

U.S. and Soviet Security Assistance

By

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security assistance programs contribute to U.S. national security objectives by assisting allies and friends to meet their defense needs and supporting collective security efforts. Security assistance is an essential element of foreign policy and a cost-effective way to build positive government-to-government relations. By sharing costs and effort, many countries can achieve a level of mutual security unattainable independently. By strengthening U.S. allies and friends, security assistance programs also serve as an economy-of-force measure which allows the United States to concentrate its available forces in areas of greatest threat. For these reasons, security assistance is an integral part of U.S. military strategy.

Security Assistance Objectives

The primary military objectives of security assistance are to assist countries in preserving their independence; promote regional security; help obtain base rights, overseas facilities, and transit rights; ensure access to critical raw materials; and provide a means to expand U.S. influence.

Elements of Security Assistance

The major components of military security assistance are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, the FMS Credit (FMSCR) Program, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

Foreign Military Sales Program. The FMS Program enables eligible governments to purchase defense equipment, services, and training from the United States on a cash basis. In addition to cash sales, FMSCR has been included in the budget and all loans have been made directly by the U.S. Government to recipient countries instead of through commercial banks. For selected countries, a portion of this credit is available as low interest loans. Approximately 84 percent of the proposed DOD FY 1987 military security assistance budget would be allocated to FMSCR.

The Military Assistance Program. This grant program provides an account for designated countries that may be used to obtain defense equipment and selected services. MAP funds allow certain economically disadvantaged countries to improve their security and ability to contribute to collective defense. The DOD FY 1987 MAP proposal represents about 15 percent of the total proposed budget for security assistance and a sizeable increase over funds appropriated for MAP in FY 1986. This increase is intended to allow the United States to assist certain needy countries by further improving their security and ability to contribute to collective defense.

The International Military Education and Training Program. The IMET program provides training to foreign military and certain foreign government-sponsored civilians on a grant basis. IMET training consists of formal courses, orientation tours, and on-the-job training. This program has greatly expanded U.S. contacts with foreign governments, whose representatives are trained by U.S. personnel. IMET students frequently assume leadership and management roles in their armed forces and elsewhere in their governments.

Over recent years, IMET expenditures represented about 1 percent of the total military security assistance budget. Figure 1 depicts expenditures and numbers of students who have attended U.S. military-sponsored training under IMET over the past six years. Since FY 1984, modernization programs have required that an increased percentage of IMET funds be used to support the training of pilots and similarly skilled technical personnel. This requirement has resulted in a higher average cost per student. This program enhances collective defense at relatively low cost to the United States by providing urgently required training to foreign forces.

FIGURE 1

**Worldwide IMET Expenditures
Students Trained in U.S.
[As of 1 January 1986]**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Expenditures*</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>Students</u> <u>Trained</u>	<u>Cost Per</u> <u>Student</u>
80	\$24.9	3,545	\$6,996
81	28.7	4,836	5,935
82	46.2	6,317	7,314
83	46.0	6,861	6,705
84	52.8	5,967	8,855
85	56.2	5,880	9,557

*Actual dollars/not adjusted for inflation.

Economic Support Fund. The ESF provides economic assistance on a grant or loan basis to selected countries having special political and security interest to the United States. This very important program, which is operated and managed by the State Department, is designed to help correct the economic problems of countries by funding and encouraging creation of growth industries. In many instances grievances leading to insurrection and low-intensity conflict can be averted through economic growth.

Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping Operations enable the United States to participate in multinational operations necessary to help prevent international conflicts. PKO were established to provide for that portion of security assistance devoted to programs such as the Multinational Force and Observers and the U.S. contribution to UN Forces in Cyprus.

Security Assistance Initiatives


Over the past few years, legislative initiatives have been introduced to increase the effectiveness of the security assistance program. These initiatives were designed to provide more flexibility in the planning, production, and delivery of military equipment, thus allowing the United States to be more responsive to nations suddenly threatened by overt hostilities, e.g., Chad, Lebanon, and El Salvador. One initiative increased the capitalization level for the Special Defense

Acquisition Fund (SDAF), which was established to improve U.S. responsiveness to anticipated FMS needs by allowing advance orders of high-demand items that have long leadtime procurement schedules. This has allowed more timely acquisition of these items.

The proposed FY 1987 security assistance budget has been developed to meet requirements in areas of the Third World where Soviet presence has increased (Figure 2). As with prior years, the FY 1987 security assistance budget proposal reflects a balanced consideration of the needs of friends, allies, and U.S. objectives (Figure 3).

FIGURE 2


**Security Assistance Budget*
(Current \$)
[As of 1 January 1986]**



*FMSCR, IMET, and MAP.

FIGURE 3

**FY 1987 Security Assistance
Strategic Apportionment*
[As of 1 January 1986]**



*Estimated Administration proposal (includes FMSCR, IMET, and MAP).

Soviet Security Assistance


Weapon transfers continue to be an increasingly important Soviet means of projecting influence. Over the past 5 1/2 years, Soviet arms sales agreements with the Third World have totaled almost \$55 billion. Although Soviet arms agreements are sometimes directed toward disrupting regional stability, recipients have been attracted by favorable financial terms, quick delivery, and, in some cases, advanced weaponry. In recent years, the sale of military equipment has become a more important source of hard currency and commodities for the Soviet Union. In several instances, Soviet weapon transfers have provided a means of acquiring base access rights abroad. Weapon transfers also provide an entree for Soviet advisors into the recipient's military establishment, allowing them to exert influence over local leaders and policies through control of training, maintenance and spare parts, and the sale of newer equipment.

Since 1955, nearly 80,000 military personnel from less-developed countries have been trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1985, approximately 19,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians were stationed in nearly 30 non-Warsaw Pact countries where they played a central role in organizing, training, and influencing client armed forces.

The Soviet Union provides a significant amount of military aid to countries in Central America and the Caribbean Basin (Figure 4), as well as Africa (Figure 5). The Soviets view the Middle East, Northern Africa, and Southwest Asia as regions of great strategic importance and have maintained an especially high level of military assistance in these regions (Figure 6). These figures compare Soviet military assistance deliveries with U.S. programs.

FIGURE 4


Military Assistance Deliveries to Countries in Central America and Caribbean Basin*
[As of 1 January 1986]



* Does not include Mexico and Venezuela.
** Deliveries through 30 September 1985.

FIGURE 5


Military Assistance Deliveries to Countries in Central, South and West Africa
[As of 1 January 1986]



* Deliveries through 30 September 1985.

FIGURE 6

**Military Assistance Deliveries to
Countries in Middle East,
North Africa, and Southwest Asia***
[As of 1 January 1986]



* Includes Israel and Egypt.

**Deliveries through 30 September 1985.