

DEFENSE AND SECURITY BEYOND EUROPE

By

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Three reasons account for increased United States defense efforts outside Europe. First, our external economy is no longer Euro-centered. Over 60 percent of our trade is outside Europe, and that percentage is growing. Without oil from South America, Africa, and the Middle East, for example, the world economy would collapse.

Second, jet travel and worldwide communications have changed what governments and peoples deem central to their interests. As Americans were watching network coverage of the shelling of Beirut, the same coverage was being beamed into the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere. In terms of the security interests of the United States, a great deal is at stake in non-European areas, which, regrettably, are fragile economically and politically.

Third, the Soviet Union pursues global ambitions. Despite its weak economy, the Soviet Union encourages and provides financial support to subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific. The expansion of Soviet power threatens world trade and worldwide communications. Weak nations seek the umbrella of American power and this has led to increasing emphasis on American defense capability outside Europe.

Overall United States security interests have meant that the Department of Defense, first and foremost, must maintain a nuclear and a conventional deterrent against Soviet aggression outside Europe, as well as within the NATO area. The 1970s were a period of malaise in the United States. Year after year, we reduced our forces. A succession of Secretaries of Defense warned that the Soviet response to our defense cuts during this period called detente was a military increase. By 1980, Soviet military investment was 170 percent of that of the United States, and Soviet accumulated investment exceeded ours by \$130 billion. We could not remain the most powerful nation in the world by investing less with each passing year.

DoD Budget Allocation by Mission and Region

17%	Nuclear Forces
21%	Conventional Naval Forces
13%	Non-European/Mobility Forces
34%	Europe-Oriented Forces
16%	Other

(FY 82-83 Avg.)

A first order of business for President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was to rebuild our nation's defenses. For the current fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1983), Congress has appropriated \$209 billion in spending. This represents a smaller percentage of our gross national product than we spent for defense in the 1950s and 1960s. Fortunately, our defense capabilities are now growing stronger; we are rebuilding, and we have tightened our belt at the same time. Throughout this effort, Secretary Weinberger has insisted upon two principles: an increase in capabilities and a decrease in inefficiencies.



Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger greets King Hussein of Jordan during his visit last December. The successful US-Jordan Joint Military Commission (a close, bilateral military bond without formal treaty status) has served as a model for similar links with six other countries in the Mid-East and Africa.

Despite publicity to the contrary, our nuclear forces receive about the same share of the defense budget today -- less than 20 percent -- that they did in the 1960s. This supports our goal of maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, not nuclear superiority.

In any United States-Soviet crisis, the fear of a nuclear war would be present. But the existence of strong nuclear forces on both sides does not guarantee an end to aggression or confrontation. If both sides fear the use

of nuclear weapons, the stronger set of conventional forces will play a decisive role in dictating the political outcome. Deterrence can fail and an aggressor can attack with conventional forces either because he believes the war will remain non-nuclear and he will prevail or because he does not believe there will be a sufficiently forceful response to his action.

In 1939, Hitler did not believe France and Britain would declare war because Poland was invaded; early in 1950, North Korea did not believe the United States would respond to the invasion of South Korea; and in late 1950, it was the United States which did not believe the Chinese would attack in response to our offensive up to the Yalu River.

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, without provoking any external military response. However, we warned the Soviets that any further aggression in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region would be met with force and that there should not be any miscalculation on their part about our intentions.

We cannot presume that nuclear weapons alone can deter Soviet conventional aggression. Our conventional forces, which comprise about 85 percent of the defense budget, must be capable of fighting anywhere and not just on the Central Front of Europe. They need mobility. Without clear maritime superiority, we would be unable to respond to a Soviet challenge outside Europe.

In the past two years, the growth in our non-NATO forces has been faster than our NATO forces. We are expanding from 480 "Total Battle Forces" ships in 1980 to 600 by 1989, with two nuclear-powered carriers authorized last year, compared to none in the prior four years. Our United States Army Rapid Deployment Forces, United States Marines, and associated mobility grew 60 percent during the past two years. Over the same period, mobility airlift has increased by 17 million ton-miles per day and improvements in sealift have increased our capacity by 200,000 tons.

Since 1981, \$500 million has been allocated to construction for facilities in Southwest Asia and another \$250 million is requested for Fiscal Year 1984. Because there is no natural constituency for funding facilities in foreign lands, DoD's Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) has championed en route access to and facilities in Southwest Asia.

To explain DoD's policy efforts outside Europe, however, it is necessary to recognize the changes in planning emphasis that have taken place. Two years ago, Secretary Weinberger challenged conventional planning wisdom in the Pentagon, which focused upon "One and One-Half Wars:" defense of NATO Europe ("One War") plus defense of South Korea ("One-Half War").

"One and One-Half Wars" had been approved in 1969 as DoD planning doctrine, when the Soviet Union was still a continental power and when world affairs were more compartmented. Today, Soviet forces are no longer deployed solely along the West European and Chinese fronts: witness the 100,000-man Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 12,000 troops and advisers in Cuba, the 2,500 in Ethiopia, and the 4,000 more in Syria along with extremely sophisticated air defense equipment.

Our defense policy has had to respond to this Soviet global extension. In the past two years, we broadened our planning to think globally, to examine the relationships among the various military threats -- the Atlantic, Europe, the Pacific, etc. What was needed for the 1980s and beyond was flexibility -- in doctrine, in mobility, in responsiveness -- rather than continued concentration upon the European theater as a separate and dominant entity.

This strategy of global flexibility, as it has evolved over the past two years, did not mean planning for intense, simultaneous conflict worldwide. Quite the opposite. It meant assessing the opponent's strength on the global chessboard, taking account of our allies' capabilities, and assigning priorities, moves, and countermoves.

FY83 Military Assistance Request
(All Figures in Millions)

	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Percent Of Grant Total</u>	<u>Loan</u>	<u>Percent Of Loan Total</u>
1. Israel	\$ 500	37	\$1,200	28
2. Egypt	400	30	900	21
3. Turkey	150	11	315	7
4. Spain	--	0	400	9
5. Greece	--	0	280	6
6. Pakistan	--	0	275	6
7. Korea	--	0	210	5
8. 35 Other Countries	<u>294.5</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>743.3</u>	<u>17</u>
TOTAL	\$1,344.5	100%	\$4,323.3	100%

In conflict against the Soviets or its surrogates, hard choices among theaters would have to be made by both sides. To help fulfill the responsibility of the Department of Defense to plan on a global basis, ISA has sponsored a series of war games and studies to assist the OJCS in formulating its planning. These exercises place a premium on outthinking a foe which has considerably more weight and muscle in some areas.

About 25 percent of the Soviet ground force divisions is deployed opposite China and along the rim of the northeast Pacific. While the Soviets are actively courting rapprochement with China, China has good reason to guard against Soviet military hegemony. Our aim for China is to build a stable and enduring relationship that recognizes our common interests and differences. On the one hand, we will abide by our commitments to Taiwan. On the other, we also expect to expand our military-to-military contacts with China in ways which do not threaten our security or that of our allies and friends.

Local or Regional Conflicts

I. Shooting Wars or Large-scale Terrorism

<u>Nations Friendly Toward US</u>	<u>Threatened by Whom</u>	<u>Nature of US Commitment</u>
1. El Salvador	Insurgents/Cuba/Nicaragua	Security Assistance/ Training
2. Honduras	Insurgents/Cuba/Nicaragua	Security Assistance/ Training
3. Costa Rica	Insurgents/Cuba/Nicaragua	Security Assistance
4. Colombia	Insurgents/Cuba	Security Assistance
5. Morocco	Polisario/Libya	Security Assistance
6. Lebanon	PLO/Confessional Factions	Security Assistance/ Training/US Forces
7. Israel	PLO Factions/Syria	Security Assistance
8. Somalia	Ethiopia/Cuba	Security Assistance/ Training
9. North Yemen	Insurgents/South Yemen	Security Assistance/ Training
10. Thailand	Insurgents/Vietnam	Security Assistance
11. Philippines	Insurgents	Security Assistance

II. Real and Present Danger of a Shooting War

12. Tunisia	Subversives/Libya	Security Assistance
13. Egypt	Libya	Security Assistance/ Training
14. Sudan	Libya	Security Assistance/ Training
15. Pakistan	Soviet	Security Assistance
16. Jordan	Syria	Security Assistance
17. Persian Gulf States	Subversives/Iran	Security Assistance/ Training/US Forces
18. South Korea	North Korea	Security Assistance/ US Forces

With Japan -- the industrial giant of the Pacific -- we share democratic values but until recently divergent military interests. Japan shunned military self-defense development in favor of economic prosperity. Japan's defense budget is approximately one-twentieth that of the United States and claims less than one percent of Japan's gross national product. At current resource rates, Japan's forces will remain inadequate through this century. ISA

marked as a genuine breakthrough former Prime Minister Suzuki's endorsement of the strategy that Japan would defend air and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles.

Current Prime Minister Nakasone has compared Japan to an unsinkable aircraft carrier, which serves to strengthen Japanese self-defense capabilities. An adequate Japanese defense capability while serving Japanese interests also contributes to global deterrence. Prime Minister Nakasone seems determined to rectify the imbalance between Japanese promises and capabilities. In order to do that, Japan will have to devote more resources to military investment. When that happens, the Free World will present a much more formidable and creditable deterrent to the Soviets.

The world has several other theaters of operation, most less stable than Western Europe and Northeast Asia. The area of highest instability is the Greater Middle East, stretching from Morocco to Pakistan. This region of 300 million people and 22 nations is marked by Qadhafi's mischiefmaking in the Horn of Africa, by the Israeli-Arab conflict, by the Iranian fundamentalist crusade against its neighbors, and by Soviet efforts to bomb and gas the Afghan people into submission.

Neither NATO nor Japan is willing to assist formally in this area. In December 1982, President Reagan approved the formation of a new unified defense command -- one of only six -- for the region. It is called United States Central Command -- USCENTCOM -- responsible for peacetime military activities, for wartime planning, and beginning this fall, for the supervision of United States military assistance in Southwest Asia.

USCENTCOM evolved from the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). ISA was the chief staff arm for the Secretary of Defense in this evolution. With the planning responsibility for at least three divisions, 11 fighter squadrons, and three carrier battle groups, USCENTCOM's primary purpose is to plan and to deploy quickly enough to deter any Soviet military planner from a blitzkrieg to control access to Persian Gulf oil. Deprived of this option, the Soviets must calculate that any large-scale war in Southwest Asia would have wider and unacceptable consequences.

And we also recognize that the range of threats in the region is broad and may not involve directly either Soviet or American troops. The United States has assured friendly nations it will assist as appropriate against threats. Unfortunately, no Mideast state identifies the Soviet threat as its highest security priority, and most assume that United States military power will deter Soviet aggression in the area. By this kind of wishful thinking, Soviet power is not credited as a military threat. Yet, paradoxically, many of these same states refuse to support United States activities which enhance this assumed United States counterpower.

Gradually, we have been overcoming the avoidance syndrome about military matters. We have built a Joint Military Commission (JMC) with Jordan, a close, bilateral military bond without formal treaty status. When Jordan refused to join the Camp David Agreements in 1978, relations were naturally strained. But former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Assistant Secretary for ISA David McGiffert maintained the JMC and nurtured its institutional links. Hence, we have been able to use the JMC to discuss

Jordan's security needs in the context of President Reagan's dramatic peace initiative.

In the past two years, ISA, drawing on its Jordan JMC experience, has initiated six other bilateral organizations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. These joined those JMCs ISA already conducted with South Korea and Japan.

The benefits of the JMCs to the United States are several: We are on a first-name basis with the military leaders of these key Mideast countries; we share threat data and capabilities assessments; and when we have disagreements, they are among friends who understand each other. The objective is to develop steady, purposeful, long-term planning and to avoid fitful or whimsical requests and a lack of common understanding.



Navy Seabees come ashore during Exercise Team Spirit in Korea. The only permanent, large-scale (40,000) US military presence outside of Europe is in South Korea. [Photo by PH1 Dennis Brockschmidt, USN]

Our relationship with Israel is special and enduring. We cannot force the Islamic world to accept Israel; neither can we, in our own sovereign interests, ignore 300 million Arabs, most of whom want American friendship, technology, and security association. The United States needs many friends in the Islamic Middle East, both for access to oil and for the preservation of a relative degree of stability, without which disintegration into widescale

violence is possible. Fortunately, most nations in the Middle East seek our friendship, admire our values, and desire our umbrella of security.

We must enhance security and stability in the Middle East. This means supporting not only Israel with arms, but also our friends who face the threats of Libya, Syria, and Iran. It also means withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and progress in the President's peace initiative.

We should have no illusions about our own backyard. With Soviet support, Premier Castro has grown from a bombastic nuisance into a dangerous adversary. Cuba is a Soviet base with impressive capabilities. Cuba hosts a 2,600-man Soviet combat brigade and a modern Soviet electronic eavesdropping and communications station.

Soviet and US Arms Deliveries to the Third World
(1977-1981)

	USSR	US
Tanks	7,000	3,000
Artillery	10,000	3,000
Combat Aircraft	3,000	1,000
Surface-to-Air Missiles	12,000	8,000
Helicopters	1,000	200

[Source: Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World, 1972-81. August 1982, US Department of State. (All numbers rounded)]

Last year, Cuba received \$3.5 billion in economic aid and the equivalent of one-half billion dollars in Soviet military equipment. It now has over 200 MiGs, including two squadrons of the very sophisticated MiG-23 fighter/attack aircraft. Cuba even has two Soviet submarines and one major combatant of frigate size. At present, 50 percent of our overseas trade products and imported crude oil pass through the Caribbean and are within the reach of these forces.

Within Central America, Castro has continued to plot and to aid in the subversion of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Colombia. He has dispatched to Nicaragua 5,000 Cuban technicians and military advisers. Nicaragua, in turn, is the command, control, and supply base for guerrilla operations.

Supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, Nicaragua has sent 70 pilots and mechanics to Bulgaria for MiG training. The island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean, has Cubans and East Germans constructing a Soviet-model airfield for hefty, long-range aircraft. This could aid Cuba in shuttling troops to Angola and to Ethiopia, while Soviet military reconnaissance aircraft routinely fly the Kola Peninsula-Cuba-Angola triangle. In the South Atlantic, Soviet naval ship days have increased from 200 in 1970 to 2,600 in 1980. These developments mean, in the event of a conflict in Eurasia, that we face the possibility of a nasty fight right off our own shoreline -- a fight which would divert United States forces destined for NATO or elsewhere.

Central America accounts for only four percent of our worldwide military assistance funding. Nevertheless, over the past two years the momentum of Marxist, Cuban-aided insurgencies in Central America has been slowed. We will persist in challenging Castro's subversive efforts, both because we should aid our neighbors when they face externally-supported attack and because our own security is affected by the development of more Soviet or Cuban-related military bases in the Caribbean.

In addition to contributing to Soviet military projection capabilities, Castro has sent 36,000 combat troops to intervene in Africa. In Ethiopia, which in 1981 signed a pact with Libya, there are 2,500 Soviet and upwards of 14,000 Cuban troops. Ethiopia, abetted by Qadhafi and safeguarded by the Soviets and Cubans, persists in military jabs aimed at overthrowing the government of Somalia, its impoverished southern neighbor.


While the Ethiopian-Somali feud is tribal and dates back 30 years to maladjusted national boundaries established by the withdrawing European colonialists, the Horn of Africa has geostrategic importance because it abuts the air and sea lines of communication and commerce to the Persian Gulf. ISA has asserted before Congress that modest military assistance to the proud and impoverished Somali people is the prudent course. We do not wish to witness the expansion of Soviet air base facilities at the southern tip of Africa, threatening all shipping through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Since 1975, Castro has stationed almost 20,000 combat troops in Angola. Ostensibly, they are to guard the Angolan Marxist regime against South African attacks. Conveniently, they guard the regime against overthrow by a well-organized, internal tribal resistance movement, led by Joshua Savinbi.

For two years, the United States goal has been the simultaneous withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola and of the South African troops from Namibia, Angola's southern neighbor. Progress toward the goal has been slow, not least of all because Castro receives almost \$300 million per year in oil from Angola, or 10 percent of Angola's total gross national product, in exchange for his troops. Put another way, Castro is renting his military to the Angolan Marxist regime for \$13,000 per soldier per year, while he pays each soldier \$3,000 per year.

For the sake of our own security, therefore, we pay close attention to regional balances and to localized threats where direct Soviet combat power is not the issue. There are four reasons to do so. The first is to maintain local power balances to prevent establishment of Soviet bases -- it is a slippery slope from a Marxist endorsed guerrilla movement to the violent takeover of a government to an overseas Soviet military base. It is not just in the Caribbean that we cannot take military security for granted. To reinforce the Persian Gulf in a crisis, our lines of communications have to pass near Soviet air and naval combat reconnaissance bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Any transit of our Pacific 7th Fleet between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans must take into account the Soviet use of air bases in Vietnam.

The second reason is to secure a network of nations which permit access to United States forces en route to a conflict. In this endeavor, we have made significant progress in the past two years.



Soviet Kiev-class vertical take-off and landing aircraft carrier under way. Soviet naval ship days in the South Atlantic area alone increased from 200 in 1970 to 2,600 in 1980.

With Honduras, we have an agreed access to airfields from which American airpower could be projected over the mid-Caribbean sea lanes should the need arise. Morocco has formally signed an en route air base agreement which strengthens our ability to reinforce quickly in Southwest Asia. Both Morocco and Tunisia have responded positively to an increase in United States amphibious exercises and in ship visits by the 6th Fleet.

We have expanded our prepositioning and exercise agreements with Oman, initiated prepositioning talks with Sudan, and received from Congress appropriations for a facility for United States air and ground forces at Ras Banas in southern Egypt. Our military exercises and planning with Jordan have also expanded.

A third reason for paying attention to regional balances is to prevent larger conflicts and to enhance the prospects for peace. A case in point is the Israeli-Arab conflict. In 1981, President Reagan authorized the inclusion of a United States Army battalion in the Sinai peacekeeping force. In 1982, the President dispatched a battalion of Marines to assist in the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. The Marines returned to Lebanon to facilitate the withdrawal of Syrian, Israeli, and PLO remnant forces and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.



Fighter aircraft from the United States, Australia, and Singapore fly over Singapore during dissimilar air combat training. US security interests require a broadening and strengthening of our military contacts.

The fourth reason for selective defense involvement in regions outside Europe is the preservation of United States credibility -- honoring treaty obligations and showing steadfastness to our friends.

These four reasons explain DoD's concern about local balances and conflicts in regions outside Europe: discouraging the development of Soviet overseas bases and the use of projection power; enhancing United States military projection power and en route access; providing United States military support where it will increase the possibility of peace; and constancy toward our friends, especially when they are beleaguered.

Our selection of goals and objectives must be made within the constraints of available resources and associated costs. The primary resource to maintain a balance of power against Soviet military power is our own defense budget. Together with those of our allies, our current defense resources and planning are encouraging.

In the case of a regional or local conflict, United States resources generally come via the State Department's Security Assistance budget, comprised of economic and military assistance. DoD recommends to the State Department the dollar levels for military aid to various nations. While military assistance has increased by more than 50 percent in the past two years, we have in fact been playing the same catch-up game we faced with our own defense budget.

Outside Western Europe, 11 nations friendly to the United States are engaged today in shooting wars or combating organized terrorism, while seven others face real and present military danger.

In only three of these 18 cases are United States ground and air forces involved. The Marines in Lebanon are there only temporarily. In Saudi Arabia, we have stationed AWACS aircraft to give Saudi fighter pilots warning of any air attack across the Gulf which would threaten Western access to oil. Only in South Korea, as we have had since 1953, do we have a permanent, large-scale (40,000) United States military presence. The trend in the past two years has not been toward the involvement of United States military forces in combat.

Our use, however, of training teams to teach others how to defend themselves is definitely up. United States Army Special Forces have played a major role because they have language fluency and training expertise. For nations with strained economies, ISA has encouraged the development of trained infantry rather than the purchase of high-technology, high-cost weapon systems. In 1981, the Special Forces deployed 70 training missions; in 1982, the number of requests for these missions almost doubled.

But we are not the world's policeman. In 1962, the United States had 7,000 personnel in overseas security assistance organizations; in 1982, the number was 750. If we add all our NATO partners in security assistance operations overseas, the total is 2,000 only about one-twentieth of the 20,000 Soviets, 14,000 Cubans, and 2,000 East Europeans.

With respect to arms sales abroad, until recently, Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World exceeded ours by ratios of up to three-to-one. Foreign military sales (including construction) by the United States have been increasing, from \$8.2 billion in Fiscal Year 1981, to \$21.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1982. Only a small portion of the total, however, represented purchases using United States grants or credit; the remainder were cash sales to friends and allies. Less than 20 percent of United States financial assistance to other nations is for military purposes; most of our aid overseas is economic.

Less than 40 percent of United States foreign military sales are weapons or ammunition; the remainder is for support services. For the current fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1983), President Reagan requested \$1.5 billion in military grants and \$4.3 billion in military loans. Of the world's 150 nations, the

United States will offer military assistance (excluding training assistance) to 42 in Fiscal Year 1983.

The military grants requested equal less than one percent of the defense budget. Military grant aid in 1982 was \$20 billion in Fiscal Year 1982 dollars; for 1983, the request was \$1.5 billion. The other \$4.3 billion in the Fiscal Year 1983 military assistance request is for loans to be repaid at prevailing interest rates, and the money loaned must be used to purchase United States equipment and services. The largest portion of the program (over 50 percent) goes to Israel and Egypt as part of the Camp David peace process.

One of the major purposes of military assistance is to serve as a quid pro quo for base rights and facilities in lieu of paying rent for land in another nation. Military assistance also supports our less prosperous allies and goes to other nations because they face real and present dangers and shooting wars. As in previous decades, we should provide more grants to offset the burden of loan credits to economically distressed nations and thereby increase their security capability while reducing the probable use of United States forces.

Despite the quantitative disparities between United States and Soviet military assistance, we have realized real security gains in the past two years. Our military equipment proved effective and reliable with the British in the South Atlantic and with Israeli forces in Lebanon.

President Reagan's low-key firmness has impressed foreign leaders. Abroad, there is the recognition that he will tolerate no extended Teheran-hostage-type drama; the response to an attack upon American interests will be swift and firm. Qadhafi's reputation in the Arab world is gravely damaged; Castro is losing momentum in Central America; the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan have fought the Soviet occupation forces to a standstill.



Students from Colombia and Singapore at the Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course, Technical Training Center, Chanute AFB, Ill. Some 5,800 foreign officers and NCOs attended US military schools under the International Military Education and Training Program in 1982.

After years of pullback and accommodation, the United States has reengaged to reassert a geopolitical balance of power which furthers American interests. Foreign leaders have perceived this. In 1982, Secretary of Defense Weinberger met with almost four times as many heads of state, foreign ministers, and defense ministers from non-NATO nations as the Secretary of Defense did in 1980.

In 1981, \$28 million was allocated for IMET (International Military Education and Training) funds, which enabled 4,800 foreign military officers and NCOs to attend United States military schools; in 1982, \$42 million was allocated and 5,800 foreign officers and NCOs came to the United States. DoD relationships today, both personal and institutional, are much stronger in Central America, throughout the Islamic and Arab Middle East, and in the Pacific.

Defense planning is not just enhancing capabilities and expanding concepts to include a global perspective in the event of a worst-case United States-Soviet conflict. Security also means maintaining good relationships with friends and allies and deterring enemies from violence through development of strong, collective defense arrangements. Much of ISA's work for Secretary Weinberger lies in attracting, through steadfastness and cooperation, friends and allies, while dampening crises before they can expand into wider conflict.



A US Army battalion has been authorized by the Administration for the Sinai peacekeeping force.

[Photo by: SP5 Ed Bosanko, USA]

The emerging Soviet geopolitical agenda under Chairman Andropov reveals several efforts to undermine our security interests by splitting Western Europe from the United States over nuclear arms and negotiations; persuading China to reach an accord satisfactory to the Soviet Union; use Soviet military equipment and troops in Syria to lever the Soviets into Middle East affairs and into the peace process; and aiding Cuban and Nicaraguan subversive efforts in the Americas to divert United States policy attention from Eurasia.

To counter these actions, the United States has increased its security efforts over the past two years and will not be diverted by a resurgence of Soviet geopolitical activism. We will press ahead with our own agenda. Near the top of the list is an effort to persuade Congress that the security assistance program is needed and is fiscally sound. The task of shoring up a series of regional balances is well under way, given the 50 percent increase in military assistance and the contacts established over the past two years. But we must press ahead. This means avoiding cuts in the military assistance program.

The United States security interests outside Europe have grown steadily. In the past two years, DoD has responded by an increase in defense resources, by modifications to defense planning, by increases in United States security assistance abroad, and by broadening and strengthening our military contacts. We cannot afford to lose the initiative we have established in this regard -- or we will face the possibility of eroding the enhanced security for ourselves and the rest of the Free World we have begun to build.

The new global scope of our defense policy responds to the practicality of the world as it is now and will be in the years ahead. Our security efforts now recognize that for the survival of the United States and its allies, the focus must be balanced -- maintaining our line of sight to Europe, but expanding our view to encompass the rest of the world.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. West authored this piece before leaving office in March 1983. Prior to assuming the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, he was Dean of Advanced Research and Director, Strategic Research Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College. Before that, he was Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is a former staff analyst and project director with the Rand Corporation, and a former Director of Program Planning in the OASD for Systems Analysis. Mr. West earned a BA in History from Georgetown University and an MA in Public Affairs from Princeton University. He was a Marine Corps officer in Vietnam.