
SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE VIEW FROM DOD

By

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INTRODUCTION

It has been one year since the last PACOM meeting, more than two years since I came to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), and almost four years since President Reagan came into office. Much has taken place in each of these time frames and I would like to present a DOD perspective on security assistance couched in terms of the recent past, the present, and the likely future. I want to provide this assessment in global, not regional, terms, since major developments have taken place in all parts of the world. Along the way, I want to discuss in some detail a number of current security assistance management issues that I know are of interest to many of you.

THE RECENT RECORD

The last four years have demonstrated how vital security assistance is in the shaping of our foreign policy, the resolution and containment of conflicts, and the improvement of our relations with a large number of nations around the world.

Several new or greatly expanded programs have been initiated by this Administration. Of special note are the new programs for Pakistan, the large increases in funding for Egypt and Turkey, and our vigorous response in Central America. Further, a promising beginning has been made with programs in China, while ensuring program continuity in Taiwan.

Our security assistance programs have also played a key role in the diminishing or containment of conflicts. We have helped prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflicts in Morocco, Chad, Somalia, Yemen, the Persian Gulf, on the Pakistani-Afghani border, Thailand, and Korea. We are still struggling to do so in Central America.

We have demonstrated that we can respond quickly--and with no significant degradation of our own readiness or painful diversions--to assist countries in crises. Such responses have been made in Central America, Grenada, Chad, Lebanon, and Thailand.

During these past four years, we have also successfully concluded base rights renegotiations in all the major countries where our bases are vital to

our national strategy, including the Philippines. The promise of security assistance funding greatly facilitated the conclusion of these agreements.

Finally, I should note that the combination of events and our security assistance programs has enabled us to cement close relations and expand our strategic dialogues through periodic talks in Joint Military Commissions (JMCs), or their equivalent, with Tunisia and Egypt, and in the longer term with Morocco, along with more general discussion groups in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan. We have also sustained or revitalized the older forums in Korea, Jordan, and Turkey. Similarly, our dialogues with the Persian Gulf states are slowly expanding.

We have carried out continued delivery and training programs in these and many other countries throughout the world. Of course, this is not to say that all conflicts have been resolved, that our relations with countries are completely satisfactory, or that our limited funding permits as much flexibility as we would want. But we have strongly positioned ourselves throughout the world in order to respond to future crises as they arise, while establishing the U.S. as a reliable partner with a greater number of countries than ever before.

TABLE 1
FMS AGREEMENTS: FY 1981-1984

	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
MAJOR WEAPONS				
-- Modern Combat A/C	28	246	229	218
-- Helicopters	28	52	17	80
-- Tanks	4	422	108	310
-- Armored Vehicles (All Types)	291	193	873	477
-- Missiles (All Types)	10,876	21,225	12,610	15,424
SALES VALUE (\$B)				
Total Sales	\$7.8	\$20.7	\$17.9	\$14.5

Turning to Foreign Military Sales figures over the last four years, as shown in Table 1, the dollar total for 1984 decreased for the second year in a row. A gradual decline has occurred in the sale of modern fighter aircraft, a decline that we expect to continue in 1985. In fact, most of the sales in 1984 were with only one country -- Turkey for 160 F-16s. Aircraft procurement decisions regarding the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could affect the pace of this slowdown. We also expect the sale of tanks, which increased in 1984,

to drop off in 1985. Our declining sales total reflects the declining world market, but because of the many strong relationships forged and maintained over the years, sales are increasing of items to support high tech systems and routine updates and upgrades of older systems. The demand for American equipment is high, but many friends and allies are unable to either pay cash or arrange sufficient financing to meet their needs.

FY 1982 - 1985 Military Assistance

Now a few words regarding the evolution of the military assistance portion of the overall security assistance budget for the past four years. An important point to be noted is that the year-to-year dollar values have been increasing for each of the specific program areas--MAP, IMET, and FMS Credit--as well as for the program as a whole; and we have been successful in getting most of what we ask for from Congress, though often only after a long struggle and considerable uncertainty as to outcome.

The two grant programs--MAP and IMET--have increased almost 400 percent in total value during these four years, but from a very low base. [In FY 1982, MAP and IMET appropriations were \$262M and \$44.26M, respectively; the comparable appropriations for FY 1985 are \$805M and \$56.22M.] The number of countries participating has also grown; in FY 1981, 63 countries received IMET training, but this has increased to about 90 this year.

There have also been major changes in the FMS credit program. Congress has consistently earmarked a growing amount of forgiven credits for Israel and Egypt. For FY 1985, the Administration decided to request that the entire program for these countries be in forgiven credits. [Israel will receive \$1.4 billion, and Egypt, \$1.175 billion in forgiven credits.] Also this year, we have eliminated the guaranteed FMS loan program and substituted a credit program whereby we can offer concessional credits at reduced interest rates to needy countries--as well as market interest rate credits to those countries that can afford them. [For FY 1985, concessional credits total \$697.5 million, and market rate credits total \$1.667 billion.]

FY 1984 Assessment

Fiscal Year 1984 is a difficult year to characterize in terms of the security assistance program -- though not in events.

The major events that dominated this period included:

-- Central America, above all, both on the ground and in the prolonged Washington debates. In the end, we secured about 80 percent of the FY 84 request, but only through a regular appropriation, plus an emergency supplemental and a regular supplemental.

-- Lebanon also dominated the headlines. We believe there was great promise in the security assistance program there before the political collapse occurred.

-- Grenada was not a security assistance operation, but our programs and assistance are making good progress in restoring order while cementing our relations with other Caribbean nations.

-- The Iran-Iraq war and its spillover into attacks on Persian Gulf shipping is the last major event worth noting. We took the opportunity to bolster the Gulf States' air defense capabilities while improving our overall strategic dialogues with them.

Otherwise, during Fiscal Year 1984 we saw vigorous Washington debates on aid to Turkey in light of the Cyprus situation, as well as concern over the deteriorating situation in the Philippines. We realized that our security assistance financing program for Israel--as well as the Israeli economy--was heading for disaster. We concluded only one truly noteworthy sale in the year--160 F-16s to Turkey, a program worth 4.2 billion dollars.

Elsewhere, we patiently presented briefings on a range of aircraft, including the FX, to member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and to some Persian Gulf nations, and we saw Thailand opt for the F-16A. The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) will have to move to the CONUS, after negotiations for its continuation in Panama collapsed. [The move was completed in December, 1984; see the Winter, 1984-85 issue of the DISAM Journal, pp. 82-94.] We made great strides in our relations with China, but had difficult arguments with Korea about third country sales, and with Spain about offsets. The Third World financing situation did not get any better. Egypt, for example, is now \$251 million behind in payments.

FY 1985 Scorecard

Let me now discuss the main outcomes of the FY 1985 Continuing Resolution (CR) passed in October, 1984.

-- As I just noted, FY 84 set a firm base for Central America, and we achieved significant funding increases in FY 85 for the region.

-- For FY 85, all FMS loans are now "on-budget"; this means we no longer have a guaranteed loan program financed by the Federal Financing Bank with funds borrowed as loans from the U.S. economy and passed to recipients at the going rate. These funds now show up as appropriations in the President's budget.

-- Also, for the first time we are able to offer credits for as low as 5 percent interest charges.

-- We actually got appropriation levels amounting to 93 percent of our requests, although the two grant programs were less than this -- 87 percent for MAP and 92 percent for IMET.

-- Obligational authority for the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) was increased by \$325 million, bringing the total obligation authority to \$800 million;


-- And the War Reserve Stockpiles for Allied or Other Foreign Forces (WRSA) account was increased by another \$248 million for FY 85. We belatedly got authority for \$125 million for FY 84, but are not able to legally use it.

Congress, however, again failed to pass an authorization bill, but did roll a few items into the CR which we had requested as legislative initiatives:

-- A new single price for FMS training has been authorized. This means that the formerly complicated and unfair three-tier price formula for FMS training has now been reduced to one standard price.

-- And, Congress also authorized 10/20 payment terms for nine countries for their FY 85 market rate loans, including Korea and the Philippines. [This provision allows a 30-year repayment of such loans, with a grace period on the repayment of principal for the first ten years; other designated countries include Greece, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Portugal, Tunisia, and Spain.]

TABLE 2
FY 1985 - 86
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Less Israel and Egypt
(\$ millions)



FY 1985 - 1986 Military Assistance

Table 2 compares the FY 1986 request currently under review at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with the FY 1985 security assistance programs levels actually appropriated. The Egyptian and Israeli programs are not included, since the size of their FY 86 programs has not yet been determined. The State Department is currently considering several modifications to its original request, including increased military assistance for Turkey and a larger level for the Guaranty Reserve Fund (GRF). Essentially, the FY 86 request, less Israel and Egypt, represents a continuity budget.

The reduction in the concessional program is due to the decision not to seek concessional credit for Greece for FY 86.

CURRENT MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Now, I would like to discuss a number of management issues we have been grappling with over the past year or so.

Commercial Contracts Financed with Credits. As you know, we recently issued guidelines on the use of FMS credits for direct commercial procurements. I do not want to reiterate those guidelines in total, but I would like to make the following summary points:

-- Although DSAA is not a party to commercial contracts, we do approve financing and make payments to U.S. contractors. Because there have been fraudulent uses of these credits in commercial transactions, we felt it necessary to tighten up our procedures.

-- We are prohibiting the use of credits for that portion of purchases covering offsets.

-- We will finance commercial sales by U.S. contractors for items manufactured in the U.S., containing mostly U.S. made items, components, and services. On items containing both U.S. and non-U.S. components and services, we will normally finance only the U.S. portion.

-- In foreign manufactured items containing U.S. components, only the U.S. content may be financed with credits, if purchased on a separate contract from a U.S. manufacturer.

-- And, the total value of each commercial contract purchased with FMS credits must be at least 100 thousand dollars.

Sole Source Requests. We want to retain the competitive procurement process consistent with the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); and we want to discourage sole source requests, unless there are strong justifications from the purchasing country. Our Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs) must play a stronger role in keeping to a minimum the number of sole source requests.


FMS Shipments. As you know, we require that countries be as self-sufficient as possible in arranging shipment of materials under FMS. The Defense Transportation System (DTS) will be considered on an exceptional basis when sensitive, hazardous, or otherwise special cargo is being shipped to meet urgent needs. Normally, commercially-purchased items will not be authorized DTS shipment.

Twenty countries were authorized an exception to the FMS transportation policy last March to allow the use of their MAP funds for the shipment of FMS purchases. These countries are funded predominately with MAP.

FMS vs Direct Commercial Sales. There have been many assessments comparing sales trends and the advantages and disadvantages of purchasing defense articles via FMS or commercial channels. Let me examine this issue for a moment.

Trends in Commercial Sales. Trends in commercial sales over the past several years are illustrated in Table 3. There has been a gradual increase in the value of licenses and of exports, partly because of more aggressive marketing by U.S. industry, partly because of the successive lifting, then elimination, of the dollar ceiling on commercial sales (in 1981), and partly because of the relaxation of restrictions on dealing with U.S. industry representatives abroad. We expect the current \$2 billion in commercial exports to level off during the next several years.

TABLE 3
COMMERCIAL SALES AND EXPORTS
(\$ billions)




* ESTIMATED

Trends in Foreign Military Sales. By contrast, as illustrated in Table 4, FMS agreements have been very volatile in recent years, as noted earlier. They have dropped for the second consecutive year, and we expect these sales to slow down and average in the \$13-14 billion range in each of the next several years.

I should add that the U.S. government does not compete with U.S. industry for military exports: DOD does not market defense goods and services, and will not provide price data on items for sale under FMS if a U.S. manufacturer is providing a quotation to a foreign country. In short, we are neutral on whether sales should be FMS or commercial.

TABLE 4
FMS SALES AND DELIVERIES
(\$ billions)



Coproduction, Offsets, Third Country Sales. As we all know, many countries want to put more of their production into the equipment they buy, and offsets continue to play a major role in contractor selection. In almost every instance, the cost to the country of indigenous coproduction will exceed the cost of a straight FMS purchase, although the potential long-term benefits in jobs and industrial infrastructure may be significant. As mentioned earlier, we prohibit the use of FMS credits for that portion of purchases covering offsets. The U.S. government does not guarantee contractor compliance in commercial cases involving offsets. Also, approval will be given for proposed third country sales on a case-by-case basis and normally only if the U.S. government would be willing to make the transfer itself. Given the fact that Congress must be notified of the proposed transfers, together with the concerns of U.S. industry, and the growing pressures for third country sales, we need to monitor these activities closely.

International Military Education and Training (IMET). Since 1976, when the IMET program was begun, we have received steady congressional support. This support is heavily dependent on bringing foreign military students to the U.S. to receive professional education and training. We have seen IMET budget levels grow, and also the benefits of the Yatron incremental pricing provision, and the passage this year of the single FMS Training Price Initiative; each reflects support and commitment to the program. Unfortunately, these increased funds and lower prices have not led to proportional increases in student numbers; however, we have seen increases in the high-cost (pilot, high tech, MTT, etc.) training. Last year we issued clear policy guidelines on the use of IMET funds so that high-cost training is held to a minimum. If we hope to continue the steady growth and support for the program, as well as the many tangible and non-tangible benefits of military-to-military contacts, we need to hold requests for waivers of these guidelines to a minimum.

SAO Functions and Manning. I continue to believe that the key to successful security assistance programs is our ability to make them work in-country. To do so, we need SAO personnel working with their host counterparts to develop, manage, and implement security assistance programs in an efficient and effective way. This can be done best when SAO functions are well-defined but flexible, when collateral duties are held to a minimum, and when the size of the SAO is proportional to the program management and oversight requirements.

We have just sent out a message detailing and clarifying the functions of SAOs (under Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) and how the SAOs are to be funded and manned. Let me summarize the message:

-- Program management and oversight is the prime function of the SAO.

-- Advisory and training activity is to be kept to a minimum and cannot impact on the primary mission of program administration; advice and training should be provided by TAFTs, TATs, and other MTTs, and is to be funded by the country.

-- Collateral duties can be performed if they do not detract from the primary function and have the approval of the mission chief;

-- And, personnel who spend more than 50 percent of their time in non-security assistance functions in support of U.S. forces should be funded in the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budgets of the unified commands.

We believe that if these criteria are followed, the operation of our SAOs will be improved and the quality of our security assistance program enhanced. [For a copy of the message text covering these criteria, see the DISAM Journal, Winter, 1984-1985, pp. 109-113.]

Billings. During the past year, we have exerted a great deal of effort in squeezing all the value we can from country accounts. In some cases, we have been able to refine country payment schedules so well that more funds have been found available to cover additional procurements. We will continue to scrub country accounts and payment schedules for more countries to see if additional funds can be freed up for new purchases.

Financing Consumables. Another issue of concern to us is the use of credits for purchasing expendables and consumables. The policy states that the use of FMS credits should be for procuring weapons and other end items to help build the force structure and military capabilities of recipient countries. Normally, countries will procure consumables and expendables with initial major end-item buys or with their own national funds, and DSAA will not ordinarily approve the use of credits for the purchase of short-life items.

However, there are special circumstances where exceptions can be made to finance short-life items, particularly for expendables and occasionally for consumables. In cases where no national funds are available and where there are overriding program needs to keep major items working, we will consider an exception to policy. But, we want to keep these instance as few as

possible. I should add that although it is not spelled out in the SAMM, we are applying the same policy and procedures to the new MAP-Merger funds.

Technology Transfer. Finally, let me mention briefly the policy on technology transfers. I know there are widely varying viewpoints on the issue--what can be transferred, to whom, by what criteria, and for what purposes--but it is imperative to remember that in all transfers of classified technology, the principles and procedures of the National Disclosure Policy (NDP) must be satisfied.

The policy does not seek to discourage the movement of goods, technology, and ideas in legitimate free world trade. But, in technology transfer requests, we have to consider not only the recipient's needs but also the country's ability to protect the technology and prevent any compromise or re-transfer to non-authorized parties. This includes closer review of requests for publications or unclassified technical data owned or generated by U.S. government contract or developed through U.S. government-sponsored research activities. We have to judge the trade-offs between our own security and those of our friends and allies on the one hand, and the potential damage any compromise may have on our security.

LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

Let me now turn to those changes we are seeking in the current legislation governing security assistance. We did well with most of our initiatives in committee action last year--except that there was no authorization bill. We did get single pricing of FMS training in the appropriations bill, even though it was the only initiative rejected outright by the Senate and House authorizations committees.

We will re-submit proposals to authorize the following: the use of administrative fees for representational funds; waivers on the return of MAP proceeds; authorization for reciprocal one-for-one Professional Military Education (PME) exchanges; and the removal of Section 620F, FAA, prohibiting assistance to the People's Republic of China. [For a discussion of these initiatives, see the Winter 1984-85 issue of the DISAM Journal, pp. 27-31.] We are also seeking greater flexibility in the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF); and we wish to remove the cost of salaries from technical services and training provided by the U.S. military under MAP. This would permit us to stretch our dollars to provide greater assistance to our poorer recipients. And, we also will be requesting another \$360 million for WRSA.

At the moment, DOD is not seeking legislation permitting Defense to provide more humanitarian assistance. We understand some are exploring ways to provide more training for foreign nationals under the aegis of the DOD budget.

Finally, there is the option of a major rewrite of the law. We are not sure what that would look like, and there is no clear congressional support for it. Moreover, there is a certain danger of opening it up to the committees where many members would like more restrictions. We do have a lot of flexibility in the law as it now reads.

TRANSITION MARKET

Looking ahead, we see an international arms market that will slow to about \$13-15 billion per annum, or somewhat less than the past four years and clearly less than the 1970s, if measured in constant terms. As the global market slows down and declines, we believe the U.S share of the market will increase and the share of our European allies will decrease.

Several factors help explain these projections. The global economic growth rate is expected to be only about 3 percent through the next several years. In addition, many third world countries completed some of the modernization programs in the late 70s and early 80s, thereby lessening their demand for major systems.

We expect that sales of major weapons systems, such as modern combat aircraft, will decline, but that countries will continue procuring spares, up-grade kits, support, and other add-on items to reduce their costs and to expand the life-cycle of the major platforms already on hand.

CONCLUSION

As we look to the next six months, certain problems will have to be faced, although the solutions may not be apparent. Security assistance funding for Israel, with its enormous economic problems and its defense procurements in excess of its available credits, will demand increasing ingenuity. The key problem of 1984, El Salvador, has now become "routinized" in the sense that we have established a viable program and secured the necessary political support, but this support is fragile. In addition, there are a number of issues now being discussed involving major weapon sales that will affect the FX aircraft. Further, the Philippines presents a difficult economic and political problem.

The FY 86 budget presents no radical departures from 1985, but it will be worked in an uncertain congressional atmosphere, with new chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Additionally, the volatility of the arms market presents further considerations, and is due in part to the vagaries of changing international priorities. Our challenge, however, is to use security assistance whenever we can to mitigate or avoid a crisis and to respond to these events.

Finally, let me say something about security assistance in crisis situations. In lesser politico-military situations requiring quick responses, we believe the security assistance system works well. In our judgement, there is ample flexibility in the law to move items quickly without adversely affecting the readiness of U.S. forces. We also believe that the procedures on hand and the responsibilities of key players within DOD--the JCS, unified commands and services--have been effective. And, we have been able to work with the Department of State to satisfy both the political and military requirements involved.

We believe that security assistance would be very important in the early stages of transition into a larger crisis or war scenario. Our participation in various JCS exercises has shown that security assistance is central to the U.S. response in the developing stages of a major crisis, but there is not enough normally in the pipeline to sustain allies or friends for the duration of a major conflict. We need, therefore, to continue to exercise the process of allocation of scarce logistics supplies in JCS exercises.

In conclusion, we believe security assistance has played and will continue to play an essential role in furthering our foreign and defense policy objectives around the world.

UNITED STATES HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

[Editor's Note. The following has been extracted from pages 5-6 of the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984, prepared by the U.S. State Department and presented to Congress in February, 1985. This annual report, mandated by Sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, contains within its 1453 pages separate reports for 164 countries, and is an important reference source for security assistance managers and executives.]

Our human rights policy . . . faces the world as it is, not as we might wish or imagine it to be, with a commitment to active engagement as a consistent approach to a variety of challenging situations. As President Reagan has said, "human rights means working at problems, not walking away from them." This is a pragmatic policy which aims not at striking poses but at having a practical effect on the well-being of real people. At the same time, it is an idealistic policy which expresses the continuing commitment of the United States to the cause of liberty and the alleviation of suffering.

Since America was created in order to make real a specific political vision, it follows that "human rights" is not something added onto our foreign policy, but is its ultimate purpose: the preservation and promotion of liberty in the world. In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1984, President Reagan stated that the United States will continue to view concern for human rights as the moral center of our foreign policy.

Our human rights policy has two goals. First, we seek to improve human rights practices in numerous countries--to eliminate torture or brutality, to secure religious freedom, to promote free elections, and the like. A foreign policy indifferent to these issues would not appeal to the idealism of Americans, would be amoral, and would lack public support. Moreover, these are pragmatic, not utopian, actions for the United States. Our most stable, reliable allies are democracies.

As the second goal of our human rights policy, we seek a public association of the United States with the cause of liberty. This is an eminently practical goal: our ability to win international cooperation and defeat anti-American propaganda will be harmed if we seem indifferent to the fate of liberty. Friendly governments are often susceptible to confidential diplomacy, and we therefore use it rather than public denunciations. But if we never appear seriously concerned about human rights violations in friendly countries, our policy will seem one-sided and cynical. Thus, while the Soviet bloc presents the most serious long-term human rights problem, we cannot let it falsely appear that this is our only human rights concern.

Our human rights policy also has two tracks or sides, the negative and the positive. The negative side is embodied in the way we oppose (through act or word) specific human rights violations in the short term. On the positive side, strongly emphasized by the Reagan Administration, we seek over the long term to help democracy, the surest safeguard of human rights.

It is a fact that most democracies have excellent human rights records; nothing is as likely as democracy to produce this result.

Obviously, the positive track of a human rights policy is not a substitute for an immediate and active response, including sanctions, for human rights violations when they occur. But the Administration believes that we should treat not only the symptoms but the disease--that we should not only respond to human rights violations, but also should work to establish democratic systems in which human rights violations are less likely to occur.

It is therefore encouraging to see real progress coming about in the strengthening of democratic institutions, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, to which President Reagan referred in his remarks commemorating Human Rights Day on December 10, 1984. Noting that today more than 90 percent of the people in that region live in nations either democratically governed or moving in that direction, the President pledged "to our neighbors the continued support and assistance of the United States as they transform our entire hemisphere into a haven for democracy, peace, and human rights."

Our efforts, and those of others, to keep human rights concerns a central focus of international relations face the continuing problem that activist human rights policies such as ours traditionally aim at affecting the domestic behavior of other countries, while governments are reluctant to alter their nation's political system for foreign policy reasons. Since the leverage that the United States does have is strongest in friendly countries, there is a danger that human rights policy might highlight and punish human rights violations in those countries while in effect giving unfriendly countries immunity. Moreover, a nation that came to display a general pattern of undermining or estranging friendly governments would obviously limit its future influence over them, including its influence over their human rights behavior. On the other hand, countries where we have little access and leverage include many countries which both restrict the human rights of the citizens and resist strongly any foreign effort to influence the situation. As an extreme example, a representative of Iran at the United Nations took the unprecedented step in 1984 of declaring that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not apply to them.

However, there appears to be growing acceptance, even among countries where human rights are not fully respected, of the validity of an international human rights agenda. Sensitivity to these annual country reports, for example, increasingly takes the form of constructive response, or at least a willingness on the part of the country concerned to engage in a discussion of its human rights image. Many countries which are strong supporters of human rights have, like us, established offices specifically responsible for international human rights policy. It is also noteworthy that in 1985 the thirty-five nations, East and West, who signed the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will gather in Ottawa for a Human Rights Experts Meeting in May and again in Budapest in October for a Cultural Forum which will also be devoted significantly to discussing human rights.

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