russia

NATO enlargement was intended to achieve emergence of a Europe whole, free, and at peace: all of Europe, not just its Western half. It was not directed against Russia. Quite the contrary: NATO enlargement was designed to welcome new democracies in Europe in parallel to efforts to reach out to Russia and develop a new NATO-Russia relationship. In designing NATO’s new role for the post-Cold War world, the United States and NATO Allies have sought to advance NATO-Russia relations as far as the Russians would allow it to go.

We wanted a new Europe and a new relationship with Russia at the same time. We sought to go forward, not backwards. Through the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council [NRC] in 2002 — the same year we invited seven eastern European countries to join NATO — we presented Russia the path toward building a partnership with NATO to strengthen the common security of all. Allies also decided not to shut the door to the possibility of even Russia itself becoming a member of NATO at some time in the future.

We assumed that we had in Russia a partner that was, over time, even if perhaps unevenly, moving toward more democracy at home and more cooperation with its neighbors and the world. But developments in recent years have forced us to question this assumption. Russia has turned toward authoritarianism at home and pressure tactics toward its neighbors. Now, by attacking Georgia, Russia has sought to change international borders by force, bringing into question the territorial settlement of the breakup of the USSR in 1991. “Revisionism” has a bad history in 20th century Europe and seems no better now. We want to have a partner in a Russia that contributes to an open, free world in the 21st century, not a Russia that behaves as an aggressive Great Power in a 19th century sense that asserts — as President Medvedev recently did — a sphere of influence or “privileged interests” over its neighbors and beyond.

Some argue that NATO itself was an aggressive instrument whose enlargement somehow caused Russia's own aggressive actions. This reflects ignorance of history. NATO did not take down the Iron Curtain. NATO did not trigger the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO did provide the conditions of security and stability under which the people of Eastern Europe — Poland, Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, and others — could reclaim their own nations. By preventing the expansion of Soviet power, NATO created the conditions under which the internal weaknesses of that system would themselves bring about its collapse. And NATO enlargement did not produce some massive encirclement of Russia. NATO enlargement created in Central Europe an area of peace, security, and stability. Stable, free market democracies along Russia's border rather than dictatorships are in everyone's best interest, including Russia's. Rather than shun Russia, or foment hostility to Russia, NATO, even as it grew, reached out to Russia to build and expand ties by helping one another as "equal partners" to face common threats and challenges.

Imagine the circumstances if NATO had not enlarged. The nations of Eastern Europe would be unsure of their place in the world, consigned to a grey zone. Some of them are anxious now, thanks to Russia's invasion of Georgia. But imagine their fear were they not members of NATO. Kept out of NATO, they likely would have re-nationalized their own defense establishments in ways that would raise tensions not only with Russia but also among their neighbors. But thanks to NATO enlargement, the part of Europe to Russia's west is the most benign and peaceful it has ever been in Russia's history. I do not expect Russians to thank us for this achievement, but they would be right to do so.

The Balkans

The area of former Yugoslavia was the greatest and most terrible exception to the mostly good history of post-1989 Europe. The violent breakup of that country threw that region into a downward spiral from which the successor nations are only now recovering.

But we believe that NATO enlargement — along with EU enlargement — can do for the Balkans in this decade what it did for Central Europe in the previous decade. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia — whose admission into NATO has been delayed only because of a dispute with Greece over its name — have undertaken and implemented the sort of reforms we have sought in significant part because they want to get into NATO. By providing general security to the Balkans, starting with the two aspirant nations whose accession the Administration is seeking the Senate's advice and consent; we can consolidate general peace and security in the Balkans. The policy of NATO enlargement has been working for these aspirant countries and for the United States, and the Administration believes that this round of NATO enlargement can open the way for all the nations of the Balkans to become part of the European mainstream.

Let me say a few words about each of these countries.

Albania

In the 17 years since Albania freed itself from one of the world's most repressive Communist dictatorships, Albania has made steady progress in creating stable, democratic institutions and a free market economy. The road has not always been easy; in 1997, Albania was shaken by a major financial scandal and domestic turmoil. But its desire for NATO membership has both shaped and motivated Albania's progress.

Militarily, Albania is transitioning to a smaller, voluntary, professional military. It has put international assistance to good use by restructuring and strengthening its armed forces to the point where Albania has become a strong and reliable partner on NATO missions, with troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. The government is also working with international assistance to make Albania landmine-free by 2010.

Albania has also made significant progress in democratic reforms. It has more work to do, and we expect its reforms to continue. Albania must accelerate judicial reforms and stay on track with its electoral reforms. The fight against corruption must be total in order to show that no one is above the law. A zero-tolerance policy — particularly in public services such as tenders, taxes, licensing, and health care — must be backed up by systematic investigations and prosecutions. By putting more emphasis on the key roles of an independent prosecutor and judiciary, Albania can send a strong message of its determination to overcome past practices.

In summary, NATO's invitation is a sign that Albania has made enormous steps forward. But it also has raised the bar, and more reform is still needed.

Fortunately, the history of NATO enlargement in the past suggests that countries continue reforms rather than abandon them, when they join the alliance.

Croatia

Croatia is already a valuable NATO partner; it has pledged about 300 troops in Afghanistan and is one of the only non-NATO members currently training Afghan military units in that country. As a military partner, Croatia has completed most of the restructuring that was needed and is currently focused on modernization, deployability, and interoperability.

Croatia has also proved its political and economic maturity. It recently completed another successful round of national elections and has become a stable democracy with strong institutions. Its election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council beginning last January has enhanced its importance as our regional and global partner on issues of international peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and regional peace, and stability.

Regionally, Croatia maintains positive bilateral relations with all of its neighbors. The Croatian government is playing a positive role in Kosovo. It is promoting stability in Bosnia, and it has reached out to moderates in Serbia.

Croatia also faces challenges, including the important issue of home reconstruction, repossession, and infrastructure development for war refugees. Croatia reported meeting its 2007 benchmarks on providing housing units to returning refugees; but the government expects almost 10,000 unresolved applications in years to come, which will pose a long-term political and financial challenge.

Judicial reform remains another challenge for the government; and Croatia has taken steps to address this, including reducing case backlog and improving training and supervision of judges and court administration.

Finally, Croatia must address its property restitution legal framework so that it does not discriminate against current non-Croatian citizens who had property expropriated during World War II and the Communist regime.

Given Croatia's strong track record in implementing reforms, we have every confidence that it has the will and capacity to be a good and contributing member of the alliance.

Macedonia

Macedonia largely escaped the civil wars that destroyed the former Yugoslavia and has made strides in building a free-market, democratic system. A multi-ethnic state, it has chosen the route of compromise rather than nationalist extremism. In 2001, with support from the United States, NATO, and the EU, Macedonia concluded the Ohrid Framework Agreement [FWA] that ended an ethnic Albanian insurgency by enshrining enhanced minority rights. Since then, it adopted the constitutional and legislative

changes mandated by the agreement and has worked steadily to implement the agreement. Macedonian Governments always have included ethnic-Albanian and Macedonian parties, who have worked to forge political compromises in the overarching interest of the country.

Macedonia continues to be a steadfast partner in the fight against terrorism. It has regularly maintained its troop contributions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia [EUFOR — European Union Force]; and it is committed to fund its defense to support peacekeeping as well as continued reforms.

Macedonia has also made good progress in strengthening the rule of law and tackling corruption. The government has pursued bold economic reforms to attract investment, boost the economy, and reduce unemployment; and we are confident that Macedonia will continue to pursue a reform agenda in line with its NATO and EU aspirations.

Like Albania and Croatia, Macedonia still has work to do: the parliamentary elections last June 1 were marred by irregularities, including intra-Albanian violence, and although reruns showed improvements, overall the elections fell short of international commitments. The Macedonia Government has made arrests and is pursuing cases; and we are urging follow-through to prosecute and sanction the perpetrators and put in safeguards for future elections. Following the elections, the soundly defeated opposition parties boycotted parliament. We urged their return, which the main ethnic Macedonian opposition party has, and encouraged a conciliatory approach from the governing coalition.

The United States continues to support Macedonia receiving a NATO invitation. Its invitation was delayed because of the dispute with Greece over Macedonia's name. Allied leaders made clear at Bucharest that this dispute is the only thing holding up a membership invitation. As soon as this dispute with Greece is resolved, Macedonia will receive an invitation to join the Alliance. Both Greece and Macedonia are engaged in negotiations on the issue, led by UN [United Nations] mediator Matthew Nimetz. We believe a mutually-acceptable solution is possible, in the interest of both countries and the region, and indeed urgent. Now is the time to settle this issue and move forward.

Last April 3rd, President Bush said both Croatia and Albania have “demonstrated the ability and the willingness to provide strong and enduring contributions to NATO. Both have undertaken challenging political, economic, and defense reforms. Both have deployed their forces on NATO missions. Albania and Croatia are ready for the responsibility NATO brings, and they will make outstanding members of this Alliance.”

On Macedonia, the President said: “We regret that we were not able to reach consensus today to invite Macedonia to join the Alliance. Macedonia has made difficult reforms at home. It is making major contributions to NATO missions abroad. The name issue needs to be resolved quickly so that Macedonia can be welcomed into NATO as soon as possible.” That remains our perspective.

These countries have had their challenges. They know that they have work to do. Their challenges are familiar to us from experience over the past twenty years of post-Communist transformation. Given their progress so far, we see a historic window of opportunity to bring them into the European mainstream. By having these countries join the Alliance, it will not only help stabilize a long-turbulent region; but it will show others in the Balkans that there is an alternative to nationalist or ethnic divisions and violence. And we believe it will inspire people in Montenegro; Bosnia; Kosovo; and, we hope, Serbia, to follow the same path.

Georgia and Ukraine

There is another part of Europe still at risk, as Russia's recent actions have dramatized.

NATO has unfinished business in Georgia and Ukraine. The leaders of these nations aspire to NATO

membership. Neither nation is ready for NATO membership now. Both nations realize this. The question is whether these countries should have the same prospect to meet NATO's terms for membership as other European nations. We believe that they should. Indeed, NATO's leaders at the Bucharest Summit agreed, declaring that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of the Alliance.

Both countries face challenges. Ukrainian society is far from united about the prospect of NATO membership, and many Allies question the maturity and stability of its leadership. Quite apart from the issues arising from Russia's attack on it, Georgia has much work to do in strengthening its democratic institutions before it would meet NATO standards.

As we consider the desire of these countries to join the Alliance, we should make clear that they have much work to do at home and that this work is their responsibility to undertake.

This is why the United States supports approving both countries entry into NATO's Membership Action Plan, the so-called MAP. MAP is not NATO membership. It is not a promise or guarantee of membership. It is simply a work program to help these countries make the progress they must make if they are to become NATO members someday, as NATO has already confirmed they will. What we should not do is give Russia a veto over NATO's decisions or consign these or any countries to a Russian sphere of influence.

Russia has made clear that it would regard even a MAP for Georgia or Ukraine with hostility. We regret this position. We believe it is the wrong choice, both for the long-term security and stability of Russia's neighbors as well as for Russia itself. NATO's growing relations with nations east of the old Iron Curtain have brought greater security and stability; Moscow's reaction has produced anxiety and tension. Moscow should reconsider its course.

We seek good relations with Russia. We take into account Russia's security concerns. But we also take account of the concerns and aspirations of people who live in the countries around Russia. Russian security cannot be achieved through imposing insecurity on its neighbors. We cannot, by lack of resolve, consign other countries to a Russian sphere of influence in which their future is limited to those aspirations that Moscow permits them to have. Free people have the right to choose their own path; and it is the policy of the United States, upheld by every Administration since the end of the Cold War, to respect and support their choices.

Russia itself recognized this right when it signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. One of the core principles of the Founding Act is "the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state."

Looking Forward

NATO's mission remains the same: the collective defense of its members. Its impact on European security and peace was profound and positive first during the Cold War and then in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The way in which NATO carries out its core tasks has and will continue to evolve to meet the changing threats. We have seen these in recent years: terrorism, cyber-attacks, and energy security. We have seen that threats may come from far afield.

Since security in Europe is not complete, we have to consider the implications of Russia's attack on Georgia. Georgia is not a NATO member, and Article 5 does not pertain to it. But the actions and the rhetoric coming from Russia's leaders have raised concerns by countries that are NATO members.

NATO's routine work has always meant participation in collective defense planning, cooperative exercises, and staying alert to new threats and developments. Certainly the events of August have

reinforced the importance of such thinking. Article 5 has and will continue to have, meaning for all of NATO's members.

I wish to express my thanks to the Committee for your bipartisan support over the years, not only for NATO enlargement, but to help NATO evolve from its Cold War roots into an institution prepared for 21st century challenges. Our nation's support for a "Europe whole, free, and at peace" has served as a beacon of hope for many countries that faced an uncertain future. Neither their development nor their freedom was guaranteed. Yet over 100 million Europeans in the past decade have found security, stability, and greater prosperity, in significant part as a result of being welcomed into the NATO Alliance. This has made America's work in the world that much easier, for it is a hallmark of our foreign policy that the spread of freedom and security benefits us as well as its immediate recipients. The advance of freedom and security in the world has sent a powerful message to many others, including those who still aspire to join: that there is a reward for putting cooperation over conflict.

Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program

By

Robert M. Perito

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[The following are excerpts from a July 2008 report prepared by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) for the Departments of State and Defense. The views expressed in this report, in accordance with USIP policy, do not advocate specific policy positions. DISAM wishes to thank USIP for their approval of this reprint.]

About the Report

In January 2008, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense requested that the United States Institute of Peace conduct an independent assessment of the process by which projects funded under Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Acts of FY 2006 and FY 2007 were developed, reviewed, and approved for funding. They asked that the study include recommendations for changes in the application and approval procedures to ensure that project proposals were reviewed through an efficient, transparent, and well-understood interagency process. The Institute agreed to conduct the study because the 1207 program is an example of the U.S. military's growing involvement in integrated "whole-of-government" approaches to U.S. security assistance programs. The study is based on interviews with staff members of the Senate and House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees and representatives from the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID].

Summary

Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY 2006 and FY 2007 authorized the Defense Department to provide up to \$200 million over two years in funds, services, and defense articles to the State Department (DoS) for security, reconstruction, and stabilization.

The DoD transferred over \$99 million in Section 1207 assistance to the DoS to fund projects in Haiti (\$20m), Somalia (\$25m), Nepal (\$10m), Colombia (\$4m), trans-Saharan Africa (\$15m), Yemen (\$8.8m), and Southeast Asia (\$16.9m).

Congress' intent in authorizing this program was to jumpstart the new State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. It was also to promote a "whole-of-government" approach to security-assistance programs.

After two years' experience, publication of principles and guidelines for 1207 project applications should solve problems resulting from a lack of awareness of the program and confusion over leadership and application procedures.

Adding USAID to the decision-making Technical Advisory Committee should remove the largest source of interagency tension that has troubled the program.

Greater clarity is needed concerning the relative weight of the program's priorities, which include security, counterterrorism, stabilization, and reconstruction and avoiding the need to deploy U.S. military forces.

There is a need for the DoD and DoS to provide additional resources to embassies that are expected to complete a relatively complicated application form. There is also a need for the DoD to streamline the provision of funds, so the money arrives in real time before circumstances change and projects cannot be implemented.

Ultimately, the DoS and DoD need to honor the intent of Congress and request that Congress appropriate funds directly to the DoS for these projects.

Introduction

Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006 and FY 2007 authorized the Defense Department to provide up to \$200 million over two years in funds, services, and defense articles to the State Department for security, reconstruction, and stabilization. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) assumed leadership of an interagency process to develop proposals and request funding for projects that would carry out the intent of the NDAA. In FY 2006, the DoD transferred \$10 million in Section 1207 assistance to the DoS for a program to support the internal security forces in Lebanon following Israel's war against Hezbollah. In FY 2007, the DoD transferred over \$99 million in Section 1207 assistance. Section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2008 provides a one-year extension of Section 1207 authority and provides an additional \$100 million.

The Congressional Mandate and History of the Legislation

The Senate version of the NDAA for FY 2006 contained a provision (Section 1207) to provide the Secretary of Defense with the authority to transfer funds, services, and articles to the Secretary of State to provide immediate assistance to crisis states to maintain or restore peace and security. There was no similar provision in the House version of the NDAA, whose conferees accepted the Senate version but added an amendment clarifying that funding would be limited to \$100 million annually for FY 2006 and FY 2007. The legislation stipulated that once the funds are transferred to the DoS, they would be subject to restrictions and requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other laws governing civilian foreign assistance programs. The Senate version of the NDAA for FY 2008 (Section 1210) provided for the extension of the 1207 authority for an additional year but increased the funding to \$200 million. Again, the House version did not have a similar provision. House conferees receded with an amendment that reduced the funding to \$100 million during FY 2008.

In their FY 2006 joint report, the conferees commended the DoS and DoD for improving U.S. capacity and interagency coordination to plan, support, and conduct post-conflict stability operations. They expressed support for the DoS' Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. They also commended the DoD for its support of S/CRS and urged it to deepen its cooperation with the DoS in planning and participating in post-conflict operations. The conferees indicated that 1207 was a temporary measure to provide resources to the DoS until S/CRS was "stood up" and adequately resourced. They made clear that it was not appropriate for the DoS to receive funds via the DoD over the long term. The conferees urged the Administration to request the necessary resources for S/CRS in its future budget submissions for the DoS.

According to congressional staff, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) introduced Section 1207 of the FY 2006 NDAA in response to requests from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to help jump start the S/CRS by providing authorization and funding for projects that would involve interagency coordination. This action was taken in recognition of the fact that Congress was unable to pass a State Department authorization bill that would authorize S/CRS to conduct a comparable program. According to congressional staff, Congress regarded 1207

as a temporary measure that should be used for short-term programs in response to emergencies and unforeseen contingencies.

The money available under 1207 was not “earmarked” but would be taken from the DoD’s operating budget, which otherwise would be used to purchase equipment for troops in Iraq, sailing days for Navy ships, or flight hours for Air Force pilots. Congress’ intention was to ensure that 1207 projects had the necessary priority to justify the diversion of DoD funds from such important purposes. At the same time, Congress wanted DoS involvement to ensure that these projects — which must have a national security focus — would include more than a military perspective and involve the use of political and economic means to resolve problems.

Overall, Congress wanted to indicate its clear support for the DoS assuming long-term responsibility for foreign assistance programs and to urge the Administration to request future funding for such projects in the DoS budget. Congressional staff noted that recent Administrations had “pumped up” the foreign assistance component of the DoD budget because of the perception that it was easier to obtain funding from Congress. In response, congressional staff expressed the hope that the relative difficulty of obtaining these funds via the DoD would encourage the DoS and the Office of Management and Budget to request the money through the regular foreign assistance budget.

These staff members viewed 1207 as a complement to Section 1206 of the FY 2006 NDAA, which provided up to \$300 million to the DoD for nontraditional security assistance to train and equip foreign military forces in counterterrorism, capacity building, stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The provision was intended to enable combatant commanders to assist countries threatened with terrorist infiltration without reprogramming already allocated funds or waiting until Foreign Military Financing (FMF) became available. The provision required the DoD to jointly formulate proposals and to coordinate program implementation with the DoS. Historically, FMF programs were conducted under the authority of the DoS. The 1206 program was designed as a two-year test of whether this authority should be transferred to the DoD.

The Current Guidelines Governing the Application Process

The DoS and the DoD published formal guidelines for the 1207 application process for 2008. On February 28, the DoS sent a telegram to all diplomatic and consular posts from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization containing “Guidance for FY 08 Section 1210 Proposal Submissions.” The telegram directed recipients to the S/CRS website for instructions on how to submit a 1210 proposal and for a template for preparing project proposals. According to the guidelines, applications must include five highly detailed elements: (1) a summary of the project; (2) a project plan; (3) contextual background; (3) a description of project monitoring and evaluation; (4) a discussion of management and coordination; and (5) a budget document covering the cost of personnel, material, administrative support, logistics, security, and other inputs. The telegram set May 1 as the deadline for submission of the first tranche of applications and June 1 as the deadline for the second tranche. Proposals received in the first tranche were to be reviewed in May and June; proposals received in June were to be evaluated in June and July.

The telegram contained a set of seven principles established by S/CRS and DoD’s Office of Partnership Strategies to guide the development of project proposals. According to the principles, programs should focus on security, stabilization, or reconstruction objectives. They should advance U.S. national security interests by promoting regional stability and/or building the governance capacity of partner countries to address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism. Programs should address urgent or emergent threats or opportunities and should involve countries where a failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. military forces.

Programs funded by 1207 should address situations that could not be dealt with by conventional forms of foreign assistance. These short-term programs should be coordinated with longer-term development efforts that are expected to be assumed by host governments or other donors. They should also be coordinated with other U.S. security-building programs, such as 1206-funded programs. Programs should involve a "whole-of-government" approach by integrating initiatives across multiple sectors. Proposals may originate from embassies, DoS bureaus, USAID, or combatant commands; but they must be developed by embassy country teams and be submitted by the ambassador to the relevant DoS regional bureau.

After consideration by regional bureaus, proposals are transmitted to S/CRS, which will convene the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to decide on whether proposals will receive funding. The five-member TAC is cochaired by S/CRS and the DoD/OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Office of Partnership Strategies and includes the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J5). USAID is a new member. Representatives from DoS bureaus and other government agencies are invited to attend when their expertise is required. Approved proposals are recommended to the S/CRS coordinator, who then sends them to the Secretary of State for approval and submission to the DoD with a request for 1207 funds. Proposals are transmitted to the DoD under cover of a memorandum from the DoS' executive secretary to his or her DoD counterpart. At DoD, proposals are transmitted by the executive secretary to the comptroller for funding.

Summary of Findings

The findings of this study fall into three general areas: (1) problems that impeded implementation of the 1207 application process in 2006–07, (2) problems involved with the disbursement of funds by the DoD, and (3) aspects of the application process that require additional clarification.

New Guidelines Should Overcome Previous Problems

Transmission of the February 28, 2008 telegram providing the principles and guidelines for 1207 project proposals should remove the most frequently cited difficulties with the 1207 application process over the past two years.

Finding 1: There was initial confusion about the ownership of the program.

Everyone interviewed agreed that the first year of the program (FY 2006) was lost to a lack of awareness of the program, confusion about how to apply for the funds, and internal conflicts between USAID and the DoS and among the DoS' various offices and bureaus over control of the process and utilization of the money. The creation of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) in January 2006 and reorganization of the entire U.S. foreign assistance process added to the confusion. The new office was given authority over all DoS and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs and charged with developing a coordinated, multiyear U.S. government foreign assistance strategy and annual country plans. The Director was given the rank of Deputy Secretary of State and served concurrently as USAID administrator. Subsequently, the head of S/CRS was given an additional title as the Director's Deputy. There was tension between F and S/CRS over leadership of the 1207 program because both offices reported directly to the Secretary of State. This was resolved to everyone's satisfaction in 2007 with the decision to allow S/CRS to take the lead because of its expertise in dealing with crisis countries.

Finding 2: The 1207 program exposed differences in organizational culture.

Throughout 2006, a clash of organizational cultures and a learning experience occurred between the DoS and DoD. From the DoD's perspective, the 1207 application process should have mirrored the well-organized, detailed, and multilevel application procedures used to apply for military assistance under Section 1206. Defense officials were not amused, therefore, when they received a two-page project application from the DoS for a 1207 project or when a memorandum from a senior DoS official arrived

requesting the DoD comptroller to send over a check for \$100 million. No applications were processed until the Lebanon War in July 2006 when Secretary Rice directed that 1207 funds be utilized to assist the Lebanese government in dealing with the crisis. At the end of the 2006 fiscal year, a proposal to assist Lebanon was accepted by the DoD, which provided \$5 million for training and equipping the Lebanese Internal Security Force (police) and \$5 million for removal of unexploded ordnance. This was the only project accepted. As a result, \$90 million of the funds authorized for FY 2006 were not utilized. At that time, there was a general recognition at the DoS and DoD that an opportunity had been missed and that a more coherent effort was needed for the next fiscal year.

Finding 3: Frequent changes in procedures frustrated the FY 2007 process.

In November 2006, S/CRS distributed draft guidelines for 1207 applications; and bureaus and embassies were encouraged to submit applications. The four-member TAC was created to decide on applications. Considerable confusion remained; however, and applicants were frustrated by repeated changes in application requirements. This frustration was particularly acute in USAID. On at least five occasions during calendar 2007, USAID officials said S/CRS issued new guidance or required changes in the format and budgets for 1207 proposals. This required USAID to withdraw and rewrite proposals that had gone forward to DoS regional bureaus or to the TAC for approval. During the year, S/CRS convened meetings with USAID to discuss application procedures. These meetings were occasionally heated. On at least one occasion, USAID appealed over the head of the TAC to a senior DoS official to reverse a decision by S/CRS to reject a proposal.

Finding 4: The primary tension generated by 1207 was between USAID and S/CRS.

After nearly two years of disagreements, tensions between USAID and S/CRS culminated in January/February 2008 in a dispute over whether USAID should become a member of the TAC. After heated discussions, a compromise was reached under which USAID was added to the TAC as a nonvoting member. Previously, USAID's formal role in the application process had been restricted to USAID field missions assisting with the preparation of proposals as members of an embassy country team. Once proposals were sent to the regional bureaus in the DoS, USAID Washington could only be involved if the TAC requested information. Once proposals were funded, however, USAID was the primary implementing agency along with the DoS' Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which handled police assistance programs.

S/CRS and the DoD argued that USAID should not be part of the TAC decision process because its role in implementing projects might give the impression of a conflict of interest. The DoD also believed that USAID's organizational culture did not demand enough rigor in planning and project development. Congressional staff believed that USAID should not be involved with making decisions concerning programs that focused on security assistance and counterterrorism. USAID countered that its expertise was required at all stages of the process to ensure that projects were developed in a manner that facilitated successful implementation. USAID felt that members of the TAC lacked the geographic, technical, and administrative expertise needed to adequately evaluate project proposals and made ill-informed decisions. USAID noted that S/CRS was the implementing agency for at least two projects: Lebanon and Haiti.

Although the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance is concurrently the USAID Administrator, it did not see itself as representing USAID in the TAC. Instead, [it] saw its role as the guardian of the Secretary of State's equities in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance. In the TAC, it was concerned with ensuring that 1207 projects conformed to the overall goals and objectives of the global U.S. foreign assistance program. It was also interested in determining whether 1207 projects were appropriate in relation to other programs for a particular region and country.

Finding 5: State's regional bureaus were confused about the application process.

USAID's misgivings about S/CRS' leadership and about the application process were shared by the DoS' regional bureaus, which described the 1207 application process as confused, opaque, and little understood by those required to prepare proposals. Given the absence of clear guidelines for identifying projects and for preparing applications, it was difficult for regional bureaus to provide guidance to embassy country teams. Frequent changes in application procedures added to the confusion, created additional work, and delayed program proposals. The complexity of the application format, the need to provide highly detailed information, the necessity for interagency coordination, and the importance of frequent exchanges with Washington were beyond the capacity of small country teams in crisis countries.

Finding 6: Lack of embassy capacity was a problem.

Along with USAID, regional bureaus sent staff members to the field to assist with and in some cases to take over the preparation of applications. Combatant commands also contributed manpower and expertise to help embassies with the application process. In the case of the proposal for Nepal and a new proposal for Sri Lanka that will be submitted in 2008, S/CRS took the lead in preparing the application. At the request of the regional bureau, S/CRS helped conduct the initial assessment, provided subject-matter experts to develop individual project proposals, and helped draft the project application. Because the level and scope of expertise required was not available in the field, the assistance provided by S/CRS made the submission of the application possible. Both the relevant embassies and the regional bureaus were delighted to receive the help.

Finding 7: The 1207 program was welcomed overall.

Despite the consternation in Washington and the amount of effort expended in the field, regional bureaus expressed satisfaction and even enthusiasm for the 1207 program. All seven of the proposals that were formally submitted to the TAC in FY 2007 were approved, although with some modifications. The process of preparing 1207 proposals encouraged a "whole-of-government" approach that was welcomed by the regional bureaus and championed by embassy country teams. In the field, the idea of integrated projects was strongly supported by agency representatives who were working together under difficult conditions to deal with common problems. Regional bureaus viewed these integrated proposals as "imaginative, responsive, and relevant." The 1207 funds enabled the regional bureaus to provide targeted assistance to meet critical needs and to take advantage of key opportunities when they otherwise would have been unable to act. In some cases even the small dollar value of these projects provided a significant increase in the U.S. foreign assistance budget for the country concerned.

A Slow Response to Urgent Priorities, but Faster Than the Alternatives

Among the difficulties with the 1207 program has been the delay between approval of projects by the TAC and the disbursement of the funds by the DoD. There are several reasons for this; however, and the process of obtaining funds under 1207 is faster than the alternatives.

Finding 8: Funds are "authorized" but not "reserved."

Section 1207 of the NDAA authorizes the DoD to make available up to \$100 million from its \$150 billion account for operations and management. There is no corresponding appropriation to set aside funding for this purpose. The DoD must make a decision that 1207 proposals take priority over other uses for the money. In FY 2007, DoD held approved 1207 applications until the end of the fiscal year to ensure that more urgent demands would not arise. Once the DoD decides to fund the project, money is transferred through the Office of Management and Budget to either the DoS or USAID, where it is held until the implementing offices can demonstrate that they are prepared to obligate the funds and implement the project. In April 2008, funds had not yet been disbursed for some aspects of the Southeast Asia Tri-

border Initiative, which was funded by the DoD in September 2007. There are numerous examples in other projects where money has yet to be obligated.

Finding 9: Disbursement delays mean missed opportunities.

Proposals for projects that were designed to respond to urgent threats or emergent opportunities were delayed because funding did not become available for up to a year after their submission. In Somalia, the defeat of the Islamic Courts Movement and the return of the Transitional Federal Government to Mogadishu created an opportunity for the United States to assist Somalia to restore stability, counter terrorism, and alleviate human suffering. An integrated proposal was prepared by the USAID regional office in the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and submitted by the ambassador to the Africa Bureau (AF) at the DoS in February 2007. The proposal was approved by the TAC but was not funded by the DoD until the end of the fiscal year in September 2007. Funds for implementing the project were transferred to the DoS during the first quarter of FY 2008 but did not reach the AF until February 2008, a year after the proposal was submitted. By then conditions on the ground in Somalia had changed dramatically. Money could not be obligated, and parts of the proposal could not be implemented because of a deteriorating security situation. Implementation of the Nepal project has also been delayed because of a worsening security situation and new differences with the Nepalese government.

Finding 10: The 1207 program is quicker than the alternatives.

A year might seem like an exceptional delay except when compared to conventional U.S. foreign assistance programs. In the normal congressional budget cycle, the Administration begins planning for the allocation of U.S. foreign and military assistance two years in advance of the fiscal year in which the funds will be utilized. Congressional earmarks, report language, and legal restrictions then determine how all but a tiny fraction of the money will be utilized during the fiscal year and thereafter. In the case of FMF, funding to deal with emergencies may not be available for up to four years in the future. Of the \$4.6 billion FMF account, only \$80 million was available for discretionary use by the DoD, an amount less than the 1207 authorization.

The same is true for the DoS/USAID foreign assistance budget, which is all but completely controlled by earmarks and other legislative limitations. Supplemental appropriations can provide funds for emergencies, but this type of legislation is often controversial and may take up to a year from preparation to congressional approval. DoS and DoD officials view the 1207 program — the proposals for which are prepared, approved, and funded within twelve to fourteen months — as operating at “light speed.” In the view of these officials, 1207 creates a “virtual contingency fund” to deal with emergencies in something approaching bureaucratic “real time.”

Progress Has Been Achieved, but Potential Problems Remain

The formal publication of application guidelines, the resolution of USAID’s status, and increasing familiarity should resolve most of the problems that troubled the 1207 program last year. There are, however, a number of anomalies and potential difficulties that remain that would benefit from clarification. These include the following:

Finding 11: The frame of reference may be too broad.

According to the guiding principles for the 1207 application process, proposals should focus on security, stabilization, or reconstruction. They should address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism. They should deal with areas where failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. military forces. Such an extensive list provides maximum scope for proposals, but it could also limit applications if all factors must be present in a proposal. Of these criteria, two are particularly open to interpretation: terrorism and military intervention.

Eliminating Sources of Terrorism

Proposals should address “sources of terrorism,” but the State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism (S/CT) was only tangentially involved in the 1207 process. This was true for the terrorism-related programs approved last year: the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Program, the Yemen Stability Initiative, and the Southeast Asia Tri-border Initiative. S/CT was not among the DoS offices that were asked to approve two of the projects, and it did not participate when these projects were considered by the TAC. The proposals originated with either USAID or the U.S. military. They aim to dissuade populations “at risk of terrorist’s influences” from joining extremist groups. Proposals contained a menu of projects aimed at providing employment and educational opportunities, health care, community policing, and improved governance. The same type of generic projects would be implemented in any turbulent area with weak government institutions. This suggests that the reference to counterterrorism in some proposals may be mostly rhetorical and that the real target is general instability.

Preventing Boots on the Ground

Proposals submitted for 1207 funding must have a national-security focus, but it is not clear how literally the requirement to prevent the deployment of U.S. military forces actually applies. The requirement does not exist in the relevant legislation and has been invoked in some cases and broadly interpreted or ignored in others. In 2006, the DoD initially objected to the Lebanon proposal on the grounds that U.S. forces were not going to participate in the expanded UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. Eventually, the project was accepted; but the value was reduced from \$80 million to \$10 million. In contrast, the Nepal project was funded despite the fact that it is unlikely U.S. forces will ever be deployed to fight Maoist guerillas in the Himalayas.

Finding 12: Worldwide scope may prove counterproductive.

Under the 1207 program, proposals are supposed to “bubble up” from the field in response to urgent threats or emergent opportunities. This is one of the fundamental strengths of the program, but a scattershot approach can have potential downsides given the complex application process. There is a risk that embassies will not apply or that country teams and regional bureaus may squander time and scarce resources producing proposals that will not be accepted. An alternative would be for Washington to provide strategic direction and invite embassies to submit proposals with the presumption that they will be approved. Additionally, the worldwide request for proposals and the limited amount of funding available create the risk that proposals will be pared down to spread the available funding as far as possible. This is what happened in 2007. The Haiti Strategic Initiative was reduced from three cities to one. The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Proposal was reduced from five countries to three. The Nepal program was limited to a four-county pilot project.

Finding 13: Help is required to complete the application form.

The complex and detailed application template for 1207 projects is beyond the capacity of small embassy country teams in crisis countries without extensive assistance from Washington-based experts and combatant command personnel. The application form is modeled on the DoD 1206 application and reflects the DoD’s bureaucratic culture, which includes large staffs of strategic planners and administrative personnel. This capacity does not exist in the DoS, USAID, or other civilian government agencies, which are understaffed and incapable of detailed, strategic planning. One exasperated USAID employee noted that during consideration of one 1207 application, the DoD representative wanted to know the daily fuel consumption of each vehicle used in the project. Highly detailed and complex application forms seem inconsistent with Congress’ intention that projects should respond to emergency requirements and the DoS’ view that applications should originate from country teams that are directly engaged in dealing with a crisis.

Despite Differences Congress Likely Will Extend the Program

In his opening statement at an April 15, 2008 hearing on building global partnership authorities, House Armed Services Committee (HARC) Chairman Ike Skelton reminded Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Rice that Congress had provided the 1206/1207 authorities in 2006 as a “temporary fix” to give the administration time to develop a more integrated approach to building partnership capacity and to rectify the situation in which the DoD was emerging as the “de facto lead agency in what used to be the State Department’s realm.” That the two Secretaries had returned to argue for increased authority for the DoD, Skelton said, indicated that the Administration “had not taken the hint.”

The HARC’s ranking minority member, Duncan Hunter, described 1206/1207 as “stop-gap” programs designed to give the Administration time to decide how stabilization assistance could be provided under the DoS’ traditional foreign assistance programs. Hunter expressed concern about reliance upon the military for training and stabilization programs when it was engaged in combat operations and needed “every penny” in the DoD appropriation. In this regard, Hunter wanted to know which DoD programs had been cut in order to provide the \$10 million in 1207 aid for governance and infrastructure in Nepal. Hunter said the committee was looking for an integrated approach to U.S. foreign assistance and not simply a shift of responsibilities to the U.S. military.

In response, Secretary Gates described the DoS controlled FMF program as outdated and strongly defended DoD’s new role in training and equipping partner military forces. Gates called for the continuation of the 1206 program and its expansion to include the training and equipping of nonmilitary security personnel such as coast guard and border-patrol forces. Gates said the DoD “would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.” As for 1207, Gates said a touchstone for the DoD is that “1207 should be for civilian support to the military, either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them.” Gates called for the extension of the 1207 authority for five years and an increase in annual funding to \$200 million. Secretary Rice endorsed the extension of 1207 and the other foreign assistance authorities within the committee’s jurisdiction. A similar request was made to the Senate. The Bush administration clearly favors the current approach with the DoD in the lead on building partnership security capacity and making the ultimate determination on whether projects are undertaken.

Despite the tone of this exchange, it appears likely that Congress will continue the 1207 program in the future. The Senate version of the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Bill extends the 1207 program for an additional three years and increases the annual funding level to \$200 million. The HASC will likely approve an extension but seek to keep the funding level at \$100 million and reduce the time limit to two years. Even if 1207 funding were increased to \$200 million in FY 2009, the amount would still fall far short of 1206 funding — the Administration requested \$700 million for this train-and-equip military program. It would also remain minuscule when compared to the \$26 billion requested by the Administration for the FY 2009 foreign assistance budget. One official referred to the level of 1207 funding as “pencil dust.”

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Administration and Congress are increasingly aware that military force alone will not overcome the diverse and largely nonmilitary challenges that the United States faces from extremism, terrorism, and political instability. The 1207 program began as a small but important effort by Congress to encourage the DoS and DoD to develop joint approaches to these emergent challenges. The initial response to this congressional initiative was a period of bureaucratic turf wars, confusion, and general indecision in FY 2006 that resulted in a missed opportunity to take advantage of the first year’s authorization. In FY 2007,

most of these inhibiting conflicts were resolved, although not without some difficulty in accommodating various bureaucratic cultures. The outlines of an application process also emerged through trial and error as much as through efforts at design. The entire \$100 million authorization was utilized. A set of seven proposals were developed and approved. Nearly everyone involved expressed satisfaction with the results, if not with all aspects of the process.

DoS regional bureaus and their constituent embassies were particularly grateful for the opportunity to develop creative and integrated programs in response to urgent needs with the prospect that funding could be received and implementation begun within months and not years. Even the very limited amount of financial resources available was not a deterrent to making the considerable effort required to complete the application, develop the budget, and push the proposal from the field through various levels of approval at the DoS and to wait until the DoD determined whether it would make the money available.

This year the application process should benefit greatly from recent experience and the publication of guidelines, the setting of deadlines, and the resolution of interagency conflicts. Although some questions about the application process remain and should be addressed, there is a sense of confidence among members of the TAC that the evaluation process will be handled efficiently and that the 1207 program is on track. There are, however, a few actions that should be taken to make the application process more effective. To improve the current 1207 application process, it is suggested that the DoS and DoD adopt the following recommendations:

Utilize the Published Guidelines

It is imperative that the TAC utilizes the guidelines sent to embassies on February 28 for this year's application process. Creating confidence in the process and handling applications efficiently is more important than making adjustments at this late date. By announcing the program, publishing clear guidelines, and handling applications in an orderly and transparent manner, S/CRS and the other members of the TAC should avoid most of the complaints about the application process made last year.

New Roles for USAID and S/CRS

Inclusion of USAID as a member of the TAC should help eliminate tensions and expedite the process. S/CRS should make clear that it would no longer implement proposals to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest.

Set Aside DoD Funds

Since the Secretaries of State and Defense have publicly endorsed the 1207 program, the DoD should set aside \$100 million as a virtual contingency fund so that proposals receive funding as soon as they are approved. This will remove the current tension over whether the DoD will actually make the money available and should speed implementation of projects. This would help avoid the inability to implement projects because a crisis has worsened or an opportunity has disappeared.

Adopt a Two-Tiered Approach

In the future, a two-tiered application process could resolve most of the problems arising from a lack of strategic direction and the need for detailed applications. The TAC should develop a "short form" and invite submissions of proposals that could be quickly evaluated. Proposals that survive this initial screening can be completed in full with a high degree of certainty that they will be accepted. Assistance with the preparation of these applications can be provided with the assurance that efforts will not be wasted.

The DoS and DoD Should Provide Strategic Direction

In the future, the DoS and DoD should provide strategic direction by encouraging specific countries

to submit proposals and by providing the administrative support required to prepare applications, much as S/CRS did this year with Sri Lanka. Other countries can apply and be considered on an equal basis, but this would ensure that critical countries would not be left out or fail for lack of capacity to prepare the applications. The DoS and DoD should also clarify how the requirements to deal with terrorism and to avoid the commitment of U.S. military forces will be interpreted.

S/CRS Should Surge Staff

S/CRS should act on plans to utilize funds from its FY 2009 budget to provide specialists to small embassies to assist with the 1207 application process. Experience has shown that the best applications come from embassies with large staffs. Embassies in crisis countries most often are small and fully consumed in dealing with day-to-day challenges. Providing additional help would make the application process more equitable and improve the quality of applications received by the TAC.

Implementation of 1207 Projects Should be Evaluated

S/CRS should use the 1.5 percent of project funds that it will set aside this year for monitoring and evaluation to determine whether the eight original 1207 projects were effectively implemented and achieved their goals. Such a study would complement this report and assist the TAC to further improve the application process in the future.

Funding Should be Transferred to the DoS

In the future, the DoS should request that Congress act on its stated intention toward the 1207 program and appropriate the funding to the DoS. The DoD could still participate in deciding on project proposals, but the money would be guaranteed and could be made available more quickly. This would require coordinating the efforts of various congressional committees, but it would streamline the application process and restore the traditional role of the DoS in funding U.S. foreign assistance.

About the Author

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About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peace-building, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Biden Addresses Military's Expanding Role in U.S. Foreign Policy

**By
Senator (Vice President-Elect) Joseph R. Biden, Jr.**

[The following are excerpts from a press release from the office of Senator (Vice President-elect) Biden, July 31, 2008.]

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph R. Biden, Jr. held a hearing entitled "*Defining the Military's Role Towards Foreign Policy*." At [the] hearing, committee members examined the Department of Defense's greater role in delivering foreign aid, the increasing prominence of regional military command posts, the effectiveness of civilian and military coordination on policies and programs, and the policy implications of broader military engagement in sectors that have been traditionally run by civilians.

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman testified before the Committee. [Note: An excerpt from Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte's testimony before the committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican leader Dick Lugar's opening statement at the hearing immediately follow this article.] A second panel of experts and NGO [Non-Governmental Organization] representatives and practitioners followed, including Dr. George Rupp, President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee; Dr. Reuben Brigety, Director of the Sustainable Security Program at the Center for American Progress; Mary Locke, former senior professional staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and Robert Perito, Senior Program Officer for the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the United States Institute of Peace.

Senator Biden's Opening Statement

We are here today to discuss an important trend affecting this country — the expanding role of the military in U.S. foreign policy.

The events of September 11th made it clear that our armed forces could not focus solely on traditional challenges — threats from traditional states with traditional military capabilities. This new world we have found ourselves in has compelled us to think in a very different way.

In response we have given our military greater funding flexibility and more resources. The Administration is trying a new model for an integrated combatant command for Africa. The military is much more deeply engaged in stabilization activities, humanitarian assistance, and foreign aid programs.

In fact, there has been a migration of functions and authorities from U.S. civilian agencies to the Department of Defense.

Between 2002 and 2005, the share of U.S. official development assistance channeled through the Pentagon budget surged from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005, rising to \$5.5 billion. Much of this increase has gone towards activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it still points to an expanding military role in what were traditionally civilian programs.

I share the concern that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently raised. "The military," he said, "has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations... This has led to concern... about what's seen as a creeping 'militarization'... of America's foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment."

This is problematic for several reasons.

First, the increasing dominance of the military in our foreign policy may inadvertently limit our options — when the military is the most readily available option, it is more likely to be used, whether or not it is the best choice.

Second, how we balance economic and military aid to a country influences perceptions about U.S. priorities and how we choose to project our power. A foreign policy that overemphasizes the military runs the risk of displacing or overshadowing broader policy and development objectives

Third, focusing on the immediate military dimensions of combating extremism instead of pursuing a long-term strategy in vulnerable countries could have the unintended consequence of purchasing short-term gains at the expense of long-term stability and sustained development.

Finally, militaries are good at winning wars and training armies. But, in my view, we do not want soldiers training lawyers or setting up court systems or instructing health-care workers on HIV/AIDS prevention or running a micro-finance program. Out of necessity, our men and women in uniform have gotten very good at this. But it is not their primary mission; war-fighting is.

The question before us today is simple: in expanding the role of our armed forces, have we diminished our civilian capabilities — our diplomatic and development assistance institutions — and have we done so in a way that undermines our national security? I have called this hearing so we can get a better understanding of the policy choices we have made — and continue to make — to reshape our civilian agencies and the military.

In this hearing, I hope to focus on the following issues:

First, why is this expansion of the military's role happening? Secretary Gates provides one answer. He argues that our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for too long. They cannot fulfill the responsibilities and challenges to our national interests around the world, absent change. If that is true, then from the military's perspective, what reforms and changes do we need so civilians can once again be effective counterparts? From the civilian side, what is required so they can support our national security priorities? What is preventing these reforms from taking place? Next, is the military the appropriate institution to implement foreign aid programs? What are the foreign policy implications of DoD's expanding foreign aid role? Does the military even want this responsibility? Third, many claim the real crux of the issue lies in the field, within Embassies and regional Combatant Commands. Combatant Commands — led by AFRICOM [Africa Command] and SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] — are assuming new roles and responsibilities that are not well understood but have broad foreign policy implications. This includes everything from strategic planning to undertaking foreign assistance programs. With funding and manpower that far exceed civilian resources, are military commands becoming the central organizing point for U.S. foreign policy in these regions?

Finally, [regarding] interagency coordination, by law, the State Department plays the primary role in overseeing foreign assistance activities. In practice, the Department of Defense is taking on more and more responsibility for [traditional] foreign assistance programs. How can we ensure that State plays its proper and necessary role?

Opening Statement for Hearing on Military Role in Foreign Policy

By

Dick Lugar

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Leader

[The following are excerpts from a transcript of U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Leader Dick Lugar's opening statement at the committee hearing on defining the military's role in foreign policy, July 31, 2008.]

During the last five years, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has focused much attention on how we can improve our diplomatic and foreign assistance capabilities and integrate them more effectively with the military component of national power. Since 2003, we have been advocating through hearings and legislation the establishment of a civilian counterpart to the military in post-conflict situations. We have argued for a rapidly deployable civilian corps that is trained to work with the military on stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. This is the intent of the Lugar-Biden-Hagel legislation that passed the Senate in 2006 and passed this Committee again this year. Increasing the capacity of civilian agencies and integrating them with our military power is essential if we are to be ready for the next post-conflict mission.

The Pentagon's role in foreign assistance also has been of longstanding interest to the Committee. In 2006, I directed the Republican staff of the Committee to investigate the expanding role of the U.S. military in areas that traditionally have been in the portfolio of the State Department. The resulting report, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Campaign Against Terror," was led by former Senior Professional Staff Member Mary Locke, who will be testifying on the second panel. The report documented the rise in development and humanitarian assistance that is being funded and managed by the Pentagon. The report recommended that all security assistance, including Section 1206, be included under the Secretary of State's authority in a coordination process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.

The role of the Defense Department in stabilization and reconstruction, foreign assistance, and public information programs has grown in the post September 11 environment. This new role includes increased funding, new authorities, and new platforms such as AFRICOM [Africa Command]. It also has produced new models for inter-agency coordination as reflected in SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] and the approval process for Section 1206 projects.

It is clear that our military and civilian capabilities are severely out of balance. In 2001, Defense spending comprised just 5.2 percent of total U.S. official development assistance. According to preliminary figures, this has increased to 15 percent in 2007. While Congress maintains generous levels of funding to our military, funding for our diplomacy and foreign assistance persistently falls short. Defense Secretary Gates points out that the total foreign affairs budget request for FY2009 is roughly equivalent to what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. The one-year increase in personnel planned by the Army is about the same size as the entire Foreign Service.

Secretary Gates has been vocal in supporting a reinvigoration of civilian agency capabilities. Until that happens, he has also made clear that the military must continue to engage in many non-combat activities, such as reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. This position reflects new thinking within the Defense Department on the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities as reflected in Quadrennial Defense Reviews.

Many experts consider the military ill-suited to running foreign assistance and public information programs. These functions properly belong with civilian foreign policy agencies. Nevertheless, Congress has granted new authorities to DoD to fill the gaps in civilian capacity. These grants of authority have been given on a temporary basis, and Congress has resisted making them permanent or expanding their reach. However, the Pentagon has continued to request that these authorities be made permanent and be expanded in both size and scope.

As this debate continues, we must address several fundamental questions. In the long term, should DoD be involved in global programs of a purely civilian nature? What are the consequences of U.S. engagement being fronted by a military uniform? In regions of the world with an uneven history of civilian control of the military, do we risk professionalizing foreign militaries to the extent that they overshadow the capacities of civilian governments? If current State Department programs providing military assistance are cumbersome and slow, should we first address those problems rather than create competing programs in other agencies?

Answers to such questions are essential to ensure that we are not engaging in mission creep that has not been well thought out by all the relevant policy actors. The best approach would be to develop a truly integrated national security strategy that assigns roles and resources according to the strengths of each foreign policy agency. Although developing such a comprehensive approach is beyond our scope today, I am hopeful that Congress, the State Department, and the Defense Department will give greater attention to constructing a system of roles and authorities that maximize the prospects for success of U.S. national security policy.

Military's Role Toward Foreign Policy

By

John D. Negroponte
Deputy Secretary of State

[The following are excerpts from a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, July 31, 2008.]

Thank you for inviting me today to provide the Department of State's views of the roles of civil and military agencies in foreign assistance. I am pleased to appear alongside Under Secretary of Defense Edelman.

Since 2001, our two departments have been adapting and improving how we cooperate to meet the challenges facing our country in the twenty-first century. We now confront threats from international terrorism, trafficking in narcotics and persons, and global pandemics that thrive on the inability of failed and failing states to perform even basic sovereign responsibilities. This Administration has recognized that defeating those threats depends as much on strengthening states and societies as on destroying enemies. Accordingly, President Bush has designated the State Department as a national security agency and made diplomacy and development, as well as defense, pillars of our national security strategy.

This Administration has begun the long-term effort to equip the State Department and other civilian agencies with the resources and capabilities to fulfill their responsibilities for our national security. With Congress' support, we have made good progress. Increases to our foreign assistance budgets, new authorities, and new interagency coordination mechanisms have enhanced the State Department's ability to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities. At the same time, as Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have both publicly argued, much remains to be done to give civilian agencies additional capabilities to meet their responsibilities. It is in the national interest that our military have strong and capable civilian partners; and that is why the Administration has requested additional funds for critical programs in the 2009 President's Budget to continue this positive trend, which I will discuss below.

To meet the global challenges that our country faces, this Administration has sought significant innovations and increases in funding for foreign assistance. Over the past seven years, we have more than doubled Official Development Assistance [ODA] to support nations struggling to improve governance, expand opportunity, and fight disease. We are on track to double our annual assistance to sub-Saharan Africa to \$8.7 billion in disbursements by 2010, in accordance with our commitment at the Group of Eight's 2005 summit in Gleneagles. The State/USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] FY 2009 Foreign Assistance Request of \$22.7 billion, a 10 percent increase from the FY 2008 request, will continue this effort, enabling our government to continue advancing important and interconnected priorities, including promoting long-term economic growth and development; reducing poverty; fighting disease; providing military assistance and training; promoting post-conflict reconstruction and recovery; delivering humanitarian response; and improving governance, transparency, and accountability.

More specifically, our core assistance programs aim to expand the community of well-governed states by helping recipient countries address short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. To meet these challenges, our FY 2009 request for core assistance accounts is over \$12 billion, a 9 percent increase from the FY 2008 request. That request supports critical investments in areas such as health, basic education, agriculture, environment, democratic governance, economic growth, micro-enterprise, and water resource management. Indeed, as Congress appropriates funds from the recently passed five-year, \$48 billion reauthorization of the PEPFAR [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] — the largest

campaign ever against a single disease — our assistance levels will rise even higher. In addition to our core assistance, in FY 2009 we also requested \$2.2 billion for the poverty reduction efforts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an innovative organization this Administration has created to empower local partners and emphasize principles of good governance, economic freedom, and investments in health and education.

Military and security assistance, requested at \$7.3 billion in FY 2009 (14 percent increase from the FY 2008 request), advances U.S. interests by equipping and training coalition partners and allies for common security goals. These programs advance international support for voluntary, multi-national stabilization efforts, including support for non-UN missions and for U.S. conflict-resolution programs and support bilateral and global programs to combat transnational crime, illicit narcotics threats, and terrorist networks.

The United States also remains committed to providing humanitarian relief, food aid, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in countries affected by natural and man-made disasters. We continue to provide resettlement opportunities for refugees and conflict victims around the globe as well as contributing to key humanitarian international and non-governmental organizations. The FY 2009 request includes \$2.4 billion for these needs.

While expanding all of these programs, this Administration has worked to keep our overall foreign assistance programming coherent and closely tied to our foreign policy objectives. Secretary Rice established the “dual-hatted” position of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator of USAID to coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance and ensure that it meets long-term development needs. So even as we spend more, we get more for every dollar.

Unfortunately, our support for struggling societies will not always take place in stable and peaceful conditions. Where the situation allows, civilian agencies will take the lead in assistance. Where conditions require, DoD will support civilian agencies or, under certain circumstances — such as in combat situations — may have the lead in administering assistance. Our efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan show the spectrum of situations in which we must operate and the ways we must respond. In these hard circumstances, the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development have benefited greatly from the Defense Department’s cooperation and resources — as they have, I should add, historically. In the post-World War II era, in the Vietnam era, indeed in any conflict or post-conflict time, our civilian and military agencies have worked together to address unique needs and circumstances. DoD’s role in administering Official Development Assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects exactly this pattern.

Our civilian-military partnership is strong, beneficial, and appropriate. It is also specific to limited situations. If one sets aside funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, ODA provided through the DoD budget drops to 2.2 percent in 2005, which is below 1998 levels. It is also worth noting, as Ambassador to Iraq, I oversaw the deployment of reconstruction funds for Iraq, as have my successors — even though these funds have come from a DoD appropriation.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, our armed forces, State, and USAID collaborate closely on assistance and more. That partnership is repeated at all levels of our government, beginning with the close working relationship between Secretaries Rice and Gates. Deputy Secretary of Defense England and I meet on a bi-weekly basis to review the many issues our departments jointly manage. In the field, the daily cooperation between our ambassadors and military commanders is exemplified by the excellent partnership of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in Iraq. That collaboration carries through at the working level to our country teams, including the leadership of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Defense Department is well-represented in our embassies through the attaché program. We have made them a valuable participant in our strategic planning process. Conversely, over

the last several years, DoD has similarly opened its processes to State and USAID to an unprecedented degree. State now participates in many of DoD's most important defense policy and strategy initiatives, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the development of AFRICOM [Africa Command] and SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] Theater Campaign Plans. At DoD's request, we have expanded our Political Advisors [POLAD] program from 15 to 31 personnel to make more State Department POLADs available to provide foreign policy expertise to military commanders in the field; and USAID is placing Senior Development Advisors in each of the combatant commands.

Closer State-DoD cooperation is serving not only our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan but also our broader efforts to address post-9/11 challenges. This Administration and Congress have recognized that we must direct resources to build partners' military capacity. We also recognized the need for increased civilian participation in its growing involvement in stabilization operations and sought authority to fund "Section 1207." We are grateful that Congress supported the Administration's efforts to redress those shortfalls through the new authorities enacted in Sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA].

Sections 1206 and 1207 are valuable tools that allow the Administration to fund military capacity-building and civilian reconstruction and stabilization assistance, respectively. Section 1206 authority has enabled us rapidly to develop partnership capacity to address emerging and urgent threats and opportunities in places as far flung as the Caribbean basin, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The flexibility and quick-reaction capability provided by Section 1206 authority is a useful complement to our FMF [Foreign Military Financing] and IMET [International Military Education and Training] programs, which are focused on longer-term support.

Section 1207 authority also complements our traditional foreign assistance tools by enabling us to provide targeted reconstruction and stabilization assistance to bolster stability in weak states, failing states, and states facing unanticipated crises. In many cases, 1207 funds allow the State Department to respond to needs until more formal programs can be planned. Ultimately, these authorities have brought more resources to the table for State and USAID-led projects that have a specific stabilization focus. Section 1207 authority has already provided program funding for interagency programs developed under the leadership of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and its continued use for future programs is completely supportive of the Secretary's goals for the newly launched Civilian Stabilization Initiative.

In FY 2006 and FY 2007, we programmed \$109.7 million in 1207 funds to eight projects covering fourteen countries, including projects to: remove unexploded ordnance in Lebanon and train elements of the Lebanese police, remove violent gangs from a Haitian slum, and help the Colombian Government extend government services to communities newly liberated from the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)]. For FY 2008, joint State, DoD, and USAID committees have identified nine priority projects to receive a total of \$100M in 1207 funds. I am pleased to note that both the Senate and House versions of the FY 2009 NDAA extend this authority, as well as Section 1206.

These authorities have also created opportunities for whole-of-government approaches to national security. Such "dual-key" mechanisms, requiring approval from both the State and Defense Departments, ensure coordination among chiefs of mission and Combatant Commanders, policy officers abroad and here in Washington, and DoD officials. In both cases, Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates ultimately hold "dual key" authority, ensuring all efforts undertaken meet the Defense Department's needs and accord with our foreign policy objectives, ensuring the Secretary of State's primacy in foreign policy. The experience our departments gain through these mechanisms helps build and reinforce a broader culture of cooperation between our agencies.

In Africa, where the State Department and USAID are deeply involved in administering a range of major foreign assistance programs, the Defense Department is working to ensure that its new regional command, AFRICOM, supports and complements our civilian-led initiatives. We are pleased that DoD is giving senior leadership positions within AFRICOM to State Department officials, positioning them well to advise the command on appropriate courses of action. AFRICOM is already working with State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to coordinate counter-narcotics strategies. We look forward to expanding State-DoD cooperation in this theater.

In the area of humanitarian assistance resulting from natural disasters, the State Department — specifically, the USAID Administrator in her capacity as Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance — has responsibility for coordinating all of our government's efforts. This is the case even when the military has the unique capability to respond. For example, in the aftermath of Pakistan's 2005 earthquake, U.S. military aircraft transported blankets, tents, and other emergency relief supplies to Pakistan, where military helicopters then distributed the relief to remote areas. State Department and USAID experts helped plan this operation to ensure that short-term assistance did not inadvertently undermine local capacities, did not duplicate other donors' efforts, did not risk causing conflict, supported long-term development work, and suited the cultural context. Such collaboration enables us to integrate short-term assistance into larger, long-term programming.

While coordinated interagency efforts — both those State leads and those DoD leads — are vital, the State Department also appreciates the importance of each government agency's contributing to our overall foreign policy goals in a manner consistent with its mandate and expertise. As you know, the Secretary of State is vested with responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, including the continuous supervision and direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs. This authority enables the Secretary of State to ensure that such programs are well-integrated and serve U.S. foreign policy. The State Department's leadership, including Secretary Rice, myself, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, and our ambassadors in the field, take this mandate very seriously. Chief of Mission authority remains the central organizing principle for U.S. engagement overseas, across all regional combatant commands. As a five-time ambassador, I am a strong proponent of this authority and believe it is adequate to ensuring that the State Department retains lead responsibility for our foreign policy. We believe that "dual-key" authorities maintain and enhance the Secretary of State's prerogatives by ensuring that she has ultimate direction of foreign assistance monies, regardless of their source.

The State Department continues to work with Congress to build its own capacity to respond to and prevent threats to our security. Together, we have made good progress over the past seven years. The State Operations and Foreign Assistance budgets have increased by 73 percent and 72 percent, respectively, from FY 2001 levels; and we have added 4,272 personnel to the Department, a 27.7 percent increase over FY 2001. This positive trend must continue. The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy has recommended that "ultimately doubling the workforces of the Department and USAID would better position both organizations to meet future challenges." Additional personnel will allow State and USAID to increase our foreign language, diplomatic, and border security capabilities; augment our public diplomacy, cultural affairs capacity, and POLAD program; increase USAID's presence overseas and development contributions; and implement the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, including the Civilian Response Corps, to provide additional civilian expertise for rapid crisis response.

The President's FY 2009 budget request seeks an additional 1,100 new State Department Foreign Service officers and 300 USAID officers. It also seeks \$7.3 billion for military and security assistance, a sixteen percent increase over FY 2008 enacted levels (excluding emergency designated funds). This assistance is critical to achieving our peace and security objectives around the world and to creating secure environments in which our diplomatic and development work can succeed. Equally critical is our request for a 60 percent increase from the FY 2008 request in Development Assistance aimed at reducing poverty,

promoting economic growth, and strengthening our commitments to Latin America and Africa. We know Congress recognizes the importance of these resources to our work, and we look forward to working together with you to strengthen these programs in the years ahead.

The mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is one that civilians must lead. But for too long, we have not had sufficient numbers of trained, prepared, and supported civilians who could provide that leadership. As a result, over the past 20 years, over the course of 17 significant stabilization and reconstruction missions in which the United States has been involved, too much of the effort has been borne by our men and women in uniform. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative [CSI] is the centerpiece of our effort to build civilian capacity for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions. It will create a rapid civilian response capability that could be deployed alongside our military, with international partners, or on its own. Experience has shown that stabilization and reconstruction missions occur in a range of circumstances — sometimes in hostile security environments, sometimes in permissive ones, and sometimes in environments somewhere in between. Our goal is to enable civilians with stabilization and reconstruction expertise to work side-by-side with the military even amidst ongoing violence, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CSI will marshal hundreds of civilian experts from across our federal government and thousands of private citizens — doctors and lawyers, engineers and agricultural experts, police officers and public administrators — to ease the burden of post-conflict reconstruction borne by our fighting men and women and ensure that civilians with the right skills, training, and equipment can deploy quickly to strengthen weak states and prevent their collapse. The President's FY 2009 budget request includes \$248.6 million to support this capability. The support of Congress, and this committee in particular, have been critical to our success thus far in launching CSI. We hope Congress will enact the additional authorizations strengthening this initiative and fully fund the President's request for this initiative. CSI will enable the State Department to assume a greater operational role in reconstruction efforts — a goal that DoD, State, and this Committee all share.

State, DoD, and all agencies of the national security complex will continue to examine how we must improve individually and collectively to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. The innovations I have reviewed today represent a positive trend in interagency cooperation. As we work to increase civilian capacity to perform the diplomatic and development missions demanded by our national security strategy, we are grateful and better off for the Defense Department's contribution of expertise, personnel, and resources in support of our work. Our nation is safer and stronger when our lead national security agencies are united in purpose. DoD's contribution is not only meeting military requirements, but directly advancing the goal of our diplomacy: a world of democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and act responsibly in the international system.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: this Administration has done ground-breaking work to make the State Department and USAID better partners to the brave men and women in our armed forces. But, of course, this effort is the work of a generation; and much remains to be done. We appreciate your leadership in this important area, especially your support for the President's Civilian Stabilization Initiative and your interest in ensuring the proper balance among our nation's diplomatic, development, and defense capabilities. In close consultation with this committee, we will continue to refine our operations and to develop better tools and mechanisms to meet the requirements of our national security. I want to thank the Committee for the opportunity to share with you the ways in which the Departments of State and Defense are working together to secure our nation.

Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership

By

Matt Bryza

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

[The following are excerpts from a speech delivered at Turgot Ozal Memorial Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, June 24, 2008.]

Like Turkey itself, U.S.-Turkey relations have navigated remarkable transitions over the past 50 years. Today, we are living in perhaps the most exciting period. Timeworn clichés about Turkey, such as “bulwark against the Soviet Union” or “NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Ally since the Korean War” or “bridge between East and West,” are being updated with new concepts, such as “energy hub” and “vibrant, emerging market.”

All of these clichés retain a certain degree of truth. But they reflect a static and simplified view of U.S.-Turkish relations. Today, the U.S. Government’s appreciation of Turkey’s geo-strategic significance is evolving in new and positive ways. Today, we are starting to understand Turkey’s multiple identities. Turkey is not merely a bridge; it is a society whose soul lies in both East and West, with a strategic and cultural reach extending from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus to the Balkans, Berlin, and Amsterdam. At the same time, Turkey is a strategic link between North and South, lying at the center of an extended Black Sea region that connects the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine with the Middle East.

With a more sophisticated appreciation of Turkey’s economic, diplomatic, and cultural might, the United States enjoys new opportunities to pursue the shared interests and common values that unite our two great countries. No factor is more significant in elevating Turkey’s strategic relevance today than its vibrant democracy. Turkey’s constitutional principles of democracy, secularism, and the rule of law can inspire reformers in the broader Middle East and beyond who seek the same political and economic freedoms and the same opportunities to improve their societies as do the citizens of the Turkish Republic.

We are thus in the process of updating our strategic concepts. To understand more deeply the opportunities before us, we should first take a brief look backward at how U.S.-Turkey relations have developed over the past decade.

During the 1990s, Turkey began fully to enjoy the fruits of Turgut Ozal’s groundbreaking reforms; and Prime Minister Erdogan has continued this important reform effort. Ankara and Washington recognized an opportunity to build a new bilateral relationship. Our Cold War conception of Turkey as the cornerstone of NATO’s Southern Flank, blunting Soviet ambitions and hosting key NATO military assets and Incirlik Airbase, was becoming outdated. As Turkey’s economy grew, so did its demand for energy, along with its ambitions to reconnect with Turkic populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, the United States sought to help the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus cement their independence by connecting their economies to European and global markets. Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed international investors to help develop the Caspian Basin’s mammoth oil and gas reserves. Then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel worked with these leaders, and with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, to develop a revitalized concept of the Great Silk Road in the version of an East-West Corridor of oil and natural gas pipelines.

And so, a new U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership was born, with energy as a centerpiece. The United States and Turkey worked together in pursuit of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCP) to connect Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas reserves with European

and global markets. Meanwhile, Turkey was developing a strategic partnership with Israel, bringing together the Middle East's only two democracies at that time to pursue their common security and economic interests.

At the outset of President George W. Bush's Administration, the U.S. sought to build on the strong energy cooperation outlined above to generate a deeper, East-West dynamic in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Our goal was to help the young independent states of these regions secure their sovereignty and liberty by linking them to Europe, world markets, and Euro-Atlantic institutions via the corridor being established by the BTC and SCP pipelines. Turkey would be the gateway. Reflecting this vision, the National Security Council and State Department reorganized their bureaucratic structures to encourage a philosophical shift toward these countries' deeper connection to Europe as independent actors. The Caucasus and Central Asia were grouped with Turkey, which the Administration viewed as these countries' crucial partner in connecting with European and global markets, and with Euro-Atlantic security institutions.

This approach proved to be of crucial importance in the aftermath of September 11. The East-West Corridor we had been building from Turkey and the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan and across the Caspian became the strategic air corridor, and the lifeline, into Afghanistan allowing the United States and our coalition partners to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom. Uzbekistan emerged as crucial in launching and then sustaining this multi-national effort from the airbase at Karshi Khanabad. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan immediately offered blanket over flight clearances, while Kyrgyzstan allowed use of the Manas Airbase, which evolved into our crucial logistics hub for Operation Enduring Freedom after Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. access to Karshi Khanabad.

U.S. efforts to establish these operational relationships advanced on the foundation of our cooperation with Turkey in preceding years on the East-West Corridor. Turkey's contributions to the war in Afghanistan grew much deeper. Turkey has now commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan twice. Former Grand National Assembly Speaker and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin served as NATO's civilian representative in Kabul. And Turkey now leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Wardak Province north of Kabul. Security cooperation in Afghanistan thus emerged as a cornerstone of strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey. At NATO's recent Bucharest Summit, Turkey and the United States joined our other Allies and Alliance partners to renew our long-term commitment to security and stability in Afghanistan. We have pledged to provide the forces, resources, and flexibility necessary for success, so Afghanistan may never again become a haven for terrorists.

Our success in sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Turkey cooperation in Afghanistan is particularly significant given the severe strains the war in Iraq initially placed on our two countries' relations. In late 2002, many of us responsible for U.S. policy toward Turkey anticipated a joint effort in Iraq that would elevate U.S.-Turkey relations to a new and unprecedented strategic level. Turkey would help the United States better understand the challenges ahead of us in Iraq, both in terms of the approaching military campaign and Iraq's post-war reconstruction; and the United States would work with Turkey to counter the PKK [Partiya Karker Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party)] terrorist threat emanating from northern Iraq, while helping to cushion Turkey's economy against any exogenous shocks that might result from war along Turkey's southern border.

Scholars will long debate what went wrong in the lead-up to the Turkish Grand National Assembly's vote on March 1, 2003. The bottom line is that the Turkish Parliament's sovereign decision to decline the U.S. requests to transit troops and equipment through Turkey and into Iraq set U.S.-Turkey relations into a tailspin and shattered our concept of strategic partnership.

Despite this, we worked hard to salvage U.S.-Turkey relations. The United States offered an \$8 billion assistance package as a sign of Allied friendship to ease what we feared could be short-term economic

shocks to Turkey's economy from the war in Iraq. Ankara eventually declined our offer, just as Washington declined Ankara's offer in October 2003 of Turkish troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Still, we tried to move ahead. We viewed 2004 as a potentially key year for restoring the U.S.-Turkey partnership. It began with Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to the White House in January. That June, Prime Minister Erdogan joined G-8 [Group of Eight (forum of top economic world powers)] leaders in Sea Island, Georgia to discuss cooperation to advance democracy in the broader Middle East and then hosted the NATO Summit in Istanbul. We hoped these events would help Turkey showcase its strategic value to the European Union as a democracy with a predominantly Muslim population and strong traditions of secularism and the rule of law. In December 2004, the European Council decided to commence accession negotiations with Ankara; and the talks began in October 2005, with strong U.S. support.

Despite this positive momentum, U.S.-Turkey relations remained stalled over the issue of PKK terrorism. Since 2006, we have made important progress in undercutting the PKK's financial, operational, and political support mechanisms in Europe — through a robust combination of political pressure and information sharing. Then-Foreign Minister Gul graciously praised these efforts. But the continued presence of PKK bases in northern Iraq led many Turkish citizens from all walks of life to resent what they perceived as the U.S. treating Turkey's primary terrorist (and national security) threat differently than we treated Al Qaida. As a result, the popularity of the United States shrank to record low-levels, reaching a depressing 9 percent in mid-2007.

The November 2007 Oval Office meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan marked a decisive turning point. President Bush's designation of the PKK as "an enemy of Turkey, an enemy of Iraq, and therefore an enemy of the United States" signaled a new approach by Washington. The intensive information sharing authorized by President Bush has opened a new chapter in security cooperation between the United States, Turkey, and Iraq. It has also cleared the way for deeper cooperation not only on security, but on energy and democracy as well.

With that historical context in place, I would like to look forward to what we are doing now to deepen our strategic partnership with Turkey. The "Shared Vision" document concluded by Secretary Rice and then-Foreign Minister Gul in July 2006 outlines a structured dialogue between our two governments in pursuit of the strategic interests and values our two countries share. Our cooperation focuses on three broad areas: energy and economy, security, and democracy.

As I noted above, cooperation on energy in the late 1990s formed a cornerstone of the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership, resulting in a successful "first phase" of Caspian development anchored by BTC for oil and SCP for gas. Today, we are focusing on the next phase of Caspian development, looking to the Caspian Basin and Iraq to help reduce Europe's dependence on a single Russian company, Gazprom, which provides 25 percent of all gas consumed in Europe. Gazprom provides 25 percent of Europe's overall gas consumption in Europe and 80 to 100 percent of gas to countries in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the Baltic region. Turkey's dependence on Gazprom, at 65 percent, is significant. Turkey also will need additional new sources of gas to help diversify its supplies.

Our goal is to develop a "Southern Corridor" of energy infrastructure to transport Caspian and Iraqi oil and gas to Turkey and Europe. The Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) and Nabucco natural gas pipelines are key elements of the Southern Corridor. Azerbaijan provides the most promising near-term option for Turkey and the EU in its pursuit of diversified gas supplies from the Caspian Sea region. Azerbaijan possesses sufficient gas reserves to fill TGI, while providing some gas for domestic, Georgian and Turkish consumption, as well as for the Nabucco pipeline. However, gas in the ground does no good. Companies need access to these resources to develop them for Turkey and Europe. These two pipeline projects alone could provide Europe up to 44 billion cubic meters (BCM) of new gas supplies over the next seven to twelve years, of which 20 BCM (a not insignificant amount) will hopefully come from Azerbaijan,

the rest from Iraq and the Caspian Basin. Gazprom, by comparison, currently exports 160 BCM to Europe. So TGI and Nabucco could add to European markets more than one-quarter of the gas currently supplied by Gazprom. Such competition is crucial to ensuring that natural gas prices in Europe are set by market forces.

To achieve these goals, Turkey and Azerbaijan must work together to resolve their dispute over the commercial terms for the transit of natural gas across Turkey and onward into Europe, including by the TGI and Nabucco pipelines. Once this dispute is resolved, Azerbaijan is more likely to be able to conclude gas sales and purchase agreements with European investors required to advance these two major pipeline projects. Turkey could come to be seen as a reliable gas transit state, elevating its strategic importance to the European Union as the crucial partner linking enormous gas supplies in the Caspian region and Iraq with European markets. With the inauguration of the Turkey-Greece gas inter-connection last November, it is now possible to export gas from Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea to Greece and the EU-15 [European Union member countries prior to the accession of ten candidate countries on 1 May 2004] via Georgia and Turkey.

Potential gas supplies in Turkmenistan and Iraq can provide the crucial additional volumes beyond those in Azerbaijan to realize the Southern Corridor. Washington and Ankara are working together with Baghdad to help Iraq develop its own large natural gas reserves for both domestic consumption and for export to Turkey and the EU [European Union]. I have the honor to co-chair the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Trilateral Working Group on Natural Gas, which aims to attract U.S., Turkish, and other international investment to Iraq's natural gas fields, much of which awaits Iraq's national hydrocarbon law, and then export Iraqi gas to Turkey and onward via the Nabucco Pipeline.

Energy is only one component of the growing economic partnership between the U.S. and Turkey, albeit, a crucial one. We are also working to deepen our trade relationship, which has lagged behind our energy and security cooperation for years. My friend and colleague, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, Dan Sullivan, co-chairs the U.S.-Turkey Economic Partnership Commission (EPC) with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under Secretary Ertugrul Apakan. Our EPC is indeed making important progress in deepening trade and investment between our two countries. And, as Turkey's economy continues to grow, it helps drive investment and economic development in Iraq and beyond.

On security, the second cluster of interests identified in our "Shared Vision" document, the United States and Turkey are deepening an impressive record of cooperation. Turkey was already making major contributions to Iraq's stabilization even before the November 5 meeting in the Oval Office that catalyzed our collaboration against PKK terrorists. Turkey has been a leader of the Iraq Neighbors process and, in fact, initially proposed the concept. Turkey's training of Iraqi political parties has contributed to the normalization of Iraq's political life. And Ankara's logistical support has been crucial to providing Coalition forces and Iraqi civilians with water, fuel, and electricity.

In Afghanistan, I have already mentioned Turkey's important contributions to ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and provincial reconstruction. During the Paris Conference earlier this month, Turkey increased its original \$100 million humanitarian assistance pledge for Afghanistan to \$200 million. Turkish firms have invested \$1.5 billion in projects in Afghanistan since 2002, including schools and mosques, hospitals and health clinics, bridges and water wells. Turkey is also leading an effort to create a special investment zone along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, which could play a key role in stabilizing that volatile region.

In the Middle East, Turkey's close and constructive relations with Israel and its Arab neighbors have enabled Turkey to play a constructive role in encouraging progress towards peace. On the economic front, Turkey is working with Israel and the Palestinians to build an industrial estate in the southern West Bank

that, when established, will generate economic development and job opportunities for Palestinians. On the political front, Turkey helped make last winter's Annapolis conference a success, encouraging Syria to attend even in Iran's absence. Turkey is facilitating a new round of indirect discussions between Syria and Israel. In these ways, Turkey demonstrates its indispensability in helping the Euro-Atlantic Community better understand the broader Middle East and develop successful strategies to advance peace and freedom in this extended region.

On Iran, while we recognize Turkey's longstanding relationship with its southern neighbor, and their economic ties, we look to Ankara to be a regional leader and continue to reinforce the international community's demands that Iran cease its nuclear enrichment program. These demands have been expressed in numerous UN [United Nations] Security Council resolutions. Moving forward, we need the strong commitment of Turkey and all our friends in the international community to send the message to the regime in Tehran that we are united in pressing Iran to change its behavior.

We anticipate that Turkey will maintain and deepen its close ties with Israel that developed into a strategic partnership in the 1990s and is based on the two countries shared democratic values. Turkey is making important contributions to maintaining peace and restoring stability to Israel's northern neighbor, Lebanon. And Turkey can play an important role in supporting economic growth in the Palestinian territories.

In Europe, the United States remains convinced that Turkey's eventual membership in the European Union will benefit Europe and Turkey alike. Turkey's blend of democracy, secularism, and rule of law can help us all deepen our understanding of how to integrate our Muslim populations into our mainstream societies while countering extremist recruiters. Meanwhile, Europe's criteria for accession to the EU provide a set of incentives for sustained reforms which, while in Turkey's national interests, are often politically difficult to make.

The United States remains firmly committed to offering all possible support to UN efforts to foster a just and lasting Cyprus settlement. Our goal is reunification of the island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that builds on the body of work assembled over the past four decades. We are pleased by the discussions between the parties that have emerged since the constructive meeting between the two leaders in March, which led to reopening of the Ledra Street crossing and technical discussions between working groups in preparation for the resumption of comprehensive settlement talks under UN auspices. We also welcomed the May 23 statement by the two leaders, which set the goals for a re-unified Cyprus. We hope to see comprehensive talks resume over the next month or so. We believe the two communities themselves must generate the solution to the longstanding division of the island. We will consider appointing a new U.S. Cyprus Coordinator once the parties on the island express their readiness for such a move by the United States.

We share our European Allies' hope that Turkey and Armenia will soon normalize their relations. This will involve a decision by Turkey to restore diplomatic relations and reopen its border with Armenia and Armenia's recognition of its existing border with Turkey. We hope such steps will also lead to a heartfelt discussion of the shared and tragic past of these two friends of the United States.

In the Black Sea region, the United States and Turkey are working together to advance democracy in Georgia as our Georgian friends pursue their NATO aspirations. Turkey can play an important role in resolving the conflict in Abkhazia, drawing on its large Abkhaz Diaspora, which is anxious to invest in Abkhazia, Georgia, and thereby stimulate cooperation and reconciliation. More broadly in the Black Sea, the United States strongly supports Turkey's leadership in Operation Black Sea Harmony to foster maritime security cooperation with Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Georgia against threats of proliferation and terrorism. We also welcome strong information sharing between Operation Black Sea Harmony and NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.

Our third cluster of common interests, the advance of democratic and market economic reform, reflects the values shared by our two countries. Turkey's unique historical experience ensures it cannot be a model for any country. But its legacy of over a century and a half of modernizing reforms can inspire those in Iraq, the rest of the broader Middle East, and beyond who seek the same political and economic freedoms as Turkey's citizens have come to enjoy. The democratic system that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk launched 85 years ago affords Turkey its greatest strategic significance in this day and age. It is precisely the advance of democracy, secularism, and the rule of law that can ensure separation of mosque and state, advance political and individual freedoms, and blunt efforts of extremist recruiters. We welcome the Turkish Government's reform of Article 301 of the Penal Code and look forward to a new and invigorated effort to enact further reforms required to fulfill Turkey's EU aspirations. The economic reforms launched by President Turgut Özal in the 1980s have helped transform Turkey into one of the most promising emerging markets in the world. Sound fiscal policies have allowed Turkey to weather the severe financial crises of the 1990s and 2001 and orient its economy toward fulfilling its EU aspirations.

We support the Turkish Government as it pursues this reform agenda. As President Bush said following the U.S.-EU Summit in Slovenia June 10: "We strongly believe Turkey ought to be a member of the EU; and we appreciate Turkey's record of democratic and free market reforms, and working to realize its EU aspirations."

But, as we know from our own experience in the United States, the job of building democracy is never done. Political ideologies must adjust to broader societal change. It took our country nearly a century to abolish slavery; and only now, 145 years later, has an African American emerged as a top Presidential candidate. In Turkey, some political leaders argue they are trying to adjust the vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to a new era; their opponents contend these efforts aim to undermine Kemalism and the constitutional principles of secularism, democracy, and the rule of law.

The current closure case against the ruling AK Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)] is where these arguments come to a head. What is clear to me as a U.S. official is that Turkey's democratic system is the product of Turkey's historical experience and remains vibrant. As in the past, Turkish democracy will work through this current and difficult challenge. In the end, a democracy requires that voters determine their country's political future; and Turkey's voters made clear decisions during elections twice in 2007. Turkish leaders, including President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, have underscored the crucial importance of maintaining the separation of mosque and state through the constitutional principle of secularism as a central element of Turkey's democratic system. Ultimately, we are confident our Turkish Allies will rely on their Anatolian traditions of pragmatism and tolerant faith, combined with a modern embrace of scientific learning, to resolve the current controversy in a way that strengthens Turkish democracy.

In summary, U.S.-Turkish relations now enjoy a new and modern agenda, which differs profoundly from our partnership during the Cold War era. We have reshaped our bilateral agenda radically during the Administration of President George W. Bush. Having weathered some serious difficulties, the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership is broader and richer than any time in the past. Our relations are based on common interests and shared values. Today, the United States appreciates Turkey as a key Euro-Atlantic Ally that uniquely enjoys multiple identities as a European, Middle Eastern, Eurasian, Balkan, Black Sea, and Mediterranean country. Our cooperation on energy, security, and democracy provide the foundation for a partnership that is more deeply and genuinely strategic than any time in the past. As we contemplate the threats that will confront the Euro-Atlantic community in the coming decade, Turkey has emerged as an indispensable partner. Maximizing the potential of our strategic partnership will require the next U.S. Administration to keep all these factors in mind and require Turkey to sustain political and economic reforms even when tempted by its propensity to avoid tough decisions.

Remarks at the 38th General Assembly of the Organization of American States

By

John D. Negroponte
Deputy Secretary of State

[The following are excerpts from remarks delivered in Medellin, Colombia, June 3, 2008.]

Sixty years ago, the nations of the Americas came together here in Colombia to adopt the OAS [Organization of American States] Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. These two documents united our region in a commitment to human rights, social justice, and representative democracy. As a result, we have witnessed a transformation of our hemisphere. Millions of once marginalized citizens now have a voice in their societies; and they are electing responsible leaders who are working pragmatically to expand opportunity, reduce poverty, and ensure security.

No country embodies this transformation more than Colombia, and perhaps no city more than Medellin. Not long ago, Medellin suffered the plagues of violence and narco-trafficking. Now Medellin grows more prosperous and secure every day. Medellin's rebirth makes it an apt setting to discuss our hemispheres democratic future.

The theme of our meeting, "Youth and Democratic Values," reminds us that thanks to the enormous sacrifices of past generations, today's youth have not known coups or military dictatorships. To the contrary, they have grown up under a democratic political process and look to that process to continue providing economic opportunities, redressing inequalities, and ending social exclusion.

Indeed, the youth of the Americas are already a force for progress. Here in Colombia this past February, for example, a young engineer launched "Un Millón de Voces Contra Las FARC" [translates "One Million Voices Against the FARC" (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)] on the Facebook website. Within days, hundreds of thousands of youth added their voices to his; and on February 3 and 4, millions more did so in person in over 100 cities around the world.

We also see the youth of the Americas influencing their societies even where that influence is resisted. In Cuba, for instance, Yoani Sanchez explains to the world the difficulty of life under dictatorship through her website, Generation Y. For her determined defense of freedom, Yoani received the prestigious Ortega y Gasset Award. Although Cuba's Government denied Yoani permission to travel to Spain to receive her award in person, she remains a shining example of the Cuban people's brave spirit. Cubans, no less than any other people in the Americas, deserve the opportunity to elect their leaders and representatives freely and democratically.

The United States strongly supports the OAS's work to ensure the fairness and credibility of democratic elections through its observer and technical assistance missions. We applaud the OAS's assistance to nascent democratic institutions in Haiti. It is, therefore, now crucial that the international community show united support for President Preval and the Government of Haiti as they seek to install a Prime Minister and hold overdue Senate elections and continue to be responsive to the fundamental needs of the Haitian people.

And we endorse the OAS's "Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices" as a means of anchoring democratic values everywhere through civic education.

The United States is committed to reinforcing the OAS's work. Since 2001, we have adopted policies to help bring greater economic and social opportunity to our hemisphere. And to promote its integration:

- We have doubled development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean.
- We have led a multilateral effort to forgive billions of dollars in debts.
- And through free trade, we have created opportunities for people throughout our hemisphere to tap into the dynamic opportunities of the global market.

In fact, this Administration has negotiated 10 free trade agreements with our partners in the Americas. If Congress passes our agreements with Colombia and Panama, we will have created an unbroken chain of free-trading nations stretching from Canada to Chile.

As you all know, trade is a powerful engine of growth when paired with market economies and the rule of law. Medellin itself is a testament to our hemisphere's potential when good governance and sound economic policies are complemented by security. We cannot realize the economic and human promise of our hemisphere's youth when transnational crime, corruption, and narco-trafficking threaten their freedom, safety, and economic well-being.

We strongly support the Secretary General's call to reaffirm our commitment to combat transnational security threats, in accordance with the OAS Charter, the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, and the Declaration on Security, including by demonstrating hemispheric solidarity with Colombia in its fight against terrorist organizations like the FARC.

Ensuring the hemisphere's security is a joint responsibility, and several nations are providing inspiring leadership. In Colombia, the government and military are courageously taking their country back from narco-terrorists. In Mexico and Central America, brave leaders are confronting gangs, organized crime, and drug lords who are destroying lives and public order.

What these democratically elected officials and civil servants do to strengthen the rule of law in Colombia, Central America, and Mexico benefits everyone in the hemisphere; and the United States is committed to supporting them. So when regional leaders proposed a broad agenda for cooperation against criminals and drug traffickers in Central America and Mexico, the United States readily endorsed it.

We call this agenda the Merida Initiative. With full funding, the Merida Initiative will provide substantial support over several years to train and equip Mexican and Central American law enforcement. We are committed to this initiative because no country in the hemisphere can be safe from organized crime, gangs, and narco-terrorism unless we are all safe.

Since that historic meeting in Colombia sixty years ago establishing the OAS Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, we all have worked tirelessly to bring freedom, democracy, prosperity, and security to our hemisphere. We have sought to protect human rights and promote social inclusion. And over the decades, we have made great progress. Now, however, we are right to look toward the future, where the eyes of the youth of the Americas are trained. What they are looking for is exactly what we should be looking for: more economic and social progress; stronger rule of law; and, above all, a flourishing, all-inclusive democracy. With those objectives in mind, we will stay on the right course over the next sixty years and ensure that the hemisphere's future is even brighter than it past.

U.S. Perspectives on the Black Sea Region

By

Judy Garber

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

[The following are excerpts from a speech prepared as the Keynote Address at the Woodrow Wilson Center Conference: Trans-Atlantic Perspectives on the Wider Black Sea Region, Washington, DC, June 10, 2008.]

The Black Sea region is growing in significance for the U.S. and transatlantic foreign policy community. The Black Sea lies at a strategic crossroads of geography and culture, where Russia intersects with the European Union, where energy producers of Eurasia connect to energy consumers of central and Western Europe, where Islamic traditions meet Christian traditions, and where Europe and the Middle East meet.

The Black Sea region is of considerable strategic importance to the United States. We now have three NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Allies bordering the Black Sea: Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria. Two European Union members are Black Sea littoral states. The Black Sea region is a crossroads in high level policy debates over energy security, with planned routes to bring central Asian gas to Europe. We have also become increasingly concerned about the region as a conduit for smugglers, whether contraband; trafficking in persons; drugs; or worse, weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. interests in the Black Sea are focused on advancing democratic and market reforms; on strengthening economic ties, energy diversity, and a cleaner, more sustainable environment to preserve the Black Sea's natural beauty and resources; and improving security throughout the region. At its foundation, it follows from the same goals we have worked so hard to achieve in Europe for the past fifty years: peace, democracy, and prosperity. Our approach seeks to promote cooperation among countries in the region. We are heartened that a regional identity has begun to develop with organizations such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and we hope to see this cooperation strengthened. The European Union also increasingly recognizes the importance of the Black Sea with its policy called Black Sea Synergy.

Both the U.S. and the EU [European Union] agree that a coordinated policy effort in the region is essential in addressing some of the more pressing issues of the decade: issues such as Iran, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, and energy security. Reaching out to countries of the Black Sea region to promote democracy, economic growth consistent with a sustainable environment, and regional security is the natural next step in the transatlantic vision of a Europe whole and free. By focusing on cooperation in these areas, we envision the Black Sea region as a nexus of security, energy diversification and trade, and political and economic freedom linking Europe with the Caspian basin, Central Asia, and the broader Middle East. In order to promote cooperation in our focus areas, the U.S. has supported and will continue to launch concrete projects in the region. I would like to highlight some of this work we have been doing:

Democratic and Market Economic Reform

A commitment to democratic values is the pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the Black Sea region. Turkey is a strong and stable democracy, as are Romania and Bulgaria. The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine are symbolic of the progress that these two countries have made toward building participatory democracies. Georgia's May parliamentary elections were another step forward in building democratic institutions by offering voters a real opportunity to choose their representatives

from a wide array of choices and showed a clear improvement over the January presidential elections. The U.S. continues to support Georgia and Ukraine's aspirations of further integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Other states in the region are also putting into place stronger democratic institutions.

When we speak of democratic values, we are referring to open political systems, free and fair elections, and a vibrant and independent media landscape, which are the prerequisites for a strong civil society. So what have we done to promote these values and institutions?

- The U.S. has provided \$10 million to fund the Black Sea Trust in partnership with the German Marshall Fund to promote cross-border and civil society NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] across the region through small grants.
- We have also supported a number of Resident Legal Advisor programs in countries including Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The advisors have provided technical assistance to their counterparts on all current issues relating to the rule of law and the implementation of international legal best practices, reforming criminal procedure codes, [and] establishing jury trials, with the goal of improving the judicial systems in these countries. In addition, the Department of Justice has provided assistance on legislative drafting and training.

Energy, Economy, and the Environment

Respect for the rule of law is also an essential element of a market economy and an open trading and investment regime. It goes hand in hand with economic development so efforts to promote rule of law are part and parcel of improving the investment climate. We look to work with the nations of the Black Sea region to support their individual and cooperative efforts to fight corruption and build transparent and accountable institutions of government. Part of good governance is good stewardship of the environment. We have used our observer status in BSEC to promote environmental awareness, such as a seminar on sharing best practices across the region last September. We are also working to improve energy connectivity. USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] is currently funding a project to analyze how to integrate high voltage electrical transmission systems throughout the region. And we are actively promoting diversification of sources of energy across the region, including support of the Nabucco project.

Security

In the security realm, we are working with Black Sea countries bilaterally and through our NATO Alliance partners in several areas:

- Maritime cooperation
- Border security
- Aerial surveillance
- Civil - military emergency preparedness

By focusing on transformation and building niche capabilities, Black Sea nations can better address emerging regional threats together. We applaud existing regional security measures such as BLACKSEAFOR [Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group], Operation Black Sea Harmony, and the Black Sea Border Security Initiative. We encourage Black Sea nations to build upon such efforts and focus on niche capabilities to achieve a stable and secure region. We see the U.S. and NATO in a supporting role; we are committed to working toward a secure Black Sea region.

We particularly welcome the counterterrorism initiative called Operation Black Sea Harmony. The Turkish Government has taken the lead on this program to share intelligence on sea traffic among all the coastal states. We are actively encouraging countries around the Black Sea to take part in this security operation. It involves monitoring the movement of vessels on the Black Sea and allows for the interdiction and boarding of suspect vessels. We welcome Russia's decision to formally join the program. It is an excellent example of countries cooperating to improve security around the region.

On the civilian side, the U.S. helped to design and bring into being the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative [SECI] Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime based in Bucharest. This "SECI Center" brings together law enforcement personnel from countries throughout the region to share information on transnational organized crime and to coordinate multinational operations against it. This organization has been so successful that the European Union intends to support it in the future.

Similarly, we have supported the Governments of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in establishing — under the auspices of their Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) — a Virtual Law Enforcement Center (VLEC) to promote information sharing and coordination of operations against trans-border criminal activities.

We provide a wide array of law enforcement training and technical assistance to most of the countries in the region to support policing and criminal justice sector reform and modernization, as well as border control.

We also support individual governments in the area (e.g., Ukraine) to bolster their own ability to detect and thwart nuclear smuggling.

Conclusion

The United States is committed to achieving peace, prosperity, and security across the Black Sea. We will continue to work with all countries of the region, regional organizations like BSEC, and other partners such as the EU to achieve these goals. At the recent NATO Summit in Bucharest, leaders noted the importance of the Black Sea in their closing communiqué:

"We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security. In this regard, we welcome the progress in consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity [sic], and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance."

It is with this inclusive effort in mind that we will seek to promote all three of our goals in the region: democratic and market reform; improved energy security and connectivity, greater economic growth, and prosperity; and security. We believe to do so not only benefits the countries of the Black Sea region, but is in the strategic interest of the United States.

A U.S. Asian Partnership

By

John D. Negroponte
Deputy Secretary of State

[The following are excerpts from a speech delivered to the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, September 17, 2008.]

The United States has been a Pacific power for much of its history. Indeed, our relations with Asia began not far from here when, not even a decade after our country's birth, an American merchant ship first docked in the port of Guangzhou. And in 1833 — 175 years ago — we signed our first treaty of friendship with an Asian power, Thailand.

In the course of my own career, and certainly in the course of American history, our presence as a Pacific power has taken many shapes. But in 1961, when I arrived in Hong Kong, and throughout that decade, when I was working on Vietnam policy, I could not have imagined the extraordinary transformation Asia would undergo in the coming decades. As President Bush noted last month in Bangkok, "Asia has gone from an area mired in poverty and recovering from world war to a thriving and dynamic region." Asia has avoided military conflict for nearly three decades, and relations among its major powers have never been better. Nearly all of Asia's economies are market-based, and robust democratic systems are flourishing throughout the region. The 21 APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] economies now account for 60 percent of global GDP [Gross Domestic Product] and half of global trade. All of this makes Asia a key component of a rapidly globalizing world. And so, America's status as a Pacific power has never been more important than it is today.

Those of us fortunate enough to witness Asia's transformation know that it was neither inevitable nor accidental. Asians, who recognize the value of education and hard work, deserve primary credit for their region's accomplishment. But Asia prospered thanks also to a broader international economic and security order sustained by American leadership. For 60 years, the U.S. presence in Asia has had a calming effect on relations among the region's major powers. Our military alliances with like-minded Asian partners have allowed many of the region's powers to trade in their swords for ploughs and harvest the gains of global trade. Our alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand remain the foundation of peace and security in Asia.

Over the last few years, the United States has reinvigorated those alliances while also reaching out to new friends in Southeast Asia. We have a growing partnership with Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, which has made a remarkable transition to democracy in recent years. To help cement Indonesia's success, the U.S. has pledged over \$200 million in 2008 to support civic, governance, and educational institutions there.

Our relationship with Vietnam has also entered a new chapter, symbolized by President Bush's visit to Vietnam in 2006 and the visit by Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Washington in June. Last week I traveled to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and saw firsthand the country's transformation from when I worked in Saigon in the 1960s. The United States and Vietnam now enjoy significant and growing trade and economic ties, an emerging military-to-military relationship, successful cooperation on health and development issues, and growing cultural and educational links. Vietnam's effort to integrate itself into the global economy has been an essential element in its remarkable growth over the last 15 years. We encourage Vietnam's leaders to continue those efforts, which have lifted millions of its citizens from

poverty and opened up opportunities for Vietnamese and American businesses. Vietnam has followed a path to growth familiar to many of its successful neighbors: encouraging private enterprise, establishing legal institutions, and opening itself to global trade through membership in institutions like APEC and the WTO [World Trade Organization]. We celebrate its people's rising prosperity. At the same time, we continue to urge Vietnam to strengthen its respect for human rights and religious freedom.

I also had the opportunity this week to visit Cambodia, a country with which our relations have been steadily improving in recent years. Cambodia is eager to overcome the tragic legacy of the Khmer Rouge; and as it works to strengthen democracy, improve public health, and increase respect for human rights, Cambodia can count on our support.

As in Vietnam, global trade and investment have transformed Hong Kong from the city I encountered when I first made the always exciting descent into Kai Tak airport in 1961. Hong Kong holds special importance for me as my first overseas posting; and I'd like to spend a minute on the past, present, and future of this remarkable city. Looking back on my time as Vice Consul, I can remember walking through the narrow streets of this densely packed city and being greeted, at every turn, by the enticing scents of delicious Chinese cuisine. U.S. Navy ships would harbor here regularly, granting a day of needed rest and relaxation to U.S. sailors and Marines serving in the Pacific. At that time, Hong Kong served as our window into China; and stories were coming out of the mainland about the terrible famine years during the Great Leap Forward.

The images of Hong Kong I carry in my memory are only faintly recognizable in Hong Kong today; but one thing that hasn't changed is Hong Kong's embrace of the free market and of an open society, which have transformed it economically and socially. Together with a strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, a free and vibrant press, and respect for individual rights, the free market has allowed Hong Kong to thrive. Hong Kong's per capita income rocketed from 28 percent of Great Britain's in 1960 to 137 percent in 1996. Today, in terms of purchasing power, per capita income is roughly equal in Hong Kong and the United States. The "one country, two systems" framework has served Hong Kong well, allowing residents here the freedom to express their views publicly, peacefully, and without interference.

The United States has a strong interest in Hong Kong's continued success. U.S. companies have invested over \$38 billion in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong is home to over 1,000 U.S. companies and 55,000 American citizens. We value this major economic relationship in its own right and as an important part of our economic integration with a booming Asia.

Freedom, competition, and individual choice are part of what makes Hong Kong so vibrant; and with that in mind, I'd like to congratulate Hong Kong on its recent successful Legislative Council elections. Although later than allowed for under the Basic Law, Hong Kong now has the opportunity to grant universal suffrage for election of the Chief Executive in 2017 and the LegCo [Legislative Council] in 2020. We hope that all parties will work together to find an effective path to universal suffrage that can be supported by the broad majority of people in Hong Kong. The United States will be closely following events here in the coming decade.

Over the past seven years, the Administration has focused great attention on building a strong relationship with a growing China — a goal that would benefit the people of Hong Kong, as well as mainland Chinese and Americans. China's rise stands out as an especially remarkable development, even against the background of Asia's extraordinary success. We want to see China integrated into East Asia and the global community as a responsible, constructive actor. This Administration has made good progress toward that goal, but the task will be the work of a generation.

- We have established path-breaking bilateral mechanisms to expand cooperation and address concerns about the range of security, political, and economic issues facing our

countries. The Strategic Economic Dialogue, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson, and my own Senior Dialogue with State Counselor Dai Bingguo are examples.

- China agreed to abide by the norms of the global trading system by acceding to the World Trade Organization. We have benefitted from its accession: since 2001, China has been our fastest growing major export market. At the same time, when Chinese policies have violated WTO rules, we have held China accountable by filing WTO cases. As China deals with international trade regulations and other challenges of economic modernization, it can look to Hong Kong as a model of what's possible with free markets, foreign investment, and the rule of law.
- Lastly, we have encouraged China to provide responsible global leadership on critical issues such as ending North Korea's nuclear program and stopping the bloodshed in Darfur. Our expectations are not always met; but by working together, we have challenged China to assume its responsibilities to strengthen the international system, with some success.

These steps have laid the foundation for China, as an aspiring global power, to move beyond a narrow conception of its national interests to a broader understanding that reflects its growing stake in the international system. The trend is in the right direction. Asia's rise, and especially China's, has also caused many to worry that U.S. influence in Asia would decline. These fears, I believe, are overblown. They ignore America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and underestimate our ability to pursue relations with every major Asian power, including China, in positive-sum terms.

It's also important to highlight how much Asia's powers have strengthened their relations with one another — and the role we've played in that process. As Asia's powers have increasingly interacted with one another through trade, travel, and other exchanges, new patterns of cooperation have emerged. Our effort to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks is a compelling example of cooperation among countries with historically tense, even hostile, relations. Although the process of denuclearization is far from complete, the Six-Party Talks demonstrate the potential for regional cooperation to complement our existing bilateral alliances.

The question facing all Pacific powers, including us, is how best to preserve and build on the gains from recent decades. As I said earlier, we firmly believe that our bilateral security alliances are and will remain the foundation of peace and stability in Asia. Those alliances are time-tested and reinforced by common interests and values. They have demonstrated their continued vitality by growing even stronger since the end of the Cold War. No one should doubt our unshakable commitment to our allies' security.

New regional organizations have the potential to complement our alliances and to help tackle region-wide issues, and the United States will remain open to their formation. We hope that, whatever regional architecture takes shape, it institutionalizes the conditions that have helped Asia attain its upward trajectory. Asia boomed within a framework of openness, U.S. engagement, and mutual security. Most Asian powers recognize this and support a form of open Asia-Pacific regionalism. The United States is a resident power in Asia, and we are a stakeholder in a regional order based on openness and cooperation.

I want to conclude by stressing that America's commitment to strong relations with the rising powers of Asia is bipartisan and that our interests in the region are enduring. The United States is a Pacific nation, and our prosperity and security are increasingly tied to Asia's. Working closely with old allies and with new friends, we will continue to lead in a region that is growing in peace, prosperity, and freedom.

Improvements to the Defense Trade Export Control System

By

John C. Rood

Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

[The following are excerpts of remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 26, 2008.]

I am excited to discuss with you the significant changes that this Administration has undertaken which we believe will maintain the United States' ability to control sensitive military technology and at the same time, permit U.S. companies to export their products in a more timely and predictable manner and collaborate more effectively with foreign companies.

If I may first tell you a bit about my background, my government service began as an analyst in the U.S. intelligence community and has included work as a staff person to Senator John Kyl, service on the National Security Council, and as the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. Last fall, I was named Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. My current portfolio is quite wide-ranging and includes the responsibility for administering the Department of State's defense export licensing program and providing foreign policy input to the dual-use export licensing program administered by the Department of Commerce.

Today, I want to discuss three areas related to defense trade reform that have been a primary focus for me since last May: changes related to the way the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls does business, the recent Presidential Directive on defense trade reform, and the treaties on defense trade cooperation that President Bush signed with the United Kingdom and Australia. I would like to first give you some context about the effort to create these treaties and several related Administration initiatives in export controls.

It is of paramount importance that we protect truly sensitive U.S. technologies in order to maintain U.S. military superiority in the world. Threats to the United States and our allies grow daily. We must always be able to arm our military forces with the very best defense technology available to meet these threats; and at the same time, we must keep that technology from our enemies. We also must strike the right balance to ensure that the measures we take to protect technology against diversion do not undermine the ability of U.S. companies to conduct legitimate business transactions. To have the resources available to develop and produce leading edge technologies, companies must be able to reliably fulfill their customers' requests.

U.S. industry has the first part of this equation "down cold", as they say. Your companies have equipped U.S. military forces with cutting edge technology for decades. The Bush Administration recognizes that work was needed on the second part of the equation — ensuring that our export control system for U.S. defense goods and technologies is administered in a timely, transparent, and predictable manner that protects sensitive technology and which permits U.S. companies to remain competitive.

Improving the responsiveness and consistency of the U.S. export control systems is a priority for me, and I believe we have made significant headway in accomplishing this goal since May 2007. I'd like to discuss some important efforts the State Department has undertaken this year as part of the Administration's effort to modernize the U.S. export control system.

DDTC [Directorate of Defense Trade Controls] Process Improvements

In FY 2008, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs expects to license up to **\$96 billion** in authorized exports for direct commercial sales. The number of applications received has increased at about **8% annually**. We anticipate that total licenses received will rise from **69,000 in FY 2006** to up to **85,000 in FY 2008**.

This is a huge responsibility — first and foremost; we must ensure our licensing decisions protect U.S. national security interests. At the same time, as I noted, we should strive to make this process timely and, to the extent possible, predictable.

Accomplishing this is a challenge. The State Department already has implemented a series of process and management reforms that have had a dramatic impact on improving the munitions licensing process.

We have brought a new management team on board. Acting Assistant Secretary Steve Mull has overseen this effort, with very good results. Our Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of this area [is] Frank Ruggiero. Frank is a veteran of the U.S. national security community; and I know he is dedicated to making the State system efficient, responsive, and rational. Frank recently hired a Managing Director, Bob Kovac, who is dedicated to ensuring the State process meets its licensing deadlines in a thoughtful, consistent manner.

Bob's efforts will be key to making sure we meet deadlines set by the President's recent directive. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is understaffed. We are working to increase staffing, more on that when I discuss the President's directive.

Since last May, we have seen impressive improvements in the munitions licensing system:

- The Directorate for Defense Trade Controls has **reduced its licensing backlog by 51%, from 7,200 pending cases to 3,450**.
- All export license applications for OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] are now being complete[d] within 7 days.
- We have a Managing Director-level review of all applications pending over 60 days, thus reducing the number of **electronic licensing cases pending over 60 days from 400 to 20 (a 95% reduction)**.
- We also have been examining longstanding policies with a view to updating them and recently implemented the first change as a result of this review. We changed our licensing policy so that employees of foreign companies who are nationals from NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or EU [European Union] countries, Japan, Australia [or] New Zealand are now considered authorized under an approved license or TAA (Technical Assistance Agreement). This will alleviate the need for companies to seek non-disclosure agreements for such nationals and recognizes the inherent low risk of transferring technologies to nationals of these countries under an approved license or TAA.
- We also are working with the Department of Commerce to clarify the application of U.S. munitions export controls to parts and components certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, an extremely important issue to AIA [Aerospace Industries Association] companies. Last night I signed a Federal Register Notice to clarify this issue. Similarly, we are reviewing internal review processes within the Department with the objective of eliminating internal bottlenecks where they may exist.

Presidential Directive on Defense Trade Reform

I want to praise the Coalition on Security & Competitiveness whose recommendations were a catalyst to the effort that culminated in recent Presidential directives.

On January 22, President Bush signed two directives involving the U.S. munitions and dual-use export control systems. I will discuss the Defense Trade directive, since the dual-use directive is the purview of my colleagues at the Department of Commerce.

The directive draws from the Administration's internal efforts to improve the system as well as the recommendations provided by the Coalition on Export Control Reform. Agencies carefully reviewed the Coalition's recommendations and recommended to the President that he adopt many of them. In some ways, I believe the Presidential directive goes farther than actions recommended by U.S. industry.

- **Timed License Review:** Under the new procedure, the Secretary of State will implement guidance to ensure the review, analysis, and decision on export authorization requests for International Traffic in Arm Regulations ([TAR]-controlled articles, services, and technologies will be completed within 60 days from the submission of a complete license application. Certain national security exceptions, such as the need to perform end-use verification or notify Congress of the proposed export, will be outlined specifically. These guidelines likely will be implemented by Executive Order, and thus available publicly.
- **Resource Improvements:** The Department is to provide a plan to the Office of Management and Budget by March 22, which will outline the resources required to carry out the directive without an increase in budgeted funds. The plan will include the financial and personnel resources necessary for the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to execute its range of responsibilities and will address the authority for and implementation of additional self-financing mechanisms, which eventually will provide up to 75 percent of the Directorate's mission.
- **Third Country and Dual-Nationals Policy:** The President directed that we will implement a policy to grant access to third country and dual nationals from other NATO countries, European Union Member States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to certain licensed defense exports without the need for a separate export authorization. As I mentioned earlier, this policy was implemented on December 19, 2007.
- **Commodity Jurisdiction Process:** The President directed the National Security Council [NSC] to work with State, Defense, and Commerce to issue revised guidance by February 22 regarding interagency coordination of the commodity jurisdiction process. The goal is to provide for a timely mechanism to complete commodity jurisdiction requests or resolve interagency disputes within 60 days. We intend to work with the NSC and our colleagues from Defense and Commerce to make this process work smoothly.
- **Dispute Resolution Committee:** The President also directed State to establish by March 1 an interagency committee to serve as a forum to facilitate timely consideration and resolution of interagency disputes on defense export authorizations and commodity jurisdiction decisions. The committee will be chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls, with membership at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. State and Defense will be permanent members of the committee with Commerce participating when commodity jurisdiction issues are addressed and Homeland Security participating when the committee addresses compliance, enforcement, and

specific commodity jurisdiction issues relating to technologies of homeland security concerns and other issues as determined by the Secretary of State. Other executive branch agencies may be invited to participate as necessary by the Secretary of State or as directed by the President.

- **Improving Congressional Notification Process:** By May 22, State will brief the National Security Council on its efforts to work with the Congress to improve the current congressional notification processes for notifying munitions licenses as required by the Arms Export Control Act. The goal is to make these processes as timely, predictable, and transparent as possible.
- **Electronic Licensing System Improvements:** The directive also provides instruction to State to finish upgrading its electronic licensing system with the goal of ensuring that all reviewers (within State and in other agencies) can electronically receive, distribute, and respond to the full range of documentation and material that is required or requested in support of the licensing process, including commodity jurisdiction requests. It ensures U.S. industry may interact, as appropriate, with the State Department on a fully electronic basis. In addition, by July 22, State, with assistance from Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security, will provide the NSC with a plan to achieve electronic interoperability among these departments and with other relevant executive branch agencies.

Our efforts to accomplish these actions are well underway, and we look forward to engaging with U.S. industry as we work to implement these efforts over the coming months.

Defense Trade Treaties

And, as you know, the Administration also signed landmark treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia on Defense Trade Cooperation this year. The U.S.-UK treaty was submitted to Parliament in the UK and to the Senate in the United States in late September, and the U.S.-Australia treaty was submitted to the Senate in early December. We recently provided the Implementing Arrangement, or “IA,” for the UK treaty to Congress and expect to provide the IA for the Australia treaty to Congress shortly.

In the interests of time, I would like to focus on the U.S.-UK treaty and note that our goals for concluding these treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia — with whom we share exceptionally close defense relationships — were the same and that both treaties are largely the same in content.

Before I discuss details, I would like to briefly outline our rationale for concluding the treaties. We have a special relationship with both these countries — the relationships are special because of our shared values, our shared outlook on the world, and because of our deep and longstanding cooperation over the decades to deal with threats to our way of life. For example, we have engaged in innovative defense trade arrangements and sharing of cutting edge technologies with the United Kingdom from the early stages of World War II, now some seventy years ago, as our countries fought to defeat Fascism, to our deep cooperation during the Cold War, where the U.S. and UK worked extraordinarily closely to successfully defeat another threat to our liberty and way of life: the threat from Communism.

Today, our nations are engaged in a struggle against another threat to our liberty, values, and way of life: the fight against terrorism and Islamic extremism. Both the U.S. and the UK have experienced significant terror attacks on our soil. Australia has experienced significant terror attacks against its citizens on foreign soil. The September 11 attacks in the U.S., the 7/7 attacks on the UK, and the Bali bombing demonstrate the emergence of a significant transnational threat which uses unconventional fighting methods. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations will use whatever technology they can acquire to accomplish this goal. As we have seen in thwarted attacks in the UK and elsewhere, they are a resourceful

foe, using traditional military hardware and technology, as well as adapting less sophisticated technologies like the ubiquitous cell phone and other common items.

This is a conflict that is global with several “fronts.” The United Kingdom [has] been our staunchest ally in this struggle, with Australia and other coalition partners critical to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in efforts to combat terrorism and the causes of Islamic extremism internationally.

In this contemporary security environment, it is essential that we take steps to achieve more rapid movement of defense items and technologies and enable our nations to more efficiently pool resources and leverage the technological strengths of U.S. and UK industries.

Our military, intelligence, and other security personnel need to be able to work together seamlessly to efficiently share information about combined operations; and the men and women on the “front lines” need to have interoperable equipment to successfully accomplish the mission — whether they are on the “front line” in Basra, Kandahar, London, Sydney, or New York.

In addition, our defense and security companies must be able to collaborate in the development of technologies that will effectively counter both conventional and unconventional threats.

It was against this backdrop that we began considering ways to put in place a more effective and efficient defense trade regime. We were mindful of the security environment; but as we sought a solution, we also needed to take into account the large scale of economic trade between our countries and the large volume of defense trade.

For example, the United Kingdom is the largest foreign investor in the U.S. (over \$250 billion); and the United States is the largest foreign investor in the United Kingdom (over \$350 billion). Moreover, the UK is our largest defense trade partner. The Department of State approved over 9,400 licenses for defense exports to the UK in 2007, worth over \$11.9 billion.

We also looked at how we were handling this large volume of defense trade and discovered that we needed to take into account the costs and benefits of continuing to perform case-by-base reviews of export license requests. Over the past two years, the State Department has processed over 15,000 such exports licenses for defense trade with the UK. Over 99.9% of these requests were approved. (Licensing volume for exports to Australia is lower but with the same extraordinarily high approval rate.)

We were also mindful of the less-than-hoped for results of the numerous defense trade reform initiatives of the past decade. As John Maynard Keynes observed, “The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones.”

With this in mind, the President directed we take bold action and negotiate a treaty with the UK and Australia that would:

- Support joint U.S.-UK military and counterterrorism operations
- Speed U.S.-UK research, development, production, and support of the next generation of interoperable defense technologies
- Enable development of the most effective countermeasures possible to combat terrorist attacks, at home and [those] against our partners in the War on Terror
- And leverage each other’s experience and reduce duplication of efforts in research, development, production, and support

The goal was to create the ability for our respective militaries and security authorities and companies to freely exchange information and technologies. To accomplish this, we have created an entirely new

structure for most defense exports. I will outline how the treaties will work using the UK treat[y] as the example, but the mechanisms described apply also the Australian treaty.

The treaty will create a community of the U.S. Government and Her Majesty's Government, including the various Ministries, Departments, and agencies, as well as the defense and security companies and facilities in both countries. Exports of most classified and unclassified U.S. defense goods, technology, and services will be permitted to go into and to move freely within this community without the need for government approvals and export licenses when in support of:

- Combined military and counterterrorism operations
- Cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support projects
- Specific security and defense projects where HMG [Her Majesty's Government] is the end-user
- And USG only end-uses

This will be a big change from today's export licensing system where numerous government approvals are often necessary for companies to hold discussions about potential projects, to pursue joint activities, to ship hardware and know-how to one another, and even sometimes to move engineers and other personnel within branches of the same company on both sides of the Atlantic. These numerous export licenses and the weeks and months waiting for review and approvals make the task of transatlantic cooperation more difficult.

Although the specific list of activities and projects that will fall under the treaty's scope remains to be developed, we envision the treaty will cover the bulk of our efforts. I believe some good examples of eligible activities and projects that will be included are efforts to develop technologies to defeat IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices], which our forces face on a daily basis in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan; aspects of U.S.-UK Missile Defense cooperation; U.S.-UK armor cooperation; U.S.-UK surface ship radar development; and the U.S. Joint tactical Radio System — UK BOWMAN radio interoperability project.

Regarding UK only end-use programs, we believe UK programs with significant U.S. content, such as ASTOR (Airborne Stand-Off Radar), would likely qualify. As with any rule, there will be exceptions. Exports of some defense items, technologies, and services will be excluded from coverage under the treaty; however, and we will identify these exclusions for the exporting public. Excluded items will still require a State Department license under the current process.

One important highlight of the treaty is that it will include the ability for both governments to effectively enforce it against violators. For example, defense articles exported under the UK treaty will be considered "RESTRICTED" in the UK; and the Official Secrets Act will apply to such defense articles. In addition to the Official Secrets Act, UK export control laws may also apply and provide an additional level of protection. The defense articles exported under the treaty may not be transferred or exported to companies or other entities that are not part of the treaty's approved community without prior permission from the UK MOD [Ministry of Defence] and USG. A violation of this requirement will, at a minimum, be a violation of the Official Secrets Act, as well as a violation of U.S. export control laws.

Re-transfers and re-exports outside the approved community will require an HMG and USG authorization. The treaty provides for an exception to the requirement for re-export authorizations for exports going outside the treaty's approved community when such exports are in direct support of UK forces deployed overseas.

We recognize that it is important to create procedures that protect national security interests but which also are usable by our respective industries. To that end, we have sought industry feedback as we go through the IA development process. In the U.S., for example, one avenue we have used is the Defense Trade Advisory Group, an established channel through which we will seek industry feedback on proposed procedures. We also have sought input in informal discussions with industry.

So how would the treaty work? With apologies to J.K. Rowling, let's consider that the U.S. and UK are each pursuing an independent effort to develop a personal invisibility cloak like that used by Harry Potter. Our DoD and HMG's MOD decide to join forces, hoping to leverage our separate efforts. They negotiate a cooperative MOU to develop the cloak. Our two governments agree to add the invisibility cloak to the list of approved projects, and each government selects its contractor team.

Under the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty, instead of the U.S. company preparing and seeking U.S. State Department approval of a TAA for this project — which would normally take around 45-60 days — the contractor will check a U.S. Government website. There are three lists to check — is the UK industry partner on the list of approved companies/facilities? Check. Is the invisibility project on the list of approved projects? Check. Is the technology on the excluded list? The invisibility cloak technology isn't excluded. Check. With all three boxes checked, the U.S. contractor and UK companies can freely cooperate without export licenses.

The U.S. company will be able to send its technical data to the UK firm to begin work, using the system established to implement the treaty. Subcontractors can be added later without the need for licenses as is the case today, so long as the subcontractor is also a member of the approved community. [There is] no need to wait for an amendment to a TAA to add an additional party like today. A few weeks later, the UK contractor team wants to visit the U.S. company to examine and discuss initial samples. This can also be done under the treaty and does not require a license.

All of these activities can all be performed without seeking prior authorization from either government, although records will need to be kept. This is a dramatic departure from the way we do things today. The treaty goes beyond being a new way of doing business — it establishes a unique defense cooperation environment to reinforce our partnership with our most important allies.

We have much more work to do. The treaty must still be considered and approved by our Senate and Parliaments in London and Canberra. Implementing agreements must still be negotiated and signed. And the hard work of implementing and making this new arrangement a reality must be accomplished.

Of course, improved defense and security cooperation is not an end in itself. Its value lies in enabling both our countries to develop and field more effective military capabilities, at lower costs, than otherwise would be the case and to support the ability for our two countries to operate together in pursuit of common security objectives.

But to paraphrase the noted American philosopher and catcher for the New York Yankees Yogi Berra, who once offered this simplistic observation on the need for clear goals, "If you want to get where you're going, it helps to know where you want to be." The U.S., UK, and Australian Governments know where we want to be and are moving forward toward that goal.

So, in closing, let me thank you for your attention this afternoon. I hope that I have provided you with useful information about the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia treaties on Defense Trade Cooperation and other actions the Administration is taking to ensure our export control system is the most effective and efficient in the world.

Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the United States

[The following are excerpts from a media note released by Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, September 25, 2008.]

The Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the United States met today in New York to consult on issues of mutual concern and to coordinate their efforts to promote regional peace and security.

Motivated by their shared vision of regional security, stability, peace, and prosperity, the parties to this statement (the GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the United States) reaffirmed their commitment to work together and to intensify their consultations as partners and friends and to seek the settlement of disputes through peaceful means.

Recalling previous meetings, including most recently the July 21, 2008 meeting in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. [United Arab Emirates], and the April 21, 2008 meeting in Manama, Bahrain, the Ministers affirmed the value of these meetings and pledged to continue meeting regularly to exchange views and consider common approaches to key issues that affect this shared vision.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts in a manner consistent with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. In line with the participants' previous declarations, including the Manama Declaration of April 21, 2008, the Ministers underlined the importance of mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states. The Ministers condemned all acts of terrorism in all its forms, extremism, sectarian violence, and sectarian agendas.

The participants reiterated their steadfast support to the states represented in the face of any threats to their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Agreeing that the peace and security of the region are critical to international peace and security, to the health of the global economy, and represent vital national interests for all, the participants resolved to continue their longstanding cooperation against such challenges and threats.

The Ministers expressed their hope that the commitments made at Annapolis will come to fruition in order to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to establish an independent, viable, and democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel, according to all relevant Security Council Resolutions. The Ministers pressed for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiations and reiterated their support for the Arab peace initiative as an effective means to tackle the Arab-Israeli conflict and pave the way for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Ministers expressed their concern about the continuing building of settlements in the occupied territories and the negative impact this has on the peace negotiations. They urged Israel to establish a moratorium on settlement activities and to dismantle settlement outposts.

Regarding Lebanon, the Ministers reaffirmed their support for Lebanon's sovereignty and security and welcomed the continuation of the political process that has followed the Arab League-sponsored Doha Agreement. The Ministers welcomed the election of President Michel Sleiman and look forward to the national dialogue and discussion of the national defense strategy. The Ministers welcomed the recent talks between Syria and Lebanon and voiced their support for the commitments to normalize relations between the two countries as soon as possible.

With respect to the Iranian nuclear issue, the Ministers affirmed the need to continue close consultations. The Ministers called on Iran to honor its promise of cooperating with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], its commitment to develop peaceful nuclear power, and its assurance that it is not seeking production of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Ministers urged Iran to cooperate fully with UN [United Nations] Security Council Resolutions mandating Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Noting the International Atomic Energy Agency's reports, the Ministers urged Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's ongoing investigation of this matter. The Ministers voiced their strong support for the right of all parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as provided for in Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Ministers reiterated their support for the full exercise of navigational rights in the Strait of Hormuz, an international waterway vital to global commerce, in accordance with international law and the Law of the Sea.

The Ministers reaffirmed their support for the national unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Iraq and the important role a sovereign, stable, and prosperous Iraq plays in the wider region. They recognized the need to support Iraq's constitutional political process and national reconciliation, while underlining the importance of the rule of law, institution building, and the holding of regularly scheduled elections. Pointing to the inclusion of Iraq at this and previous meetings, the Ministers called on the international community to take additional steps to help re-integrate Iraq more fully into the international community. The Ministers welcomed recent progress at strengthening bilateral relations.

The Ministers reaffirmed the obligations of all states, in accordance with international law; relevant agreements; UN Security Council Resolutions 1546 (2004), 1618 (2005), 1267 (1999), and 1373 (2001); and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, to combat terrorist activities and to prevent the use by terrorists of their territory for supplying, organizing, and launching terrorist operations in Iraq. The Ministers expressed support for Iraqi efforts to prevent the transit of terrorists and illegal arms and emphasized the responsibility of Iraq and its neighbors to control their common borders against all forms of illicit trafficking.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of the continuity of their meetings under this configuration of states, composed of the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the United States, as a diplomatic vehicle to promote regional security, consultations, and coordination. The Ministers called for regular meetings of this group to be held every six months, hosted on a rotating basis by each of the group's members. The Ministers welcome the possibility of a meeting to be held in Baghdad in early 2009.

MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

[The following are excerpts from a fact sheet released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, DC, July 31, 2008.]

Countering the proliferation of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) is a top national security priority of the United States. MANPADS, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, in the hands of criminals, terrorists, and other non-state actors pose a serious threat to passenger air travel, the commercial aviation industry, and military aircraft around the world (over 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS missiles since the 1970s). The United States and other concerned countries have recognized this and taken steps to counter this threat. After the November 2002 attempted shoot-down by terrorists of a civilian airliner in Mombasa, Kenya, the United States redoubled its efforts to keep MANPADS from falling into the wrong hands and is working closely with numerous countries and international organizations to keep the skies safe for all. With U.S. assistance, this cooperation has led to the destruction of over 26,000 excess, loosely secured, illicitly held, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS since 2003.

The White House launched an initiative in late 2002 to prevent the acquisition and use of MANPADS by terrorists and other non-state actors. At the direction of the White House, the U.S. Department of State, supported by the U.S. Department of Defense, leads the United States' international efforts on this critical issue. Within the Department, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation have the lead responsibility in this area.


This updated fact sheet provides a brief description of MANPADS, their origins, [and] examples of MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft and highlights some of the United States' efforts to cooperate with other countries to counter the threat.

What are MANPADS?

MANPADS, commonly described as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, are surface-to-air missiles that can be carried and fired by a single individual or carried by several individuals and fired by more than one person acting as a crew. Most MANPADS consist of: 1) a missile packaged in a tube, 2) a launching mechanism (commonly known as a "grip stock"), and 3) a battery. More modern MANPADS also contain a separate missile ejection motor. The tubes, which protect the missile until it has been fired, are normally disposable. Rudimentary sights are mounted on the tube. The missiles themselves are usually comprised of a flight motor, a warhead, a control section, and a guidance section that directs the missile toward the targeted aircraft. A single-use battery is typically used to power the missile prior to launch.


MANPADS launch tubes typically range from about 4 feet to 6 1/2 feet (1.2 to 2 meters) in length and are about 3 inches (72 millimeters) in diameter. Their weight, with launcher, ranges from about 28 pounds to just over 55 pounds (13 to 25 kilograms). They are easy to transport and conceal. Some of the most commonly proliferated MANPADS can easily fit into the trunk of an automobile.

There are three main types of MANPADS: 1) Infrared (IR) seekers that hone in on an aircraft's heat source, usually the engine or the engine's exhaust plume; 2) Command Line-of-Sight (CLOS) systems whereby the MANPADS operator visually acquires the target aircraft using a magnified optical sight and then uses radio controls to guide the missile into the aircraft; and 3) Laser Beam Riders in which the missile flies along the laser beam and strikes the aircraft where the operator has aimed the laser.



SA-7b

MANPADS were designed to be used by legitimate national military forces to protect their troops and facilities. With their relatively short range, MANPADS are regarded as the last missile-based air defense available to protect against aerial attack, to be deployed in tandem with gun-type systems that seek to defeat attacking aircraft by destroying them with a barrage of projectiles. They can attain a speed of about twice the speed of sound and strike aircraft flying at altitudes up to approximately 15,000 feet (4.57 kilometers) at a range of up to 3.2 miles (5 kilometers).



SA-14


Although superficially similar in appearance, MANPADS should not be confused with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). RPGs are also portable and shoulder-fired. However, RPGs are unguided weapons designed primarily to be used against ground targets and are generally ineffective against aircraft, except at very close range. Some RPG attacks on low-flying aircraft have been mistaken for MANPADS attacks.

When Have MANPADS Been Used Against Civil Aviation?

Since the 1970s, over 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS, causing about 28 crashes and over 800 deaths around the world. The following list is a sample of reported incidents involving civilian aircraft. All of the incidents listed below, except the Mombasa incident, took place in zones of conflict.

- **March 12, 1975**
A Douglas C-54D-5-DC passenger airliner, operated by Air Vietnam, crashed into inaccessible, hostile Vietnamese territory after being hit by a MANPADS. All six crew members and 20 passengers were killed in the crash.
- **September 3, 1978**
An Air Rhodesia Vickers 782D Viscount passenger airliner crash landed after being hit by a MANPADS fired by Zimbabwe Peoples Revolution Army rebels. Four crew members and 34 of the 56 passengers were killed in the crash. 10 survivors were shot to death afterwards.
- **December 19, 1988**
Two Douglas DC-7 spray aircraft, chartered by the U.S. Agency for International Development to eradicate locusts, en route from Senegal to Morocco, were struck by MANPADS fired by POLISARIO [Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguia-El-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popular Liberation Front for Western Sahara)] rebels in the Western Sahara. One DC-7 crashed killing all 5 crew members. The other DC-7 landed safely in Morocco.
- **September 22, 1993**
A Tupolev 154B aircraft operated by Transair Georgia was shot down by Abkhazian rebels, crashed onto the runway, and caught fire, killing 108.
- **April 6, 1994**
A Dassault Mystère-Falcon 50 executive jet carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and its French flight crew was shot down over Kigali, killing all aboard, and sparking massive ethnic violence and regional conflict.
- **October 10, 1998**
A Boeing 727-30 Lignes Aeriennes Congolaises airliner was downed over the Democratic Republic of the Congo jungle by Tutsi rebels, killing 41.
- **December 26, 1998**
A United Nations-chartered Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport was shot down over Angola by UNITA [União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)] rebels, killing 14.
- **January 2, 1999**
A United Nations Lockheed L-100-30 Hercules transport was shot down by UNITA rebels over rebel-held territory in Angola, killing 9.

MANPADS Attacks on Civil Aircraft Since 1975



Source: Santo Polizzi Transportation Security Administration

- **November 28, 2002**
Terrorists fired two MANPADS at an Arkia Airlines Boeing 757-3E7 with 271 passengers and crew as it took off from Mombasa, Kenya. Both missiles missed.
- **November 22, 2003**
A DHL Airbus A300B4-203F cargo jet transporting mail in Iraq was struck and damaged by a MANPADS. Though hit in the left fuel tank, the plane was able to return to the Baghdad airport and land safely.
- **March 23, 2007**
A Transaviaexport Ilyushin 76TD cargo plane was shot down over Mogadishu, Somalia, killing the entire crew of 11.

Who Makes and Possesses MANPADS?

Some 20 countries have produced or have licenses to produce MANPADS or their components. These include Bulgaria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

It is estimated that over 1 million MANPADS missiles have been manufactured worldwide since they were first produced in 1967. The United States believes that most of these systems are either in national inventories or have been destroyed. However, in many cases, these systems have not been accounted for properly.

MANPADS are found in the stockpiles of many countries around the world, including those of manufacturing military nations. The United States believes that thousands are outside of the control of national governments and a number of terrorist organizations, including al Qaida, have MANPADS in their possession. The total number of MANPADS remaining in the global inventory is difficult to

estimate with precision because the destruction of MANPADS systems — either by warfare, accident, or systematic demilitarization — is not always tracked or publicized. Even more uncertain is the number of operational systems within that total inventory, as a number of variables — age, storage conditions, and quality of maintenance — influence the life-expectancy of such systems. Even vintage systems may remain functional long after their projected life-span, particularly if properly stored and maintained.

Given the unique threat posed by MANPADS to aviation due to their ease of use, relatively small size, and portability, the United States exercises strict controls over production, storage, and transportation of its MANPADS. The U.S. exercises diligence when selling them to other governments in order to ensure that they are properly secured and not sold or transferred to others without prior consent.

The black market cost of MANPADS can vary widely, ranging from as little as a few hundred dollars to several thousand dollars, depending on the model and its condition. Given the relatively low cost of some of these systems, there is a heightened risk for acquisition by terrorists or other non-state actors.

What is the United States Doing to Counter the Proliferation of MANPADS?

On January 24, 2008, the White House announced that in keeping with the priority placed on this issue, President Bush had accorded the Personal Rank of Ambassador to Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., who serves as the Department of State's Special Envoy for MANPADS Threat Reduction. Special Envoy Bloomfield leads the interagency task force that is implementing the United States International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan — a component of the broader National Strategy for Aviation Security — to protect global aviation from MANPADS. The Special Envoy engages high-level foreign government officials on U.S. efforts to reduce the worldwide threat from excess, loosely-secured, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS.

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) manages the United States program to eliminate or better secure excess, obsolete, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS that could fall into the hands of non-state actors. WRA [Weapons Removal and Abatement] assists countries to secure their stockpiles, to maintain reliable inventories of their systems, and/or to destroy those MANPADS stocks that are not needed for national defense. Many MANPADS currently retained in national stockpiles are aged and obsolete, hence are relatively ineffective against modern military aircraft, but could still pose a threat to slower-moving civilian aircraft.

The Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction (CATR) in the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation works through bilateral and multilateral engagement with an emphasis on responsible export controls to prevent illicit transfers of MANPADS or the technology to produce the weapons.

The U.S. Department of Defense supports international negotiations by providing expertise on the proper management and control of MANPADS in foreign holdings and by enforcing stringent physical security and accountability for MANPADS in U.S. possession. The Department of Defense established the Golden Sentry program to monitor the end use of MANPADS sold through Foreign Military Sales to ensure that they are not diverted for unauthorized use. Golden Sentry is supported by the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the U.S. Army.

Multilateral Efforts

Under the auspices of the Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, the United States has worked in a number of international fora to obtain agreement with countries to strengthen controls over the export of MANPADS and to enhance weapons stockpile security. Over 95 countries have agreed to adopt measures that ensure the standards established are put in place.

At the June 2003 G-8 [Group of Eight, a forum of the top economic world powers] Evian Summit, leaders agreed to a U.S.-initiated MANPADS Action Plan that includes the following measures:

- Provide assistance and technical expertise for the destruction of excess MANPADS
- Adopt stringent national export controls on MANPADS and their essential components
- Ban transfers of MANPADS to non-state end-users, MANPADS should only be exported to foreign governments or to agents authorized by a government
- Exchange information on uncooperative countries and entities
- Examine for new MANPADS the feasibility of adding specific technical performance or launch control features that preclude their unauthorized use
- Encourage action in the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Aviation Security Working Group on MANPADS (ICAO Resolution A-35-WP/50)

The G-8 continued to actively focus on implementation of these measures through 2004; and in 2005 and 2006, the U.S. provided G-8 leaders with the implementation status of the MANPADS Action Plan. To date, preliminary discussions on possible MANPADS-specific agenda items are underway between the Department of State and its G-8 counterparts.

In December 2003, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (www.wassenaar.org), the first multilateral institution covering conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, adopted strengthened guidelines for control over MANPADS transfers. These guidelines detail how countries will evaluate exports of MANPADS; conditions they will set for recipients to receive the systems; and how systems will be stored, transported, used, inventoried, and inspected.

Similar guidelines were adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in May 2004 (www.osce.org/documents/html/pdf/html/2965_en.pdf.html). Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) adopted these guidelines in November 2004. In June 2005, the 35th General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) also adopted similar guidelines in Resolution AG/RES 2145 (XXXV-O/05).

The United States is continuing efforts in all of these and other regional fora to emphasize the need for implementation. The United States has submitted to the Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE a detailed paper on how the United States controls MANPADS. Since then, over half of the participating states have submitted papers on their MANPADS control. In addition, the MANPADS guidelines were updated at the 2007 Plenary.

On February 18, 2005, the United States announced the start of a NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Project to help Ukraine destroy stockpiles of its excess munitions, small arms, light weapons, and MANPADS.

Bilateral Cooperation

United States bilateral efforts are focused on regions and countries where there is a combination of excess MANPADS stocks, poor control, or a demonstrable risk of proliferation to terrorist groups or other undesirable end-users. The United States works with countries who's MANPADS might be vulnerable to develop a nonproliferation strategy to reduce stocks, secure remaining weapons, and ensure that the host governments have in place appropriate policies and procedures for controlling exports.

On February 24, 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov signed the “United States-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of Man-portable Air Defense Systems” in Bratislava, Slovakia to facilitate mutual destruction of obsolete or excess MANPADS, exchange information on controlling MANPADS including improving measures to enhance physical security, and to share information about MANPADS sales and transfers to third countries.

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement uses the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related (NADR) Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction Program funds (www.gao.gov/new.items/d04521.pdf) to:

- Destroy obsolete MANPADS which have little military value but could be lethal against global aviation in the hands of terrorists
- Improve physical safety and security as well as standards of inventory control and accountability of MANPADS that may be needed for legitimate self-defense purposes to ensure that remaining stocks are not stolen or illicitly transferred

Since 2003, the U.S. Department of State has enabled the destruction of nearly 26,000 MANPADS in 25 countries in Africa, Central America, Eastern Europe, and South East Asia.

A few examples of some successes illustrate the Department of State’s extensive efforts. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina in destroying its government-held stockpile of almost 6,000 MANPADS between 2003 and 2004, helped to destroy 45 MANPADS in Liberia in 2003, and helped Cambodia to destroy its entire stock of 233 MANPADS in 2004 as well as better secure other weapons kept for its national defense purposes. To date, PM/WRA has facilitated Hungary’s destruction of over 1,500 MANPADS, Macedonia’s destruction of 156 MANPADS, and Montenegro’s destruction of 1,500 MANPADS and has funded the securing of over 100 MANPADS in Afghanistan as part of a broader weapons collection and destruction effort in that country.

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement’s MANPADS programs are supported by the DTRA’s Small Arms and Light Weapons Branch, which provides physical security and stockpile management seminars and assessments. DTRA’s programs orient host nation experts to international best practices, assess current host nation practices, and offer tailored advice to countries on how to better secure their MANPADS and other weapons retained for national defense purposes. All of this assistance is offered at little or no cost to the host nation. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement can, in some cases, provide technical and financial assistance to implement DTRA’s recommendations. Assistance may also be provided to countries at the request of the United States’ Geographic Combatant Commanders or other elements of the U.S. Department of Defense.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports international efforts and has established an International MANPADS Assist Visit (MAV) program within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This program assists host nations in conducting vulnerability assessments to identify potential launch areas around their international airports and develop mitigation strategies to counter the threat. Since 2003, TSA has assisted 23 countries in conducting 29 MAVs.

What You Can Do to Help

If you have information concerning the illegal possession of MANPADS, immediately contact the appropriate law enforcement authorities in your country.

Americans who are living or traveling overseas who wish to report the illicit possession of or location of illicitly-held MANPADS should contact the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the

nearest U.S. Embassy or the Legal Attaché at the specific U.S. Embassies listed on this website — www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm — as soon as possible.

In the United States, American citizens, other residents, and visitors who have knowledge about the possession or location of illicit MANPADS, both in the United States or in other countries, should immediately report this information to the nearest field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by telephone or by e-mail using this web tip sheet: <https://tips.fbi.gov>. Or they may telephone the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) at this toll-free number: 1-888-ATF-BOMB or 1-800-283-2662.

Remarks on Release of the Annual Report on the Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008

By

David T. Johnson

**Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs**

[The following are remarks delivered September 16, 2008, Washington, DC.]

Yesterday, the President made his annual designation of the so-called Majors' List of illegal drug-transit and drug-producing countries. As the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, it's my privilege to present the President's determination and to discuss our broader efforts to combat illicit drugs.

Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the President is required to notify Congress of those countries he determines to be major illicit drug-producing countries or major drug-transit countries. But it is important to understand that a country's presence on this list does not reflect its counternarcotics efforts nor does it reflect its cooperation or its relationship with the U.S. The designation can reflect a combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to be produced or trafficked through a country despite its own best efforts.

But when a country does not live up to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and conventions, the Majors' List process signifies that by the President determining that the country has, quote-unquote, "failed demonstrably." Such a designation can lead to sanctions. However, the President may also provide a waiver when he determines there is a vital national interest in continuing U.S. assistance. Even without such a waiver, humanitarian assistance and counternarcotics assistance may continue.

This year the President has identified the following countries as major drug transit or drug-producing countries: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Just for your information, there aren't any surprises on that list. It's the same as it was last year.

Of these 20, the President has determined that three countries, Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, "failed demonstrably" during the last 12 months to make sufficient or meaningful efforts to adhere to the obligations they have undertaken under international counternarcotics agreements. In the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela, the President has given waivers to possible sanctions under U.S. law, so that the U. S. may continue to support various programs to benefit the Bolivian and Venezuelan people. In Venezuela, funds will continue to support civil society programs and small community development programs. In Bolivia, the waiver will permit continued support for agricultural development, exchange programs, small enterprise development, and police training programs, among others.

Venezuela has been found to have "failed demonstrably" for the fourth consecutive year. The Venezuelan Government's continued inaction against a growing drug trafficking problem within and through its borders is a matter of increasing concern to the U.S. Despite Venezuelan assurances that seizures have increased, the amount of drugs bound for the U.S. and Europe continues to grow. Much of this drug traffic through Venezuela and bound for Europe is transiting Western Africa, and the corrupting influence of this illicit wave threatens governance and economic stability in this region. Corrupt officials and organized crime within Venezuela have exploited the situation and a weak judicial system has failed effectively to prosecute these criminals. Additionally, Venezuela has refused to renew its

counternarcotics cooperation agreements with the U.S., including refusing to sign letters of agreement to make funds available for cooperative programs to fight the trafficking of drugs from and through Venezuela to the U. S.

Burma has also “failed demonstrably” again this year. Burma continues to be the largest source of methamphetamine pills in Asia. Additionally, poppy cultivation, which had been in dramatic decline, has again turned upward. The military regime has made little apparent effort to curb production of the pills and little effort to stop poppy cultivation. Their efforts to reduce demand, interdict drug shipments, and combat corruption and money laundering continue to be lackluster.

This is the first year that the President has determined that Bolivia has “failed demonstrably.” This was a not a hasty decision. Bolivia does have a number of effective, U.S.-supported, coca eradication and cocaine interdiction programs. However, Bolivia remains a major narcotics-producing country, and its official policies and actions have caused a significant deterioration in its cooperation with the U.S. President. Morales continues to support the expansion of licit coca leaf production, despite the fact that current legal cultivation far exceeds the demand for legal traditional consumption and exceeds the area permitted under Bolivian law. Much of the surplus coca leaf production is traded in unregulated, so-called legal markets and is diverted to cocaine production. The expansion of cultivation and lack of controls on coca leaf resulted in a 14% increase in the area of coca under cultivation, and an increase in potential cocaine production from 115 to 120 metric tons.

Recently, cocalero syndicates – endorsed by the Government of Bolivia – expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development from the Chapare region where they ran a number of programs to promote the development of economic alternatives to coca cultivation. And last week the Drug Enforcement Administration was similarly expelled from the Chapare. These actions form part of an apparent Government of Bolivia policy to restrict the scope of U.S. support for its counternarcotics efforts. These actions represent a retreat from Bolivia’s international obligations to control cocaine trafficking.

We have a number of programs in place which can make a positive contribution to the struggle against narcotics trafficking in Bolivia, but they will only be effective with the full support of the Bolivian Government. We believe it’s up to the Bolivian Government now to take concrete steps to fulfill its international obligations with respect to narcotics production and trafficking. And we stand ready to help.

Turning to other countries on the list this year, Afghanistan has made measurable progress in its efforts to eliminate opium poppy. Recent reports from the UN indicate that the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan increased from 13 to 18 last year. This increase has taken place primarily in those provinces where there is sufficient security, governance, and alternative development.

Nowhere in Afghanistan has counternarcotics progress been more dramatic than in Nangarhar. In 2007, that province ranked as the second-highest poppy cultivating province in Afghanistan, but now it’s virtually poppy-free. This results from a counternarcotics strategy integrated into security operations, a balance of incentives and disincentives, and very strong leadership from the governor of Nangarhar.

Much, however, remains to be done. Enormous challenges remain in Afghanistan, and the Government of Afghanistan needs to take aggressive action to meet these challenges, in cooperation with and with the support of the international community. Five provinces in the south of Afghanistan continue to produce over 85 percent of Afghan opium poppy. Here, the insecure environment, insurgent activity, and widespread corruption have allowed poppy cultivation to increase. Recently, the newly appointed governor in Helmand has taken steps to curb the growth of poppy. These programs are a clear step in the right direction, but they can be undermined by insurgent activity, organized crime, and corrupt officials. It will take strong political will and effective international programs to deal with these challenges.

Drug trafficking in Central America is a growing threat and a difficult challenge for the region due to its limited capacities to combat the narcotics trade and the criminals behind it. Drug-trafficking organizations are moving aggressively into the region from Mexico and from Colombia. The long Central American coastline provides traffickers easy access for illegal maritime drug routes. While there have been some noteworthy seizures, many more shipments remain undetected.

Regional support and institution building will be critical elements in our efforts to stem this flow. More vigorous anti-organized crime measures and extradition laws need to be enacted and enforced. In the next year, we will be working closely with the Central American governments to expand counternarcotics programs and law enforcement, and the rule of law assistance under the Mérida Initiative.

Mexico has long been a close partner in our counternarcotics efforts. This partnership has been deepened and strengthened under the Calderon Administration. The congressionally approved, multiyear Mérida Initiative provides a quantum step up in our counternarcotics and law enforcement programs. The overall objectives of the Initiative are to break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; to strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; to improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; to curtail gang activity; and to reduce demand for drugs throughout the region.

We're also grateful for our close cooperation with the Government of Colombia in our counternarcotics fight. While challenges remain, Colombia continues to disrupt the drug trade with effective eradication and interdiction programs. Ecuador, whose Pacific coastline makes it a strategic partner in narcotics interdiction, has made progress in stopping drugs destined for the U.S. Increased inspections and staffing at air, land, and sea ports and an awareness of changing traffic patterns have helped to reduce the drug flow. We are working closely with Ecuador to provide equipment and training to modernize and improve Ecuador's own detection capabilities. Coca growing and processing and cocaine traffic remains a problem in the Colombia-Ecuador border area. We urge the governments of Ecuador and Colombia to engage constructively to eliminate coca cultivation and cocaine transit from this border region.

India is internationally licensed to produce licit opium poppy gum for legitimate pharmaceutical purposes, and it maintains a strict monitoring and distribution process. However, there is diversion from its licit opium production into the illicit market. India pursues tight controls over the industry and continues to refine measures to guard against the continuing challenge of diversion of the crop for illicit purposes. We remain concerned about illicit opium poppy gum production in areas where no illicit cultivation was previously thought to exist. We encourage the Government of India to continue its vigilance in these areas, destroying fields of the illicit crop, and bringing to justice those behind this activity.

As I noted in the context of drug flows from and through Venezuela, the countries of West Africa have emerged as key transit points for Andean cocaine headed for Europe. As a result, the fragile governments of these countries are now threatened by criminal networks and drug-trafficking organizations. Although Guinea-Bissau has been the focus for narcotics trafficking, criminal operations are now moving southward into Guinea and are also becoming active in Sierra Leone. Because West African states lack the resources to counter these transnational criminal organizations, international and bilateral donors are working to assist West African governments with their counternarcotics strategies.

Nigeria continues to make progress on counternarcotics and has worked with the U.S. on money laundering cases. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, which began operations in 2005, has successfully investigated and convicted several high profile defendants. Recent developments in Nigeria, however, raise questions as to whether the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission will remain an effective anti-corruption unit. We've made our concerns known to the Nigerian Government and look forward to progress under the Commission's new leadership.

Illegal drugs and transnational crime pose a threat to every nation's political, economic, and social well being. Governments around the world have come to realize that drug trafficking fuels public corruption and distorts economies and that traffickers and other groups, including terrorist organizations, can work together in ways that destabilize governments and destroy societies. It's the self-interested responsibility of all nations to combat this blight. By implementing a strategy of eradication, interdiction, alternative development, criminal justice reform, anti-corruption, and demand reduction, we can confront these threats and promote stability and security around the world.



Security Assistance Community

Army Unveils New Stability Operations Manual

By
John Harlow

[The following is from an article released by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) News Service on October 6, 2008.]

The commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Gen. William S. Wallace, unveiled new Army doctrine today at the annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army in Washington.

The new Stability Operations field manual, FM 3-07, puts stability operations into doctrine after it was recently introduced in FM 3-0, Operations, where its importance was elevated to the same level as offensive and defensive operations.

“We recognize that in a contemporary operational environment in the 21st Century, conventional military operations, offensive and defensive, will be conducted simultaneously with stability operations,” Wallace said. “Our hope is that FM 3-07 becomes a source document not just for the military and agencies within our government but also non-governmental agencies with which we routinely work.”

Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., said “America’s future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering.”



Civil affairs officer with the 3rd BCT, 4th Inf. Div., gives a stuffed animal to a little girl Jan. 14 during a convoy stop in Albu Hayat, Iraq. Horine carries stuffed animals and other treats to hand out to children with him when leaving Camp Taji. The Army’s new field manual, FM 3-07, provides extensive doctrine on stability operations. Photo by Pfc. April Campbell

“Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate ‘soft’ power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector,” Caldwell continued.

Given the complexities of the future operating environment, the Army must look at the different ways the elements of national power (military, economics, diplomacy, and information) are employed, according to the new manual. It states that military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail during a time of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors fueled by expanding religious extremism, competition for energy, globalization outcomes, climate and demographic changes, and the increased use of violence to achieve political and ideological ends.

“Our objective when we go into a foreign country is to leave, but to leave with that country safe and secure,” said Caldwell. “If we work to ensure stability has returned, it will allow their people to live their lives in an orderly manner, feeling safe and secure.”

During stability operations, doctrine states U.S. military forces will partner with different U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental agencies, and coalition partners to bring help and return the quality of life to the people.

This doctrine will make stability operations a more conscious portion of that which a Soldier prepares for and executes in the future by institutionalizing the recognition that stability operations are part of operations, TRADOC officials said.

“We brought in representatives from many different agencies from within the government and outside the government,” said Lt. Col. Steve Leonard, chief of CAC’s operational-level doctrine directorate. “We invited all the different services and some of the think tanks to make sure we cast the widest net possible when putting this doctrine together. We brought them in before writing the doctrine and made sure that everyone was working toward a common goal.”

The comprehensive approach to doctrine development is the key to stability operations; and with the different government agencies, our allies, and the non-governmental community involved in the writing of the doctrine, it will help shape the roadmap from conflict to peace.

“We have to understand how to balance our approach,” said Leonard. “There needs to be balance between the political and military imperatives that drive our operations and humanitarian principles that guide the efforts of relief agencies. Ultimately, the people are the focus of stability operations. So while we work to establish good governance, economic recovery, security, and rule of law, we also have to give those Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) the space and freedom to be able to be independent of the military and transparent to the people they are helping; so they can do their jobs.”

“Stability operations is part of the entire military-planning process,” said Caldwell. “Some people are talking about pre-emptive stability operations. They are doing that because we literally need to plan for and resource it before military operations begin.”

This isn’t something new to the Army or the U.S. military, TRADOC experts pointed out. They said Soldiers and leaders have been performing the five critical tasks of establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and supporting economic and infrastructure development around the globe for years. They said what’s new is that these tasks are now addressed before, rather than after, conflict and conducted within the context of peacetime.

“We intended for this manual to be able to be used by all the services, all the departments and agencies of government, and all the NGOs who might be participating in a stability operation,” said Leonard. “This manual can be a ‘how to’ guide for any service, any nation (that) might partner with the United States or any agency, governmental or non-governmental.”

“Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine,” said Caldwell. “It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world.”

Developing an Interagency Stabilization and Reconstruction Lessons Learned Process

By

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U.S. Agency for International Development File Photo

Agency-specific lessons learned processes and multiagency knowledge sharing solutions exist at the operational and tactical levels. However, developing an integrated, interagency process at the strategic level will help to ensure that the U.S. Government, as a whole, is further empowered to prepare, plan for, and respond to contingencies in the future.

The Best Practices Working Group (BPWG), formed under National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, is exploring options for developing an interagency Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) Lessons Learned process.

The BPWG has established an interagency Lessons Learned Task Force to flesh-out specific options for how an interagency stabilization and reconstruction lessons learned process could collect, vet, distribute, and, most importantly, implement lessons in a timely fashion. In addition to examining advantages and disadvantages for each option, the task force is identifying potential bureaucratic obstacles, resource implications, and mitigation strategies.

The Lessons Learned Task Force builds on the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Lessons Learned Workshop, which was hosted by the BPWG, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) on March 11-12, 2008 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. More than 80 participants took part, representing a broad cross-section of practitioners, trainers, policy-makers, and lessons learned experts. The workshop examined PRTs holistically, noting fundamental differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. The event helped to identify recommendations for improving the effectiveness of PRTs and future models, and to start the process to conceptualize a U.S. government lessons learned system for S&R.

The task force's methodology includes an informal survey of the experience and best business practices of lessons learned approaches across the federal government. For example, members of the task force have interviewed experts at a range of organizations from NASA to the Internal Revenue Service to the Department of Homeland Security. In addition, the task force has interviewed potential customers of an S&R lessons learned process to better understand requirements from the strategic to tactical levels. Common themes of the interviews include effective approaches to promote a non-reprisal culture of learning and trust, which is critical for success. In addition, having senior level champions and a protected

budget and mandate are enablers that ensure an unimpeded and meaningful process. Finally, ensuring accessibility from the field and that the process is responsive to customer requirements are essential.

The task force comprises representatives from civilian and military organizations including: Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities (OSD/STB); USAID Chief Operating Officer; USAID Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; U.S. Department of Agriculture; Joint Staff J-7; Joint Center for Operational Analysis; Headquarters U.S. Air Force A9L; Center for Army Lessons Learned; PKSOI; and the CCO.

From the CCO community especially, the Lessons Learned Task Force would welcome advice, inputs, and experience in developing this process. For further information or comments, please start a member discussion in the CCO portal (preferable) or feel free to contact the facilitators: Chris Wendell, S/CRS, WendellGC@state.gov, 202-663-0846; or Amon Killeen, OSD/STB, amon.killeen.ctr@osd.mil, 703-697-5543.

Civil Affairs Sailors Work to Improve Humanitarian Effort Outcomes

By

Kristen Noel

American Forces Press Service

Washington, DC, August 20, 2008

The Navy's budding civil affairs force will help sustain U.S. military humanitarian efforts in developing countries, the force's commander told online journalists and bloggers in an August 8, 2008 teleconference.

Many past humanitarian missions were completed with little thought to how the country would maintain the project, Navy Capt. Robert S. McKenna, commander of the Maritime Civil Affairs Group, explained. For example, he said, a school would be built without attention to who would attend the school, who would teach, or where the budget for maintenance and teaching materials would come from.

"So now," McKenna said, "instead of doing this in an ad hoc nature, we're building a force that understands civil affairs and understands effects-based operations."

McKenna explained that the Maritime Civil Affairs Group, which was established in July 2006, spent the past two years creating a training program to develop civil affairs teams. Since the Navy never had a civil affairs force, he said, officials solicited the assistance of the Army to craft the six-month training pipeline.

The training, McKenna said, familiarizes sailors with the 16 functional areas that form the basis of civil affairs work. Sailors also receive training in foreign languages and port assessment, and they complete a month-long expeditionary combat skills course, he said.

"We can't make experts, obviously, in 16 different areas," he said. "So, they know enough about those areas to be able to go out and do a good assessment." Sailors are considered civil affairs generalists when they complete the training, McKenna explained.

The Maritime Civil Affairs Group already has deployed teams to Africa, Iraq, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean to assist with ongoing civil affairs and humanitarian missions.

"We have another team that just departed to go to the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa," he said. "They're going over there to do a 45-day pre-deployment site survey in preparation for a commitment, where we'll send two teams in December for a six-month deployment."

The civil affairs forces' role, McKenna said, is to provide strategy and planning for humanitarian projects and to advise combatant commanders and Navy component commanders. He added that civil affairs teams should be on the ground long before a ship arrives, assessing the area's needs.

"We need to be out way ahead of the ship so we can establish those relationships that we need, and we can liaison with civil authorities there," he said. "And we can find out where they need help and where we can give help."

Despite involvement in a few current missions, McKenna said, it's going to take time for the Navy to build a professional civil affairs force.

"I think over the next five to 10 years you're going to see this force grow and become more widely known and more widely used," he said. "And it's going to become a strong force for our national defense."

U.S., Serbian Leaders Discuss New Ways To Cooperate

By

Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service

Belgrade, Serbia, October 21, 2008

The military-to-military relationship between the United States and Serbia is growing closer, the top military officers of both countries said here, Oct. 20, 2008.

Serbian Army Chief of Defense Gen. Zdravko Ponos and ADM Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke to reporters following their meeting on the relationship.

Mullen said the two men had a good, candid and productive meeting. "I always learn a great deal coming out and meeting someone face to face," he said.

The relationship between the United States and Serbia is difficult. The U.S. participated in Operation Allied Force — a 72-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 that forced the nation to withdraw military and paramilitary units out of Kosovo. Following U.S. recognition of Kosovo's independence earlier this year, a mob attacked the U.S. embassy here and burned part of it.

Still, the U.S. and Serbia must work together for peace in the region and beyond, Mullen said.

"This is a friendship that has weathered many trials and grown stronger and stronger with each additional contact," he said. "We are also partners, and partnerships are very important in the 21st century."

The Serb army is seeking to modernize, and the U.S. can help, the chairman said. Serbian officers are attending U.S. staff and war colleges, and Serbian cadets attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.

Serb military leaders also are working to establish a modern noncommissioned officer corps, modeled after the U.S. example. But cooperation in the region is most important, Mullen said.



BELGRADE, Serbia — U.S. Navy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Serbian chief of defense, answer questions during a press conference here, Oct. 20, 2008. The chairman was on a three-day trip to the region to visit defense counterparts. (DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley)

“Serbia’s cooperation with [NATO’s Kosovo Force] in the Joint Implementation Council has been greatly appreciated, and your interest in modernizing your military through the Partnership for Peace program is commendable,” he said.

The chairman called Ponos “a strong partner in a vital region where “security and stability continue to be incredibly important to achieve and sustain.””

Both men agreed that their two countries have totally different opinions of Kosovo and that this complicates the relationship. Serbs regard Kosovo as an integral part of their nation, even though only a small number of ethnic Serbs live there.

“These are very complicated political relations in which the military has to cooperate,” Ponos said through an interpreter.

The relations between the two countries have come a long way since the low point of the late 1990s. After the democratically elected government came into power following the fall of Serb strongman Slobodon Milosevic, the United States and Serbia began rebuilding the military-to-military relationship. Now, “there is too big an investment to be pulled down,” Ponos said.

“Under such difficult political relations, economic relations between the two nations continue to grow,” he said. “Cultural relations continue to grow, too. Why shouldn’t military relations continue to grow, even though those are the most difficult aspect of it all?”

The Serb military chief said that every generation of leaders must continue to build relations. “Everything they are doing should be putting one more brick into the relationship for the generation to come,” he said.

Mullen said that although the nations are separated on Kosovo, they share much common ground.

“We are in complete agreement on the success of the military-to-military engagements,” the chairman said, “not just on paper, [but also] on the ground, where we are able to exchange and assist and make a difference for the future.

“Most importantly,” he said, “what we continue to agree on is that these developments occur in an environment that does not have violence in it, and we continue to move ahead peacefully with respect to Kosovo and, indeed, in the region.”

Mullen said he is not in Serbia to dictate to the Serb military leaders what they should do. Rather, he said, he is here to listen to the leaders, address their concerns, and find new ways to work together.

The Merida Initiative

Fact Sheet

**U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, DC, August 6, 2008**

The Merida Initiative demonstrates the United States' commitment to partner with governments in Mexico and Central America to confront criminal organizations whose actions plague the region and spill over into the U.S.

The Initiative's Scope

The Merida Initiative is a multi-year program to provide equipment and training to support law enforcement operations and technical assistance for long-term reform and oversight of security agencies. This year, Congress approved an initial \$400 million for Mexico and \$65 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, which was passed in the FY08 Supplemental. The President's FY09 budget proposal for the Merida Initiative includes \$450 million for Mexico and \$100 million for Central America.



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U.S. Domestic Efforts

The Merida Initiative complements U.S. domestic efforts to reduce drug demand, stop the flow of arms and weapons, and confront gangs and criminal organizations. The initiative also complements broader efforts by the Governments of Mexico and of Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti to engage on every front in the battle against organized crime.

Why Now?

Daily developments on the ground in Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti demonstrate the urgent need for action. The criminal organizations, under great pressure by law enforcement agencies, are behaving in increasingly violent ways. Our partners in the region are confronting transnational gangs and criminal organizations at great personal and financial costs. It is in the national security interest of the U.S. to support our partners' fight against this scourge, prevent further violence from spilling over our border, and make our streets safe once again from drug and gang-related crime. They are doing their part – we must do ours.

Components

The Merida Initiative will provide funding for:

- Non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners and canine units for Mexico and Central America to interdict trafficked drugs, arms, cash and persons.
- Technologies to improve and secure communications systems that collect criminal information in Mexico.

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- Technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of justice – vetting for the new police force, case management software to track investigations through the system, new offices of citizen complaints and professional responsibility, and witness protection programs to Mexico.
 - Helicopters and surveillance aircraft to support interdiction activities and rapid response of law enforcement agencies to Mexico.
 - Equipment, training and community action programs in Central American countries to implement anti-gang measures and expand the reach of these measures.

Regional Solutions

By working collaboratively with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti we confront this regional threat with a regional solution, and undermine the ability of criminal organizations to adapt their behaviors and evade justice.



French Military Docs, Nurses Contribute to Continuing Promise

By

**Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Ernest Scott
U.S. Southern Command
USS Kearsarge, At Sea**



BAYAGUANA, Dominican Republic (October 5, 2008) - French Air Force Lt. Colonel, a medical augmentee embarked aboard USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), exams a Dominican boy's throat during a general medical examination at the El Deporte y Recreacion Derecho de la Poblacion during the humanitarian/civic assistance mission Continuing Promise (CP) 2008. Kearsarge is the primary platform for the Caribbean phase of CP, an equal-partnership mission involving the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Brazil, France, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class (SW/AW) William S. Parker/Released)

Since August, the Continuing Promise (CP) 2008 mission has included medical personnel from Brazil, the Netherlands, and Canada. During outreach efforts to the Dominican Republic Oct. 3 -16, medical personnel from France also joined in the humanitarian/civic assistance mission.

Currently embarked aboard USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) for the CP 2008 mission, French medical personnel have been eager to offer their assistance.

“We’ve participated in similar missions, but nothing of this scale,” said French Air Force Lt. Col. Bruno Rosier. “The amount of sick and injured people who are receiving care is amazing. They need our help, and together we are making sure they get it.”

In the Dominican Republic alone, Kearsarge established four medical sites that provided basic medical care, as well as dental and optometric aid to many rural areas.

“In some places, we provided care that the citizens otherwise would not have received,” said Master Chief Virginia Coste, a nurse in the French Navy. “Whether they received medical treatment or just education, we made a difference, and they know they have our support.”

However, the patients are not the only ones who are benefiting from this mission, said Rosier. “At the end of each day, we all walk away a little richer,” he said. “Each morning we arrive at the clinic and see the vast number of people waiting,” said Coste. “The way they welcome us seems to break down all barriers between us. We have so many nations together under one roof, yet no one thinks of the diversity, just the mission.”

Kearsarge is supporting the Caribbean phase of CP, a joint effort among the U.S., partner nations, and non-government organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to South American countries.

Kearsarge is under the operational control of U.S. 4th Fleet. U.S. 4th Fleet’s mission is to direct U.S. naval forces operating in the Caribbean, and Central and South American regions and interact with partner nation navies to shape the maritime environment.

The CP Caribbean Phase is the second of two HCA deployments to the Southern Command area of focus for 2008. The first CP deployment was conducted by USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Pacific.



Perspectives

The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress

August 25, 2008

[The following are excerpts of a report prepared for members and committees of the Congress by the Congressional Research Service. References to Annexes or Appendices have been retained in the excerpt even though the Annex or Appendix itself may not be included. A full copy of the report can be found at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>.]

Summary

The Department of Defense (DoD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DoD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DoD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DoD role by providing DoD with its mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities.

The historical DoD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes: responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities, and strengthening foreign governments' ability to deal with internal and international threats through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DoD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military's capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, DoD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

DoD's perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DoD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DoD in the creation of extensive international and interagency "partnerships," as well as an expanded DoD role in foreign assistance activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DoD role in many activities. Indeed, a key DoD document acknowledges that state-building tasks may be "best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals." Nevertheless, although reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DoD officials believe that the U.S. military must develop its own capacity to carry out such activities in the absence of appropriate civilian forces.

In the second session of the 110th Congress, members have faced several choices regarding the DoD role in foreign assistance. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to make permanent

two controversial DoD authorities. It has also proposed legislation to enable U.S. government civilian personnel to perform some of the tasks currently carried out by the U.S. military, as well as to form a civilian reserve corps for that purpose. Congress may also consider options to improve DoD coordination with civilian agencies on foreign assistance activities.

Introduction¹

The Department of Defense has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DoD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DoD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has shaped the DoD role through a wide variety of authorities contained in the Foreign Relations and Intercourse (Title 22 U.S. Code) and Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. Code) statutes, and through annual legislation. To some analysts, the DoD role has been in effect a product of Congress's willingness to fund defense rather than foreign affairs budgets. In some instances, the activities in which DoD participates serve an institutional purpose for the U.S. military, providing U.S. soldiers and sailors with opportunities for military training, for cultivating military-to-military contacts, and for gathering information on foreign countries where they may someday be called to operate.

The historical DoD role in foreign assistance can be regarded roughly as serving three purposes:

- **Responding to humanitarian and basic needs**—Since at least the 19th century, U.S. military forces have provided urgent assistance to foreign populations in time of disasters, such as earthquakes and floods. More recently, U.S. military forces have also provided aid in humanitarian crises such as famines and forced population movements. DoD aids foreign populations under authorities to conduct humanitarian assistance in a variety of other circumstances, including as an adjunct to military training and exercises with and as part of military operations.
- **Building foreign military capacity and capabilities**—DoD provides military equipment, weapons, training, and other assistance to build up the military capacity and capabilities of friendly foreign countries. Such support is provided to augment military capacity to perform counternarcotics, counterterrorism, internal defense, border defense, and other missions, and as part of post-conflict state-building. The origins of current programs date to the early years after World War II, when the United States sought to help rebuild Europe.
- **Strengthening foreign governments**—Besides building foreign military capacity, DoD plays a role in U.S. efforts to help foreign governments secure their territories against internal and international threats with a variety of non-military tools. These include state-building efforts, such as strengthening police forces, and bolstering the legitimacy of foreign governments by undertaking small-scale economic, health, and social projects (and in the case of conflict zones, political projects), generally in areas outside capital cities. Although such efforts were carried out sporadically as early as the 19th century, the post-World War II U.S. occupations in Germany and Japan are regarded as state-building models. More recently, DoD support for border protection and nuclear non-proliferation initiatives strengthens foreign governments by curbing international threats.

¹ The introduction and overview were prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs. These sections draw on the appendices at the end of the report by several CRS [Congressional Research Service] analysts from the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

During the past few years, Congress has provided DoD with new, non-combat authorities to prosecute the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to conduct counterterrorism² activities elsewhere. Congress granted these authorities in response not only to the immediate needs of U.S. military operations in conflict zones, but also to the Bush Administration's efforts, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), to redirect and reshape U.S. government capabilities in a new strategic environment. As a result, some analysts believe that DoD is playing an increasing role in assisting foreign populations, militaries, and governments. Critics view this role as potentially detrimental to U.S. foreign policy, citing a perceived lack of strategic coordination between DoD and the State Department (and other agencies where applicable), a failure to ensure that DoD programs are sustainable, and a militarization of the United States' image abroad. These analysts call for greater clarity and reforms in defining DoD's foreign assistance role and responsibilities.³ This report provides Congress with historical context and current information and perspectives regarding DoD's role and responsibilities in a range of foreign assistance activities.

In an overview and appendices, this report provides background information on and discusses issues related to the DoD's role in providing U.S. foreign assistance and undertaking foreign assistance-type activities. Topics include the types of assistance DoD provides, the authorities under which DoD conducts its programs, and coordination and cooperation mechanisms between DoD and other agencies. The report begins with a brief introduction to the three areas in which DoD plays a role in foreign assistance and to Congress's part in authorizing that role. Next, the report briefly discusses the general evolution of DoD's role and the Department of State's current perception of that role based on current national security needs. The report then provides an overview of the evolution of the DoD role and current activities in the three areas cited above, with a snapshot of the varying perspectives on the DoD roles in these areas. Finally, the report discusses issues that Congress may wish to consider. The appendices provide more detailed information on the current and most significant foreign assistance programs in which DoD plays a role.

This report refers to a *Department of Defense* role in foreign assistance rather than a *U.S. military* role because DoD may use either military troops or civilian contractors, or both, to implement programs. The term *U.S. military* is used only for activities in which U.S. troops are used exclusively.

2. The term *counterterrorism* in this report refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

3. Several recent reports reflect these perceptions. Two of these are congressional reports: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, Washington, D.C., December 2006 (hereafter referred to as 2006 SFRC Report) and U.S. Congress, House, *Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008* to accompany H.R. 1585, S.Rept. 110-447, Section 952, December 6, 2007. Two were produced by Washington, D.C.-based think tanks: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*, Final Report of the Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance, CSIS Report, December 2007 (hereafter referred to as CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007); and Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role*, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 131, November 2007 (hereafter referred to as *The Pentagon and Global Development*). Another was produced by an international organization: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, *The United States: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, 2006, p. 15, (hereafter referred to as the DAC Peer Review 2006). Another was produced by a group of non-governmental organizations: George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, *Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy*, a joint publication of the Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, March 2008.

Overview: DoD's Evolving Response to Perceived Needs

DoD's perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time. During the years in which the United States' primary national security threats were posed by other States, there were differing perspectives within DoD on the use of the military in non-combat roles. With the fall of the Soviet Union, these differences sharpened. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DoD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DoD in the creation of extensive international (and interagency) "partnerships," as well as an expanded DoD role in foreign assistance activities.

The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) is the first key document that reflects the evolution of DoD thinking as it grapples with the implications of 9/11 for U.S. national security and U.S. defense policy.⁴ The assertion of top U.S. defense officials and military leaders that DoD needs "new and more flexible" authorities to operate in the current strategic environment forms the rationale for DoD's request for new authorities,⁵ especially to advance a new "Partnership Strategy."⁶

As outlined in the 2006 QDR, the Partnership Strategy is one of DoD's key tools for the United States' "long war" against a new threat — that is, the decentralized networks of "violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice," who "will likely attempt to use" weapons of mass destruction "in their conflict with free people everywhere."⁷ Countering such networks, as well as the rogue powers that may sponsor them, will require "long-duration, complex operations involving the U.S. military, other government agencies and international partners," which are waged simultaneously in multiple countries.⁸ To do so will also require that the United States "assist others in developing the wherewithal to protect their own populations and police their own territories, as well as to project and sustain forces to promote collective security."⁹

4. U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report. (QDR)* February 6, 2006. (Hereafter referred to as 2006 QDR.) The QDR is a congressionally mandated report (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 118) produced every four years that delineates a national defense strategy consistent with the President's most recent National Security Strategy, based on the perceived threats to U.S. interests, and defines the necessary force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, budget, and other elements to carry out that defense strategy. The 2002 National Security Strategy, the most recent before the 2006 QDR, sets forth eight tasks for the U.S. government, among them four, which directly involve DoD: (1) "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends"; (2) "work with others to defuse regional conflicts"; (3) "prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction"; and (4) "transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century." pp. 1-2.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 83. The full quote states: "The ability to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, 'military diplomacy' and complex interagency coalition operations are essential — but in many cases require new and more flexible authorities from the Congress."

6. 2006 QDR, *op. cit.* The previous QDR, although published in late September 2001, was written and cleared before the 9/11 attacks.

7. *Ibid.*, p. v.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

In the 2006 QDR, as elsewhere, DoD maintains that developing the foreign “wherewithal” to enhance domestic and collective security requires a “whole of government” approach. Through the November 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05, entitled the Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, defense leaders mandated that DoD “be prepared to conduct and support” civilian agencies in conducting SSTR operations, but also indicated doubt that civilian agencies will create the needed capabilities to carry out state-building tasks. Thus, while DoD acknowledges that state-building tasks may be “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” it also sees a need to develop its own capability to perform “all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”¹⁰ As reflected in the 2006 QDR, DoD is placing a new emphasis on the utility of non-combat foreign assistance activities and expects to continue to play an important, if not a proportionately expanding, role in U.S. foreign assistance in the developing world.

DoD subsequently reiterated these points. In October 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates referred to this new perception of the DoD role: “And until our government decides to plus up our civilian agencies like the Agency for International Development [USAID], Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy — where they must stay.”¹¹ This theme was once again repeated in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, which found that U.S. forces had “stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development, and governance” and that the “U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities,” while noting “this is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.”¹²

In a report to Congress in mid-2007, the State Department had argued in favor of new permanent DoD authorities. It viewed such authorities, including several mentioned below, as a means “to provide a flexible, timely, and effective whole-of government approach to today’s security environment that is well coordinated in the interagency [coordination process] both in Washington at the policy level and in the field at the operational level, and with appropriate, relevant oversight by Congress.”¹³

10. The November 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05, the Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Hereafter referred to as DoD Directive 3000.05.) This directive discusses state-building tasks as part of stability operations. It is the first DoD document to designate stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission.” The state-building tasks it specifically lists are helping to rebuild indigenous institutions, including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; reviving or building the private sector, and developing representative governmental institutions. This directive may be accessed at [<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm>]; last accessed July 22, 2008. For more on this topic, see CRS Report RL33557, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, by Nina M. Serafino.

11. U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2007. Accessed through [<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches>]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

12. U.S. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 17. In the same paragraph, this document stated: “Greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations successful and to relieve stress on the men and women of the armed forces. Having permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could also make it less likely that military forces will need to be deployed in the first place.”

13. U.S. Department of State. *Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act*. Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. July 3, 2007. Hereafter referred to as the *Section 1206(f) 2006 NDAA Report*. This report is available through the Department of State website: [<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/spec/90867.htm>]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

The following sections discuss DoD's traditional and current responsibilities in disaster assistance and humanitarian activities, assistance to foreign militaries, and assistance in other state-building areas. They also discuss recent proposals for enhanced authorities as spelled out in the QDR and related legislation submitted to Congress.

Responding to Humanitarian and Basic Needs

DoD engagement in U.S. government disaster relief and humanitarian assistance activities is longstanding, with U.S. military forces playing an important role in U.S. disaster assistance since at least the 19th century.¹⁴ DoD also plays a role in other humanitarian emergency situations, such as providing aid and protection for relief workers in cases of famine or forced population movements. More routine humanitarian assistance activities and civic action programs abroad date back at least to the turn of the 20th century; these usually take place in the context of U.S. training exercises or military operations.

Evolution of Humanitarian Programs, Authorities, and Funding Since the 1980s

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress provided specific DoD authorities for humanitarian aid as the Reagan Administration's civilian leadership sought means to support its allies in conflicts in Central America and Afghanistan. During that period, Congress provided specific authority to DoD to (1) provide non-lethal excess property and supplies from the DoD stocks when requested by the State Department and for distribution by the State Department; (2) provide space available military transportation for private donors to send supplies and food to needy foreign populations; and (3) carry out civic assistance programs that involve small-scale construction, reconstruction, and maintenance projects, and provide limited medical attention to rural populations. (See **Appendices A and C.**)

Since then, Congress has somewhat modified and expanded DoD disaster response and humanitarian programs, incorporating aid to mitigate environmental disasters and demining training, and has introduced separate health programs. (See **Appendices A, B, and C.**) Thus, DoD disaster and humanitarian aid now encompasses a broader range of potential assistance than the basic humanitarian relief of food and emergency supplies provided by non-governmental organizations. In 1994, Congress established the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) DoD budget account to fund many of these programs.¹⁵

Disaster Relief and Related Humanitarian Assistance

The DoD role in providing disaster relief to foreign populations when natural and manmade disasters strike serves both foreign affairs and military needs. The lead authority for disaster response is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DoD participation is conducted on the direction of the President or at the request of the State Department, through the appropriate U.S. ambassador. Nevertheless, DoD is often the first U.S. agency to respond to foreign disasters and other humanitarian crises because of its readily deployable resources. DoD international emergency responses allow the United States to contribute effectively in alleviating suffering abroad and enhancing the country's international image, as well as the U.S. domestic and foreign image of the U.S. military. (See **Appendix A.**) Such activities are also undertaken for strategic or foreign policy reasons. A famous post-World War II example of such motivation was the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift, when U.S. Air Force and [British] Royal Air Force

14. Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 63.

15. Section 1411, PL 103-337, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1995. The account was first authorized at \$86 million. It was established to cover activities under 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404 (newly established by that bill), 2547, and 2551.

flights of relief supplies to Soviet-blockaded West Berlin demonstrated a U.S. and U.K. commitment to a strategically important area.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance in the Context of Military Training and Operations

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs, as currently conducted, usually take place in the context of training exercises and military operations. In that context, they are carried out as much for the U.S. military to gain situational awareness and the support of local populations as to alleviate suffering. When provided under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 401), the primary purpose of the program must be to train U.S. armed forces. In addition, the assistance must not duplicate any other assistance, and it must meet the security interests of both the United States and the host country. Section 401 authority has been often used for training exercises for the National Guard, and for military reserve personnel and active duty personnel in certain specialties, especially medical personnel. U.S. Special Operations Forces also conduct humanitarian assistance activities as an adjunct to military training exercises with foreign militaries and as an integral part of stability and counterinsurgency operations. The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises with friendly foreign militaries are conducted under 10 U.S.C. 2011, primarily for the benefit of training the Special Operations Forces, but humanitarian assistance programs such as medical and veterinary visits may be added to cultivate goodwill among local populations and as part of the training for foreign troops.

U.S. humanitarian and civic assistance activities also can be an integral part of military operations. During the Korean and Vietnam conflict eras, military civic action programs that included medical assistance were an integral part of military efforts. Now, in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, teams of U.S. Special Operations Forces work together with foreign militaries on small-scale humanitarian and civic action projects. The primary purposes of humanitarian and civic assistance in such operations are to extend the reach of the national government, enhance its legitimacy among local populations, and cultivate relationships and trust that may lead to information sharing on terrorists' locations and planned activities.¹⁶

New DoD Health Programs

Recently, Congress has added new health programs to the humanitarian assistance portfolio of the U.S. military. Beginning in FY 2000, Congress has provided funds through the Defense Health Program to educate foreign military forces in HIV prevention activities in conjunction with U.S. military training exercises and humanitarian assistance activities in Africa. Subsequently, other DoD health programs have been added. (See **Appendix B**.)

Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Commander's Emergency Response Program Funds in Afghanistan and Iraq

Congress provides special funding and authorities for programs with a humanitarian assistance component in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. The DoD-lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and State Department-led units in Iraq, for which DoD provides security, are central to U.S. efforts to promote host government authority and stability to areas outside the capitals in those countries. These integrated civilian and military teams count humanitarian assistance among their tools to provide stability in difficult areas, extend the reach of the central government, strengthen local governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stimulate local economies. In addition, commanders on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq use Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds,

16. Authors' interview with DoD officials, January 2008.

which Congress appropriates, to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.¹⁷ (See **Appendix K**.)

Funding Accounts

For many years, prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, funding for DoD disaster response and humanitarian assistance projects was appropriated annually in the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) Account. This account covers disaster response and a variety of other humanitarian assistance programs codified under six Title 10 authorities.¹⁸ Congress gradually increased appropriations for OHDACA from \$49.7 million in FY 2002 to \$63.204 million in FY 2007.¹⁹ These funds were available for one fiscal year. For FY 2008, Congress appropriated \$40 million in that account specifically for disaster relief and response, to be available for two fiscal years (i.e., through FY 2009), and an additional \$63.3 million to be available for those purposes for three fiscal years (i.e., through FY 2010). The Administration's FY 2009 OHDACA request is for \$83.273 million in new money.

17. CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. It initially used Iraqi funds for use in that country. Subsequently, Congress has provided CERP funding for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress first provided up to \$180 million for the *Commander's* Emergency Response Program in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, PL 108-106, Section 1110, November 6, 2003. (Hereafter referred to as the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.) Congress subsequently provided additional funds: up to \$854 million in FY2005, up to \$500 million each for FY2006 and FY2007, and up to \$500 million thus far for FY2008. (See the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, PL 108-375, Section 1201, as amended by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, PL 109-12, Section 1006; the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, PL 109-163, Section 1202; and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, PL 110-161, Section 606(a)). Note that the spelling for the first word in the name of this program is not consistent; it is sometimes spelled *Commanders'*. This report uses the spelling first used in legislation.

18. These are 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561 (previously 2551). Section 401 authorizes DoD to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in host nations in conjunction with military operations. Section 402, popularly referred to as the Denton Amendment, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transport, without charge, humanitarian supplies (as well as supplies that respond to serious threats to the environment if other transport is not available) that have been provided by a non-governmental source to any country on a space available basis. Section 404 authorizes the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to provide international disaster assistance to prevent the loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. Section 407 provides authority for humanitarian demining assistance. Section 2557 authorizes providing nonlethal excess DoD supplies for humanitarian relief. Section 2561 provides additional authority for the transport of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide, as well as authority to transport supplies to respond to or mitigate serious harm to the environment.

19. The amounts in the intervening years were \$58.4 million for FY2003, \$59.0 million for each FY 2004 and FY 2005, and \$61.546 million for FY2006. Figures from annual DoD appropriations acts.

The Bush Administration is seeking monies for humanitarian purposes under a longstanding DoD account, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), that provides funds to combatant commanders for a variety of purposes. In its FY 2009 budget request, the Bush Administration asked for \$100 million for the CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. Over the past decade at least, Congress has appropriated \$25 million in annual DoD appropriation bills for the CCIF, and additional amounts in FY 2005-FY 2007 supplemental appropriations legislation, but thus far the CCIF does not appear to have been used extensively for humanitarian projects.²⁰ (The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2009, S. 3001, would authorize \$75 million for the CCIF, for use worldwide except in Iraq and Afghanistan as long as the CERP is available in those countries.)²¹

Perspectives on Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. officials state that DoD has instructed military commanders to look more broadly than in the past at humanitarian assistance, employing it as a component of U.S. security cooperation with foreign nations.²² Guidance to U.S. combatant commanders has stated that DoD regards humanitarian assistance as “foremost a tool for achieving U.S. security objectives,” which can also serve several “complementary security goals.”²³ The “complementary” goals cited are “improving DoD visibility, access, influence, interoperability, and coalition building with military and civilian host nation counterparts; building/reinforcing security and stability in a host nation or region; generating positive public relations and goodwill for DoD that will enhance our ability to shape the regional security environment; bolstering host nation capacity to respond to disasters ... and promoting specific operational readiness skills of US military personnel.”²⁴ The 2006 QDR places humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations under the rubric of “humanitarian and early preventive measures” and claims that the use of such measures can “prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.”²⁵ State Department officials welcome the

20. U.S. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification*, February 4, 2008, p.103. When codified in 1991 (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 166a), the CCIF (then known as the CINC Initiative Fund), provided funds for exercises and military education and training of foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil assistance.” A 2006 amendment changed “civil assistance” to “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a priority category, “particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation.” (John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, PL 109-364, Section 902.) To this point, this fund may not have been used for extensively for humanitarian programs. In response to a Congressional Research Service request for information in 2007, DoD stated that just under \$1 million had been used for humanitarian purposes from FY 2005 through FY 2007. (Information provided by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail correspondence of November 7, 2007.)

21. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009*, report to Accompany S. 3001, 110th Congress, 2nd session, S.Rept. 110-335, pp. 317-318.

22. Authors’ interview with DoD officials, December 2006.

23. Joint message from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), providing policy and program management direction for FY 2005 OHDACA planning and execution. Section 3 (General Guidance) A and B.

24. *Ibid.*, Section 3B.

25. 2006 QDR, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

U.S. military's ability to deliver disaster and humanitarian relief assistance in a timely fashion. They also tend to favor routine humanitarian assistance and civic action projects, albeit as a matter of necessity, because such projects allow the U.S. government to provide supplies and medical services to needy populations, and to construct schools and clinics in underserved areas, where funds are not otherwise available. These projects can create goodwill and personal contact for the United States, often in areas where U.S. diplomats would otherwise not venture.

DoD and U.S. military personnel attitudes toward disaster response and humanitarian relief vary. Attitudes tend to be favorable for immediate disaster response and for training exercises, particularly for National Guard and Reserve troops. Attitudes become ambivalent when U.S. military personnel are used for prolonged periods for humanitarian assistance in conventional operations.

Over the years, observers have raised a variety of concerns regarding humanitarian and civic assistance in non-emergency situations. Analysts have long faulted such assistance for sometimes being short-sighted and producing ill will when projects are not well selected.²⁶ In the 1990s, Congress scrutinized U.S. humanitarian and civic action activities in Central America.²⁷ Critics continue to view some projects as ill-conceived and at odds with sound development policy; for instance, schools built in areas where there are no teachers to staff them undermine the credibility of the United States and the host nation government, or assistance that, albeit inadvertently, benefits one ethnic group over another exacerbates ongoing conflicts.²⁸ (See **Appendix A.**) The Bush Administration has recently created new coordination mechanisms that may address such concerns. (See the section on DoD interaction with other agencies, below.)

Building Military Capacity and Capabilities

Since the early years after World War II, U.S. military assistance programs to train and equip foreign military forces have been an important component of U.S. foreign assistance and DoD has played a major role in those programs. Even though the major train and equip efforts are conducted under State Department programs, DoD has long been responsible for carrying out most of the work involved in building foreign military capacity and capabilities. Sizable military assistance programs put in place soon after World War II served the primary purpose of bolstering the defense capabilities of major allies against the Soviet Union, but in subsequent years, military assistance programs also began increasingly to serve political and diplomatic, as well as military, ends. For the past several decades, military assistance — carried out through the State Department's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs — has become an important tool of bilateral relations, intended to strengthen and cement relations with foreign governments, reward allies, and cultivate new partners. A recently added State Department program to train and equip foreign peacekeepers and a DoD program to train and equip foreign military forces for both counterterrorism missions and stability operations reflect the intention to develop capable international partners in quelling conflict and curbing terrorism. For many years, DoD training of foreign military forces was carried out by Special Operations Forces, but now DoD officials describe it as a key mission for the U.S. military as a whole.²⁹

26. See especially John W. DePauw, "Understanding Civic Action," in *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, pp. 1-7. This book presents critical views of civic action from a sympathetic perspective.

27. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Role of the DoD in Humanitarian Assistance*, hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 19, 1994, H.A.S.C. No. 103-49 (Washington: GPO, 1995).

28. The Pentagon and Global Development, *op. cit.*

29. Secretary of Defense Gates' October 2007 speech, *op. cit.*

Evolution of Military Assistance Authority

The Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949 was the legal forerunner to all major post-World War II military assistance programs. Congress passed the MDAA to provide weapons and military equipment to the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to a number of other countries.³⁰ The MDAA's successors, the Military Security Act (MSA) of 1951 and the MSA of 1954,³¹ were the major vehicles for U.S. foreign assistance until the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which stands today as current law. The MSA of 1951 created the Mutual Security Agency in the Executive Office of the President. The MSA Director was responsible for the "continuous supervision, general direction, and coordination of all foreign aid — military, economic, and technical assistance."³² Thus, during the early part of the 1950s, DoD administered the military assistance programs under the White House's policy direction and guidance.³³ Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State Department (PL 81-329, 63 Stat. 714), whose officials were charged with coordinating with DoD regarding military aid.³⁴ As described by the forerunner of the Congressional Research Service in 1959, the purpose of the State Department coordination of military aid (identified as "an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy") with other forms of aid was "to help achieve the basic policy goals decided upon by the President with the advice of the National Security Council" (NSC).³⁵

Origins of State Department Programs and Oversight

As economic and development assistance became the U.S. government's preferred tool for countering Soviet influence in the developing world, Congress entrusted the State Department with the leadership role for foreign assistance, including military assistance, when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)

30. The MDAA (PL 81-329, 63 Stat. 714) authorized military aid to the original NATO nations (Canada and 10 European nations) and to Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan. CRS Report 85-91 F, *An Overview of United States Military Assistance Programs*, by Richard F. Grimmett. This archived report is available from the author.

31. PL 82-165 (65 Stat. 373) and PL 83-665 (68 Stat. 832).

32. The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, *U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and Related Information*, February 27, 1959, pp. 139-140. Hereafter referred to as "U.S. Foreign Aid."

33. With the creation of a Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1953 to administer economic aid and technical assistance, the Secretary of Defense was also subject to coordination with and supervision by the FOA Director, who reported directly to the President. Congress divested the FOA director of responsibility for supervising military aid in 1954. U.S. Foreign Aid, *ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

34. In 1955, Congress established the International Cooperation Administration within the State Department, among whose functions was coordinating nonmilitary aid with DoD administered military aid. Congress moved coordination responsibility to a higher level, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, when it created that post in 1958. U.S. Foreign Aid, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

35. U.S. Foreign Aid, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

of 1961.³⁶ Since then, with the exception of the period inclusive of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the major foreign military assistance programs — the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and the International Military Education Training (IMET) program — have been carried out under State Department oversight and guidance.³⁷ These programs are implemented, however, by a DoD agency: the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the DoD Under Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor.³⁸ (See **Appendices D and E.**) In 2005, Congress created a third State Department train and equip program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to provide training in peacekeeping skills and related equipment to foreign militaries. (See **Appendix I.**)

DoD Education and Training Programs

In addition to the major programs to build foreign military capacity under State Department authority, Congress authorizes and funds DoD to conduct a wide variety of smaller military-to military education and training programs. These offer foreign military personnel the opportunity to attend U.S. military education and training programs, in addition to those funded under IMET, as well as conferences and meetings. They also provide the U.S. military with important opportunities to cultivate relations with foreign military officers. Congress generally requires all such activities to be conducted with the approval

36. As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.” The original, 1961 language of Section 622(c) stated that the section applied to “assistance programs authorized by this Act...” A 1976 amendment deleted this limitation. (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, PL 94-329, Section 543(b)(2)(B)). The Arms Export Control Act, which as of 1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, be responsible for “the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter...” (PL 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752.)

37. Foreign Military Financing, as well as Foreign Military Sales, are carried out under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended (PL 90-629). Section 2(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2752) states that nothing contained in the Act “shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.” Section 2(b) states that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this Act...”

38. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) became the DSCA in 1999. In 2000, DoD Directive 5105.65 expanded the responsibilities originally carried out by the DSAA. Among other tasks, DSCA helps develop, coordinate, and implement security and cooperation assistance plans and programs, including FMS, FMF, IMET, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian civic action, mine action training, and other programs. More information is available on its website, at [<http://www.dsca.osd.mil>]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

of the Secretary of State.³⁹ Combatant commanders may also use up to \$5 million from the CCIF in any fiscal year “to provide military education and training (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses) to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries....”⁴⁰

DoD Counternarcotics Train and Equip Support

Under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 124), DoD is the lead U.S. government agency on the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal narcotics into the United States, but it falls under the oversight of the Secretary of State, who is charged with coordinating counternarcotics assistance (22 U.S.C. 2291). Since the 1990s, DoD has provided training and related support to foreign militaries and law enforcement authorities for counternarcotics purposes under authorities that Congress extends regularly in annual defense authorization legislation. (See **Appendix F**.) Under “Section 1004” authority, first established in 1990 to enable DoD to support counterdrug agencies and currently extended through FY 2011,⁴¹ DoD may provide training and other support to improve foreign counternarcotics capabilities at the request of any U.S. federal department or agency, or of any U.S. state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency. Under “Section 1033” authority, first established in 1997 and currently extended through FY 2008,⁴² DoD may provide patrol, boats, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment to designated foreign governments and maintain and repair those items. Originally provided for Colombia and Peru, this authority now covers 16 more countries. Human rights concerns have figured prominently in congressional consideration of the DoD role in counternarcotics programs. Largely in response to such concerns, in 1998, Congress placed a restriction in the DoD appropriations bill prohibiting U.S. training of foreign military units for which credible evidence exists of gross violations of human rights.⁴³ This restriction has been extended annually but is less restrictive than the provision in foreign operations appropriations, first enacted in 1997 and codified in 2007, which prohibits the use of State Department

39. Numerous DoD educational institutions offer education and training to foreign students. The military service schools offer such opportunities, as do the DoD regional centers for security studies (i.e., the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies [the last three of which are at the National Defense University]). The Political-Military Bureau at the State Department publishes an annual report entitled *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest*, as required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 656 (22 U.S.C. 2416). The State Department publishes the unclassified portions of the report on its website.

40. 10 U.S.C. 166a(e)(C).

41. NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, PL 101-510, Section 1004 (10 U.S.C. 374 note); last extended and amended by the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, PL 109-364, Section 1021.

42. NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, PL 105-85, Section 1033, last amended and extended through legislation including the FY 2007 John Warner NDAA, PL 109-364, Section 1022.

43. Department of Defense Appropriations, 1999, PL 105-262, Section 8130 and restated in annual defense appropriations acts thereafter, most recently in, DoD Appropriations, 2008 (PL 110-116, Section 8062). The latest version of the “Leahy Amendment” states that none of the funds made available by the Act “may be used to support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.” The Secretary of Defense may waive this provision if he determines that “such a waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.” The earlier version forbid the use of funds “if a member of” a potential recipient unit had committed such a violation.

funds for any assistance to military units for which credible evidence is found of gross violations of human rights.⁴⁴

DoD “Section 1206” Military Capacity Building Authority for Counterterrorism and Stability Operations

In 2005, Congress provided DoD with authority and funds for a major DoD-run train and equip program. Established by Section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 as a temporary “pilot program,” this “Foreign Military Capacity Building” authority allows DoD to transfer funds to train and equip foreign militaries to enable those forces to better conduct counterterrorism operations or to “participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces” participate.⁴⁵ Currently in effect through FY 2008, this “Section 1206” authority has provided up to \$200 million in FY 2006 and up to \$300 million in FY 2007 and FY 2008 to meet needs that emerged after the planning cycle for the regular budget submission. This authority is subject to strict conditionality. The original FY 2006 legislation required a presidential initiative to initiate a program; in FY 2007, this was changed to permit the Secretary of Defense to authorize a program with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Although the legislation does not require the Secretary of State’s “approval,” DoD and the State Department currently interpret “concurrence” to mean “approval.”⁴⁶ (See **Appendix H**.)

DoD Desire for Permanent Foreign Military and Police Capacity Building Authority

In 2007, Congress denied a DoD request to significantly expand Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign military forces, substantially increase the funding, and make it permanent. In May 2007, DoD had proposed legislation for “Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign Military and Other Security Forces” that would provide a new, permanent DoD authority to spend (or to transfer to the Department of State or other federal agency) up to \$750 million per year to train and equip foreign

44. The comprehensive version of the human rights provision popularly known as the Leahy Amendment (i.e., the ban on any foreign operations assistance to foreign security forces for which credible evidence was found of gross violations of human rights) was first enacted as Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (PL 105-118), and in annual foreign operations appropriations thereafter. Earlier versions of this restriction had applied to specific countries, programs, or funding accounts; e.g., such a restriction was placed on counternarcotics assistance in the section on the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control account, PL 104-208, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997. Section 651 of Division J, PL 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, codifies this restriction at Section 620J (22 U.S.C. 2378d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This provides that no assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act “to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.” An exception is made if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to Congress that the government of a country “is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.”

45. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, PL 109-163, Conference Report H.Rept. 109-360, p. 801, and the FY 2007 John Warner NDAA Conference Report H.Rept. 109-702, p. 833.

46. A DoD FY 2009 budget document states that under the “dual-key” approval system developed for Section 1206 programs, U.S. embassies and the military combatant commands are encouraged to jointly formulate programs and the responsible embassy and command “must approve each program explicitly in writing.” U.S. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification*, February 4, 2008, p. 103.

military and security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support military and stability operations. There would be no requirement, as in Section 1206, that training for military and stability operations be tied to operations in which the U.S. military participated. The extension would permit DoD to train and equip gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. Rejecting the strict conditionality of Section 1206, DoD proposed that the Secretary of State be permitted to waive any restrictions that might apply. In 2007, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) expressed skepticism regarding an extension of the program “in the absence of ... an established record of success.”⁴⁷

In its FY 2009 budget request, the Bush Administration asked Congress to codify an expanded version of Section 1206 that would increase the annual authorization to \$750 million and include a broad array of security forces in addition to military forces. The House version of the bill would extend current authority through FY 2010 (Section 1206, H.R. 5658, the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY 2009). The Senate version of the NDAA for FY 2009 (Section 1204, S. 3001) would extend Section 1206 authority through FY 2011, increasing the annual authorization to \$400 million. It would also authorize the use of funds for security forces whose primary mission is counterterrorism, subject to the police training restrictions of 22 U.S.C. 2420. (See the section below on civilian capabilities for substantive objections to such authority.)

Perspectives on Building Foreign Military and Other Security Force Capacity

DoD views training for foreign military and other security forces as an expanding area, and seeks expanded authorities for DoD programs. The 2006 QDR calls for DoD to “improve and increase IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping relationships and developing future foreign leaders.”⁴⁸ More specifically, it recommends the expansion of DoD and State Department authorities “to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations,” noting that these “may be non-military law enforcement or other security forces...”⁴⁹ In late 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates identified “the standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police” as “a key mission for the military as a whole.”⁵⁰

47. In its report on the NDAA for FY 2008, HASC stated that it had provided DoD with the limited Section 1206 authority over the past two years, despite the State Department’s historical responsibility for foreign military capacity building, because of DoD’s expression of “strong interest” in the program. Congress, however, according to HASC, “has clearly and strongly discouraged further legislative proposals to expand or make permanent DoD’s ‘train and equip’ authorities in the absence of this required report and an established track record of success.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008*, report of the Committee of Armed Services on H.R. 1585 together with additional views, 110th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 110-146, part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 401. Hereafter referred to as HASC. Report 110-146 on the FY 2008 NDAA.

48. 2006 QDR, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

49. 2006 QDR, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

50. He suggested that this is in contrast to the past, when only Special Operations Forces focused on training missions, but the inclusion of “police” — historically the province of other agencies — may be telling. See U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the “Landon Lecture” delivered at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Accessed through [<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches>]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

In the post-9/11 environment, some defense analysts have urged policy makers to develop more expeditious mechanisms for the United States to provide military training and military support. DoD officials argue that the routine planning processes through the traditional State Department “train and equip” authorities are too cumbersome and time-consuming, reflecting political rather than operational military needs, with the planning, budgeting, and implementation cycle taking two to three years. On the other hand, some Members of Congress have faulted Section 1206 for lacking enough added value to justify making permanent a major train and equip program outside the State Department’s authority. In a December 2006 report, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated its concern that the program was used largely to fund areas where the U.S. military sought to enhance military-to-military relations rather than to meet emerging needs.⁵¹ The committee recommended that all security assistance, including that administered under Section 1206, be placed under State Department control.

Similarly, in line with a 2006 QDR recommendation⁵² and the desire for more flexibility in providing assistance to allies and friendly states, DoD has also sought broader reimbursement authority for coalition support forces and expanded logistics support to other States “partnering” with the United States. Congress has been more responsive to these requests. (See **Appendix L**.)

Strengthening Foreign Governments Against Internal and International Threats

DoD has supported foreign governments’ efforts to counter internal and international threats with assistance that goes beyond help to foreign military forces. In many situations, and currently in Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD has played a significant, if not a leading, role in tasks related to nation-building or state-building. Such tasks include helping establish or strengthen rule of law capabilities (police, judicial, and prison institutions and facilities), reinforcing the administrative capacity of central governments, strengthening local governments in rural areas, and bolstering national economies. Such state-building support is now widely perceived as a means to deter or control internal and international threats. Although U.S. military personnel carry out this role most often in combat situations, where the presence of untrained, unarmed civilians may be a liability, they may also carry out this role because of a shortage of trained civilian personnel. Because the circumstances have varied greatly, such assistance has usually been carried out under a mix of authorities and programs.

Historical Precedents and Current Activities

The most notable example of U.S. military involvement in state-building occurred in the post-World War II military occupations of Germany and Japan, although there are earlier examples, such as the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines around the turn of the 20th century. In the 1990s, DoD personnel

51. 2006 SFRC Report, *op. cit.* “Section 1206 assistance, with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing threats to the United States that are so immediate that ... [they] cannot be included in normal budget processes. The Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her authority in the new process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.” p. 3.

52. 2006 QDR, *op. cit.* The recommendation is to expand DoD authority to provide logistics support, supplies and services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement if necessary, to enable them to participate in operations with U.S. armed forces. Two related recommendations are to “Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund, and, as appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision devices for use by coalition partners” and to “Expand Department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition partners for use in military operations in which they are participating with U.S. forces.” pp. 89-90.

provided such assistance in peacekeeping and postconflict operations as part of military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Sometimes DoD provides such assistance to foreign governments as part of military counterterrorism, internal defense, and counterinsurgency efforts. Special operations forces teams carry out a variety of state-building activities, to strengthen local leaders and defuse ethnic and other rivalries, as part of their civic assistance projects. Congress also provides DoD with authority to train and otherwise assist foreign law enforcement officials to perform counternarcotics operations, although there is no standard source for determining the degree to which DoD provides such support.

Activities in Iraq and Afghanistan

In Iraq and Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) carry out state-building political and economic activities, in addition to civic assistance and humanitarian activities. Although no data are available on the extent to which state-building activities are directed or conducted by U.S. military personnel, soldiers may be involved when there are not enough civilian members of a PRT.

U.S. military field commanders in those countries carry out reconstruction projects with CERP funds, with each major subordinate commander authorized to approve grants up to \$500,000. Originally intended to help military commanders establish stability in hostile areas, CERP has now become a main source of funding for infrastructure development.⁵³ (See **Appendix K** on DoD in Iraq and Afghanistan Economic Reconstruction.) Congress has thus far denied Administration requests to extend CERP funding authority for DoD use on a worldwide basis.⁵⁴

In Iraq, DoD's large role in infrastructure reconstruction has been unusual. While the State Department and USAID were tapped to manage early economic assistance programs in Iraq, DoD was called on in 2004 to carry out the largest infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, DoD's own Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) also was initially found insufficient to manage the task, and DoD contracted the job directly with private companies. ACE was subsequently tapped for a management role. Although the State Department assumed responsibility in 2005 for setting priorities for most aid programs, DoD developed, and Congress funded, a DoD program to rehabilitate some 200 Iraqi firms that had been state-owned under the Hussein regime, without either State Department or USAID input. (See **Appendix K**.)

Perspectives on State-Building. Much of DoD's state-building activities have thus far been carried out within the context of military operations. For many years, DoD and U.S. military leaders rejected a nation-building role, arguing that it was not appropriate for U.S. military forces and detracted from combat readiness. As defense analysts and military personnel began to perceive state-building as essential to the success of peacekeeping and related operations, attitudes began to shift about the desirability of the U.S. military role in state-building. In 2005, DoD Directive 3000.05 identified state-building as key to the success of stability operations and stated that "U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so."⁵⁵

53. Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*, 07-015, October 18, 2007, pp. 23-34. Hereafter referred to as SIGIR Review of PRT Effectiveness.

54. The HASC, in its report on the FY2008 NDAA, stated that current DoD authority for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance under Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 20 and 10 U.S.C. 2561 can be used by field commanders without bureaucratic obstacles. HASC Report 110-146 on the FY 2008 NDAA, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

55. DoD Directive 3000.05, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Critics find DoD state-building activities marred by a lack of both strategic planning and application of economic development “best practices,” by the absence of civilian input and integration with civilian efforts, and by insufficient oversight. Some critics, however, recognize that the context in which some of these activities are undertaken can justify their ad hoc nature, short-term objectives, and lack of civilian expertise, and note that DoD has made efforts to improve soldiers’ ability to carry out such tasks.⁵⁶ Concerns focus on the extension of state-building activities to non-conflict situations; for example, extending CERP authority worldwide, as requested by the Administration, without more State Department control, or activities of combatant commands, especially Africa Command, might lead to perceptions that the United States is “militarizing” its foreign policy.

Defense experts implicitly acknowledged a factual basis for at least some criticisms of its state-building role by expressly stating in 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05 that civilians would be better suited to accomplish political, social, and economic tasks in many circumstances. Nevertheless, DoD officials regard the United States as faced with a strategic imperative to undertake such activities in the new global environment, and the U.S. military as charged with performing them where civilians cannot. DoD officials are currently grappling with the many issues and tradeoffs involved in better preparing military forces to carry out a wide variety of political, social, and economic tasks for stabilization and reconstruction, as well as other activities, alone or in conjunction with civilian personnel, in the absence of civilian personnel.⁵⁷ An important part of this task for DoD, the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies is to determine and prioritize an appropriate civil-military division of labor in non-combat areas.

With DoD’s renewed request in 2008 to expand Section 1206 to allow training of foreign police and related security forces (including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, and infrastructure) in addition to military forces, Congress is faced with a sensitive issue. Since at least the 1970s, Congress has been concerned with the possible human rights implications of U.S. assistance to foreign police forces in general, and DoD assistance in particular.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, many analysts argue that many more foreign police personnel are needed, especially gendarmes trained in both police and military skills, for

56. For example, see 2006 CSIS Task Force Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-20.

57. A May 2006 DoD memo on implementing the 2006 QDR strategy states that DoD “must be prepared to grow a new team of leaders and operators, who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures, working with local networks, operating alongside or within United Nations organizations, and working alongside non-governmental organizations to further US and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quiet influence — rather than through military force alone. To support this effort, new approaches to education assignments and career incentives, as well as new authorities are needed.” Deputy Secretary of Defense, *Memorandum on Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity (BCP) Execution Roadmap (unclassified)*, May 22, 2006. p. 6.

58. Congress has limited the assistance that U.S. government agencies can provide to foreign police forces since the 1970s, when such assistance was provided to police forces that were perceived of as violating human rights. Over the years, Congress has loosened restrictions by adding statutory exceptions to the codified prohibition on police training (Section 660 of the 1961 FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2420) for certain situations and providing exceptions for assistance to certain countries and situations elsewhere in law. Currently, the U.S. government provides assistance through the State Department and the Justice Department to foreign police forces in many countries. In addition, as mentioned above, since the 1990s, Congress has authorized DoD to provide training and other assistance to police forces and other law enforcement officials for counternarcotics purposes.

post-conflict operations,⁵⁹ and some might prefer that DoD provide personnel to fill that training gap, especially in major post-conflict zones.

Major Issues and Options for Congress

What Are the Effects of DoD Activities on U.S. Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy Goals?

DoD is involved in a broad range of foreign assistance activities. U.S. military personnel deploy as first responders to foreign disasters and provide humanitarian relief and basic needs assistance in other urgent situations. U.S. military personnel also provide medical and veterinary assistance and civic support (such as the construction or repair of small educational and medical facilities) as a routine part of their training and as part of military operations. U.S. troops routinely train foreign military forces and are authorized to train police forces for counternarcotics missions. Recently, in the context of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere, they have provided humanitarian assistance and taken on state-building tasks related to political and economic development. For the past several years, DoD has worked to enhance its own capabilities to carry out state-building and to draw on civilian advice. It has also urged Congress to enhance the capabilities of civilian agencies to form partnerships with DoD in those activities.

DoD stresses a national security imperative for its activities in the foreign assistance area. Critics, however, most often judge DoD involvement in foreign assistance activities in terms of its effect on foreign relations and foreign policy goals. The following sections recapitulate the perceived benefits and liabilities of that involvement.

Summary of Benefits

The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DoD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military's capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, promoting the image of the United States as an humanitarian actor.⁶⁰ Especially in conflict situations, military forces can provide needed security, intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, command and control and communications capabilities, and maritime support.⁶¹ Humanitarian assistance also provides a means to cultivate good relations with

59. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has published several works pointing to this gap. Recent publications include one on building U.S. police capacity to fill the gap, while another discusses the work of an Italian school to train constabulary police. See Robert M. Perito, "U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations," *USIP Special Report 191*, August 2007, and Michael Dziedzic and Colonel Christine Stark, "Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations," *USIPeace Briefing*, June 2006. Both last accessed through [<http://www.usip.org>], July 22, 2008.

60. While the military can move quickly once authorized to deploy, one author points out that "The decision-making processes that activate them [i.e., military personnel] may reduce their respective advantage." Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1966, p. 151. Hereafter referred to as *Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda*.

61. This list of benefits is taken from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee, (OECD/DAC) Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operations, *Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict: Comparative Advantages and Costs*, Paris: OECD, 1998, pp. 12-15. (Hereafter cited as OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs.) This document also lists a military advantage providing a response to a possible future use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (p. 15).

foreign populations, militaries, and governments. For U.S. diplomacy, military training and other security assistance can be a potent tool to cultivate or cement relations with foreign governments.

U.S. military personnel view humanitarian assistance and military training and education and other opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Such opportunities help soldiers enhance their skills to operate in a variety of foreign environments and establish contacts with foreign military personnel that may serve them in future operations. Since 9/11, DoD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations and regional organizations and to participate with the United States in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Summary of Critiques

Observers have advanced several critiques of the DoD role. These deal with the effects on humanitarian activities of nongovernmental organizations; the implications for foreign policy objectives, including counterterrorism, economic development, and state-building and democracy promotion; and the relative effectiveness of civilian versus military personnel.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that carry out humanitarian missions hold mixed views on DoD humanitarian assistance activities. They generally do not criticize the use of the U.S. military in first response disaster relief operations. Some are critical, however, of the use of U.S. military forces in a broad range of “humanitarian and basic needs” activities in conflict areas. Although military forces can provide needed security in unstable environments, in some situations, military involvement in humanitarian assistance can be problematic. Especially when military personnel are directly involved in providing humanitarian assistance and other humanitarian acts, military assistance can be viewed as jeopardizing the lives and work of NGO personnel by stigmatizing them as participants in a military effort. These criticisms were provoked by the U.S. military’s humanitarian role in Afghanistan, where non-governmental humanitarian aid workers felt their neutrality was compromised by soldiers in civilian dress who distributed humanitarian aid as part of military operations. Since then, DoD has made an effort to engage nongovernmental aid workers and to develop means to work together. While some humanitarian relief NGOs now welcome the security that military forces can provide in hostile areas, others still feel that their lives are endangered by the proximity of soldiers engaged in humanitarian activities. In areas without U.S. military involvement, local populations may also take the use of military personnel for such activities as a prelude to military action or intervention.⁶²

The use of military forces may also impede the advancement of foreign policy goals. For instance, the December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, viewed the use of DoD personnel for counterterrorism programs as an obstacle: “In Latin America, especially, military and intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda.”⁶³ As pointed out in **Appendix F** on counternarcotics cooperation, Mexico has resisted counternarcotics assistance that would involve the U.S.

62. 2006 SFRC Report, *op. cit.*, states that there is evidence that some host country nationals question “the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went to the northern part of the country to help local communities build wells, erect schools, and carry out other small development projects to help mitigate the consequences of a long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether the military was there to take sides in the conflict.” p. 12.

63. 2006 SFRC Report, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

military. One analyst claims that “African publics and governments have already begun to complain that U.S. engagement is increasingly military.”⁶⁴

In the area of economic development, some analysts question whether the U.S. military objectives in carrying out small-scale infrastructure projects in conjunction with exercises and operations respond to short-term exigencies rather than abiding by development “best practices” to accomplish long-term structural reforms.⁶⁵ In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, some analysts point out that “some normal development practices will inevitably take a back seat to operational realities.”⁶⁶ In the case of humanitarian and civic action activities in non-conflict areas, however, a lack of integration with long-term development plans can raise expectations of economic growth and development that cannot be fulfilled with the limited resources available.

The use of U.S. military personnel in state-building activities may convey mixed signals in activities where the objective is to promote democracy and enhance civilian control. While the use of U.S. military forces is seen as appropriate in state-building efforts that involve the training of foreign militaries, some analysts believe that it may undermine that objective when used in other state-building activities by reinforcing stereotypes in underdeveloped nations — such as that military forces are more competent than civilians — or legitimize the use of military forces for civilian governmental responsibilities. Further, some analysts believe that DoD has failed to strengthen institutional mechanisms for civilian control in its dealings with foreign militaries.⁶⁷

The lack of expertise within the military to carry out coherent plans for economic and political development in foreign nations is also considered problematic. While the placement of USAID officers within combatant commands may alleviate some of the worst problems, some analysts believe that their presence may not be sufficient to ensure that best practices are routinely applied.⁶⁸

Civilians are cited as enjoying an overall advantage in many humanitarian and state-building tasks. Military forces are, however, recognized as possessing a decided advantage in some humanitarian mission tasks, such as providing security and air support, particularly in hostile situations. Despite that military advantage, however, one study judged civilian personnel more effective in carrying out a wide range of humanitarian tasks in conflict situations. These tasks are acquiring the supplies necessary for humanitarian assistance operations, assessing and utilizing local resources, interacting with the local population, providing the most suitable medical response, managing refugee camps, and providing water

64. Gerald Loftus, “Speaking Out: Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic Dynamic,” *Foreign Service Journal*, December 2007, p. 16. (Hereafter referred to as “Expeditionary Sidekicks?”)

65. The Pentagon and Global Development, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

66. *Ibid.*

67. The Pentagon and Global Development, *op. cit.* According to this report: “While the Pentagon conducts training programs to promote professionalism and civilian control of ... foreign militaries, it gives relatively less attention to broader security sector report (SSR) — including the effort to ensure that military, police, and intelligence services and ministries are accountable to democratically-elected governments.” pp. 14-15.

68. Among the findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation that compiled the 2006 SFRC report was “that country teams in embassies with USAID presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID, affecting both personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of the world.” p. 9.

and sanitation.⁶⁹ Another study judged that although most multinational military personnel assisting with the Rwanda crisis in 1994 were “skilled in their own areas, [they] had no unique competence in such matters as refugee camp construction, community health and disease control, or shelter management. Moreover, their security preoccupations — for example, the prohibition against U.S. forces from leaving the Kigali airport, the reluctance of the Japanese to work in refugee camps — also circumscribed what the troops themselves were able to achieve.”⁷⁰

Relative Costs

There is a widespread presumption that using military forces for many humanitarian missions, military support, and state-building activities costs more than using civilian personnel for the same tasks, but analysts note the absence of reliable studies on relative costs. One 1998 study on the use of international military forces for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations judged that the use of the military is “generally more costly than civilian means” and “will far exceed the costs of providing the aid itself.” The study attributed the greater costs to the military emphasis on making its activities “fail-safe” rather than cost-effective, building into its procedures “safeguards, redundancies, and limitations that often do not exist with civilian means.... Civilian and commercial means are, in general, leaner and less redundant.”⁷¹ The study cautioned, however, that its general conclusions were “presented as hypotheses.”⁷²

Relative costs can vary according to the circumstances. For instance, according to the 1998 study cited above, when “military assets are already deployed (either for humanitarian assistance or for peacekeeping), the marginal cost of using these personnel and resources will be low. In these areas, then, the military can be a cost effective means of delivering and supporting humanitarian assistance.”⁷³ A variety of other factors can influence relative costs. The military’s economies of scale and shared costs may reduce the price tag on the use of military forces; on the other hand, the degree of force protection in the field and the amount of equipment with which the military deploys can raise costs.

For some analysts, cost considerations are beside the point, as there are certain situations where military forces are indispensable and certain places where few civilians will go. Decisions on the most appropriate division of labor between military and civilian personnel are better made on the basis of comparative advantage in each situation.

69. OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

70. Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

71. OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

72. OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

73. *Ibid.*

Colombia: An Opportunity for Lasting Success

Fact Sheet

Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC

September 16, 2008 [updated 6 November 2008]

“With courage and sacrifice, Colombians have taken their nation from the verge of failure to the brink of peace and prosperity in little more than a decade. The U.S. has been with them every step of the way.”

— Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice



*Rescued U.S. hostage
Source: American Embassy Bogota*

On July 2, 2008, the Colombian army rescued 15 hostages, including three American citizens, from FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrillas. Not a shot was fired. This rescue reflects what the government and people of Colombia have accomplished over the past decade in combating violence and restoring stability. Colombia’s achievements are a foreign policy success, and the product of two U.S. Administrations with broad bipartisan support from the Congress.

U.S. economic, counter-narcotics, and security assistance are key elements of our joint strategy to promote peace, justice, and prosperity in Colombia. Temporary trade preferences complement the assistance by creating jobs in the legitimate economy. The U.S.-

Colombia Trade Agreement, pending before the Congress, makes those preferences permanent and will create jobs for U.S. workers and farmers by giving U.S. exports the same access to Colombia that Colombian exports have in the United States.

From Near Failing State to Strategic Partner

In the late 1990s, Colombia was failing. Violence was rampant, citizens were fleeing the country, and the economy was plummeting. The United States and Colombia decided to work together to combat violence and instability. Since President Alvaro Uribe took office in 2002, security has improved dramatically. Homicides have dropped by 40%, kidnappings by 83%, and terrorist attacks by 76%. Over 31,000 paramilitary combatants and 10,000 guerrillas – mostly from the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) – have demobilized. FARC guerrillas’ top leadership has been disrupted, and the rank and file are deserting.

Drug cartels have been dismantled, and Colombia has extradited over 700 drug traffickers – including 15 paramilitary leaders – to the United States. Cocaine production has fallen by a third, seizures of cocaine bound for the United States have more than doubled, and, while estimates differ, coca cultivation has declined since 2002. [Since 2001, cocaine production has fallen by a quarter. “– November Update] Interdiction and eradication have kept an average of 400 metric tons per year of cocaine from reaching the United States. Alternative development programs benefit over 135,000 families. Colombia’s economy is growing rapidly (6.9% in 2007), and poverty continues to drop.

Improving Human Rights

The U.S. is working closely with Colombia to promote human rights, ensure access to justice, and end impunity. Working with the International Labor Organization, Colombia has strengthened its labor laws. The Ministry of Interior and Justice devotes over \$13 million to protect more than 1,900 trade union members. The Prosecutor General's Office established a special unit with a \$1.5 million budget to investigate cases of violence against trade union members. According to a non-governmental organization (NGO) figures, homicides of union members have dropped over 80% since 2002, and the murder rate of union members is lower than that of the general population. With the transition of the criminal justice system from an inquisitorial to a prosecutorial system, cases now move from arrest to verdict in months instead of years, and conviction rates have grown to over 60%.



Anti-FARC demonstrators. ©AP Images

Colombia's Success is our Success

Colombia is one of our closest allies in South America and a democratic anchor in the region. Economists estimate that the U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement will lead to the creation of 270,000 jobs in Colombia's formal economy while increasing U.S. exports to Colombia by an estimated \$1.2 billion. The Agreement establishes a strategic economic partnership that is beneficial for both nations and creates a relationship of equal partners. Through this agreement, the United States and Colombia look forward to completing the task we embarked on together in 2000.

Colombia's Transformation



Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators via USAID ESDB, IMF World Economic Outlook via USAID ESDB, and Embassy of Colombia, Washington, D.C.; all September 2008.

Peacekeeping: A Report on the Global Peace Operations Initiative

[The following are excerpts from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, GAO-08-754 June 26, 2008.]

Summary

In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has allocated \$374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the program. Congress mandated that the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assess and report on the initiative. This report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DoD) data and program documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted field work in eight countries.

State and DoD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However, State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DoD have trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the \$98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions. While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepers, primarily from Africa, have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the overall outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training. State, in consultation with DoD, has selected 52 partner countries that generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, State's human rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses. For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received military training but were not screened for human rights violations.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below. Status will change from “In process” to “Implemented” or “Not implemented” based on our follow up work. For more information contact: Director, Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade (202) 512-8979.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Recommendation: To enhance GPOI’s effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should work in consultation with DOD to assist Italy in staffing the key unfilled positions at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) to better evaluate progress made and monitor results.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To enhance GPOI’s effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should monitor implementation of new procedures to account for delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries on an ongoing basis.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To enhance GPOI’s effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities of COESPU graduates in their home countries.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To enhance GPOI's effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should develop and implement, in consultation with DoD and in accordance with the GPOI strategy, the use of standard military task lists and related training standards to enable program managers to evaluate the quality of training and measure the proficiency of trainees program-wide.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To enhance GPOI's effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should ensure that the evaluations of contractor performance of training in Africa are properly recorded into the contractor performance system as required by agency regulations.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To enhance GPOI's effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should develop a system for monitoring the vetting activities for all GPOI training and ensure that all individuals in composite units are vetted for human rights violations, as required by State policy.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that GPOI activities enhance the capabilities of countries to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own, the Secretary of State, in consultation with DoD, should assess estimated resources and time frames needed to complete peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that GPOI activities enhance the capabilities of countries to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own, the Secretary of State, in consultation with DoD, should ensure that any plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Field Studies Program: Mining the Unintended Consequences

By

**Lieutenant Lonnie Prater
SC, USN, Instructor, DISAM**

In July 2008, DISAM hosted nineteen ranking officers of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the National Police, Iraqi Special Forces and the Counterterrorism Bureau for an accelerated course in the aspects of Security Assistance most pertinent to their needs as an emerging partner nation. Over the two short weeks they were with us, each of the students participated in a number of low cost Field Studies Program (FSP) events designed to impart a lasting, favorable impression of the American way of life and the ways we as citizens interact with our government.

The Iraqi students visited the Dayton Federal Building and a local jail, toured the United States Air Force Museum and attended Wright-Patterson AFB's open-to-the-public summer air show. In addition to these events, the students were split-up into a handful of small groups and invited to dinner at the homes of several DISAM staffers and a few guests from the community. These dinners covered the entire spectrum from back patio cookouts to a semi-formal dinner party. Conversations, often via interpreters, were friendly, lively and frequently focused on sharing details of day to day life in America and Iraq. Another theme that seemed to repeat itself throughout the conversations was that of the immense gratitude the freedom-loving people of Iraq feel toward America. Some told stories of human rights abuses under the previous regime that seemed positively Orwellian: men disappearing in the night, never to be heard from again; arbitrary enforcement of the law; living under the tyranny of an elite few with no protection from their excesses. One man gripped my hand and told me with wet eyes how wonderful it was now to see his countrymen no longer living in fear of their government. "It was like living in a jail, every day, before the Americans came. Thank you all for giving us back freedom."

Hearing these sentiments so often repeated, thinking about the way life must be under a regime opposed to rights and freedom, feeling the boundless gratitude these men tried so hard to communicate with such unsuited tools as words and handshakes--all of this shook the foundations of my own outlook, and to no small degree.

Anyone who's been in the international training community longer than a week or two can tell you why we have the FSP: to foster a better awareness "out there in the world" of the way America expresses its ideal of a responsive, impartial government of, by and for the people. There are dozens of after-action reports sent in by dutiful International Military Student Officers (IMSOs) every year, each a testament to the success of FSP in achieving these goals. But little to nothing is ever mentioned about the effects these programs are having on our own citizens and communities; that's just not where the focus is. Which is why I'm writing a commentary on the unintended consequences of FSP (and by extension, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.)

If I was affected so strongly by one experience, and made to think harder about my own country's principles and actions, it's no great leap to imagine that many of the civilians who come in contact with our international students will be affected similarly. When we involve civilians and the community in our FSP plan, we are not just promoting an understanding of American values to our guests; we are allowing our fellow citizens to examine and reinforce those values in the crucible of honest direct communication with someone whose culture might express such values differently or to a different degree.

I do not have numbers at hand regarding how many (non-USG employed) citizens are involved in our FSP events each year. I suspect the schools with the larger throughput of international students

do more community partnering than the schools that only see a few each year. Regardless, I hope that looking at the subject from this angle might encourage IMSOs to seek out more opportunities to include the community-at-large in their FSP events. The more we aim for these collateral benefits (using some of the tactics in the “Leveraging the Community” sidebar), the more soundly our FSP events will hit their primary mark: stronger relationships with partner nations who understand--and hopefully come to share--our vision of government as defender of internationally recognized human rights.

Leveraging the Community

- **Look outside the fence line for sponsors**—Many bases are surrounded by ethnically rich and diverse communities, often with clusters of first, second and third generation immigrant families of similar heritage. Seek out some of these niches when you are looking for sponsors and escorts, rather than sticking to an internal “watch bill” of rotating staffers. There’s so much more to American life than the parts we see everyday in uniform, on-base or on Main Street, USA.
- **Conversation counts**—Use the rubric of the FSP program to guide discussion at FSP events. One person speaking to a group of international students about his relevant subject is wonderful. Several International Military Students (IMS) engaging in spirited face to face conversation with a handful of Americans from more motley backgrounds in a more open, social forum is better. Not only will students feel freer to ask questions and share their own worldviews, but they are far more likely to come away from the event with a warmer, more lasting and positive impression. This isn’t to say never do the lecture-speaker approach--just make sure there is adequate time for more relaxed talk afterward!
- **Sometimes the simplest things reveal the most**—It’s easy to rely on the “low-hanging fruit” of touring government buildings, media establishments, schools, businesses and museums; these sorts of things should be included in any FSP plan. But don’t discount the value of simple things that hold universal importance. Family, shelter, safety, property. Education, perhaps? A simple and low-cost Free Market event could be an afternoon walking through a few homes for sale, discussing with a friendly realtor and a cadre of community sponsors the things that are most important to local buyers and sellers. Tie your FSP events to the concerns that are basic to us all. Not only because these are the things that your community sponsors will have most in common with your international students, but also because here in the minutiae of daily life lie the details that create a lasting, personally relevant snapshot of the American way.
- **Monitor results**—It’s important to check up on your students and their escorts or sponsors regularly. Something as simple as a misconception or bad interpersonal chemistry can decimate the value of an entire event. Make sure your community sponsors are adequately screened and trained. Feedback from hosts and guests can help improve the sponsor program and widen the lanes of communication at your FSP events.
- **Most important**—Remember that communication is more than just an avenue for information delivery; it’s a two-way street. Make room for your international students to share things about their country in the course of your FSP events (elementary class visits, for example) and watch how much they learn about American life simply by answering the questions sincere and curious Americans have about their homeland.

Education and Training

The Creation of Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET)

By

Elisa Moskowitz

[This is an article developed from an original paper written at the National War College in 2008.]

The advent of the Cold War's demise and changes to the international security structure in the late 1980s-early 1990s sparked an initiative to make available new professional military education opportunities under the auspices of Security Assistance, a group of foreign aid programs that support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. One of the most successful of these programs, International Military Education and Training (IMET), was seen as an ideal medium from which to generate a new curriculum designed to advance democratic principles and reach a broader pool of international participants.

The new initiative, Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET), was established by Congress in 1990 and provided for specific non-combat related military education and training "based upon the premise that active promotion of democratic values is one of the most effective means available for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and fostering peaceful relationships among the nations of the world."¹ In addition, E-IMET opened up these courses to civilian officials involved in security matters in their countries, including representatives from non-governmental organizations and legislators.

Background: Why the Need for a New Program?

IMET was created as a grant program by Congress, under the International Security Assistance Act of 1976, which was an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Its purpose was:

to help countries unable to purchase U.S. military training under the Foreign Military Sales Act (the existing program at the time) to meet their needs. Congress wished to help allies and friendly countries pursue their interests with an initiative that was practical, economical, and focused on the future. It saw military training as the most effective vehicle within the former grant military assistance program and wanted to sustain it without losing legislative control. Senior Defense officials at the time endorsed the new program as a better way to identify budgetary costs and program objectives, while still providing a means of maintaining military ties and strengthening the military potential of our friends and allies.²

1. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "E-IMET Home Page," http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eimet/eimet_default.htm.

2. John A. Cope, *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*, McNair Paper 44 (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 1995), 5.

IMET enabled recipient countries to send applicable military personnel to a variety of courses provided by the U.S. military departments (2,000 courses offered annually at 150 U.S. military schools across the country).

Funding for IMET (and other Security Assistance programs) is appropriated from the International Affairs budget of the Department of State (DoS). DoS maintains overall responsibility of IMET, and the DoD administers it. The objectives of IMET-funded training are to develop rapport, understanding, and communication links; to develop participant nations' training self-sufficiency and improve their ability to manage their own defense establishments; and to develop skills to operate and maintain U.S.-origin equipment.³

In 1990, staff members from the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) came up with the idea to build on IMET's successes and pursue a "higher calling" to force an agenda promoting democratic values.⁴ The countries that could benefit the most fell into two categories: existing IMET recipients that needed to strengthen their human rights records and fight corruption (e.g., Guatemala and Indonesia) and nations that had no real experience with such democratic principles as transparent defense budgets, military justice, and civil-military relations (e.g., Honduras and South Africa).⁵ Thus, the idea for a revised IMET program was born, one that would focus on the pillars of a democracy and offer only non-combat-related education and training – Expanded IMET.

In one way "Expanded" IMET was a misnomer, as the initiative actually limited what IMET was already offering. E-IMET was to focus on teaching professional level management skills, improving the efficacy of military and judicial systems, and strengthening military codes of conduct.⁶ Specifically, E-IMET's mandate was to educate "U.S. friends and allies in the proper management of their defense resources; improving their systems of military justice in accordance with internationally recognized principles of human rights; and fostering a greater respect for, and understanding of, the principle of civilian control of the military."⁷ The logic was that the successes achieved under IMET could be replicated through E-IMET and help promote military professionalism and good governance.

In another way, though, "Expanded" was an apt title for this program because more nations could participate and "because the target audience of IMET was 'expanded' or broadened to include civilians not specifically within a foreign country's defense establishment (but who hold security-related positions). This was an important step in that it also expanded the role of the U.S. military."⁸ E-IMET was a new arena for U.S. military education, as the "kinds of training mandated through Expanded IMET legislation (did) not conform to the traditional combat role and conventional orientation of the U.S. military. Systematic U.S. military training of foreign civilian officials (was) an even greater departure."⁹

3. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, 425, <http://www.dsca.mil/samm/Chapter%2010%20-%20International%20Training.pdf>.

4. Personal interview with Keith Webster, former program officer, Defense Security Assistance Agency, January 23, 2008.

5. Personal interview with Kay Judkins, IMET program manager, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, February 12, 2008.

6. General Accounting Office, Observation on Post-Cold War Program Changes, Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 1992, Report NSAID-92-248, 19.

7. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "E-IMET Home Page."

8. Ronald H. Reynolds, *E-IMET: Is It Accomplishing Its Human Rights Focus in Latin America?* Doctoral dissertation (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Graduate School, 2001), 18.

9. Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy, Jr., *International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993), viii, quoted in Ronald H. Reynolds, *E-IMET: Is It Accomplishing Its Human Rights Focus in Latin America?*

Timing is a key element; and the promotion of E-IMET benefited from events of the day, which helped it gain even more support in the Legislative and Executive branches of the U.S. Government. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, E-IMET was also seen as a means to advance democratic values to countries that had been behind the Iron Curtain for decades. Courses that stressed good governance and democratic principles, which were available not only to military personnel but also to applicable civilian officials, were seen as a way of strengthening these new and emerging democracies and sustaining their growth and progress. Furthermore, this idea supported larger U.S. national security goals (make former enemies into friends), value projection (promote democratic ideals), and cooperation (strengthen capabilities in partner nations).

The Players

The Congress

The catalyst for the initiative was the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the SAC. (It is not unusual for an initiative to start in an appropriations committee, especially if there is an existing law that can accommodate it.)¹⁰ The proposal was welcomed by the SAC Chairman at the time, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT); and there was general bipartisan support within Congress (the SAC staffers on the majority side who came up with the idea cultivated support among their Republican counterparts). First of all, E-IMET was not perceived as controversial; it was seen as way for the U.S. to work with governments who needed help to reform their militaries, which, it was hoped, could cascade to other types of reform. Secondly, no additional funding was being requested; the SAC proposed allocating a portion of the existing IMET budget for specific E-IMET programs.¹¹ Thirdly, the proposed legislative language clearly spelled out the parameters of the program; there was no ambiguity about what the program could provide and to whom. Finally, the Congressional report language stated that DoD (specifically the Defense Security Assistance Agency) had to report to the Senate on E-IMET's implementation; close Congressional oversight was an element of the program during its first few years to ensure that it met the intent of Congress.¹²

The Administration implemented E-IMET during FY 91. A management system and structure was established to ensure that program guidelines were followed. DoD was asked to review existing courses to determine which ones were relevant for E-IMET or could be amended to meet E-IMET's requirements and to recommend the creation of new ones. One million dollars of the FY 91 IMET budget was set aside for E-IMET programs with plans for an estimated \$2 million to be set aside from the FY 92 IMET budget.¹³

The Department of State

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State (State PM) had oversight responsibility for Security Assistance programs, which fall under the purview of the Foreign Assistance Act. State PM was responsible for drafting the annual IMET budget requests to Congress and for determining final country allocations of the funds, which extended to E-IMET. The initiative took State PM somewhat by surprise, since it began with the appropriators. However, there were no real objections, as the initiative did not encroach on State's oversight role. It helped that one of the SAC staffers who proposed E-IMET was a former State Department Foreign Service Officer and knew what types of programs were needed and would fit into the foreign assistance sphere. Finally, State PM also saw the initiative as a way to

10. Personal interview with Carl Raether, former Senior Legislative Manager for Appropriations, U.S. Department of State, January 31, 2008.

11. Personal interview with Tim Rieser, former staff member, U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, January 23, 2008.

12. Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Report to the United States Congress on Development of the Expanded IMET Initiative," reprinted in *The DISAM Journal* (Fall 1991): 94.

13. *Ibid.*

further U.S. engagement with nations that had not been eligible previously for foreign military assistance within parameters that did not undermine U.S. foreign policy norms.

The Department of Defense

The Department of Defense played a key role in E-IMET's creation. DoD was not enthusiastic about the initiative at first because it imposed limits on the already existing IMET program; but the SAC staffers allayed concerns by assuring DoD that the new initiative would bring in new countries with which DoD could engage, albeit under specific auspices. Furthermore, funding would not be cut from other programs to pay for the new program; E-IMET would simply be folded into the IMET budget.¹⁴ (Over time, the IMET budget was increased; by the late 1990s, approximately 30 percent of the IMET budget was spent by recipient nations on E-IMET courses.)

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA),¹⁵ which reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, became the E-IMET administrator (a function it already played for other Security Assistance programs). DSAA was given responsibility for identifying courses that would fit in with E-IMET; for working with the military departments to create new courses; for advising the Security Assistance Offices at U.S. embassies around the world as they recruited suitable E-IMET students; for reporting to Congress on the program's implementation; and for putting out policy guidance to all relevant departments, agencies, schools, and the Combatant Commands. DSAA's role in the first months of E-IMET was critical; for had the agency not succeeded in meeting the congressionally mandated obligations, the program's future could have been jeopardized.¹⁶

The Military Departments

The military departments, responsible for providing the courses, can be considered the "face of E-IMET." In another stroke of good luck for E-IMET, it happened that the Department of the Navy was serving as the executive agent for a successful existing program that taught defense resources management to international students. DSAA saw this as the perfect jump-off point for E-IMET, and the Navy complied. Part of the Navy's enthusiasm was related to the fact that the coming end of the Cold War would likely lead to defense budget cuts and military base closings, and E-IMET provided a justification for keeping relevant schools open. The Navy then created new courses that met the other two requirements under E-IMET's legislation: civil-military relations and military justice and human rights. Thus, three of E-IMET's flagship programs came from Navy schools. As E-IMET gained stature in the Security Assistance realm, the Departments of the Air Force and the Army followed with course offerings. Ultimately, the War Colleges and the Command and General Staff Colleges would be included in E-IMET's approved course list.¹⁷

The Non-Governmental Sector

Several public interest groups were initially skeptical of the E-IMET initiative because of well-publicized cases in the 1980s of School of the Americas (SOA) graduates who committed human rights abuses in their home countries, including a number of IMET-funded military students. Beginning in the early 1990s, SOA overhauled its image and incorporated human rights modules in its courses and added

14. Personal interview with Tim Rieser.

15. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) was re-designated the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in October 1998, to reflect its enhanced role of overseeing all aspects of international military cooperative development efforts.

16. Personal interview with Warren Olsen, former IMET program manager, Defense Security Assistance Agency, February 11, 2008.

17. Personal interview with Rita Verry, former program manager, Defense Security Assistance Agency and Navy International Programs Office, January 31, 2008.

new courses that addressed the abuses committed by alumni.¹⁸ Several years later, vetting of all potential Security Assistance student candidates became mandatory to prevent violators from receiving this type of aid. (SOA was legally closed in 2001 and was succeeded by the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation at the same location, which is now DoD's principal Spanish-language training facility for Latin American military and security-related personnel.)¹⁹

In particular, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) was one non-governmental organization that had reservations about E-IMET early on. DSAA took the initiative to meet with WOLA representatives regularly and invited them to observe E-IMET courses offered at military schools in the United States. This type of active outreach helped enhance the public's understanding about E-IMET and alleviated concerns of human rights advocacy organizations. The non-combat nature of E-IMET ultimately was perceived as having a greater potential for promoting positive values than non-engagement was.²⁰

Conclusion

On November 5, 1990, PL 101-513 was passed, which allocated \$1,000,000 of the existing IMET budget for "developing, initiating, conducting, and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering military establishments and budgets and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights."²¹ From a listing of nine courses in 1992, E-IMET grew to 35 over three years.²²

The story of E-IMET is a very rewarding one, but the account of the processes behind its creation is not terribly exciting. There were so many favorable conditions related to the initiative that the path to its realization was rather smooth and uneventful. An idealist could say the stars were in alignment; but a realist would say that "everyone's self-interest was served,"²³ which almost guaranteed E-IMET's implementation and also helped ensure its success.

Each of the main players had a motivation for seeing E-IMET come about: Congress wanted to engage certain countries by exposing them to educational programs that promoted good governance; the State Department was given a new tool for accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives by spreading democratic ideals and developing closer bilateral ties; the Defense Department could expand its military contacts with new nations that were eligible for E-IMET funding and help enhance defense capabilities in partner nations; the military departments benefited by providing new courses and bringing in new students during a time of defense budget cuts and base closures; and the public gained through enhanced U.S. security that resulted in the expansion of U.S. military allies and partners, many of whom first came into the fold under E-IMET auspices.

There was also an element of serendipity involved while E-IMET was being born. The SAC staffer who came up with the idea came from the State Department and knew how programs worked there.

18. Federation of American Scientists, "International Military Education and Training," Arms Sales Monitoring Project, http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html#_ftn49.

19. Center for International Policy, "Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation," Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide to Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/soa.htm>.

20. Personal interview with Warren Olsen.

21. Public Law 101-513.

22. Cope, 15.

23. Personal interview with Warren Olsen.

The right people happened to be in the right places within DoD at the time the proposal came up, including senior leadership within DoD and experienced program officers at DSAA who took a strong interest in E-IMET and made sure that it would fulfill its goals and gain continued support from Congress. And the Department of the Navy had a course ready to go that fit E-IMET's mandate.

Expanded IMET is now a key element in Security Assistance and helps enhance the ability of friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promotes the sharing of common defense burdens, and helps foster regional stability. E-IMET's focus on three major democratic principles — civilian control over the military, responsible defense resource management, and military justice and human rights — may make it even more important today than it was at the time of its creation as the U.S. Government increasingly looks for non-kinetic ways to promote foreign and security policy goals. In the 16 years since E-IMET was implemented, nearly 140 nations have participated in more than 100 courses. E-IMET has yielded many successes and has been used as a model for other foreign assistance programs.

About the Author

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Controlled Unclassified Information “A Review and Revision”

By

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The very mention of the words TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL which define the classification levels of the USG national security information, alert one to be vigilant. The Executive Order 12958 (EO 12958), as amended, establishes the Executive Branch’s Classified National Security Information Program. The EO states that, “Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation’s progress depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation’s security remains a priority.”¹

For most of us that work for, or with the USG, the circumstances when we will actually deal with classified information are relatively infrequent. This is not so for Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). Many of us deal with CUI, sometimes on a daily basis, and with frequent use may come less “vigilant” habits. “The term Controlled Unclassified Information is used in the DoD to collectively describe unclassified information to which access or distribution controls have been applied pursuant to the laws and regulations of the originating country.”² If the controls are not implemented, information critical to our Nation’s security may still be compromised.

The purpose of this article is to give you a “**Review**” of CUI and explain the ongoing “**Revision**” of CUI.

Review

If CUI describes unclassified information to which access or distribution controls have been applied pursuant to laws, than what is the lawful authority? Chief among the laws that provide the legal basis for the control of CUI are the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, Freedom of Information Act and PL 98-94. The presence of access and/or distribution control markings identifies information as CUI. The primary marking for DoD is “For Official Use Only.” Some USG agencies use different markings. The standardization of markings will be part of the discussion under the REVISED portion of this article.

There are a litany of DoD regulations, directives and instructions that cover the disclosure of official information. All the documents are in the public domain and should be close at hand when questions about the control of USG information are visited. The primary documents, their number, name and primary purpose are listed below.

- DoD 5200.1-R, “*Information Security Program*,” January 14, 1997

Promotes proper and effective classification, protection and downgrading of official information requiring protection in the interest of the national security

- DoD 5400.7-R, “*Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program*,” September 4, 1998

Polices and responsibilities for the implementation of the DoD FOIA Program

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- DoD Directive 5230.9, “*Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release*,” August 22, 2008
Policies and procedures for the release of information for publication or public release
 - DoD Directive 5230.24, “*Distribution Statements on Technical Documents*,” March 18, 1987
Policies and procedures for marking technical documents, including production, engineering, and logistics information, to denote the extent to which they are available for distribution, release, and dissemination without additional approvals or authorizations
 - DoD Directive 5230.25, “*Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure*,” November 6, 1984
Establishes policy, prescribes procedures, and assigns responsibilities for the dissemination and withholding of technical data
 - DoD Instruction 3200.14, “*Principles and Operational Parameters of the DoD Science and Technical Information Program*,” May 13, 1997
Release of DoD technical data
 - DoD Instruction 5200.39, “*Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection Within the Department of Defense*,” July 16, 2008
Protection of CPI

These documents are not meant to be a complete list of references for policies covering the disclosure of official information, but a solid base of reference.

The DoD 5400.7-R, DoD Freedom of Information Act Program (FOIA) states, “The public has a right to information concerning the activities of its Government.”³ The Regulation goes on to say, “DoD policy is to conduct its activities in an open manner and provide the public with a maximum amount of accurate and timely information concerning its activities, consistent always with the legitimate public and private interests of the American people.”⁴ The FOIA also says that USG information may not be made available if it falls within one of nine exemption categories described in the Act and the appropriate USG official determines it should be withheld from disclosure.

The list, and descriptions, of exemptions can be found in DoD 5400.7-R, Chapter 3. The first exemption deals with classified information and the other eight deal with unclassified information. A more concise list and description of the ‘unclassified information’ exemptions, extracted from the “*International Programs Security Handbook*,” is listed below.⁵

- Exemption Two: permits the withholding of information that pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of a government agency. This exemption has a high and low profile. The high profile permits the withholding of a document which, if released, would allow circumvention of an agency rule, policy, or statute, thereby impeding the agency in the conduct of its mission. The low profile permits withholding if there is no public interest in the document, and it would be an administrative burden to process the request.

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- Exemption Three: permits the withholding of information that a statute specifically exempts from disclosure by terms that permit no discretion on the issue, or in accordance with criteria established by that statute for withholding or referring to particular types of matters to be withheld.
 - Exemption Four: permits withholding information such as trade secrets and commercial and financial information obtained from a company on a privileged or confidential basis which, if released, would result in competitive harm to the company.
 - Exemption Five: exempts inter- and intra-agency memoranda that are deliberative in nature. This exemption is appropriate for internal documents that are part of the decision making process and contain subjective evaluations, opinions and recommendations.
 - Exemption Six: provides for the withholding of information, the release of which could reasonably be expected to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of individuals.
 - Exemption Seven: permits withholding records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings; would deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication; could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of others; disclose the identity of a confidential source; disclose investigative techniques; or could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
 - Exemption Eight: permits withholding records or information contained in or relating to examination, operation or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of any agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.
 - Exemption Nine: permits withholding records or information containing geological and geophysical information and data (including maps) concerning wells.

If unclassified information is determined to qualify for an exemption under the FOIA exemptions two through nine, the DoD policy is to mark the data “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)”. Other required distribution or control markings documented in DoD Directive 5230.24 or other regulations would also apply. FOUO information must be controlled in a manner sufficient to ensure unauthorized persons do not gain access. It is usually sufficient to lock the information in a desk drawer, bookcase, filing cabinet or locking it in a room where only authorized persons may have access.

Revision

In the fall of 2007, the President of the U.S. issued “National Strategy for Information Sharing.” This document reinforces the exchange of information across all Federal Government sectors as well as with external partners. On 9 May 2008, the President released the Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies on the Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information. The purpose of the memo states:

(1) This memorandum (a) adopts, defines, and institutes “Controlled Unclassified Information” (CUI) as the single, categorical designation henceforth throughout the executive branch for all information within the scope of that definition, which includes most information heretofore referred to as “Sensitive But Unclassified” (SBU) in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), and (b) establishes a corresponding new CUI Framework for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating information designated as CUI. The memorandum’s purpose

*is to standardize practices and thereby improve the sharing of information, not to classify or declassify new or additional information.*⁶

The Presidential Memorandum designates the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) as the CUI Executive Agent to oversee and manage the implementation of the new CUI Framework. In a memorandum dated 21 May 2008, Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the U.S., officially established within the NARA the “Controlled Unclassified Information Office.” The memo goes on to say that:

*Under my direction and in accordance with the Presidential Memorandum (May 09, 2008), the Director of the Controlled Information Office shall: Develop and issue CUI policy standards and implementation guidance consistent with this memorandum, including appropriate recommendations to State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partner entities for implementing the CUI Framework. As appropriate, establish new safeguarding and dissemination controls, and, upon a determination that extraordinary circumstances warrant the use of additional CUI markings, authorize the use of such additional markings;*⁷

The memo lists additional actions including, but not limited to, establish and chair the CUI Council; establish, approve, and maintain safeguarding standards and dissemination instructions; establishing baseline training requirements; and advising the heads of departments and agencies on the resolution by the CUI Council of complaints and deposes among departments and agencies.⁸

A Department of Defense CUI Task Force, jointly led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (OASD (NII)/DoD Chief Information Office (CIO) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) (Intelligence), was established in January 2008 to oversee development of a transition plan and identify costs associated with the implementation of the Presidential Memorandum on CUI.⁹ The Task Force has initiated a DoD CUI Transition Plan to identify specific transition activities based on a phased implementation of the CUI tasking. Phase one, in FY 10-12, will concentrate on Program and Information Technology areas to include Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement. Phase two, FY 13-15, will cover all other DoD Programs and Information Technology Areas. As the new CUI procedures are implemented, training will be required for all DoD employees. If you are a member of the Department of Defense look for more guidance on CUI over the next few years.¹⁰

It is the duty of all to control access to certain USG information critical to our Nation’s national interests. The laws, regulations, directives and instructions are available to guide us. As the new CUI framework for designating, marking, safeguarding and dissemination of information is being developed and implemented, it is up to all of use to be diligent in our efforts to put the “Control” in Controlled Unclassified Information.

About the Author

John Smilek is a DISAM Assistant Professor for the management of security assistance. He is the coordinator for the Technology Transfer and International Programs Security Requirements instruction and is the Course Manager for the CONUS Course (SAM-C). He is also an instructor in FMS logistics, acquisition and foreign policy. He has an undergraduate degree in Technical Education from the University of Akron, and a master’s degree in Management and Public Administration from Webster University.

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Training and Educating for Complex Operations: What DISAM Can Do for You

By

**Lieutenant Colonel James Toomey
USA, Deputy Director, DISAM**

In September, I attended the 2008 Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop sponsored by the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) with support from a number of other prominent organizations and key USG agencies, including those from the DoD and Department of State (DoS), universities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private contractors. The focus of this conference was how to overcome seven perceived gaps, defined by these groups in a recent survey, between all sources of training and education available and the learning or preparation requirements of USG personnel, contractors, and others supporting complex operations throughout the world, in particular, stability operations.

Just to be clear on this, stability operations are defined by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and DoD as “operations that are conducted (by the U.S. military) in coordination with other instruments of power to reestablish and maintain a safe and secure environment (in a location outside the U.S.) and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief...”¹ These operations can be distinguished from both purely private or commercial efforts, outside of any partnership with the U.S. military, to provide security or relief abroad as well as any domestic efforts to respond to U.S. civil relief, civil defense, or natural disaster needs on the home front.

When I discovered this, as a member of the DISAM faculty, I was immediately overjoyed – not because I revel in the thought of poorly planned or executed stability operations, but because I instantly realized that of the seven specific educational/training gaps identified in the survey, DISAM could help in a significant way, to overcome at least six of these gaps. In the remainder of this article, I’ll show just how DISAM can help DoD and other USG personnel, as well as some contractors and even foreign organization or foreign nation representatives, to fill these gaps. Before I do this, for those of you who have never heard of DISAM, I offer the following brief description of our institution: DISAM is a DoD facility located on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, that offers professional programs designed to provide practical training and education, as well as research and other support, for those involved in the implementation of U.S. security assistance (SA) and security cooperation (SC) activities.

The first gap listed in the executive summary of this survey, distributed at the conference, concerned creating a “whole government/whole community” approach for dealing with complex operations. In other words, how can the USG create good communications and cooperation among its own agencies, while simultaneously partnering with NGOs and others outside the government, to coordinate organizational training and doctrine, programs, qualification standards, etc., in order to promote effective preparation and teamwork? DISAM’s activities directly support this objective. We teach how U.S. embassies, military departments, DoS bureaus and offices, and commercial contractors function and work together, and what different government agencies are represented on country teams. To support our classroom instruction, we regularly invite foreign government representatives, university professors, and senior USG officials as guest speakers in several of our resident courses. The DISAM Journal, published quarterly, shares advice and information on education, training, and current developments related to SA and SC. Our website provides up-to-date, electronic copies of DISAM, DSCA, and other agency publications, direct links

1. Robert M. Perrito (ed) and others, *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*, United States Institute for Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2007

to other agencies, and an “Ask and Instructor” (AAI) feature, where students can submit questions on complex subjects which are usually answered by faculty subject matter experts within two working days.

The second gap identified in the survey concerned making leadership and management courses available to provide appropriate “skill sets” to personnel, both military and civilian, supporting complex operations. DISAM offers 17 resident courses, as well as on-line courses and outreach activities (training team visits, publications, etc.), which target DoD, DoS, and other USG personnel, U.S. defense contractors, and foreign national students. The school strives in all these efforts to create a common understanding of U.S. laws and policies governing security and foreign assistance programs, as well as the variety of authorities and funding sources used to support these programs. This understanding is critical for those trying to stabilize post-conflict countries or areas overcome by natural disasters using SC and SA programs, such as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). In addition, we provide hands-on training on the use of the Security Assistance Network (SAN), Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), and other automated information management systems used to carry out SA and SC programs.

The third gap was perceived to be the lack of situational and cultural awareness related to complex operations, and the fourth gap noted that operators need to recognize and respect local or host-country capacities. DISAM helps to fill these gaps through blocks of instruction on cross-cultural communications and, as a part of our Security Cooperation Management Overseas (SCM-O) course, through our five different regional seminar programs (respectively, on Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Pacific Rim) which introduce students to the culture, societies, economics, security establishments, and political systems of these regions. Cross-cultural topics are also currently included in other courses offered by DISAM.

A further gap addressed the need to develop coordinated public diplomacy, standardized lexicons and doctrine, and common communication channels and operational language. DISAM can assist in this objective through many of our programs and services, which support lasting relationships between different communities involved in SA and SC activities, and educate or inform our students from all of these groups on common, significant, and recognized policies, practices, and processes. In addition, our publications often include extensive terms/definitions annexes and our faculty members conduct continuous liaison with other USG and non-USG organizations, and incorporate information derived from this contact into our curriculum. We also keep up a sort of informal ‘lessons learned’ section in the AAI database, which keeps a record of past answers to questions submitted by our students, thus retaining the benefits of the extensive research performed to answer certain questions.

The seventh gap identified concerned professional development: the lack of career incentives available to encourage people from different organizations to obtain training and education related to complex operations. DISAM also offers something here. Some of our courses, both resident and non-resident, award International Programs Security Requirements (IPSR) certification, which is currently required by the Secretary of Defense for all DoD personnel engaged in international programs. In addition, some of our courses award Continuous Learning Points (CLPs) required for biannual professional certification of DoD acquisition personnel, and may also award Continuing Professional Education (CPE) units required for members of the DoD financial management workforce. On a broader level, DISAM’s SCM-O and our Security Assistance Management CONUS (SAM-C) course are both certified by the American Council on Education (ACE), which means successful completion of either course may provide graduates with up to three undergraduate college credits in supply chain management. DISAM programs are accredited overall by the Council on Occupational Education.

DISAM also administers, on behalf of DSCA and in support of the Security Cooperation workforce, a 12-month graduate-level studies program in partnership with Tufts University in Massachusetts which

culminates in the award of a Global Master of Arts degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The particular program, called GMAP II is designed to provide an international affairs focused degree opportunity to DoD civilians, with some availability to military personnel, working in international affairs positions. For those selected serving in FMS funded positions, tuition and other expenses are covered within funds provided by DSCA to execute the program. DISAM has been serving a growing number of students in recent years, and with the increasing emphasis on DoD “soft power” activities, involving ever more complex requirements beyond basic combat operations, the importance of our training and education is also likely to continue to increase for years to come. For more information on what DISAM can do for you, check us out on our website, at <http://www.disam.dscamil>.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel James Toomey is currently Deputy Director of International Studies at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, as well as Director of European Studies and a contributor to its African Studies program. He has worked as a Sub-Saharan African (48J) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for the U.S. Army for approximately ten years, with tours of duty at three U.S. embassies abroad including service as a Defense Attaché in Haiti and Liberia, and an assignment as the Chief, Central Africa Branch at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). He possesses four degrees related to international business/political affairs, including master’s degrees from Columbus State University and the University of Florida, where he also obtained a certificate in African studies.

Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) Tips

[The following are tips courtesy of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Newsletter — multiple editions.]

Letter of Requests (LOR) Submitted by Electronic Mail

If purchasers prefer to send LORs via electronic means, they must provide a list of authorized signers and senders to the Implementing Agency. Furthermore, LORs submitted using electronic means must be submitted through appropriate channels outlined in SAMM paragraphs **C5.1.3.1. (Significant Military Equipment requests)** and **C5.1.3.2. (Non-Significant Military Equipment requests)**. Purchasers who wish to submit LORs electronically should also contact the Implementing Agency to determine if a file naming convention should be used in the “subject line” of the email. To submit electronic information copies of LORs to DSCA (Operations Directorate), purchasers should contact their respective DSCA Country Program Director (CPD) for their email address. See **SAMM Chapter 5, Section C5.1.3.3.** for more details. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Kidd Manville, Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 604-6594 or kidd.manville@dsc.mil. The SAMM is available at www.dsc.mil/samm.

Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Information

SAMM Chapter 5, Figure C5.F4. provides basic information describing some of the codes and language used on the LOA such as Source Codes, Availability Lead Time, Type of Assistance Codes, and Delivery Term Codes. This document, along with the LOA Standard Terms and Conditions, is attached to the original LOA that is sent to the purchaser for review and acceptance. It is pertinent to the purchaser in that it not only further defines the information contained in the LOA, but also because it identifies the information that the purchaser must enter upon acceptance such as the Mark For and Freight Forwarder codes. The document is relevant to the U.S. for the same reasons, and it is also an excellent tool for LOA review. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Kathy Robinson, Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-4368 or kathy.robinson@dsc.mil. The SAMM is available at www.dsc.mil/samm.

South Korea Joins NATO+3

Section 3 of PL 110-429 created a status in law for the Republic of Korea equivalent to that for the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand with respect to notifications of foreign military sales. This means, for example, that 36(b) notifications for South Korea are now required only when their values reach the higher NATO+3 levels and require only a 15 day formal notification period.

Revised Directive on DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation

DoDD 5132.3, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance, March 10, 1981, has been cancelled and replaced by **DoDD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation**, October 24, 2008. It establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF); Guidance for the Development of the Force; and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code and statutory authorities, Executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of security cooperation, including security assistance. A copy is available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513203p.pdf>. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Steve Wentworth, Plans Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-3855 or stephen.wentworth@dsc.mil or Mike Slack, Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-3842 or michael.slack@dsc.mil. [Editor’s note: The new DoD Directive can be viewed in its entirety in this edition of the *DISAM Journal* at the front of the Legislation and Policy section.]

Funding of Acquisition for Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

In accordance with **Table C5.T6. of Chapter 5 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)**, the acquisition process is an activity which should be funded by the FMS Administrative Surcharge. The acquisition process can be case funded (incrementally) when additional acquisition support is required to execute the program or when the customer has requested acceleration of the program (example: a large sale that requires extensive management due to the complexity of the system). When acquisition/contract personnel are case funded, there should be an explanation in the LOA line item description note that explains how the acquisition process for that particular LOA is over and above the standard level of service. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Kent Bell, Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 604-6612 or kent.bell@dscamilitary.com.