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# **Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance**

**By  
Center for Strategic and International Studies**

[The following are excerpts of the final report of the Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance, December 2007. The complete report can be viewed at the following web site: [www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org).]

## **About the Center for Strategic and International Studies**

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Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

## **Preface**

In early 2007, CSIS launched an expert task force to examine the growing involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD) as a direct provider of non-traditional security assistance, concentrated in counterterrorism, capacity building, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The Task Force set out to shed light on what drives this trend, including the new global threat environment; assess what was happening at the same time in the diplomatic and developmental realms; evaluate DoD performance in conducting its expanded missions; and consider the impact of the Pentagon's enlarged role on broader U.S. national security, foreign policy and development interests. From the outset, the Task Force sought to generate concrete, practical recommendations to Congress and the White House on reforms and legislation that will create a better and more sustainable balance between military and civilian tools.

We have been very fortunate that Representative Robert Andrews (D-NJ) of the House Armed Services Committee and Representative Mark Kirk (R-IL) of the House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs agreed to serve as the Task Force co-chairs. Both are intellectual leaders in Congress and eloquent spokesmen for a robust and balanced U.S. national security policy. We are grateful for their guidance and commitment.

In populating the Task Force, we consciously sought to bring to the table the divergent perspectives spanning the defense, diplomatic and development communities. All needed to be present for the Task Force to succeed, and for it to be different. Seldom, it seems, do all three deliberate together

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on shared emerging challenges and pragmatic options for moving forward. We succeeded in achieving this essential goal. The Task Force's thirteen members are all prominent individuals, with extensive experience in the executive and legislative branches, the U.S. military, Department of Defense, Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and major think tanks. We thank the Task Force members for clearing their busy schedules to participate in several meetings, and for their generous intellectual input and feedback on drafts. Both the analysis and recommendations of this report reflect a strong majority consensus among the Task Force members endorsing its policy thrust and judgments, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.

The Task Force is grateful to the project's gifted core contributors. Through their extensive personal contributions, Jim Schear of National Defense University, independent consultant Mark Wong, and Stewart Patrick of the Center for Global Development spearheaded analysis of disaster relief, counterterrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction, respectively. We wish to single out Stewart Patrick for special praise in light of the exceptional skill and care he invested in bringing the full report together.

The Task Force is indebted to Elizabeth Sullivan and Eric Ridge of CSIS, who ably managed its multiple activities and the final report's publication. Finally, we wish to thank the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for supporting this experiment, financially and intellectually. Linda Frey and Smita Singh were active partners, at all times flexible, engaged and accessible. Their support made it possible to test whether diplomatic, development and security experts could engage successfully in a focused, constructive dialogue on the balance of approaches needed in this new era.

## **Executive Summary**

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. concept and approach to global security have changed fundamentally. Weak and failing states, long neglected, have risen dramatically as a priority focus. We understand that threats to U.S. interests can emanate from within states with which the United States is not at war and that persistent poverty can be a significant contributor to those threats. There is now a strategic imperative to devise multi-decade, integrated approaches that are preventative in nature. Foundational to this preventative approach are sustainable overseas partnerships that build capacity for good governance and security, foster economic prosperity and social well-being, and more effectively promote community-level development. Accordingly, we now place a very explicit, and far higher premium, on the unity of effort of our foreign and national security policy instruments, especially defense, diplomacy, and development.

In just a few short years, the Pentagon's role as a direct provider of foreign assistance has surged. The DoD has assumed an expanding role in counterterrorism, capacity building, post-conflict operations, and humanitarian assistance. Beyond implementing traditional military-to-military programs supported by DoS funds, DoD has been granted temporary authorities by Congress to use directly appropriated funds both for prevention and post-conflict response, concentrated in conflict-ridden, non-permissive environments where civilian actors have difficulty operating or where civilian capacities are weak or absent. DoD has also provided billions of reimbursement dollars to coalition members, such as Pakistan and Jordan, outside of the formal DoS-run Economic Support Funds process.<sup>1</sup>

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1. To date, insufficient tracking of these funds has hampered DoD's ability to justify them on the grounds of reimbursement for coalition expenses. It is also questionable whether DoD, rather than the DoS should have authority over disbursement of coalition funds. As recent events in Pakistan have highlighted, this is a significant and potentially worrisome issue area that warrants further study.

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From 2002 to 2005, DoD's share of U.S. official development assistance increased from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent. The Bush Administration has recently submitted to Congress a proposal, in the form of the Building Global Partnerships Act that would give the Pentagon with additional and permanent authorities to provide such non-traditional security assistance. Some of these authorities are used in Afghanistan and Iraq and DoD would now like to make them permanent and global. At the same time, the United States has consistently under-resourced the diplomatic and development instruments of its national power. The staffing, programs, and operational capacities of the USAID and the DoS have continued to stagnate at the very moment in history when diplomatic and development agencies should be better, not less well positioned to advance the United States' new, evolving global agenda.

The CSIS Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance was constituted to identify the main drivers behind these asymmetric trends; to assess Pentagon performance in several non-traditional areas; to examine what is happening at the same time in the diplomatic and development spheres; to evaluate the implications of DoD's enlarged role for U.S. national security, foreign policy and development objectives; and to offer concrete recommendations to foster a better balanced and more sustainable division of responsibilities between the Pentagon and U.S. civilian agencies. This document summarizes the Task Force's findings and recommendations based on a series of meetings and expert consultations held between March 2007 and October 2007. It proposes policy, institutional and legislative changes for consideration by the current and future Executive Branch and Congress.

### **Focus of Inquiry**

The Task Force focused on three areas of DoD non-traditional security assistance:

- Counterterrorism (CT) Capacity Building Assistance to help partner countries police and control their territories, so that these territories do not become havens for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Relevant initiatives include the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign security forces for CT and stability operations.
- Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction efforts to shore up weak states, and prevent their deterioration and consolidate peace following major combat operations including the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a vehicle to promote military-civilian collaboration in the field, and the creation of new funding mechanisms, notably the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).
- Humanitarian Assistance in response to major natural disasters (e.g., the Indian Ocean Tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake), failed states and prolonged irregular warfare.

The Task Force also examined the newly-launched U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) with a view to how the military might pursue its coordination with the diplomatic and development communities most effectively to achieve success in the above three areas.

### **The Main Drivers Behind These Trends**

The Task Force attributes DoD's growing assistance role to three main factors:

- Urgent operational requirements of the Global War on Terrorism, including building up the capacities of partners and responding quickly and flexibly to emerging opportunities.
- The relative incapacity of USG civilian agencies. In both diplomatic and development spheres, underinvestment in personnel and programs, and institutional culture limit the

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ability of these civilian agencies to maintain, mobilize and rapidly deploy sufficient resources and numbers of skilled personnel for state-building, particularly in conflict zones.

- A mismatch between authorities and resources within the Executive Branch, whereby DoS has legal authorities but very limited resources while the reverse is true for DoD. This disconnect skews incentives in favor of an ever-higher operational reliance upon DoD and the extension of DoD's authorities to compensate for weak civilian performance.

### **Key Questions and Policy Dilemmas**

These recent trends pose formidable policy dilemmas. In charting a way forward, the Executive Branch and Congress need answers to the following questions:

- Are recent trends exceptional or are they part of a long-term trajectory of ever greater reliance upon DoD to provide non-traditional assistance? U.S. national interests will continue to require effective development assistance, including in support of defense and diplomatic objectives as well as for traditional poverty reduction goals. Absent a concerted major effort to ensure significant improvements in diplomatic and developmental capacities, the Task Force believes DoD will inexorably shoulder an increasing share of the burden in building the capacities of weak and failing states and rebuilding war-torn countries.
- Is the DoD the right agency to be playing this role? Other than in armed conflicts or similar discrete operations, it is inadvisable to yield leadership for humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction to the military. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing need for effective military contributions to overall U.S. security assistance, and the operational exigencies of semi and non-permissive environments at times necessitate military leadership in these areas.
- What impact do recent trends have on U.S. foreign policy? DoD non-traditional security assistance can be indispensable in responding to urgent U.S. security challenges and strategic needs. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid undermining DoS leadership in international affairs, and indeed to strengthen it. Similarly, DoD programs must bolster broader U.S. foreign policy objectives to achieve enduring stability, economic prosperity, and community development. Smart, agile concurrence procedures can help better align DoD aid programs with the broader U.S. foreign policy agenda.
- What impact do recent trends have on U.S. development objectives? The short-term security imperatives of winning hearts and minds will sometimes trump longer-term development considerations in the design and delivery of DoD assistance, particularly in situations of active insurgency. As a rule, however, DoD aid programs should be nested within broader U.S. efforts to build effective, accountable, and sustainable local institutions. The Pentagon whenever possible should defer to indeed be active advocates of civilian agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in the design and implementation of development and humanitarian projects.
- What balance should the United States seek between DoD and civilian capabilities? The Bush administration and its successor should work with Congress to build more robust capacities within U.S. civilian agencies to help meet public security, good

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governance, and development challenges in unstable and post-conflict countries, and to reduce reliance on DoD for these tasks. A high priority should be augmenting and building up the capacities of civilian agencies. Not only will this allow stand-alone civilian capacity, it will also create the necessary civilian capacity to liaise with and integrate into defense organizations. In the interim, the authorities granted DoD to build the capacities of partner countries should largely remain temporary and limited to named contingency operations, rather than be made global and permanent as the Bush administration has requested.

- How realistic is it to expect that robust civilian capacities will actually emerge and be funded? A business-as-usual approach to these pressing issues is simply unacceptable and antithetical to U.S. long-term national interests. Meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century requires the United States to marshal the full range of instruments of national power and influence. Creating a whole-of-government approach and requiring the Executive Branch to explain how its budgets support a unified national security and foreign aid strategy will substantially improve the nation's ability to address the structural roots of poor governance, instability, and extremism in the developing world.

### **Key Findings and Recommendations - The Big Picture**

The United States stands at a crossroads in defining the contours of its national security policy. Despite rhetorical emphasis on the challenges of weak, failing and post-conflict states, and the need to build up civilian capacities for transformational diplomacy, there is continued neglect of critical non-military components of national power and influence. The DoD's growing provision of non-traditional security assistance and the Pentagon's request to expand and make some new assistance authorities permanent—reflect an understandable effort to work around this asymmetry to respond to urgent contingencies. The Pentagon's entry into new forms of security assistance does bring distinct short-term benefits in insecure environments, particularly in countries deemed critical to winning the Global War on Terrorism, where DoD conducts diverse missions such as helping improve the effectiveness of security forces, restoring systems of governance, and providing essential services.

By defaulting to reliance on the military, however, the U.S. aggravates existing institutional imbalances. The authority, responsibilities, and resources of the U.S. military continue to grow as U.S. civilian diplomatic and developmental capacities further erode. Moreover, recent trends risk over-extending the already stretched U.S. armed forces. Although there are compelling reasons to give DoD flexibility to provide foreign assistance in specific, circumscribed crisis situations, granting more permanent, global authorities does not address the larger structural problems and must be handled carefully to avoid undermining both sustainable capacity building and broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

To advance U.S. national interests into the future, it will be critical to re-balance the military and non-military components of U.S. global engagement. This will entail systematically correcting the imbalance between civilian and military resources and authorities. Equally important, it requires building up relevant civilian expertise within DoS and USAID, so that they are in a position to deliver stability-creating assistance in difficult environments.<sup>2</sup>

The Task Force acknowledges the many shortcomings in the outdated *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* (FAA). Although many Task Force members believed the FAA and its implementation

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2. Restoring USAID's once-vaunted technical expertise would be a good place to start. Notwithstanding specialized units like the Office of Transition Initiatives (OIT), USAID has only modest standing, deployable technical expertise. There is only one person within USAID, for example, engaged full time in the security sector reform (SSR).

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procedures require revision, the Task Force chose to focus its efforts on identifying smart, actionable steps that can attract broad bipartisan support and bring quick results. This more narrow focus also recognized that other recent reports have attended to the need for fundamental changes in the FAA, which many on the Task Force endorse.<sup>3</sup>

To unify the U.S. government's approach to national security, the Task Force recommends, first, the Executive Branch provide increased budget transparency to Congress in the form of an integrated resource picture for U.S. foreign, national, and homeland security policy. Wholesale revision of the existing congressional authorization and appropriations structure would require bold leadership and near unanimous support in Congress—conditions that will not be obtained in the near term. Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) should be required to document more systematically how the foreign assistance streams for USAID, DoS, DoD and other relevant U.S. agencies fit together. Such transparency would help provide an accurate portrait to Congress of what the U.S. is actually spending across agencies to meet its most pressing national security challenges, as well as facilitate the creation of benchmarks to assess progress in meeting these objectives through various instruments of national power.

Second, Congress should take steps to ensure more effective and comprehensive oversight over foreign and security assistance programs across existing committee jurisdictions. One potential solution would be the creation of a Select Committee on U.S. National Security in both the Senate and the House, comprised of bipartisan leadership from all relevant communities. Simply improving coordination processes across committees could also bear fruit.

Third, both Congress and the Executive Branch need to elevate the priority attached to development, placing it on an equal footing with defense and diplomacy in U.S. foreign and national security policy. To this end, the Task Force calls for a significant increase in U.S. official development assistance (ODA), and for better integration of the multiple streams of development aid.

What are the critical next steps to create a new balance between the civilian and military domains? To improve the performance of civilian agencies in conflict prevention and post-conflict response, the Task Force recommends the next administration appoint an NSC Senior Director for Conflict Prevention and Response to serve as a locus of interagency coordination on these issues in the White House, in close concert with OMB. The Senior Director should also occupy the contingency planning role envisioned in Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. At the same time, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should be empowered with a larger multi-year funding stream, so that it may lead contingency planning for the DoS and USAID. The DoS should create and Congress provide budget support for the standing Civilian Reserve Corps proposed by President Bush in his January 2007 State of the Union address. Congress and the White House should also expand the expeditionary capabilities of civilian agencies, particularly within the U.S. Agency for International Development.

### **Counterterrorism Capacity Building**

The Task Force welcomes DoD's commitment to building the capacities of vulnerable developing countries to secure their borders and territories and to mitigate the underlying sources of support for terrorism. A review of regional CT programs in Africa suggests that unity of effort remains elusive at the strategic, organizational, and resource levels. There is a lack of coherent strategic vision and authoritative plans to guide identification of critical U.S. government CT capabilities, to rationalize resources across agency boundaries, and to integrate activities in target countries. At the organizational level, there is a persistent structural misalignment between regionally-based COCOMs

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3. See, for example, *Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership*, ed. Lael Brainard, Brookings Institution, 2006 p. 1-361.

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and DoS country-based approaches, complicating the use of either instrument as an interagency platform. Finally, at the resource level, a failure to invest in the civilian CT capabilities required to improve governance and the rule of law, promote economic and social development, and advance public education, results in an overreliance on military instruments in the GWOT. To promote a more integrated U.S. approach to counterterrorism, the Task Force endorses stronger DoS and DoD joint strategic planning and coordination at the regional level and recommends that DoD, DoS and USAID present relevant congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget, part of the more comprehensive effort requiring increased Executive Branch budget rationalization and transparency. To overcome organizational obstacles to unity of effort, the Task Force calls for more robust cross-staffing at COCOMs, the DoS, and USAID; the creation of interagency CT task forces in U.S. embassies; and additional funding and professional incentives for cross-agency counterterrorism training and exercises. To redress funding gaps, the Task Force recommends interagency formulation of country-specific assistance strategies, the establishment of flexible CT accounts for use by U.S. ambassadors, and increased funding for USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

The issue of 1206 funding authority was the most contentious facing the Task Force. Some members questioned DoD's competence in conducting non-military security training (as proposed by the administration) and worried about the potential militarization of U.S. foreign assistance. They argued that Section 1206 authority should be repealed and more emphasis placed on reforming the FAA to provide more flexible tools to the DoS for such training purposes. Other members disagreed, arguing that Section 1206 represents exactly the kind of innovative and agile mechanisms required to conduct the Global War on Terrorism. They also noted the historical inability of other agencies to operate in non-permissive environments. These members generally supported the Bush administration's request to make 1206 authorities permanent and global, to allow DoD training of non-military counterterrorism elements under the provision, and to create a higher resource ceiling for the program.

The Task Force ultimately concluded that Section 1206 does provide a valuable, flexible instrument to meet unanticipated contingencies and opportunities in the struggle against terrorism. The use of such funds, however, has wider foreign policy implications. Accordingly, 1206 authority should be restricted to time-sensitive, emerging threats, require robust DoS concurrence and joint formulation of projects, and be subject to close Congressional oversight. To maximize the effectiveness of the 1206 authority, which currently requires annual reauthorization, Congress should extend 1206 authority over five years to foster program stability (rather than making it permanent and global) and allow DoD to carry over unspent funds across fiscal years. It should also permit DoD to use such monies in combat zones or other insecure environments to work with non-military internal security forces that typically fall under the Ministry of the Interior (such as constabulary, border police, counterterrorism forces, and coast guards), subject to explicit agreement from the Secretary of State and intense legislative oversight. Over time, Section 1206 authority should be phased out, replaced by a substantial, flexible cross-government contingency fund (notionally within foreign military financing (FMF)) to support current 1206 activities.

### **Post-Conflict Operations**

The Task Force welcomes DoD's adoption of security, stabilization, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations as a core mission of the U.S. military and its acknowledgement of the need to devote resources and personnel to this undertaking. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Commander's Emergency Response Program can be helpful in delivering assistance rapidly in war-torn settings. At the same time, both initiatives have serious shortcomings and almost no documentation. PRT effectiveness has sometimes been hampered by ambiguous mandates, the absence of interagency doctrine, the lack of metrics for success, inadequate baseline assessments and strategic planning, insufficient civilian agency personnel and resources,

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minimal pre-deployment training and uneven coordination with other agencies notably USAID. To correct these shortcomings, the National Security Council should initiate a government-wide process to clarify PRT mandate and doctrine, including agency roles; DoD and its civilian partners should commit to joint planning, assessments, and training and commence more robust monitoring and evaluation of PRT impacts; and USAID should streamline processes for delivering assistance in post-conflict settings.

The Task Force likewise recognizes that CERP has the potential to be an agile, short-term national security instrument to leverage support of local leaders and populations. There should be continued use of CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, CERP should be made global, but limited to named operations, and, like Section 1206, be authorized over five years to foster program stability and to allow DoD to carry over unspent funds across fiscal years. CERP also has several potential weaknesses that should be corrected without undermining its fundamental flexibility. These include balancing the highly decentralized nature of the program, which is essential to success, with the need to make CERP less vulnerable to waste and abuse; developing CERP doctrine to make CERP less dependent on the judgment of individual commanders; increasing coordination and inputs on CERP uses from governance and development professionals within DoS, USAID, and other agencies; and conducting a comprehensive assessment of the uses and impacts of CERP for security, political stability, and economic recovery. To promote more effective and accountable use of CERP funds, without compromising their operational agility and flexibility, DoD should compile lessons learned and institutionalize training for field commanders in use of CERP; DoD should develop stronger financial controls and improved approval processes and promote standing arrangements (memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between COCOMs and Chiefs of Mission (CoMs) on the use of such funds; and DoS and USAID personnel should be deployed to brigade or battalion level, as the embedded PRT (ePRT) concept currently provides.

### **Humanitarian Assistance**

The Task Force finds that U.S. civil-military procedures for coordinating humanitarian assistance work reasonably well during both forced entry international operations and major natural disasters (such as Hurricane Mitch or the Indian Ocean tsunami). Such coordination becomes more problematic and controversial in contingencies involving chronic rather than immediate human needs, as in protracted complex emergencies, stability operations, and situations of irregular warfare. Among other shortcomings, military and civilian collaboration is often complicated by: conflicting or contradictory signals of what is expected of DoD in the provision of humanitarian relief; uneven synchronization of needs assessments and joint humanitarian assistance planning by USAID and DoD; the breakdown of information sharing in non-permissive settings; lack of timely USAID input on quick impact projects; and shrinking humanitarian space non-government organizations aid providers in non-permissive environments.

The Task Force proposes several reforms to strengthen civilian and military performance in humanitarian operations. These include drafting a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on interagency support for humanitarian assistance; supporting full USAID staffing of Senior Development Advisor positions (SDAs) at COCOMs, including individuals with expertise in emergency relief; ensuring timely USAID review of all DoD humanitarian assistance projects; increasing USAID Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds available for immediate disaster needs; keeping humanitarian-related information collected by the U.S. military in unclassified channels to the extent feasible; and continuing a regular dialogue with humanitarian non-government organizations on their needs in non-permissive environments. With regard to DoD's Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, there should be expanded use of such funds for stabilization missions only where the Chief of Mission and COCOM jointly determine such efforts are in U.S.

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national security interests and there is insufficient civilian capacity. Such a change would require action by congress.

### **African Command**

An effective U.S. approach to Africa will marry the best elements of development, diplomacy, and defense. It will take full account of the U.S. complex, rising stakes in Africa: comprised of humanitarian interests; poverty alleviation; good governance and human rights; energy security; resolution of chronic wars and internal conflicts, concentrated in weak or failing states; counterterrorism; and rising trade and investment competition with China and other Asian powers. The newly launched U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, is a DoD platform that for the first time seeks to unify U.S. military assistance programs for the region under a single roof. Its new leadership has also been eager, acting in parallel with the experimental approach of the SOUTHCOM and elsewhere, to seek new means to integrate civilian agencies into its work in non-traditional ways. If successful, AFRICOM will bring greater unity and cost-effectiveness to U.S. security programs and begin soon to demonstrate concrete results. There is much more that the U.S. can contribute to building African peacekeeping capacities, and strengthening control by African partner states of borders, ports, weakly governed remote territory and rich maritime environs. Much more can be done through expanded military-to-military partnerships to strengthen democratic norms, respect for human rights, effective planning and civilian oversight within Africa's security sector, and public health programs, especially with respect to HIV/AIDS. But to be successful, AFRICOM's mandate and mission will need also to be conspicuously embedded in (and subordinate to) a broader, U.S. government-wide effort, led by the DoS, to set and oversee U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. It will need to operate as a complement to USAID, and not a rival or threat.

AFRICOM has been launched amid controversy. The U.S. has been actively engaged in support of Ethiopian military interventions inside Somalia, on counter-terrorism grounds. The creation of a unified U.S. military approach, with the possibility of a significant headquarters' presence on the continent, has stirred considerable opposition in Africa and elsewhere, and made more conspicuous the chronic weakness of U.S. diplomatic capacities in Africa. Until the U.S. enhances the quality and strength of its diplomatic corps in Africa, its policy approach will not be balanced and effective, and a unified AFRICOM will continue to appear threatening.

AFRICOM's success will also depend on the Pentagon's ability to address several outstanding challenges in its delicate first year. Any decision for basing AFRICOM's headquarters in Africa should follow from U.S. strategic objectives in the region. The DoD will need to clarify the new Command's mandate and concept of operations, as well as its relationship to civilian U.S. departments, the National Security Council, and U.S. missions in host countries. Proposed Regional Integration Teams (RITs) need far better explanation, and interagency consensus, if they are to become reality. For all of these reasons, basing decisions should either be postponed to a much later point or suspended altogether.

In a similar vein, AFRICOM's leadership will need to explain more persuasively the value of the new Command for African countries and populations, while better managing expectations about what it can accomplish in the near-term. AFRICOM will need quickly to bolster the relevant regional expertise of its military staff and persuade civilian agencies to commit adequate numbers of personnel to the Command's headquarters. In its dialogue with Congress, the Pentagon will need to ensure an adequate funding base to meet AFRICOM's requirements and convey to African partners that the U.S. is indeed serious about expanding its security partnerships in Africa. Finally, the Command must find the right balance between long-term preventive action and short-term crisis response in U.S. engagement on the continent.