

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Honorable William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, presented the following address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC, on 21 May 1982. Of particular interest are his comments regarding the vital role of security assistance in support of the worldwide interests of the United States. We are indebted to Col Robert H. Lilac, USAF, Office of Legislative Affairs and Security Assistance, National Security Council, for furnishing this speech to the DISAM Journal.

The pace of national security affairs has seldom been faster than during this past year and a half. The initial release of our strategic arms reduction proposals, the crisis over the Falkland Islands, and the upcoming summits in Versailles and Bonn are but the latest in a series of scheduled and unscheduled events that have seized the attention of the national security community.

We have seen the return of the Sinai to Egypt and the regular launches and recovery of the space shuttle Enterprise.

We have witnessed in grief the brutal murder of Anwar Sadat, General Dozier's kidnapping in Europe, war in the Middle-East, and attempted guerilla insurrections in the Caribbean.

We have begun intermediate range nuclear force negotiations in Geneva, participated in the Ottawa and Cancun summits, and welcomed many heads of state and government to Washington.

We have watched democracy at work in El Salvador and Jamaica and seen tyranny in Afghanistan and Poland.

It is a complex, interdependent world, with opportunities often disguised as challenges. The pace is not likely to relent, and in this rush of events it is easy to lose sight of the forest given that the trees we deal with are as ambulatory as Macbeth's Birnam Wood.

For these reasons, in early February of this year, the President directed a review of our national security strategy. At that time our strategy was a collection of departmental policies which had been developed during this administration's first year in office. The President wanted to review the results of that first year, to see where we were, to make sure our various policies were consistent, and to set the course for the future.



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In particular, we wanted to make sure that any discussions we had with the leadership of Congress on reductions in our defense budget, and any discussions with the leadership of the Soviet Union regarding arms reductions, were based both on a well thought through [and] integrated strategy for preserving our national security.

The President's involvement in this study is a good example of how he involves himself in national security affairs. As a former Governor, President Reagan's experience more clearly lies in economic and domestic policy areas. But a lifetime of interest in, concern for, and debate of national security issues has built a framework of philosophy which Ronald Reagan articulated to the American people and which they endorsed a year and a half ago.

The conversion of that philosophy to policy has been one of the President's major efforts this year. He views national security as his most compelling responsibility, and he has come to treat it accordingly.

This year about a third of the President's office time has been devoted to national security work -- more than any other area of endeavor. He has already signed 35 national security decision directives, 19 of them this year, a pace that compares favorably with his predecessors. There have been 57 meetings of the National Security Council during this Administration -- nearly one a week. The President has personally chaired them all. Few Presidents, none in peacetime, have paid this much attention to our security problems.

In this particular security review, the President played an extraordinarily active role. He progressively reviewed and commented on all nine interagency draft segments as they were prepared. Sometimes we returned to the drawing board, sometimes our fuzzy language was sharpened by the Presidential first person singular. The NSC staff led the effort in its role as an honest broker of ideas. Secretary Weinberger's 1982 defense policy provided an excellent foundation for the military portion of the study. The senior leadership at Defense, State, CIA, and the other interested agencies were totally involved. The JCS met twelve times to consider various parts of the study. But when it was done, the study and the decisions were the President's.

Now that the work is done, we have come to several conclusions.

First of all, the purpose of our strategies should be to reserve our institutions of freedom and democracy, to protect our citizens, to promote their economic well-being and to foster an international order supportive of these institutions and principles.

Second, we are confident that the policies of our first year have been internally consistent and that they do lay the groundwork for a strategy that will protect the security of the United States.

Third, a successful strategy must have diplomatic, political, economic, and informational components built on a foundation of military strength.

Fourth, our strategy must be forward-looking and active. We must offer hope. As the President said last year at Notre Dame, "Collectivism and the subordination of the individual to the state is now perceived around the world as a bizarre and evil episode of history whose last pages are even now being

written." We have something better to offer: Freedom. To secure the America we all want and the global stability and prosperity we all seek, we cannot sit back and hope that somehow it will happen. We must believe in what we are doing. That requires initiative, patience and persistence. We must be prepared to respond vigorously to opportunities as they arise and to create opportunities where none have existed before. And we must be steadfast in our efforts.

Fifth, ours must be a coalition strategy. We, together with our friends and allies, must pull together. There is no other way. We must achieve an even closer linkage with regional allies and friends.

Next month's NATO summit is a case in point. There may be a vocal minority questioning the basic assumptions of the Atlantic Alliance. It is not the first time, nor will it be the last. But when President Reagan and the other NATO leaders meet in Bonn next month, there should be a strong reaffirmation of alliance unity, vitality, and resolve. A strong, unified NATO remains indispensable for the protection of Western interests. The differences among NATO members involve shaping NATO, not whether there should be an alliance. At Bonn, we will witness fundamental agreement on the need to strengthen our deterrent posture. We will see a balanced approach to arms control. NATO remains dedicated to the common task of preserving democracy.

Sixth, the economic component of our strategy is particularly important. We must promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortion to trade and broadly agreed rules for resolving differences.

The summits at Ottawa and Cancun played a positive role in the search for a cooperative strategy for global economic growth. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a further contribution, offering a constructive, long-term commitment to countries in our hemisphere. Next month's Versailles summit will be another step. We anticipate an atmosphere of realism at Versailles. We hope it will inspire new thinking while deflating outworn concepts.

We must also force our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings.

And seventh, the maintenance of peace requires a strong, flexible, and responsible military. The rebuilding of our national defenses is now an urgent task.

For obvious reasons, I cannot discuss the defense portion of our review in the detail you might desire. I will try to provide the highlights and, where I can, some degree of specificity.

Our interests are global, and they conflict with those of the Soviet Union, a state which pursues worldwide policies inimical to our own. The Soviet Union maintains the most heavily armed military establishment in history and possesses the capability to protect its military forces far beyond its own borders. We have vital interests around the world, including maritime sea lanes of communications. The hard fact is that the military power of the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these vital interests. The Soviet Union also complements its direct military capabilities with proxy forces and surrogates,

with extensive arms sales and grants, by manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations, and through support to a number of insurgencies and separatist movements by providing arms, advice, military training, and political backing.

Our military forces, and those of our allies, must protect our common interests in our increasingly turbulent environment.

We must be prepared to deter attack and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.

In this regard, the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces will receive first priority in our efforts to rebuild the military capabilities of the United States. Nuclear deterrence can only be achieved if our strategic nuclear posture makes Soviet assessment of the risks of war, under any contingency, so great as to remove any incentive for initiating attack.

The decisions on strategic nuclear forces, which the President announced last fall, remain the foundation of our policy.

The highest priority was to be accorded to survivable strategic communications systems.

In addition, we plan to modernize the manned bomber force, increase the accuracy and payload of our submarine launched ballistic missiles, add sea launched cruise missiles, improve strategic defenses, and deploy a new larger, more accurate land based missile.

This latter decision was reaffirmed by the President last Monday. He views the production of a modern ICBM, with the earliest possible introduction into the operational force, as absolutely essential.

The President provided some guidance to the Department of Defense on priorities he wished accorded to various basing and defense schemes, but he essentially asked Defense for their recommendations on a permanent basing mode by early fall so that he could comply with Congressional desires for an Administration position well before the end of the year.

At the same time, the President made it clear that until a more survivable basing mode has been selected, funded, and cleared for construction, he wishes to retain the option of deploying a limited number of M-X in Minuteman silos as an integral part of the M-X program.

The silo basing option provides a hedge against unforeseen technical developments and program changes. It is a clear incentive to the Soviets to negotiate arms reductions, and even in silos, M-X gains in survivability as all three legs of the strategic triad are modernized.

The M-X program is too important to allow the risk of technical environmental or arms control debates to delay the introduction of the missile into the force.

While the failure to strengthen our nuclear deterrent could be disastrous, recent history makes clear that conventional deterrence is now more important than ever. Current overseas deployments will be maintained to provide a

capability for timely and flexible response to contingencies and to demonstrate resolve to honor our commitments. Ground, naval, and air forces will remain deployed in Europe, in the Western Pacific, in Southwest Asia, and elsewhere as appropriate. In this hemisphere, naval forces will maintain a presence in the North Atlantic, the Caribbean Basin, the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean. Forward-deployed forces will be postured to facilitate rapid response. Intermittent overseas deployments from the United States will be made as necessary.

Our strategic reserve of U.S.-based forces, both active and reserve components, will be maintained at a high state of readiness and will be periodically exercised. Last year's Bright Star exercise in the middle east and last month's Ocean Venture 82 in the Caribbean provided a valuable experience for our forces. They also demonstrated a multi-national, multi-force capability to defend our interests and those of our friends worldwide. Our need to swiftly reinforce worldwide, means that improvements in our strategic mobility and in our reserve structure are terribly important.

Although the most prominent threat to our vital interests worldwide is the Soviet Union, our interests can also be put in jeopardy by actions of other states and groups. In contingencies not involving the Soviet Union, we hope to rely on friendly regional states to provide military forces.

Should the threat exceed the capabilities of regional states, however, we must be prepared within the framework of our constitutional processes, to commit U.S. forces to assist our allies. This does not mean that we will push ourselves into areas where we are neither wanted nor needed. What it does mean is that we cannot reject in advance any options we might need to protect our vital interests. To do so is to invite aggression, undermine the credibility of our commitments to our friends, and place at risk our global objectives.

This highlights the importance of security assistance. By this term we mean foreign military sales, grant assistance, international military education and training, economic support funds, and peacekeeping. If we do not assist our allies and friends in meeting their legitimate defense requirements, then their ability to cope with conflict goes down and the pressure for eventual U.S. involvement goes up. Yet today security assistance is not doing the job it should.

Resources are inadequate and often of the wrong kind. During the 1950s, the security assistance budget ranged from five to ten percent of the defense budget. Today, it is about one and a half percent. While it is not necessary to return to the post war levels that re-armed and secured western Europe, some steady growth in security assistance can be our most cost-effective investment.

The annual budget cycle constrains long range planning. Countries participating in our security assistance program and the procurement officers at the Defense Department both need to plan ahead. Procurement lead times limit the responsiveness of the overall program. Finally, legislative restrictions reduce the ability of our government to react appropriately to emergency conditions.

An effective security assistance program is a critical element in meeting our security objective abroad. Thus, it is a real complement to our own force structure. Security assistance can help deter conflict, and it can increase the ability of our friends and allies to defend themselves without the commitment of U.S. combat forces. Effective programs can establish a degree of compatibility between U.S. forces and the forces of recipient countries so we can work together in combat, if necessary. Not only does security assistance offer a cost-effective way of enhancing our security worldwide, but it also strengthens our economy in general and our defense production in particular. In short, a little assistance buys a lot of security.

For these reasons, we are planning a priority effort to improve the effectiveness and responsibility of this vital component of our national security strategy. We will be looking at ways of reducing lead times. We will take a hard look at existing legislation and future resources requirements. Programs require predictability: this points toward more extensive use of multiyear commitments and a larger capitalization of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund. In sum, security assistance needs fixing and we have a plan to fix it.

No one should mistake the main goal of American global strategy: that goal is peace. We have devoted too large a portion of our national resources and emotion over the past forty years in the alleviation of want, hunger, suffering, and distress throughout the world to want anything but peace in every corner of this planet. Those who slander the United States with charges of warmongering can barely paper over their own guilty consciences in this regard. In particular, the record of the Soviet Union in arms suppression of popular movements since 1945 is unparalleled among modern nations.

To maintain peace with freedom, therefore, we are forced reluctantly to plan carefully for the possibility that our adversaries may prove unwilling to keep the peace.

When we turn to a strategy for our military forces, we enter the world of assumptions, scenarios, and hypothetical projections. It would be our strategy to employ military force to achieve specific political objectives quickly on terms favorable to the United States and our allies.

We need a better, more detailed strategy in order to buy the right equipment, develop forces, and lay detailed plans. This strategy must provide flexibility yet allow pre-planning.

In trying to solve this problem, we have looked at such strategy as a planning continuum. At the lower end of the spectrum, our guidance emphasizes the integration of economic aid and security assistance, foreign military training, and supplementary support capability.

At the higher end of the conflict spectrum, our strategy guidance takes into account the global military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters. We recognize that, in spite of our efforts to preserve peace, any conflict with the Soviet Union could expand to global dimensions. Thus, global planning is a necessity. This does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously on all fronts. We can't. What it does mean is that we must procure

balanced forces and establish priorities for sequential operations to ensure that military power would be applied in the most effective way.

It is in the interest of the United States to limit the scope of any conflict. The capability for counteroffensives on other fronts is an essential element of our strategy, but is not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend our vital interests in the area in which they are threatened. On the other hand, the decision to expand a conflict may well not be ours to make. Therefore, U.S. forces must be capable of responding to a major attack with unmistakable global implications early on in the conflict.

The President has established priorities in the way our forces would be used in combat, in terms of geography, and in terms of force development -- What do we fix first?

We have tried to analyze the risks we face. We cannot fix them all at once, in part because things take time, and in part because the Soviet military advantage results from a decade of investment. There is not enough money available to eliminate the risks overnight.

What we have tried to do is analyze the risks, put first things first, and develop plans for how we will conduct ourselves if worst comes to worst.

On the other hand, we want to hope for the best, and we want to offer that hope to others: our allies, our friends, the Third World, and especially to the citizens of the Soviet Union.

It is our fondest hope that with an effective yet prudent national security policy, we might one day convince the leadership of the Soviet Union to turn their attention inward, to seek the legitimacy that only comes from the consent of the governed, and thus to address the hopes and dreams of their own people.